Security and Sovereignty in the North Atlantic

L. Heininen

• Publisher: Palgrave Pivot
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN:
  9781349500703
  9781137470713
• eBook ISBN:
  9781137470720
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Diplomatie & Abkommen

The North Atlantic continues to be an area of international strategic significance regionally and globally. This study explores the strong processes of sovereignty, as well as new independent states and micro-proto-states that are forming in the region.

1

Introduction

Lassi Heininen and Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen

Abstract: As a major strategic arena for arms race in the Cold War, the North Atlantic controlled the connection between North America and Europe. Since then there has been a significant shift in the security architecture of the North Atlantic, as different stages and special features of its security indicate. The North Atlantic continues to be an area of international strategic and geopolitical significance regionally and globally because of its access to the Arctic Ocean and its potential sea routes. More interesting, the region is characterized by former major powers, e.g., Denmark, middle powers such as Britain, and the super powers, Russia and the USA, with their legacies and current interests. Furthermore, there are strong currents of devolution and independence, the results of which being creation of a new small state, Iceland, and a micro-proto-state that is self-governing, Greenland.

Keywords: devolution; micro-state; the North Atlantic; security; small state; sovereignty

Heininen, Lassi, ed. Security and Sovereignty in the North Atlantic. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. DOI: 10.1057/9781137470720.0007.

The North Atlantic – here defined as the sea space and its rim-land between the west coast of Norway, Scotland, the East Coast of USA (New England), and that of Canada up to Greenland in the north – has been, and continues, to be an area of international strategic and geopolitical significance. The sea space controls the connection between North America and Europe, which made it a major strategic “maritime theater” and arena for arms race during World War II, and particularly for the Cold War between the two superpowers (the USA and the Soviet Union). Together with the Barents Sea, this sea space also includes an access to the Arctic Ocean, which has just been “discovered” as a (new) ocean, i.e., without (multi-year) sea ice (e.g., Heininen, 2013, p. 94).

In the 1980s, in addition to the arms race, between the USA/NATO and the Soviet Union, the deteriorating state of the marine environment of the Northern seas, caused by long-range (water) pollution (e.g., DDT, heavy metals, POPs) as well as regional and local pollutants (e.g., dumped radioactive wastes and accidents of nuclear submarines) became a growing concern among the people. This was followed by the environmental awakening, as some sort of paradiplomacy by the people and environmental movements, which became so influential that it pushed the governments of the Arctic states to start international cooperation for Arctic environmental protection and establish the Arctic Council (AC) in 1990s. In early 21st century, the North Atlantic and the Barents Sea were transferred into a transit area for energy shipments from North-West Russia via the North Cape to Western Europe and North America. In the near future, these Northern seas together with the Arctic Ocean will be a potential region for trans-Arctic shipping between the North Pacific economic power houses of China, Japan, South Korea, the centers of the world economy of Western Europe and the Atlantic coast of the North America.

This, and particularly changes in the North Atlantic security architecture as well as Arctic geopolitics, can be defined by different stages of security due to the changes in problem definition of security discourses and premises, and by special features indicating main reasons for these changes (see Heininen, 2013, pp. 100–106): The different stages are (1) first, “militarization” by World War II, which was characterized by hot warfare and an arms race and consequently; (2) the second stage, “military theater,” which covers most of the Cold War period, and this includes political and military competition and arms race between the two superpowers and military blocs; (3) third, due to long-range pollution and the environmental awakening there was a transition period meaning a significant change in the geopolitics of the region and a shift in the traditional security architecture of the Arctic and changes in its premises meaning less military tension and more environmental cooperation; and (4) finally, in the 2010s the stage could be described something like “state sovereignty vs globalization.” Correspondingly, special security features are keenly related to these stages, for example, implementation of the technology models of (classical) geopolitics is one of the primary causes of the militarization of the region. Behind the environmental awakening of the people were severe nuclear accidents in the 1980s which resulted in nuclear safety emerging as a new kind of environmental risk, for Iceland and particularly for fisheries. It is part of a keen interrelationship between the environment and the military, since most of the radioactivity is caused by the military. Climate change with its local and regional impacts, as well as global implications, can be defined as a new security feature in the entire North.

