āIt is a dream come true for criminals and terrorists to find a place where no one can look for them, and where they can mix with, ally with ⦠and work with minimum interference from legal authorityā (Levitsky 2008: 392). These safe havens have been called a variety of names from ādark cornersā (Crane 2008) to āgeopolitical black holesā (Naim 2005)āareas governed by transnational criminal, terrorist, and insurgent organizations that are outside effective state-based government control and are sustained by illicit economic activities. They are modern-day versions of the pirate islands of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Daniel Patrick Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs in its Mapping Global Insecurity Project has, to date, identified 150 such places around the globe and completed in-depth case studies of 80. We call these geographic locations āblack spots,ā recognizing that they represent particular locations that do not fit within our usual definitions of a state. Much like the black holes in astronomy that defy the laws of Newtonian physics, these black spots defy the world as defined by the Westphalian state system. In effect, they provide us with a map of the world as viewed through the eyes of organizations engaged in transnational criminal activities. These black spots are the nodes connecting and facilitating the illicit activities of such organizations and their trafficking in drugs, weapons, people, money, natural resources, household goods, and violence.
One such black spot became the focus of attention during the US War in Afghanistanāthe Federally Administered Tribal Areas or
FATA. Located on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan,
FATA is outside the effective control of both governmentsāindeed, that is one of its advantages in the view of those involved in transnational criminal activities. But this region is not ungovernedāit is governed by structures that facilitate a black market in drugs, weapons, and natural resources, exploiting the areaās geography, poverty,
corruption potential, and closeness to a conflict zone. Other examples of black spots are the dual cities
Tabatinga and Leticia on the border of Colombia and Brazil, the
Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, the
Bekaa Valley in Lebanon,
Kismayo in Somalia, the Wa
State in Myanmar (Burma), and the
Tohono Oāodham Reservation on the US border with Mexico. Among the 80
black spots we have mapped and studied in depth and which will figure prominently in this book, 18% are in Africa, 20% in
Asia, 19% in
Europe, 16% in the Middle East, 21% in Latin America, and 6% in North America. Table
1.1 contains a list of these 80 black spots by region.
Table 1.1Black spots studied by region
Africa: Tri-border Area, Algeria/Mali/Niger; Equatorial Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Niger Delta, Nigeria; Tri-border West Africa (Sierra Leone/Liberia/Guinea); Goma, DRC; Kisangani, DRC; Lubumbashi, DRC; Mbuji Mayi, DRC; Shinkolobwe Mine, DRC; South Darfur, Sudan; Barawe, Somalia; Kismayo, Somalia; Ilemi Triangle, Kenya/Sudan/Ethiopia |
Asia: Little Wahhabi, Dagestan; Chuy Valley, Kazakhstan; Fergana Valley (Kyrgzstan/Tajikistan/Uzbekistan); Rasht Valley, Tajikistan; Azad Kashmir, Pakistan; FATA, Pakistan; Gilgit Baltistan, Pakistan; Muzaffarabad, Pakistan; Kashgar, China; Tachilek, Myanmar (Burma); Wa State, Myanmar (Burma); Mae Sot, Thailand; Strait of Malacca; Surabaya, Indonesia; General Santos City, Philippines; Sulu Archipelago, Philippines |
Europe: Gudauta, Abkhazia; Kodori Gorge, Georgia; Pankisi Gorge, Georgia; Samegrelo, Georgia; South Ossetia; Transnistria; Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Novi Pazar, Serbia; Presovo Valley, Serbia; Sandzak Region, Serbia; Kosovska Mitrovica, Kosovo; Urosevac (Ferizaj), Kosovo; Scampia/Secondigliano, Naples; Ceuta and Melilla, Spain; Marbella, Spain |
Middle East: El Arish, Egypt; Rafah, Gaza Strip; Netanya, Israel; Bekaa Valley, Lebanon; Ein el-Hilweh, Lebanon; Hezbollah Territory, Lebanon; Nahr el-Bared, Lebanon; Abu Kamal, Syria; Erzurum/Kars/Igdir Triangle, Turkey; Hakkari-Van Provinces, Turkey; Sirnak Province, Turkey; Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Saada Province, Yemen |
North America: Kahnawake Reservation, Canada; Kanesatake Reservation, Canada; Akwesasne Reservation, Canada/US; Blackfeet Reservation, US; Tohono Oāodham Reservation, US |
Latin America: Altar, Mexico; Chetumal, Mexico; Ciudad Juarez, Mexico; Los Zetas Territory, Mexico; Michoacan State, Mexico; Nogales, Mexico; Sinaloa State, Mexico; San Pedro Sula, Honduras; Darien Jungle, Panama/Colombia; FARC Territory, Colombia; Marquetalia Republic, Colombia; Nueva Loja, Ecuador; Tabatinga-Leticia Corridor, Brazil/Colombia; Manaus, Brazil; Ciudad del Este, Paraguay; Encarnación, Paraguay; Pedro Juan Caballero, Paraguay. |
Although often differing in scaleāfrom a neighborhood to a city to a mountain valley to a province, 90% of the black spots that we have studied so far are located on, across, or around national borders. They are found in what has aptly been called the āborderlandsā (van Schendel 2005). Such border areas offer opportunities for avoiding legal entrapment, marking as they do the extent of a particular stateās legal zone of influence. And in so choosing, the black spots are overwhelmingly (90%) found in areas along these borders where corruption is prevalent and that can be described as involving geographically and/or jurisdictionally challenging terrain. Three-quarters came into being because they are on traditional trading routesāthink about the āsilk roadā of old linking Asia to Europe, the trails through the Amazon in Latin America, the routes across the Sahara desert, and the sea routes of the privateers. Some 86% are located near conflict zones in areas that are ethnically heterogeneous.
