EU Coordination in International Institutions

Policy and Process in Gx Forums

Peter Debaere

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN:
  9781349560103
  9781137517296
• eBook ISBN:
  9781137517302
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book examines the European Union (EU) coordination of the G7, G8 and G20 (Gx). The author comprehensively maps out the different coordination processes for each Gx forum and assesses the procedures used, the actors involved as well as the evolution of the Gx forum over time.

Part I

Introduction

1

Introduction

In the G7, G8, and G20 (Gx), four large EU member states – France, Germany, the UK, and Italy (EU4) – are directly represented¹ as being opposed to the 23 non-Gx EU member states (EU23).² The EU has fully participated in the G8 for more than three decades and has been an official member of the G20 since the G20’s inception in 1999. Given the EU’s long-time participation in these Gx forums, one could expect that the EU23 would be in some way or another involved in the EU’s preparation for Gx meetings. After all, EU representatives in the Gx are supposed to represent all EU member states. This book endeavors to test that assumption.

A closer look at the Gx context suggests that the involvement of the EU23 is not as evident as it might seem. For example, the G7, G8, and G20 are informal, club-like forums of nation-states that lack the basic features of an international organization such as a foundational treaty or formalized rules for membership. As the Gx outcomes also lack any legal status, it is unclear to what extent the EU23 are actually bound by the EU’s commitments in the Gx and thus to what extent EU23 involvement is required. In addition, the EU4, who participate in national capacity in the Gx, may obstruct attempts to involve the EU23 in order to protect their privileged membership of the Gx. The presence of the EU4 next to representatives of the EU could also undermine the role of the EU in the Gx. The EU representatives have to walk a thin line to avoid upsetting the EU4 while also representing the EU23. Hence, involving the EU23 countries might not only be unnecessary but also undesirable or inappropriate.

In this work, the problematique of EU23 involvement is approached by looking at internal EU coordination. Internal EU coordination refers to coordination that involves all EU member states and takes place before or after Gx meetings. The focus on internal EU coordination excludes coordination ‘on the spot’ among the EU4 and EU representatives in the margins of Gx meetings. It also excludes internal decision making within the European Commission to establish an EU position for the Gx. The first main research question in this study is as follows: ‘To what extent does the EU coordinate internally for the G7, G8, and G20?’ The study investigates if and how the EU coordinates for Gx meetings, analyzes the procedures used, and examines the actors involved. To map the level of coordination, an elaborate definition of coordination and a coordination scale have been developed.

It appears that EU coordination varies across the three Gx forums and across different policy domains. For example, established internal coordination mechanisms with all EU member states are nearly nonexistent for the G8. In contrast, coordination mechanisms for the G20 are relatively well developed, especially for economic and financial affairs. All EU member states have plenty of opportunities to shape the EU’s position in the G20 as far as economic and financial matters are concerned. For development-related G20 agenda items, in turn, internal EU coordination is limited to informative briefings by the European Commission. These patterns require further analysis and constitute the second main research question: ‘What explains the differences in EU coordination for the G7, G8, and G20?’

This study on internal EU coordination for the G7, G8, and G20 adds value to the academic literature in two main ways. First, by focusing on how, when, and why member states decide to coordinate, it tackles an under-explored aspect of the research on the EU in international contexts. Despite a growing body of literature on the Union’s presence in international institutions (e.g., Jørgensen & Laatikainen, 2013) and the effectiveness of internal EU coordination (Smith, 2010; Van Schaik, 2010), studies that explain why and when EU coordination is performed are relatively rare. Most analyses on internal decision making in the framework of the EU’s external relations are situated in the traditional foreign-policy sphere or in the area of trade policy (Delreux, 2006: 244). Internal decision making in the context of the EU’s external economic relations remains, however, largely under-explored.

Moreover, this book develops a more sophisticated conceptualization of coordination than that which already exists by approaching coordination as a process rather than the degree to which EU member states can agree on a common EU position. This conceptualization facilitates future comparative research on EU coordination for multiple international institutions and benefits the theorizing of EU coordination. Furthermore, this research adds to the growing recognition that factors both at EU level and at the level of the international institution should be taken into account in order to understand the EU’s behavior in international contexts. So far, however, little systematic attention has been paid to the question of how the character of the multilateral system influences, constrains, or enables the EU to act (Kissack, 2010: 5).

