The Impact of European Employment Strategy in Greece and Portugal

Europeanization in a World of Neglect

S. Zartaloudis

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN:
  9781137361967
• eBook ISBN:
  9781137361974
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Through the new use of new empirical evidence derived from analysing employment services, gender equality policies and flexicurity in Greece and Portugal, this book provides compelling new insights into how European Employment Strategy (EES) can influence the domestic employment policy of European Union member states.

1

Introduction

Unemployment has been one of Europe’s long-standing problems. Since the early 1990s, in a growing number of countries employment rates have been decreasing while unemployment rates have been increasing (cf. Symes 1995; Esping-Andersen 2000; Gallie and Paugam 2000; Bermeo 2001; Giugni 2010). Structural unemployment is a central element of the unemployment problem of Europe. In addition, unemployment affects almost a fourth of the youth labour force, compounding the social problems associated with unemployment. Moreover, labour markets are characterized by significant inequalities between highly skilled and low-skilled workers and between men and women (cf. Sapir 2006; Esping-Andersen 1990; 2002; 2009).

In this context, the European Union (EU) has developed its own employment policy which has three institutional pillars, each with a different mode of policymaking and governance. The first is the ‘legislated employment rights’ pillar, based on a standard community method; the second is the ‘law via collective agreement’ pillar, which is a negotiated alternative to the first pillar and involves agreement among social partners prior to legislation; the third is the ‘European Employment Strategy (EES)’, the most recent, experimental and ambitious pillar.¹ At the 2000 Lisbon Summit, the EES was used as a model for other policy areas under the umbrella of a new EU instrument – the Open Method of Coordina-tion/OMC² (de la Porte 2002; Zeitlin 2005). The OMC was perceived as a learning process, which would be open with regard to member states’ involvement and policy outcomes (Regent 2003: 210). Policy targets were set by the European Commission, but national responses were formulated at the national level with no formal sanctions (Hodson and Maher 2001: 724). Peer review and benchmarking were the fundamental tools for promoting policy learning (Regent 2003: 210). Even though all political actors (EU institutions, member states, social partners, non-governmental organizations (NGOs)) were involved in the practical implementation of the EES, the coordinating role was given to the Commission (de la Porte 2002: 44).

The significance of the EES has been hotly debated in the literature (for a succinct summary, see Borrás and Radaelli 2010; Kröger 2009a; Zeitlin 2005; 2009; Rhodes 2005). The first wave of scholars perceived the EES as the European employment policy’s ‘golden goose’, a new process which would transform European and national policymaking content and procedures. The EES was perceived as a new mode of governance that signalled a significant shift from hard law to soft law and from employment protection to employment promotion (Rhodes 2005: 283–284; for an extensive analysis of the OMC novelties compared to previous soft law procedures, see Borrás and Jacobsson 2004: 189–191). The EES and more generally the OMC were also expected to increase input legitimacy as it would be open to as many actors as possible, including for the first time non-state actors, such as civil society organizations (Borrás and Jacobsson 2004; de la Porte and Nanz 2004). The expectation was that all participants in the EES would reach consensus on policy outputs through the spread of best practices (Goetschy 1999; de la Porte 2002; Hodson and Maher 2001; Regent 2003). By contrast, others were quick to dismiss it as a process which was ‘too soft’; as a result, it would be incapable of promoting social Europe and altering member states’ employment policy (Scharpf 2002; Chalmers and Lodge 2003). Likewise, some authors perceived the EES/OMC as ‘cheap talk’ and irrelevant for policy outcomes (Moravcsik 2005; Hatzopoulos 2007; Idema and Kelemen 2006; for a review, see Borrás and Radaelli 2010; Kröger 2009b). Initial research indicated that the EES had some impact on domestic policy which varied across member states and policy areas (cf. Foden and Magnusson 2003; Govecor 2004; Jacobsson and Viffell 2007; Zeitlin et al. 2005; Heidenreich and Zeitlin 2009).

This book aims to shed light on the domestic impact of the EES on the employment policy of two under-researched member states – Greece and Portugal (see Section 1). In other words, the central question of this book is ‘whether, how and to what extent the EES influenced domestic policymaking in the specific areas of Public Employment Services (PES), gender equality policies (gender mainstreaming, reconciliation and pay gaps) and flexicurity’. It attempts to explain an empirical puzzle observed in two countries of the Southern European periphery and answer critical questions related to employment policy in Europe. In doing so, this study aims to make several empirical and theoretical contributions to the existing EES, OMC, Europeanization and comparative politics literatures. Empirically, it attempts to provide a sound explanation and better understanding of employment policymaking and welfare reforms. It also aims to shed light on the impact of the EES on national employment policymaking. Furthermore, it will examine different policy areas in which the EES stimuli differ. The goal of this comparison is to draw general conclusions on what kinds of EES stimuli and which conditions work best to promote substantive policy change in employment policy defined as Europeanization. In addition, because Greece and Portugal belong to the world of transposition neglect and also have a significant policy gap between their domestic policies and European policy, they pose a real test for the EES’s ability to influence member states’ employment policy. Thus, this study aims to find the conditions that promote Europeanization of member states’ employment policy when the EU stimuli are primarily based on soft law.

