Conflict, Democratization, and the Kurds in the Middle East

Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria

David Romano,Mehmet Gurses

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781137409997
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Vergleichende Politikwissenschaften

In Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, central governments historically pursued mono-nationalist ideologies and repressed Kurdish identity. As evidenced by much unrest and a great many Kurdish revolts in all these states since the 1920s, however, the Kurds manifested strong resistance towards ethnic chauvinism. What sorts of authoritarian state policies have Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria relied on to contain the Kurds over the years? Can meaningful democratization and liberalization in any of these states occur without a fundamental change vis-à-vis their Kurdish minorities? To what extent does the Kurdish issue function as both a barrier and key to democratization in four of the most important states of the Middle East? While many commentators on the Middle East stress the importance of resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute for achieving 'peace in the Middle East, ' this book asks whether or not the often overlooked Kurdish issue may constitute a more important fulcrum for change in the region, especially in light of the 'Arab Spring' and recent changes in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria.

SECTION I

Authoritarianism and the Kurds

CHAPTER 1

Turkey, Kemalism, and the “Deep State”*

Michael M. Gunter

Introduction

A strong case can be made that ever since the Sheikh Said rebellion was crushed in 1925,¹ the Kurdish question in Turkey has been one of the main factors preventing it from becoming a complete democracy. Instead, the Kurds have been viewed as threatening the very foundational rationale for Turkey’s existence as a unitary state in which ethnicity is supposedly an irrelevant criterion in the public and political spheres.² As a result, Turkey has largely opted for “securitization”³ rather than democratization to deal with the problem. In other words, the Kurdish question has impeded the development of democracy in Turkey itself. Accordingly, a democratic resolution of the Kurdish problem could open the door to the full development of democracy in Turkey and would go a long way toward making Turkey eligible for admission into the European Union (EU).

The Kemalist Republic of Turkey was established out of the ashes of defeat in World War I by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923 based on the concept of an exclusive Turkish national identity that, among such other factors as secularism and statism, proved hostile to any expression of Kurdish identity.⁴ Since it would be a contradiction in terms to maintain such a situation in a true republic, an arcane or Deep State (Derin Devlet) developed alongside or parallel to the official State to enforce the ultimate principles of the Kemalist Republic. This Deep State became “an omnipotent force with tentacle-like hands reaching everywhere . . . a state within the legitimate state.”⁵ The colorful but enigmatic phrase Deep State referred to how this secret “other” state had penetrated deeply into the political, security, and economic structures of the official State, which as the Baba Devlet (Daddy State) claimed a special reverence from the people instead of being their mere servant.

Today, however, Turkey is seeking to join the EU, a candidacy supported by a large majority of its population and an initiative that promises to help solve Turkey’s long-standing Kurdish problem.⁶ Clearly, a Republic of Turkey that is truly a pluralistic democracy cannot be constituted along the lines of the Copenhagen Criteria⁷ necessary for Turkey to join the EU until the Deep State is dismantled. The process, however, will prove tortuous at best.⁸ For example, recent Turkish reforms to meet EU-mandated criteria sometimes appear to be merely paper concessions. Others argued that the ultimate problem was more to do with the inherent ethnic Turkish inability to accept the fact that Turkey should be considered a multiethnic state in which the Kurds have similar constitutional rights as co-stakeholders with the Turks. Moreover, during 2011 and 2012, many leading intellectuals were rounded up for alleged affiliations with the Koma Civaken Kurdistan (KCK) or Kurdistan Communities Union, which is said to be the urban arm of the Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK),⁹ whose proposals for democratic autonomy seem to suggest an alternative government. Many of those arrested were also affiliated with the pro-Kurdish Baris ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP) or Peace and Democracy Party.

Those arrested included a well-known publisher, Ragip Zarakolu, who has been a key figure in human rights advocacy in Turkey for decades and has suffered from political repression under successive governments for his efforts. Zarakolu was in ill health, so there was the fear that imprisonment would threaten his life. In April 2012, he was suddenly released from prison. Also among those arrested was Busra Ersanli, a political scientist whose original work on early Turkish nationalism continues to be consulted by scholars throughout the world.

Even more recently, Leyla Zana, a famous female Kurdish leader and BDP member of parliament, was once again sentenced to prison on May 24, 2012, for “spreading propaganda” on behalf of the PKK. The charges concerned nine speeches she had made over the years during which she had argued for recognition of the Kurdish identity, called Öcalan a Kurdish leader, and urged the reopening of peace negotiations between Turkey and the PKK. Previously in 1994, Zana had been stripped of her membership in parliament and imprisoned for ten years on similar charges. Such Turkish actions reminded one of what the French used to say about the Bourbons: “They learned nothing and they forgot nothing.”

What Is the Deep State?

Many observers dismiss the idea of the Deep State as simply a conspiracy theory.¹⁰ However, Turkish citizens (both ethnic Turks and Kurds alike) seem particularly susceptible to such theories. For them, nothing is as it seems. There is always some deeper, usually more cynical explanation for what is occurring. Only the naïve fail to understand this.

