Peace, Justice and International Order

Decent Peace in John Rawls' The Law of Peoples

A. Förster

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9781137452658
• eBook ISBN: 9781137452665
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Political Philosophy
• Index: Politics & International Relations

How can fair cooperation and a stable peace be reached in the international realm? Peace, Justice and International Order discusses this question in the light of John Rawls' The Law of Peoples, offers a new approach to Rawls' international theory and contributes to the discourse on international peace and justice.

1

Introduction

The international state system has lately undergone a huge development having to meet great changes and challenges. Two world wars in less than 50 years, in particular the cruelties of World War II and their dimensions, gave impetus to quick and enormous changes: the development of an extensive human rights regime, normative limitations to the legitimacy of warfare and the establishment of the United Nations (Martin and Reidy 2006, 3). The decline of colonialism and the end of the Cold War reshaped the international state system and power schemes. Globalization brought the world closer together, establishing new ways of communication and cooperation, but also new dangers and challenges, calling into question the autonomy of states or even their raison d’être. ‘One of the greatest challenges posed by this new international order has been that of providing appropriate standards of justice for this emerging system’ (Martin and Reidy 2006, 3). John Rawls contributed to this search, in 1993 with his Amnesty Lecture and then in 1999 with the homonymous monograph The Law of Peoples (LP).

Again, Rawls turns against dominant concepts, against realism as well as strong cosmopolitan claims, as he had turned against utilitarianism in A Theory of Justice (1971) (TJ) where he searched for principles of justice for a liberal democratic society. LP, however, does not give an answer to the question of how to establish a just world order, at least not primarily. It is rather meant to provide liberal regimes with a guideline according to which they should organize their foreign relations to enhance a peaceful, stable and just international realm in order to establish a Society of Peoples, a fair cooperative scheme between the well-ordered societies of the world. This guideline is meant to be applicable to the here and now, to present a feasible realistic utopian concept. LP is thus more a theory of international peace, stability and justice, developed within a realistic utopian framework for existing (and future) liberal societies and it has to be read, interpreted and criticized as that.

Rawls’ international theory stands in the shadow of TJ. ‘It is generally agreed that Rawls was the most important political theorist within the Anglo-American world since John Stuart Mill, and his masterwork, A Theory of Justice, is at the centre of modern thinking on its subject’ (Brown 2010, 311). John Rawls is thus considered the theorist of justice, and not of peace. Although LP might not be as ground-breaking as Rawls’ earlier work, there are valuable concepts and ideas, amongst them the peace argument and the idea of toleration both of which are overshadowed by the asserted contradictions between TJ and LP.

The distinct value of LP, the new ideas introduced, and more generally the answer the ‘most important political theorist since John Stuart Mill’ presents to the question of peaceful, stable and fair international cooperation, are overshadowed not only by his masterpiece, but also by the reception by ‘Rawlsian thinkers’. A special victim of this is the peace argument Rawls introduces in LP. The main critique LP has had to meet is of it not being cosmopolitan or at least sufficiently liberal. Rawls’ international philosophy, however, belongs to the liberal camp, but he combines elements of different traditions or schools of thought in a way that almost seems inconsistent. A weak cosmopolitanism (universal grasp of core human rights) is combined with communitarian elements (the intrinsic good of community and the individual as part of society).¹ In LP, Rawls adopts his method (the original position (OP) and the veil of ignorance) and ideas (reasonable pluralism and an overlapping consensus). However, he arrives at different conclusions. Instead of formulating, for example, an international principle of distributive justice, he opts for a duty of assistance. Why? In LP, Rawls changed his focus. While TJ and PL look for principles of justice for a domestic society, Rawls in LP tries to identify the most appropriate set of principles according to which relations between societies can be organized to be as peaceful, as stable and as just as possible. All three are necessary and interdependent criteria. This focus might clarify why LP might not be what philosophers and political theorists would have expected from the theorist of justice.

