Giddens and Politics beyond the Third Way

Utopian Realism in the Late Modern Age

P. Kolarz

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781137524713
• eBook ISBN: 9781137524737
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Political Philosophy
• Index: Social Sciences

Assessing the political dimensions of Anthony Giddens' work from the 1970s to the present, this book highlights new directions for politics distinct from his Third Way. Kolarz provides an assessment of Giddens' political relevance and utility for present-day political endeavours, reflecting on the approach to critical social theory found in his early work, notably his theory of structuration and critique of historical materialism, and his consequent utopian realist analysis of late modernity. Giddens and Politics beyond the Third Way extracts from his work a rationale for global redistributive action, as well as an integrative approach to policymaking, suggesting that coherence of centre-left emancipatory politics requires coordination of policy areas previously thought of as separate.

Part I

Utopian Realism: A Political Reading of the Early Giddens

1

Critical Foundations – Structuration and System Transformation

To fully understand the politics of Anthony Giddens, we need to begin by looking at work that preceded his overtly political contributions. The Third Way (1998a) is most evidently of a programmatic nature, and even The Consequences of Modernity (1990) and Modernity and Self-identity (1991a) have clear political implications, which will be the focus in subsequent chapters. But these later texts have been the subject of much critical literature, and there are many ways of interpreting their political salience. In order to be able to contextualize Giddens’ political writings, we can look to his earlier contributions. Structuration theory and his critique of historical materialism give us a perspective on his approach to politics at a conceptual level. Here we can ascertain his deeper sociological outlook: how he treats power, constraint and emancipation; how societies can change; and how sociological work relates to such changes.

This chapter considers the overall utility and, in particular, the normative dimensions of structuration theory. It subsequently shows that these are further developed into a Giddensian approach to critical social theory – termed here a Giddensian ontology of critique – when combined with his perspective on historical materialism. Starting with The New Rules of Sociological Method (1976), Central Problems in Social Theory (1979), and explicitly outlined in The Constitution of Society (1984), structuration theory seeks to overcome the gulf between structural determinism on one hand and methodological individualism on the other. This is accomplished by noting the ‘duality of structure’ (Giddens, 1984: 25), meaning that structure is at once created by actors, as well as affecting their actions, and as such has both constraining and enabling properties. This is deduced from the idea that structure only comes into existence when instantiated by the agent, or more precisely, where structural properties, defined abstractly as rules and resources, are instantiated and thus contextualized by agents into ‘systems’ (Giddens, 1984: 24–5). Especially significant here is the role of knowledge, on which the agent draws in order to produce, reproduce or indeed transform the system. Whilst this signifies an attempt to solve the structure/ agency debate implicit in classical social theory since its early days, Giddens notes:

Specifically, [structuration theory] is the label I attach to my concern to develop an ontological framework for the study of human social activities. By ‘ontology’ here, I mean a conceptual investigation of the nature of human action, social institutions and the interrelations between action and institutions.

(Giddens, 1984: 201)

This provides us with the most concise summary possible of structuration theory and of the fundamental aim attributed to it by Giddens. Naturally, a well-integrated theory on anything may be perceived by some as having a certain beauty in and of itself. But that aside, it is important to ascertain the further benefits of this ‘ontological framework for the study of human social activities’. Especially in this case, where there is hardly any analysis of substantive contexts (as found for instance in Giddens’ later works), and where instead abstract, second-order concepts such as structure, agency, change, power, time and space are theorized, the question is: what is this good for? Given its abstract approach, there are three main possible uses, none of which necessarily negate each other, but which would nevertheless result in different ways in which social scientists might look to structuration theory to aid their endeavours. Firstly, structuration theory might be understood as a general theory, in other words, as a broad narrative capable of informing the entirety of sociological endeavour at the meta-theoretical level. Secondly, it might be understood as a theoretical background for empirical research: a framework that researchers might look to in order to design and guide the collection or analysis of their data. Thirdly, it might function as a guideline or basis for critical theory and a more politicized social analysis. The analysis here will focus on the latter possibility, though it is worth briefly considering the former two.

Structuration theory: grand narrative, empirical tool or normative framework?

Regarding the possibility of general theory, structuration theory is of limited use because it lacks rigour on several concepts used within it. Gregory (1989), for instance, notes a failure in structuration theory to adequately take into account both the production of space as well as the symbolic and normative aspects of spatial representation.¹ This is a significant weakness, because Giddens attributes much importance to the idea that structures are re-instantiated, reproduced and potentially transformed over time and space. Reflecting on Giddens’ notion of agency, Wilmott (1997) has made the charge of an incomplete appreciation of the unconscious, resulting in limited and one-sided understanding of how the agent might operate. Meanwhile, Thompson (1989) notes a reductionist view of structure, defined by Giddens as rules and resources: this definition, once again, is characterized as opaque and incomplete, a charge that has been made frequently about Giddens’ work (O’Boyle, 2013). In a similar vein, Bauman notes that Giddens’ definition of structure amounts to little more than a conceptual shift ‘from the realm of objects to the realm of rules’ and that now structure operates ‘in the algebraic rather than the mechanical sense’ (1989: 42).