Moreover, this monograph aims to fill an important empirical gap in the field of study. Existing literature on the EES impact on Greece and Portugal can be divided into two main categories: (i) comparative studies and (ii) in-depth single case studies. The main comparative projects are the Govecor project (Govecor 2004; Linsenmann et al. 2007) and a number of edited volumes and special issues which tried to provide a broad account of the EES impact on member states (Zeitlin and Pochet with Magnusson 2005; Foden and Magnusson 2003; Heidenreich and Zeitlin 2009; Kröger 2009a; 2009b; Graziano et al. 2011). This book not only builds on these studies but also advances the field of study by tackling some of their limitations. Greece is not always included in comparative studies, while Portugal is included only in the Govecor study. In addition, most of these studies are outdated as their empirical inquiry ends in 2003 – that is when the five-year assessment of the first EES period was completed (Govecor 2004; Linsenmann et al. 2007; Zeitlin and Pochet with Magnusson 2005; Foden and Magnusson 2003). Further, they do not follow a common theoretical and methodological framework – something that significantly limits the validity of their overall conclusions. The only comparative study available that includes both Greece and Portugal and has a time frame lasting until 2010 (see Sotiropoulos 2011 for Greece; Zartaloudis 2011a for Portugal) does not focus on the key policy areas investigated in this book.

Although both countries are under-researched and excluded from most comparative research projects, there have been a few studies on the Europeanization of social policy (including employment policy) in both countries (for Greece, see Sotiropoulos 2004b; Featherstone 2005b; Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008; Petmesidou and Mossialos 2006; Dimitrakopoulos and Passas 2003; Johnson 2003; Feronas 2007; Karamessini 2006; Ioakimides 2001; for Portugal, see Guillen et al. 2003; Silva 2009; 2011). In addition, there have been some in-depth studies on labour market and pension reforms in Greece (Featherstone 2005b; Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008), on gender mainstreaming (GM) in Greece (Karamessini 2006), a number of comparative studies from the Expert Group on Gender, Social Inclusion and Employment (EGGSIE) on the measures included in the National Action Plans (NAPs)/National Reform Programmes (NRPs) for GM in all EU members (Rubery et al. 2005; 2006; 2007) and two papers on the impact of the EES in Greece (Johnson 2003 and Feronas 2007). Besides Karamessini (2006), who examined the promotion of GM in Greece until 2002, and Silva, who examined the Portuguese PES reform, none of the aforementioned investigations focus on the policy areas of the study. This book will build on these studies and try to advance the existing literature. This chapter will signpost the research that follows. Thus, it presents the book’s puzzle and case studies and discusses the book’s research methodology.

1. Book puzzle and case studies

The book aims to examine the conditions under which the EES can influence member states’ employment policy. It will try to explore this by examining two critical or ‘least likely’ cases: Greece and Portugal (King et al. 1994: 209; Hancké 2009). Both countries have a number of features that could be expected to inhibit any significant impact of the EES. Yet, both appear to have implemented domestic policy reforms as a result of the EES. More specifically, both countries belong to what has been identified as the ‘world of neglect’, where neither political nor administrative elites adhere to the norm of compliance with EU law (Falkner et al. 2005: 325).³ In countries belonging to the world of neglect, compliance with EU law is not a goal in itself, such that negligence at the transposition stage is the defining characteristic of this world (Falkner et al. 2005: 325; Falkner and Treib 2008). The typical reaction to an EU-related implementation duty is inactivity. The national adaptation process is initiated only after the Commission intervenes, since without its intervention transposition obligations are often not recognized at all. In the most recent effort to examine the compliance record of the Southern European countries, it was argued that Italy and Spain should be included in the ‘world of domestic politics’, whereas only Greece and Portugal were classified as true members of this negligent club (Hartlapp and Leiber 2010). It should be noted that, although these studies focus only on one policy instrument (EU social directives), they are relevant for other types of measures. After rejecting a number of alternative hypotheses (including ideology, preferences, misfits and capacity), Falkner et al. (2005) and Hartlapp and Leiber (2010) argue that the best explanation for any given country’s response to external instruments is a certain ‘compliance culture’ that exists in the political and administrative elites. Therefore, it can be expected that this compliance culture would be pervasive among political and administrative elites that respond to EU-related policy instruments irrespective of their degree of softness.