Taking state interest into account and limiting his aspirations to a realistic utopian framework, Rawls also takes realist positions into account. The claim for toleration and respect of all well-ordered societies is based on liberal theory and might be considered Rawls’ main contribution to it in reference to LP: Although liberal democracy is considered the most just and reasonable system, imposing this system on other regimes that pass the threshold of what is tolerable is illiberal and may cause conflicts, instability and injustice. Rawls’ idea of reasonable pluralism at the international level, obliging liberal peoples to tolerate decent regimes as equal cooperation partners, and the principles of the Law of Peoples, which can be regarded as an overlapping consensus between them, are ideas worth being considered and discussed. Even if there are no peoples in the real world, the ideal might help to discern criteria according to which one can review state behaviour; it can give additional justification to existing or evolving international norms, or, focusing on the Society of Peoples as the union of these ideal societies, help to develop or improve international institutions. It can help to avoid illiberal policies that aim at liberalizing other societies, to avoid the imposition of liberal values on regimes that maintain their own reasonably just system of values. The model can sketch a path to the final aim – peace, stability and justice in the international realm. Equally, the idea of the Society of Peoples as an ideal institution might serve as a model for existing institutions.

Rawls thinks across and between the lines of the ‘isms’. He does not paint the world in terms of black and white, liberal and non-liberal, friend and foe, the West and the rest, but in different shades of grey, where no existing regimes escape censure. These shades and how they are interwoven are worth being drawn out clearly. A short overview will sketch the development from TJ over PL to LP, introducing central conceptions and arguing that the supposed contradictions between TJ and LP are comprehensible results of a development within Rawlsian thinking and that LP has a distinct value within it.

Furthermore, although LP is Rawls’ ‘last word’, it is not the last word on his international theory: LP as a theory is incomplete; rather than a comprehensive theory, it is a sketch of Rawls’ international thought and he is aware of that when leaving room for additions or changes on several occasions.

Rawls provides an alternative view of international relations as they should be. The overall aim of this project is to draw out this alternative world via a clear sketch of Rawls’ concept, identifying and discussing ambiguities and weaknesses and deliberating on the question of whether LP may meet its task and can function as a guideline for more peace, stability and justice in the international realm and what that peace might look like. In concrete terms, I want to substantiate whether Rawls does actually sketch the path to a decent peace. Does Rawls’ international theory, his typology of regimes and the system of cooperation between them, work as a model for international relations? If not, why not and can the model be adjusted? And if so, what does LP contribute to international political theory and practice? How can LP enhance peace, stability and justice on the international level?

The combination of realistic and utopian elements as well as the divide between his ideal and non-ideal theory pose problems for the applicability of Rawls’ model. He relates ideal peoples to non-ideal surroundings, sketches an ideal decent society at the same time stating that something like that ideal ‘is the best we can realistically – and coherently – hope for’ (LP, 78).²

Here, the concept of decent peoples creates an additional problem. Rawls does not refer to any existing or historic decent society; decent peoples appear to be constructions. However, their moral status as equal cooperation partners to liberal peoples is essential to the theory. As Rawls’ aim is to sketch a system of cooperation promoting peace, stability and justice and as he builds on the assumption of a democratic peace, one would expect that Rawls would, ascribing this special moral status to decent societies, include them into the assumption of stable and just peace. One would expect Rawls to enlarge the scope of democratic peace towards a ‘decent peace thesis’, which he, at least explicitly, does not. So does Rawls take the idea of reasonable pluralism and of tolerating decent regimes as equals seriously? Or is it just the most effective way towards a society of liberal peoples, as it might be more promising to motivate decent societies to reform by cooperation rather than by coercion? All this has to be regarded under the premise that decent societies exist at all. If there is nothing corresponding to decent peoples in the real world, then Rawls’ arguments of reasonable pluralism and toleration are meaningless. LP might even be judged as a ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing’, a way to indirectly impose liberal principles on non-liberal regimes. If there are no decent societies, never have been and most probably never will be, the principles of the Law of Peoples remain liberal values and do not constitute an overlapping consensus; liberal democracy remains the only regime type qualifying as well-ordered. Spreading those values by means of intervention or the duty of assistance could then be considered liberal imperialism, which is exactly what Rawls aims to avoid. If there are decent societies in the real world, why does Rawls not name examples and deliberate on a decent peace? Is the assumption of decent peace normatively and empirically provable? And if so, how could it be implemented within the framework of international relations?