Nevertheless, historical evidence indicates that even in the days of the Ottoman Empire (Turkey’s predecessor), covert organizations existed to defend state security. In an awkward attempt to illustrate the Ottomans’ benevolent attitude toward rebellious Kurds during the nineteenth century, for example, Metin Heper writes about how “Kor Ahmed Pasha of Revanduz . . . surrendered on conditions of honourable treatment . . . [and how] the Ottoman government kept its word and sent him and his family and tribesmen to no other place than Istanbul.”¹¹ Heper neglects to tell his readers, however, that during his return from Istanbul Kor Ahmed Pasha (also known as Mire Kor or the blind mir because of an eye affliction) simply disappeared, probably treacherously executed on the orders of the Sultan. Moreover, many would argue that the fate of the Armenians during World War I was largely the result of confidential government orders to turn loose a secret killing organization known as the Teskilat-i Mahsusa (Special Organization).¹²

More recently, who can doubt that there is more to be known about the motives that drove Mehmet Ali Ağca, supposedly a right-wing Turkish nationalist possibly working for the Soviet Union, to attempt to assassinate Pope John Paul II on May 13, 1981, or to murder Abdi İpekçi, the chief editor of the liberal daily Milliyet, in 1979 and then escape from prison and make the attempt on the pope?¹³ More recently, what mysterious court decision temporarily freed Ağca in January 2006 before a public outcry led to his return to prison? As one recent analysis concluded: “Somebody with omnipresent tentacle-like hands that can extend to anywhere—from judiciary to army or security forces or any other institution—within the state makes a plan to kill a journalist, or to kill young students whose ideas they deem to be a threat to the state and that same somebody skillfully protects its bloody pawns from justice.”¹⁴ When the author of this chapter visited Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK),¹⁵ in March 1998 Öcalan spoke often of the “hidden games” all sides in the Kurdish struggle were playing.¹⁶ Although it usually would be judicious to avoid accepting conspiracy theories, one must also remember that even paranoids have enemies.

A useful recent definition found the Deep State to be “made up of elements from the military, security and judicial establishments wedded to a fiercely nationalist, statist ideology who, if need be, are ready to block or even oust a government that does not share their vision.”¹⁷ Military and security elements determined to preserve the Kemalist vision of a Turkish nationalist and secular state are the key elements of the Deep State. To some extent, all of these ingredients have long been institutionalized in the Milli Guvenlik Kurulu (MGK) or National Security Council. The official job of the MGK was, and still is, to advise the elected government on matters of internal and external security. Until the recent EU reforms mandated by Turkey’s EU candidacy and the enormous AKP electoral victory over determined military opposition in July 2007 gave civilian authorities more control,¹⁸ the MGK also often served as the ultimate source of authority in Turkey.

Before these recent reforms the MGK was clearly under the control of the military. It consisted of ten members: the president and the prime minister of the Republic of Turkey, the chief of the general staff and the four military service chiefs, and the defense, foreign affairs, and interior ministers. The modern Republic of Turkey, of course, was founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, whose power originally stemmed from his position in the military. Thus, from the beginning, the military played a very important and, it should be noted, very popular role in the defense and, therefore, the politics of Turkey. One could probably date the beginning of the military’s preeminent political role and the solidifying of the Deep State to the Kurdish uprising of 1925 and the emergency rule powers that were invoked as a result. Both the Kurdish revolt and liberal democratic elements in the new Turkish Republic were squashed in this period. Following the military coup of May 1960, the new constitution, which went into effect in 1961, provided a constitutional role for the military for the first time by establishing the MGK. Over the years, the MGK has gradually extended its power over governmental policy, at times replacing the civilian government as the ultimate center of power over issues of national security. After the “coup by memorandum” in March 1971, for example, the MGK was given the power to give binding, unsolicited advice to the cabinet. After the military coup of September 1980, for a while all power was concentrated in the MGK, chaired by the chief of staff, General Kenan Evren, who later became president from 1982 to 1989. Although the MGK greatly reduced the rampant terrorism in Turkey at that time, a major price was paid in terms of human rights for all Turkish citizens, not just those who happened to be ethnic Kurds.

During the 1990s, the MGK began to exercise virtually total authority over security matters dealing with the Kurdish problem. In his role as chief of staff, General Doğan Güreş held a particularly strong influence over the elected Turkish government headed by Prime Minister Tansu Çiller to the extent that the phrase “as good as thirty men” was reportedly used to describe her.¹⁹ The “postmodern coup” in June 1997 that toppled Turkey’s first Islamist government was sanctioned by an MGK edict issued a few months earlier.

One important way the MGK exercised its control behind the scenes was through issuing a rather lengthy, and until recently top-secret, National Security Policy Document (MGSB) once every four years and updated every two years.²⁰ The MGSB defined and ranked Turkey’s priorities in domestic and international security and outlined the national strategy to be followed. The precise content of the document was revealed only to the top generals and highest-ranking state administrators. Thus, some referred to the MGSB as “the ‘state’s secret constitution’ or the ‘red book’ on the basis of which the State is run.” In other words, “the real responsibility of running the Stat...