The 80 black spots studied here are governed by rules and norms that are either imposed (42%) or embedded (53%). In other words, there is a governance framework in place to guide behavior. A major tenant of this governance structure is to remain āinvisibleā or off the radar of the international media as well as national and international law enforcement. Moreover, counter to ours and othersā expectations, black spots are not a phenomenon of the post-Cold War era and the demise of the Soviet Union. Close to 60% of the 80 black spots were in place well before 1991 and 41% have come into being since 1991. As we will show, those in place prior to 1991 often resulted from borders being mandated in areas that divided particular ethnic groups and tribes, separating these groups and tribes jurisdictionally from one another and giving rise to a variety of insurgent groups and organizations. The Durand Line which was drawn by the British in the late 1800s to demarcate the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is one such example. It cuts through the Pashtun tribal areas and the Baluchistan region and has facilitated the development of a number of black spots including FATA noted earlier (Walker 2011).
Discovery of Black Spots
How did we discover this phenomenon we have called a black spot? This project grew out of a dissertation in political science done as part of the Moynihan Instituteās study of transnational crime (Stanislawski 2006), which involved fieldwork in Ciudad del Este in the tri-border region of Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina. This research project was based on ethnographic observation of what went on in this particular community as well as āconversationsā (informal interviews) with people in the area engaged in what appeared to be illicit activities and officials of the Paraguayan government with responsibility for security and law enforcement. It became quite apparent across the period of study that the economy of the city was built around illicit activities and not under the control of the central government. But the city was functioning effectively with a thriving economy. Indeed, Ciudad del Este was being governed by collaborating transnational criminal organizations.
Based on this research and an extensive review of literature on the behavior of transnational criminal, insurgent, and terrorist organizations; of what goes on in supposedly ungoverned territories and so-called failed states; and of various types of illegal trafficking, we developed a set of questions to ask of other identified potential black spots to explore if Ciudad del Este was āone of a kindā or whether there were other such functioning areas like it. We focused on the following four sets of questions that our literature review and experience suggested were important to examine. Each set explores a different area of analysis: (1) What are the conditions that lead to the development of black spots and their sustainability? (2) How is state authority challenged and/or undermined by a black spot? (3) What kinds of insecurity do black spots produce and/or export to the outside world and how? (4) What defensive moves have national and international legitimate authorities made in response to black spots? The questions posed in each of these areas of analysis have become the foundation for a coding manual used as a guide in doing an in-depth case study of each black spot. The answers to these questions form the data on which this book is based. The coding manual can be found in Appendix A.
Employing research assistants from around the world, we asked them to identify some geopolitical areas in their countries that seemed outside central government control and generally were known to engage in illicit activities. They were quick to nominate areas with such a reputation. We, then, had them use open source materials (e.g., Benavides 2015; UN Office on Drugs and Crime documents; US Department of State reports; BBC Monitoring; Agence France-Presse; International Crisis Group reports; STRATFOR; Economist Intelligence Unit reports) and write a case study of the particular area, answering all the questions in the coding manual that we had identified out of the study of Ciudad del Este and our more general literature review. Such a procedureācalled structured, focused comparison (George 1979; George and Bennett 2005)āprovides the researcher with an in-depth case study of a black spot based on a common set of theoretical ideas but also enables that same researcher to develop a quantitative database that facilitates comparison across cases since the same questions were asked of every case. We learn what is unique to a particular case as well as what is common among the cases. Once completed, a case study is updated regularly to explore if anything has changed and, if so, how. This process allows us to take advantage of new open source materials and yearly updates. Importantly, those writing the in-depth case studies often speak the language or languages relevant to those in the black spot and can monitor local open sources as well as those done at the national and international levels. An example of an in-depth case study is found in Appendix B. Summaries of a sample of the case studies are available in a special issue of the National Strategy Forum Review (Stanislawski 2011).
Validity Probes
Because we are heavily reliant on open source materials in identifying black spots, we have been interested in validating our observations and designations through research in the field. Several of the projectās research assistants have visited areas identified as black spots in addition to Ciudad del Este mentioned above. Among these have been the Akwasasne Reservation that crosses the border between Canada and the US along the Saint Lawrence River (Spencer 2011); Marbella, Spain (Roberts 2016); and black spots along the age-old Balkan trading route that goes through Kosovo, Serbia, and Bos...