Further examples of these kinds of charges have been collected into several volumes of critical work.² The main conclusion to take from the existence of such extensive criticism is that viewing the theory of structuration as a general theory is problematic: this would certainly need to involve arranging all these concepts – structure, agency, time, space and so on – into some kind of integrated framework, satisfying the merits of all previous methodological traditions from the interpretive to the structural-functionalist and beyond; but at the same time, these concepts would also all need to be adequately theorized and defined. As shown earlier, many commentators note that this is not the case. Summarizing the point, Kaspersen notes:

Giddens’ structuration theory … is unique in its scope. Giddens applies the entire spectrum of classical and modern social theory as the basis of his grandiose attempt at reconstruction. No one other than Giddens has been able to combine elements from Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Mead, Goffman, Parsons, Merton, Schutz, Offe, Heidegger, the Swedish geography of time, Freud, Eriksson, Foucault, etc. into an apparently coherent theoretical approach. It is precisely the enormous, ambitious character of the project which is also Giddens’ weakness, creating flaws and gaps in his argumentation.

(Kaspersen, 2000: 186)

The case for general theory is further weakened by the fact that Giddens himself hardly ever refers to general theory in his work and has in fact distanced himself from overarching theories of this type, though specifically he uses the thematically slightly different term ‘grand narrative’ (Giddens, in Bryant and Jary, 2001a: 244–5).

Though commentators are sometimes suggestive of the idea of structuration theory as a general theory, exemplified for instance in the earlier quote from Kaspersen, it can hardly be viewed in this way due to vagueness and incomplete definitions on several key components. Giddens has himself expressed caution about such types of theory, and there is furthermore little consensus among social scientists on whether a general theory would be desirable in the first place (Holmwood, 1996). On these grounds we can discount the option of structuration theory having much discernible use in this respect; the possibility chiefly arises due to its broad thematic scope. Though Giddens draws together a plethora of different perspectives, there is little evidence to suggest he does so in order to construct a theory to unify all theories. Instead, this integrative project likely serves a more substantive purpose, and not integration for its own sake.

On structuration theory’s possible capacity to aid empirical research, the picture is more complex. Unlike on the issue of general theory, where Giddens distances himself from the notion, he makes several pronouncements on the importance of the relationship between theory and practice. He notes the importance of the link between theoretical and empirical work at many points in his career (Giddens, in Bleicher and Featherstone, 1982: 74), and elaborates on this importance in The Constitution of Society, dedicating substantial portions to the issue of structuration theory in relation to empirical research and even stating a set of rules to inform and guide empirical research. These are worth paraphrasing here as an illustrative summary of the structurationist approach:

• All human beings are knowledgeable agents, and their knowledgeability infuses social action with a level of complexity sociological endeavours are scarcely able to fully capture and describe.

• Some of the most important tasks of social science are to be found in the investigation of unconscious action, unacknowledged conditions, and unintended consequences of action, and their ideological connotations.

• The study of day-to-day life is integral to analysis of the reproduction of institutionalized practices. Wider connections to the everyday need to be understood in the context of their integration into this micro-level.

• Most daily practices are not directly motivated, making routinized practices a key site of investigation and a prime expression of the duality of structure.

• Contextualities are integral to the investigation of social reproduction.

• Social identities are associated with rights, obligations and sanctions. Variable between societies, such use of standardized markers associated with age, gender and so on are fundamental in all societies.

• ‘Constraint’ can have many meanings and does not necessarily derive from structural properties of social systems.

• The degree of closure of societal totalities – and of social systems in general – is widely variable, dependent on structural principles.

• The study of power is integral to social scientific enquiry: it provides the context for action.

• Any sociological observation can be incorporated by non-sociologists into their frame of reference. Lay objections to sociological findings may therefore have considerable importance.

(Giddens, 1984: 281–4)

Giddens’ commitment to empirical research and his wish to inform empirical endeavours is evident from such prescriptions. Yet, there is in fact limited empirical work that directly utilizes structuration theory, especially if we compare Giddens’ direct impact on empirical research to figures such as Bourdieu or Foucault, the former of which especially has become a near ubiquitous provider of theoretical frameworks in ethnographic work. The main areas where we find structuration theory as a methodological framework for empirical research is in fields such as governance and strategy of organizations, for instance in studies on policy spheres or management (Weiss and Bucuvalas, 1980; Morgan, 1990; Whittington, 1992). However, these studies typically make limited use of it, most often identifying a ‘duality of structure’, or other individual concepts from Giddens’ theory in their field and then using it as a frame of reference, rather than using the theory as a whole – or the entirety of his guidance – to inform their approach. Studies on the use of technology are an exception to this: here we find more systematic application of structuration theory. But in these instances, where structuration theory has explicitly been utilized for empirical research, it has often first undergone considerable extension and reworking by other authors: owing to its abstract nature, criticisms noted earlier are confirmed in their salience, and authors often design and develop methodological frameworks of their own around the basic concepts given by Giddens – in effect filling the gaps and tightening his vague definitions until a suitably detailed methodological framework is developed (Orlikowski, 1992; Pozzebon and Pinsonneault, 2005; Stones, 2005). Held and Thompson summarize these points on salience for empirical research:

Although the theory of structuration, and Giddens’ related work on time and space, have generated considerable theoretical debate, they have received a more cautious response from social scientists engaged in empirical research. For there are many who feel that Giddens’ work, however interesting it may be on a general theoretical level, is too abstract and formal to be of much use in carrying out empirical research projects.