The North Atlantic is also characterized by small states, and even micro-states, with penetration by super powers, and middle powers with colonial and imperial legacies. These entities share a historical legacy of being overseas dependencies of the Kingdom of Norway in the Viking and Middle Ages and subsequently the Kingdom of Denmark. There have been strong processes of penetration of the region by stronger outside powers. However, there are also strong currents of devolution and independence which created one sovereign small state, Iceland, and will in all likelihood create two even smaller micro-states, the Faroe Islands and Greenland, as Bertelsen describes in his chapter. In view of the weakness of the historical, current, and future sovereign actors in the area, and the geopolitical and strategic interests of stronger outside powers, there has always been, is, and will be strong penetration by these outside powers. This penetration has, however, varied greatly according to the state of the international system, and in the recent years have been a low point in this interest.

The processes of the growing sovereignty and responsibility of small and micro-states have influenced the North Atlantic area with the growing responsibility of Iceland and the growing independence of Greenland, as well as the Faroe Islands, and the interaction with outside powers. Iceland has skillfully managed its foreign and security policy with very limited absolute capabilities since sovereignty in 1918. From July 1941 and during the Cold War this was done through partnership with USA having the US air base at Keflavik, Iceland, as the linchpin. However, in the 1970s and 1980s there were special incidents, the Cod Wars between Britain and Iceland, and in the 2010s there was the Ice Shave episode due to the economic crisis in Iceland. The withdrawal of the US troops from the airbase of Keflavik in September 2006 pushed Icelandic capabilities to their limits, which was solved by the assistance in air patrolling of other NATO member states, particularly Denmark and Norway. All this has greatly changed the security environment of Iceland and meant growing responsibilities and deeper defense cooperation, as Petursson discusses in his chapter.

The Faroe Islands and Greenland have a self-governing status and are developing toward greater independence and responsibilities within the Kingdom of Denmark with extremely limited absolute capabilities. The Kingdom’s Strategy for the Arctic 2011–20 clearly recognizes this, i.e., “an equal partnership between the three parts of the Danish Realm” and states “A peaceful, secure and safe Arctic, with self-sustaining growth and development” as the main aim (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011, pp. 10–11). It will be a major challenge for these micro-proto-states to take on more security responsibilities and will require well-designed partnerships with surrounding states with much greater capabilities. One way to respond to this challenge is to have “paradiplomacy” and via that develop new kinds of (external) relations, as Greenland is already doing. There are, however, several open questions on how to proceed, as Ackrén asks in her chapter.

Denmark will be faced with greater constitutional and political complexity and tension in the Kingdom of Denmark, and Denmark will have to manage a process of devolving increasing power and responsibility to the Faroe Islands and Greenland (see Bertelsen, this volume). The Kingdom of Denmark has great constitutional difficulties with (con-)federative decision-making between different actors while there will continue to be extreme imbalances of capabilities. Denmark is destined to withdraw from the North Atlantic in the long term, but the process of withdrawal will be a major test to Denmark, the Faroe Islands, Greenland, and bordering partners. Correspondingly, Norway will in all likelihood grow in importance in the North Atlantic, and it will for a very long time be the Nordic middle power in the region. Norway’s strategic position and national security, as well as economy, are completely tied up with the sea space of the Barents Sea and the North Atlantic and will remain so in the future, as offshore hydrocarbon extraction is moving toward the High North.

