Poland and EU Enlargement

Foreign Policy in Transformation

J. Kaminska

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN:
  9781137452221
• eBook ISBN:
  9781137452238
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book analyzes changes in Polish foreign policy in the context of the EU membership, exploring Poland's transition from a policy taker to policy-maker. It focuses on how Poland shapes EU policy towards the Eastern neighbors.

CHAPTER 1

Polish Foreign Policy and the EU

Introduction

This chapter is a scene setter and sets the framework for the case studies by discussing the variables at work on the Polish side. It points to the legacies of the past¹ and analyzes the extent to which they constrained or triggered changes on the individual, institutional, and structural levels in Poland. It claims that domestic factors often rooted in legacies mattered for compliance with the EU’s policies despite the country’s commitment to reform and argues that lack of administrative capacity acted as a burden in pursuing influence after the accession. By explaining the development, objectives, and motivations of Polish foreign policy after 1990, it also contributes to the study of changes that have occurred in the last 20 years by tracking all the processes that have impacted on the formulation of foreign affairs in Poland. Central to this analysis is the Polish approach to the CFSP before and after the 2004 Enlargement. This was first contested, but later provided Poland with key tools and instruments that helped to realize a more active presence in international affairs, and effective promotion of national preferences at the European level.

The first part of the chapter provides context for the analysis of the historical background brought by Poland to the EU, emphasizing the difficulty of political and economic transition faced by the country in order to be recognized as a potential EU candidate. These efforts were accompanied by a developing identity as regional leader that has in recent years influenced relations between the Central and Eastern European states within and beyond the EU. The resultant growth of national self-esteem was however constrained by downloading pressures from the EU, leading to frustration caused by a low capacity to influence the EU before Enlargement. This feeling of being a constant downloader with no ability to shape issues crucial to the national interest on one hand, and strong motivation to adapt in order to join the EU on the other, defined the pre-Enlargement dynamic of the late 1990s.² An overview of this difficult road to active engagement in the EU foreign policy, as well as the adaptation process is set out in the middle part of this chapter.

The second part of the chapter explores EU influence on national administrative structures and decision-making processes before and after integration. The key argument presented concerns limitation of Europeanization due to politicization and post-Soviet legacies rooted in national administration, diplomacy, and political elites. As the chapter shows, these continue to impact the ability of the state to effectively pursue its goals in the EU. This part also contributes to the discussion on state effectiveness in projecting national preferences onto the EU level after the accession by looking into the negotiation strategies applied by Poland in the EU after 2004. The final part of the chapter explores Polish decision making before and after accession, showing how the EU exercised its influence on national administrative structures. Without this wider perspective, which takes into account the Polish geopolitical setting, historical experiences, and both intellectual and communist influences on structural and systemic levels of the executive, diplomacy, and society, it would be difficult to understand Polish aims and behavior within the EU. This link between past and present, and its impact on foreign policy process and outcome, makes up the core of this chapter.

Due to the changing geopolitics of the post-Soviet region after the end of the Cold War, countries in CEE found themselves not only in a new environment but also in a new neighborhood.³ The end of the Soviet Union, which dominated their existence, politics, and structures, constraining choices made during the last 50 years, was connected to significant redefinition of those states’ identities, roles, and positions in the regional and international arena. However, post-communist transformations have taken different shapes in CEE,⁴ as responses to the challenges of a post-communist reality varied, but in all of the states in the region the “legacies of the past” are still persistent to some extent. In many ways, this communist heritage limited the impact of the EU. Paradoxically, however, it has motivated the process of rapid transformation and competition in transposition of EU rules and requirements between the CEEs. The EU had potentially wide influencing opportunities owing to the weakness of state administration and gaps left by the communist system.⁵ However, the EU’s ability to provoke and stimulate competition between the CEEs⁶ in the acquis adoption did not necessarily motivate changes in the identity of the newly independent post-Soviet satellites. Constraints occurred: first because the clash between European and domestic arenas brought many dilemmas to elite and national audiences and second because of the EU’s limitations as a political actor.⁷

It cannot be disputed, however, that European integration was perceived by Poland as the sole way to become a full and independent member of the international system. After decades of communist rule, it was seen as a unique opportunity to legitimize the state’s new-born democracy and raise the country’s profile and position in Europe.⁸ European integration was regarded as a remedy for everything: unemployment, social, economic, and political problems. This led not only to high expectations after the Enlargement but also to the belief that the EU would solve all the problems of the state. However, despite being clearly marked, the aim of European integration proved more difficult to achieve than Poland expected. The strong conditionality principle and the many efforts the country had to make in order to comply with the EU resulted in a feeling of constant adaptation, leading to frustration among political elites and the nation. Even though European integration proved to be a challenge that demanded immense efforts from the entire society, Poles had no doubts that those efforts were to be rewarded in political and economic terms after Enlargement. Expectations of political and economic profits, combined with historical experiences, the geopolitical position of the country, as well as regional⁹ power self-identity have determined the Polish role and behavior within the EU. Undeniably these political, economic, and social factors provided a challenge to the European integration process both on national and EU levels.