An in-depth understanding and analysis of Rawls’ theory as presented in LP is essential to analysing these questions and problems. Therefore, the following chapter explores the realistic utopian framework and its relation to ideal theory as well as the force both have for dealing with real world circumstances and for evaluating real world problems. On that basis, Chapter 3 draws out Rawls’ understanding of peoples and states and their relation to one another. Why does Rawls use ‘people’ instead of ‘state’ and what are the differences? Rawls’ understanding of the terms is analysed with regard to its descriptive and normative content. Also, the relations between peoples and their status of existence as political entities are analysed. Do peoples exist in the real world and on what conception of political regimes are Rawls’ definitions based? Here, Rawls’ differentiation between ideal and non-ideal theory becomes crucial. If peoples are ideals, how come they are actors in non-ideal theory?

Chapter 4 draws a clearer picture of Rawls’ five types of political regimes and clarifies ambiguities within his differentiations. As pointed out already, essential questions hereby arise from the relation between liberal and decent peoples. Is it reasonable to expect liberal regimes to tolerate non-democratic but decent societies as equal cooperation partners and vice versa? Is Rawls’ claim based on normative assumptions (reasonable pluralism) or founded on pragmatic motives (democratization via cooperation instead of coercion)? The question of toleration is discussed in some depth, as it is not only crucial for understanding Rawls and his critics, but also essential for the project pursued: If Rawls takes toleration seriously, he would subsequently need to extend the democratic peace thesis to a decent peace thesis.

The next chapters then explore possible ways of recasting Rawls’ theory in the international system. Chapter 5 focuses on the centre of LP: the principles of the Law of Peoples. Problems arising from the construction of the international OPs are analysed and it is argued that one, rather than two OPs for the international realm are more convincing. It is questioned, whether the principles can be rightly regarded as an overlapping consensus between liberal and decent regimes and explored why Rawls chose those eight principles. The focus here lies on the most contested principles: human rights minimalism, the duty of assistance and, in reference to the latter, the missing principle of distributive justice.

Rawls provides hardly any information on how a Society of Peoples may be structured (Chapter 6). Is it a mere forum of all regimes qualifying as well ordered, or should it take the shape of an international institution, equipped with a basic structure and clear decision-making processes? As the duty of assistance and the right to war seem to be understood as a combined effort, and as there needs to be an entity controlling, and if necessary enforcing, the principles of the Law of Peoples within the Society, a basic structure and clear procedures might be necessary. Could the European Union serve as an existing model for a ‘regional Society of Liberal Regimes’? What should the Society of Peoples look like? Is it a loose union of all regimes qualifying as peoples or is it an international institution that would then have to claim to being a legitimate authority on the use of force, given that a people’s right to war, though being limited, is not reduced to cases of self-defence? How can it improve international relations or institutions? The model of the Society of Peoples is discussed against the background of an alternative institution, the League of Democracies, which might embody what Rawls beyond his realistic utopian framework might aim for: a society of liberal peoples.