In addition, Greece and Portugal share all the characteristics that authors have identified as key obstacles in the implementation of EU policies (for a succinct summary, see Hartlapp and Leiber 2010: 471–474): (i) there is a very high ‘misfit’ between EU and national policies which usually results in inertia or even retrenchment (Börzel and Risse 2000; 2003; Risse et al. 2001); (ii) both countries have weak administrations⁴ and inefficient political systems which lack expertise, resources and coordination (La Spina and Sciortino 1993; Van den Bossche 1996; Linos 2007); (iii) their political systems are reactive (La Spina and Sciortino 1993) and party dominated (Ioakimidis 2001); (iv) the gap between legislation and practice is generally high (Putnam et al. 1993); (v) they lack societal actors who will act as ‘pull factors’, namely forces of full implementation according to the ‘bottom-up’ implementation theory (Börzel 2000; Lipsky 1978); (vi) there is a general absence of consensual and corporatist decision-making tradition, which has been shown to promote transposition and implementation of EU policies.

Moreover, both countries have similar socio-political backgrounds and welfare systems with common features. More specifically, the literature on the features of Southern European welfare systems follows mainly three distinct approaches. The first one argues that Southern European welfare states are perceived as the underdeveloped/poor version of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) conservative or corporatist model. In contrast, the second approach argues that they share a set of distinctive features, which lead to a unique type of welfare model. Despite the numerous differences between these two schools, both agree that Southern Europe forms a group; yet they disagree on whether the similar characteristics result in a variety of Esping-Andersen’s conservative type or a new one (for a detailed discussion of these schools’ main propositions, see Arts and Gelissen, 2002: 141–146). Finally, the third approach understands Southern Europe as welfare societies (Santos and de Sousa 1994; Hespanha 1999; Marinakou 1998). Despite their differences, all these schools of thought agree on the weakness of the Southern European welfare states resulting in a high misfit between EU and domestic policies (Foden and Magnusson 2003; Heidenreich and Bischoff 2008; cf. Börzel 2005). Consequently, one would expect to find a weak employment policy with limited resources and poor design and efficiency. This poses a significant barrier to the EES in achieving an impact on both Greece and Portugal, as they may lack the human, financial and institutional resources to respond to the EES stimuli. Moreover, both countries have an under-developed employment policy which would not be able to provide the necessary support to their workforce and therefore be at odds with the core goals of the EES. Therefore, Greek and Portuguese pre-EES employment policies are expected to act as barriers to the incorporation of the EU stimuli. The latter treat social (including employment) policy as a productive factor of the economy, namely a factor which increases productivity and competiveness (cf. Schelkle 2008; Schelkle and Mabbett 2007; Andersson 2005).

Further, while both Greece and Portugal were not classified by Hall and Soskice (2001:21) in their original typology of Varieties of Capitalism (VoC), they were later classified as two cases belonging to a third VoC type called ‘Mixed Market Economies’ (MMEs) (Hancké et al. 2007; Molina and Rhodes 2007). The main characteristics of MMEs are (Kornelakis 2011: 55–56) strong institutional stability combined with low institutional complementarities and clustering, and mixed coordination, that is both market and non-market. In MMEs the non-market element is provided mainly by the family, given the absence of state intervention and the under-developed and inefficient welfare state (Hancké et al. 2007; Molina and Rhodes 2007). As a result, both Greece and Portugal can be considered as two countries which have few prospects of institutional change (Hall and Thelen 2009).

In other words, the existing literature indicates that Greece and Portugal constitute two critical or ‘least likely’ cases in the EU-27 in examining the impact of the EES in their employment policies. In the EU-15, the world of neglect was the least likely to comply with EU law (Falkner et al. 2005). More recently, Falkner and Treib (2008) added the ‘world of dead letters’ to their typology to cover the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). In this category, EU directives are not systematically enforced and implemented despite their quick transposition. Therefore, the impact of EU directives on national policy is doubtful. The world of neglect and the world of dead letters share one key characteristic: compliance is often superficial as shortcomings in enforcement and application are quite common. Even though Falkner and Treib (2008) argue that enforcement and application problems are not the defining characteristics of the world of neglect, this cannot be said for Portugal and Greece. Specifically, their typical procedural pattern during the transposition stage was neglect, as well as significant enforcement and appl...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables and Figures
• Acknowledgements
• List of Acronyms
• 1. Introduction
• 2. The European Employment Strategy and National Employment Policies
• 3. Theoretical Framework
• 4. Public Employment Service’s Reform in Greece: Following the EU Money?
• 5. Reforming the Portuguese PES: Europeanization through Soft Law Empowerment?
• 6. Tracing the Europeanization of Greek Employment Policy with Regard to Gender Equality Promotion: Following the ESF Money?
• 7. Gender Equality Promotion in Portuguese Employment Policy: Europeanization through Domestic Empowerment
• 8. Incorporating Flexicurity in Greek Employment Policy: From a Promising Start to a Melancholic End
• 9. Incorporating Flexicurity in Portuguese Employment Policy: Europeanization through Stealth?
• 10. Conclusions
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index