In order to analyze the influence of the state on the EU, it is important to highlight that the nature of the EU makes it difficult to achieve planned goals for newcomers, as the sheer variety of institutions and bodies are confusing for young democracies. Knowledge of how to find its way in Brussels corridors comes with time, making it difficult for newly accessed states to compete with those already institutionalized into the EU’s decision-making processes. Questions about how the national government organized the coordination and preparation of EU and CFSP issues is also relevant for this study, as it has a direct impact on EU effectiveness. Clear understanding of established formal and informal patterns are critical in achieving aims, but as shown in this study, domestic conditions provided constraints for compliance with the EU¹⁰ as communication between Poland and the EU proved in some situations to be faulty, which in turn distorted national ability to make an impact on EU policy content. Certainly, internalization of the goals and styles of EU foreign policy by newcomers facilitates projection of national objectives,¹¹ but this process cannot occur without a committed government willing to rapidly adapt to the EU in order to gain profits in the long term.

Polish Foreign Policy Choices after the End of the Cold War: Return to Europe or Always in Europe?

The EU’s accession process interacted with a complex mix of variables making it difficult to pinpoint one that had crucial importance on national adaptation to the EU. The determination to “return to Europe”¹² and to be recognized as an equal member of the democratic community was a common feature for all post-communist states, but ideas of what constituted this process were relatively diverse among the countries of the region.¹³ Undeniably, aspiration for membership was a crucial condition affecting transformation in CEEs, but choices made by their respective governments were subjected to particular experiences and situations, as well as the importance of EU membership for their respective political elites.

In the case of Poland, the collapse of the communist regime and the changing geopolitics in the early 1990s left the state in a security vacuum, which escalated a feeling of fear over future choices of its partners and former enemies.¹⁴ The Polish Western direction was an outcome of those fears, but also of the desire to become a member of the democratic community.¹⁵ Positioned between two strong states and former enemies that have erased Poland from the map many times in the past, and being aware of its own limitations as what Wivel and Mouritzen¹⁶ term a “non-pole power,” Poland had limited choices. The external constellation and different factors clearly indicated the Euro-Atlantic direction. Russia was weak and divided, without a clear vision of the future, but left with the Soviet legacy and therefore unpredictable; Germany, unified, and embodied in European structures offered support and help on the European road, but still unsolved questions concerning the Neisse-Oder border were a burden to a full Polish-German reconciliation process; Central European neighbors started to declare their pro-European aspirations calling for a Central European alliance in order to lobby the EU membership; also the United States started to show more proactive support for the Polish democratic changes and aspirations.¹⁷ The West, although tough and demanding, seemed to be much friendlier than Russia, who was still threatening a response to NATO or EU accessions.¹⁸ The choice of reliable friends with the resources to provide security guarantees was directly connected with the country’s experiences. The strong link between Poland and the West was believed to provide the basis for change and a stable, predictable future.

Anchoring national foreign policy on the EU required a demonstration of good cooperation and a solution of problems with the neighbors. Rapid improvements occurred in the early 1990s, when Poland made big efforts to close the chapter on difficult and hostile relations with its Eastern neighbors. This was achieved by first introducing the so-called duality or double-track policy of good relations with neighboring countries and at the same time good cooperation with Russia, and later on by supporting Eastern partners on their way to democracy. The policy of duality¹⁹ was a way of balancing between a still influential and unpredictable Russian partner and the desire to support newborn democracies in the neighborhood. Although unsure of the Russian response, Poland was the first country to recognize Ukrainian independence in 1991 and oppose the USSR’s intervention in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia in January 1991. By recognizing their independence,²⁰ Poland had taken a high risk, as the Soviet army was still based on Polish territory (left only by the end of 1993²¹). Indeed, taking into consideration Russian rhetoric at the time, the Russian response was uncertain.²² This policy however, has won Poland many friends and long-term partners, as those countries became supporters of Polish actions and established a strong Russia-skeptic EU alliance after the 2004 accession, which became the core of the “new Europe” in the post-Enlargement setting. Those pre-Enlargement “friendships” have also paved the way toward new “coalitions” that emerged after the accession, especially when Poland was trying to upload to the EU the EaP initiative.

To make sure that the integration process would include the Central European countries, the Visegrad Group²³ was established, having as its main goal cooperation between Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in order to achieve the EU membership. However, instead of promoting both intraregional cooperation and the cooperation at the European level, it only promoted the latter.²⁴ Limited intraregional cooperation was a result of fears that successful collaboration might cause a delay in the integration process due to divergence in economic transformation among the partners. The Visegrad Group also faced many internal problems as the minority, ethnic difficulties, and negative ster...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction
• 1 Polish Foreign Policy and the EU
• 2 Between Europeanization and National Commitments: Negotiating New Agreements between the EU and Ukraine
• 3 Shaping EU Policy Toward Russia? The Veto Case
• 4 Shifting EU Policy Eastward? Poland’s Role in Establishing the Eastern Dimension of the ENP
• Conclusions
• Annex
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index