Britain, or UK, and Canada are middle powers on the margins of the area, which have and will, to a greater extent, partner with the small states being discussed here. Britain has historically been the dominant sea power in the North Atlantic until bipolarity of the Cold War. It still has keen strategic interests in the region, particularly in the North Atlantic, but also has policy interests toward the Arctic region, as the government’s first policy document on the Arctic clearly shows (see UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2013). Also Scotland has obvious strategic interests in the Arctic and would become more active in the cooperation (e.g., Johnstone, 2012, pp. 110–125). If Scotland, which got her self-governing status in 1999, aims to become independent, then there are both Britain, or England, and Scotland influencing the region and its interrelations. The Faroe Islands is close to Scotland, the Orkneys, and the Shetland Islands. Britain and Norway, as well as Iceland, are the natural partners for the Faroe Islands in many respects including security, for example, Britain also occupied the Faroe Islands militarily during World War II. Canada is one of the other real Arctic maritime countries, together with the Russian Federation, which has many strategic and security interests in the far North, not least due to the rapid climate change seen to threaten (maritime) sovereignty of Canada. Canada will be a key partner in the Western North Atlantic for a more and more independent Greenland. For example, Canada, Denmark, and Greenland will have to design a partnership with a growing Canadian-Greenlandic partnership while solving the border dispute of Hans Island, one of the last maritime disputes in the Arctic.

The US hegemony over the North Atlantic was secured and structured through the NATO membership of the Kingdom of Denmark, Iceland, and Norway, and military bases in Iceland and Greenland. This hegemony was challenged by the massive Soviet naval presence on the Kola Peninsula and submarine operations in Northern seas. The USA changed the practicalities of North Atlantic security significantly with her withdrawal from the Keflavik air base in 2006, which meant that the USA and Iceland had to rethink their security partnership. The Thule radar station in North-West Greenland plays a pivotal role here, similar to the one it played in Danish-US Cold War relations. The future development of the Danish-Greenlandic-US partnership over Greenland, based on the Igaliku Agreement of 2004, will be crucial for the development of Greenland and its security toward greater independence and eventual sovereignty. NATO as a military bloc is still militarily and military-politically the main actor in the North Atlantic region, though not in the Arctic. There, the USA, as well as her military and navy, has approved state policy, although it has hardly been implemented there, which puts Corgan to claim in his chapter that, so far, the USA continues to be a spectator in the Arctic.

A former super power, the Soviet Union acted intensely in the North Atlantic and competed militarily there during the Cold War. While the Soviet Union challenged the US control of the North Atlantic, the Russian Federation is still interested in the North Atlantic geopolitically and economically. It has good trade and other relations with Iceland and Norway, and is building a relationship with the Faroe Islands and Greenland. The sea space with an open access from the Barents Sea both to the North Atlantic and the Arctic Ocean is still strategically important for the Northern Fleet of Russia, and a reason enough for the modernization of Russian navy, particularly nuclear submarines. This modernization of the Russian military is first of all to protect national interests, and it does not mean to seek military superiority in the High North, as Konyshev and Segunin argue in their chapter. These seas are also gateways for Russia’s export of energy from the Russian Arctic to Europe and North America, and Murmansk is one end of the Northern Sea Route connecting the centers of the world economy, the North Pacific, and the North Atlantic. Russia continues to evolve its strategy for the Arctic region, as well as the North Atlantic, having more emphasis on economic activities and trade, particularly dealing with energy, and energy security.

The European Union is also strongly present in the North Atlantic, unlike in the Arctic (Ocean), where it “is inextricably tied to” (European Commission, 2008, p. 2). The EU has important security-political and economic interests, not least due to the communication lines between EU member states and Canada and the USA. The EU already has an impact in the Arctic through international negotiations on climate, financing Arctic science and research, and being a big buyer of the fishes caught by Iceland and Norway (for more information see Bailes and Heininen, 2012, pp. 84–97). The Union would like to become an active player in the region and therefore has developed its Arctic strategies, but it has problems convincing all the Arctic states, particularly Canada, and therefore has not, yet, succeeded. Indeed, the EU can be seen, or interpreted, to be either the “Good” or the “Evil” in the Arctic, as Balao puts it in her chapter.