(Held and Thompson, 1989: 9)

In her critique of structuration theory in relation to empirical research, Gregson goes as far as saying that Giddens’ guidelines offer nothing new and, indeed, that Giddens’ characterization of certain empirical projects as ‘structurationist’ is flawed (1989: 242). In this context she reflects on Willis’ Learning to Labour (1977), an example used by Giddens to illustrate the use of structuration theory (1984: 298). Contrary to his claims, Gregson notes that Learning to Labour goes well beyond the scope of Giddens’ guidelines and, more importantly, is not theoretically informed by Giddens, but rather by Gramsci, Althusser, Lukacs and Marx. Consequently, she concludes, most empirical researchers have little need for Giddens, whilst Giddens requires examples such as Learning to Labour to justify the scope for structuration theory’s application (Gregson, 1989: 242–3).

Furthermore, she notes the relative brevity of Giddens’ comments on empirical research, adding to the issue of structuration theory being too abstract and having insufficient clarification of key concepts to be able to substantively aid empirical endeavours – a point that likewise limits its scope as a general theory. Reflecting on Giddens’ guidelines, she notes:

… whilst few would disagree that social research has an ethnographic moment, that people demonstrate a vast number of skills in the course of daily life and that temporal and spatial structures are critical, for the purposes of empirical research the key questions concern which ‘actors’, which skills and which temporal and spatial structures we choose to investigate; and how we investigate these, where and when.

(Gregson, 1989: 240–1)

Though structuration theory has been used in some areas of empirical research, usually either in a rudimentary fashion or in conjunction with significant development, there is evidence to show that by and large the theory is not of much direct use as a methodological framework to take to a field. But we can account for this mismatch between Giddens’ pronouncements on the importance of empirical research and structuration theory’s eventual lack of utility for it, by supposing that it does not seek to directly guide or prescribe certain forms of empirical research but rather seeks in some form to position empirical research in relation to theory. In other words, Giddens is trying to say something about a possible function rather than a possible process of empirical research. This may not be of direct use to commentators such as Gregson, whose points would thereby be no less valid, but it would be possible to account for the importance Giddens places on the theory-practice relationship despite his limited use to the practitioners. This brings us to the last of the three possibilities for structuration theory’s use posited at the outset.

In the case of structuration theory, where there is no explicitly stated critical intent, a useful starting point is to assess its normative dimensions. Even of these, little is ever made explicit, but there is a distinct normative element, which some commentators have noticed, though never fully appreciated in terms of its implications. The normative dimension of structuration theory lies in the undue emphasis Giddens places on the agent, which in turn urges us to problematize forms of reflexivity and capacities for social transformation.

We saw earlier that many critics have voiced charges of vagueness and incompleteness in the discussion of structuration theory’s various components. But whilst specific elements, such as time, space or the unconscious, are criticized as being insufficiently defined and lacking depth of consideration, critiques of Giddens’ ideas on agency are centred not on incompleteness of definition but rather more on the excessive degree of optimism regarding the agent’s capacity to act freely. Bauman notes:

The goal is … on the one hand to dethrone the concept of ‘structure’ as an external, pre-existing determinant of action; on the other, to deny the random or entirely self-propelled character of actors’ behaviour.

(Bauman, 1989: 42)

Bauman hereby suggests an element central to structuration theory: one of its fundamental tenets is that the individual has power. Bauman only vaguely alludes to this, but some further investigation confirms this. In his guidelines to empirical research, Giddens notes:

The study of power cannot be regarded as a second-order consideration in the social sciences. Power cannot be tacked on, as it were, after the more basic concepts have been formulated. There is no more elemental concept than that of power. … power is the means of getting things done and, as such, directly implied in human action.

(Giddens, 1984: 283)

In the context of structuration theory, it is therefore of crucial importance to Giddens that the power to affect the reproduction of structure is in the hands of the agent. Importantly, the individual does so as an active, reflexive, knowledgeable social agent (Giddens, 1984: 15; Tucker, 1998: 56, 80–1). At the same time, Giddens is cautious not to portray the notion of power as an entirely positive concept. Whilst he separates the concept of power from that of domination, he notes that power is tied to constraint, exploitation and coercion as well as to freedom, emancipation and interdependence (Giddens, 1984: 257; see also Tucker, 1998: 114–5). So whilst the power of the individual is a central ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• Summary of Chapters
• Introduction: Anthony Giddens – Social Theory and Politics
• Part I: Utopian Realism: A Political Reading of the Early Giddens
• Part II: The Contours of a Giddensian Politics
• Part III: The Third Way and Beyond: Critique and Reconstruction
• Notes
• List of Anthony Giddens’ Works, 1960–2015
• Bibliography
• Index