Second, the relatively recent appearance of the G20 at the center of global governance has renewed interest from policymakers and academics in the role of the EU in the Gx system. Nevertheless, in general, the role of the EU in the G7, G8, and G20 remains largely underexposed. The literature in particular neglects the involvement of the EU23, who are, after all, indirectly represented in the Gx through their EU membership. This research obviously addresses that gap. In addition, by measuring the perception of the relevance of the Gx, the study offers new and useful insights on how EU member states perceive the Gx. Although the attitude of most G8 and G20 countries vis-à-vis the G7, G8, and G20 has already been covered in the literature (Lesage, 2010a; Bradford, 2011), the perception of the G7, G8, and G20’s relevance by the EU, including the non-Gx EU member states, has not yet been systematically addressed.

1.1 Research approach

This research on EU coordination for the Gx forums is embedded in a pragmatist tradition. In the words of Kaag and Kreps (2012: 192), pragmatism is broadly interpreted as ‘what works’. It proposes an answer to epistemological and methodological debates based on the idea of using the particular approach(es) that work(s) for the particular problem. A pragmatist abandons the search for epistemological purity and relies on those assumptions and methods that are useful to understand a complex phenomenon. For the purpose of this study, pragmatism is perfectly suited. Pragmatists study practical problems rather than testing abstract theories (Cornut, 2009: 5). Given the unexplored state of the research on the subject, this study primarily aims to bring about deep and comprehensive understanding of EU coordination in the context of the Gx. A pragmatic stance allows us to approach this complex phenomenon with an open mind. It encourages us to seek exposure to different arguments in theory as well as in practice, approach these arguments openly, and compose our own arguments creatively, thereby being constantly reminded of and challenged by the shortcomings of the arguments (Kornporbst, 2009).

The research questions in this book – namely if, how, and why the EU coordinates for the Gx – are examined through abductive reasoning. Abduction is one way of pursuing scientific research in a pragmatic tradition and incorporates elements of both induction and deduction. In order to acquire social knowledge, researchers engage with the empirical field on the basis of existing conceptual notions derived from scholarship. During the process, concepts may be adjusted or rejected, and new concepts may be introduced or developed based on new empirical insights (Friedrichs& Kratochwil, 2009; Hellmann, 2009; Kaag & Kreps, 2012).

This iterative process of letting insights from the field interact with concepts from the literature led to a working definition and conceptual framework of coordination and a coordination scale. Also, the causal factors to explain the differences in EU coordination across the Gx system have been distilled out of this abductive reasoning process. Expert interviews revealed potential causal clues that have been put into relation to hypotheses found in the literature and vice versa. Certain findings have been further explored via an online survey, while intuitively developed expectations have also influenced the reasoning process.

In a pragmatist tradition, concepts have been incorporated in the analysis only if they appeared to be useful for understanding the problem. Consequently, this study does not apply one single coherent theoretical framework but instead constructs a conceptual and analytical framework by combining elements from several different theoretical perspectives. This approach is particularly useful because EU coordination for the Gx and international institutions in general is still largely under-examined. Eventually six causal factors were identified: existing policies, interests, competences, Gx relevance, EU influence, and the organization of the Gx system. These variables are elaborated in Chapter 3. With regard to causality, I assume ‘multiple conjunctural causation’, which implies that different causal paths may lead to the same outcome (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009: 8). EU coordination can thus be explained by different configurations of causal factors.

With regard to the scope of this study, the aim was to be as comprehensive as possible in mapping the level of EU coordination for the Gx so as to ensure that no important empirical data were overlooked. After all, if certain cases with extreme coordination ‘values’ had been missed, that could have seriously undermined any conclusions on causality. Therefore, coordination processes have been examined for nearly all aspects of the Gx process. This includes not only coordination for the seven different policy areas of finance, development, trade, agriculture, labor, climate, and energy, but also coordination for the Gx summits and sherpa meetings.

One policy area has been excluded from the research, notably foreign affairs. No attention is paid to so-called ‘high politics’ such as peace and security, geopolitical issues, or non-proliferation. Although foreign affairs issues represent a significant share of the G8 agenda, this choice has been made because of feasibility considerations. This study already covers multiple different policy areas, and including foreign affairs would be at the expense of what is currently presented. Foreign affairs issues have distinct characteristics, involve other networks, and tend to depend more on the news of the day. The expectation was that the learning costs and additional research efforts connected with foreign affairs would not have been compensated by new and innovative insights. However, the subject is definitely a promising area for further research.

Findings on the question of why the EU coordinates to a certain degree are structured as a comparative embedded case study that applies each causal factor to eight cases, each representing a different policy domain in a particular Gx forum. Case sampling has followed a ‘most important’ case-selection strategy.