All in all, there is a significant shift going on in the security architecture of the North Atlantic, as well as a remarkable change in Arctic geopolitics, with changes in security discourses and premises, partly even paradigms, as we discuss in this publication. First, we will look at the processes of devolution of power and withdrawal through Denmark, or the Kingdom of Denmark, and its presence in the North Atlantic in the last centuries (by Bertelsen). Second, we look at the processes of sovereignty and responsibility of small states with a focus on the growing responsibility of Iceland, particularly in security matters (by Petursson), and the growing independence of Greenland and her interaction with outside powers (by Ackrén). Third, we examine and discuss the current military strategies and changes in security premises of the two superpowers, the USA (by Corgan) and the Russian Federation (by Konyshev and Sergunin). Finally, we describe and discuss on the European Union as an (global) Arctic player through its policies in and for the Arctic region, including the northernmost part of North Atlantic, and its Arctic strategy(ies) (by Balao).

References

Bailes, A. J. K. and Heininen, L. (2012) Strategy Papers on the Arctic or High North: A Comparative Study and Analysis (Institute of International Affairs at University of Iceland: Occasional Paper of the Centre for Small State studies).

European Commission (2008) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – The European Union and the Arctic Region (Brussels, 20.11.2008 COM(2008) 763 final).

Heininen, L. (2013) Arctic Security – Global Dimensions and Challenges, and National Policy Responses,” in G. Alfredsson, T. Koivurova and A. Stepien (eds) The Yearbook of Polar Law Volume 5, 2013 (Leiden-Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers).

Johnstone, R. L. (2012) “An Arctic Strategy for Scotland,” in The Arctic Yearbook 2012 – “Arctic Policies and Strategies” (Thematic Network on Geopolitics and Security and Northern Research Forum). http://www.arcticyearbook.com.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011) Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands: Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020 (Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2011).

The UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2013) Adapting to Change: UK Policy Towards the Arctic. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/251216/Adapting_To_Change_UK_policy_towards_the_Arctic.pdf.

2

Devolution and Withdrawal: Denmark and the North Atlantic, 1800–2100

Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen

Abstract: The history of the North Atlantic encompasses the Kingdoms of Norway, Denmark – Norway and Denmark since 1814. These kingdoms have faced geopolitical pressures in the North Atlantic, especially since the Napoleonic Wars. Together with internal national-liberal pressures of national awakening, calls for self-determination have shaped the development of the Kingdom of Denmark in the North Atlantic. Iceland developed through a national awakening in the 1840s from a self-government to a sovereignty in 1918 and subsequently a republic in 1944. The Faroe Islands obtained home rule in 1948, Greenland in 1979. Both home rules were expanded in 2005 and Greenland transformed to self-rule in 2009. The Kingdom of Denmark will continue to be marked by devolution and withdrawal far into the 21st century.

Keywords: devolution, Kingdom of Denmark; Nation-building; Sovereignty

Heininen, Lassi, ed. Security and Sovereignty in the North Atlantic. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. DOI: 10.1057/9781137470720.0008.

Introduction

Many people probably think of Denmark as a small Continental European country at the entrance to the Baltic Sea, which has geopolitically navigated in a space dominated by Sweden, Germany and Russia for centuries. However, when we look at the constitutional unit, the Kingdom of Denmark, is a state that is geographically overwhelming placed in the North Atlantic and the Arctic, these regions having played a central role for the Kingdom of Denmark for centuries and will continue to do so. This book looks at the North Atlantic as a contested sea space consisting of micro, and small states that are penetrated by middle, great, and super powers. This chapter discusses k...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• 1  Introduction
• 2  Devolution and Withdrawal: Denmark and the North Atlantic, 18002100
• 3  Icelandic Security in a Changing Regional and Geopolitical Seascape: Limited Capabilities and Growing Responsibilities
• 4  Greenlandic Paradiplomatic Relations
• 5  The USA in the Arctic: Superpower or Spectator?
• 6  Russian Military Strategies in the High North
• 7  The European Unions Arctic Strategy(ies): The Good and/or the Evil?
• Index