With regard to the G20 agenda, five cases have been included: finance, development, labor and employment, food and agriculture, and trade. In this study, finance and development represent the two key G20 cases while the other three policy domains are relatively less elaborate. Findings on the G20 cases of labor and employment, food and agriculture, and trade are therefore grouped under the heading ‘Other G20 Cases’. This is due to two reasons. First, finance and development appeared to be ‘extreme cases’ with extreme values of EU coordination. In order to detect potential causal factors, both cases have been studied first and rely on the largest number of interviews. As soon as more specific hypotheses came to light, preliminary findings were applied to the other G20 cases. Consequently, these cases are included in the study as they offer valuable information and provide useful insights for the hypotheses under consideration. More importantly, conclusions based on extreme cases can be representative for the population – that is, the Gx process – only if they are compared with a larger sample of cases (Seawright & Gerring, 2008: 297).

Second, research on the ‘other G20 cases’ is less extensive because G20 activities in these areas are less prominent and rather limited and modest. For example, food and agriculture appeared on the agenda only in 2011 and 2012, with only two high-level meetings. It is also illustrative that trade issues are not prepared in a dedicated trade working group, but form one of the many agenda items at meetings of the G20 sherpas, the leader’s personal representatives.

As far as the G8 is concerned, an analysis of the agenda between 2008 and 2012 resulted in the selection of two cases: development and energy/climate. The second case treats both energy and climate issues together since the G8 has been framing energy and climate security as interconnected challenges since 2002 (Van de Graaf, 2013: 135). For reasons mentioned earlier, foreign affairs issues have been excluded from the study. Finally, during 2008–2012 the G7 has been dealing only with financial, economic, and monetary issues.

A final point is that this study is a comparative embedded case study. Embedded case studies involve more than one unit of analysis (Scholz & Tietje, 2002: 9–10). The choice for an embedded case study was motivated by the realization that the variables are active at different levels of analysis. For example, competences, relevance, and the organization of the Gx are related to the policy domain, while the latter two also vary depending on the Gx forum. In addition, existing policies and interests are focused on individual dossiers. Therefore, cases have been further specified into dossiers, following a similar ‘most important’ sampling strategy. The selected dossiers are listed in Table 1.1 and substantively introduced in Chapter 5.

Table 1.1 Selection of cases and dossiers

1.2 Structure of the book

The remainder of the book is structured as follows: The next chapter briefly sketches how the G7, G8, and G20 are organized and how the EU is represented in each of the forums. Subsequently, Chapter 3 develops a definition of coordination and constructs a coordination scale. Additionally, six hypotheses are suggested to explain EU coordination for the G7, G8, and G20: existing policies, interests, competences, relevance; EU influence; and Gx organization. In this chapter, methods and data collection are also discussed. Empirically, the book relies on 88 expert interviews, official documentation, and an online survey completed by 160 government officials in the EU member states and institutions.

The fourth chapter represents the second part of this book (Part II) and examines the level of internal EU coordination for the G20, G8, and G7. In a detailed manner, it maps out the different processes for each Gx forum by focusing on the what, how, where, and who. It provides a comprehensive overview of the (informal) procedures, the actors and committees involved, and the evolution over time. Furthermore, the role of the European Parliament is briefly discussed.

Whereas Chapter 4 explores the level of coordination for the G7, G8, and G20, the chapters in Part III attempt to explain why that level of coordination varies across the Gx system. Chapter 5 introduces the cases, and Chapters 6 through 11 apply the six hypotheses to the cases. The chapters are, however, not structured by the cases but rather by hypotheses and variables. In this way, the focus lies in the explanatory value of the variables. It allows us to systematically compare the role of a single variable across the different cases. At the end of each chapter, some concluding remarks are made on the explanatory value of the variable in question. Finally, Part IV consists of only Chapter 12, which concludes with a careful attempt to construct causal paths that lead to different levels of internal EU coordination for the Gx.

This study illustrates, among other things, that Gx-related factors significantly influence the level of internal coordination for the G7, G8, and G20. However, coordination seems to be less affected by the informal character of the Gx than is generally assumed. Furthermore, it is argued that the role of the non-Gx EU member states cannot be ignored if one seeks to understand the level of internal EU coordination for the Gx. Finally, it appears that the European Commission seems to be more concerned about its own performance and that of the Union in the Gx than about involving the non-Gx EU member states in the Gx process.

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Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Part I  Introduction
• Part II  Mapping EU Coordination
• Part III  Explaining EU Coordination
• Part IV  Conclusion
• Appendix – List of Interviews
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index