After having presented a broad elaboration of Rawls’ theory, drawn a picture of it and discussed some of the ambiguities and problems that arise from both, Chapter 7 elaborates on the question of whether decent peoples exist in the real world. Identifying decent societies is crucial in two ways. First, identifying those regimes proves that Rawls does not merely invent decent societies to justify imposing liberal principles on non-liberal regimes but rather presents an overlapping consensus between liberal and non-liberal well-ordered societies avoiding liberal imperialism. Second, it is helpful in empirically substantiating the claim that the democratic peace thesis might be enlarged to a decent peace. Peoples are ideals that do not have, as such, correspondents in the real world. Therefore, one has to reduce the standards, as one would have to reduce the standards for liberal peoples, to find non-ideal counterparts, or to identify those regimes closest to the criteria for decency. Those are referred to as ‘aspiring decent regimes’.

Based on the identified candidates for aspiring decent societies, Chapter 8 then focuses on the question of how far a decent peace thesis might hold true. The theoretical as well as empirical justifications for a decent peace are explored. If there is something like a decent peace that would give additional support to Rawls’ idea of toleration, having in mind that the focus is on peace, stability and justice on the theoretical level (if it can be substantiated that the criteria made responsible for a democratic peace also apply to decent societies and can thus be suspected to have a similar effect) as well as empirically (if it can be displayed that regimes that qualify as aspiring decent do pursue peaceful foreign policies in relation to other aspiring decent or liberal regimes). If there is not something like a decent peace, reasonable pluralism and cooperation, instead of coercion, are nonetheless still valid arguments. Would Rawls have supported a decent peace thesis and why does he not deliberate on it in LP?

Finally, the concluding chapter (Chapter 9) sums up central findings, therein drawing an instructive picture of how LP may enhance peace and justice in the international order, where specifications and amendments seem crucial, and how that order might be shaped.

2

Practical Relevance of a Realistic Utopia

According to Rawls, the international order would be more peaceful, more stable and more just if there were only liberal democratic societies; however, he also says this is unrealistic and there are other forms of society that deserve respect and can be added to the zone of peace that democracies have established between themselves. Calling his theory a ‘realistic utopia’ shows that Rawls thinks both within and beyond theoretical boundaries, here by linking ideal theory to real world circumstances.

But what is or is meant by a ‘realistic utopia’? At a first glance, the term is a neologism that seems contradictory – a realistic, thus possibly existing, ‘no place’. In the Rawlsian context, a realistic utopian conception goes beyond the limits of what is ordinarily understood to be possible by staying within the framework of an achievable social world; it shows what is realistic, relating to a concept that is theoretically and also practically possible, normatively highly desirable, but highly unlikely to ever exist (LP, 6f.). Rawls’ claim in LP is thus not to draw out a perfectly just ideal international order, but rather one that is at least theoretically achievable and that presents normative limits to state action, thus being of practical relevance, one that – in Rawls’ words – needs being reconciled to our social world. This does not, however, imply that Rawls seeks a compromise between idealistic and realistic thinking; it does not try to ‘settle for a compromise between power and political right and justice’ but rather to set ‘limits to the reasonable exercise of power’ (LP, 6). LP thus draws out – from a normative perspective – by what principles state action can and should reasonably and realistically be guided. To understand whether the realistic utopian framework and thus LP might be considered a paradox, a no place, it is essential to understand and discuss Rawls’ ideal theory and the degree to which it matches the framework Rawls situates it in and how that can be considered ‘realistic’.

Rawls’ division between ideal and non-ideal theory has been widely accepted and has become commonplace. The realistic utopian conception introduced in LP though, despite the fact that LP is structured into ideal and non-ideal theory, seems to disturb this divide, insofar as it draws out a sketch of less than perfectly ideal international relations that is considered realistic, es...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Figures
• Foreword by Chris Brown
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• Chapter: 1 Introduction
• Chapter: 2 Practical Relevance of a Realistic Utopia
• Chapter: 3 Why Peoples, Not States: Why States, Not Peoples?
• Chapter: 4 A Typology of Political Regimes
• Chapter: 5 International Justice and the Principles of the Law of Peoples
• Chapter: 6 The Society of Peoples: A Union of Well-Ordered Societies?
• Chapter: 7 Decent Peoples and the Real World
• Chapter: 8 Decent Peace in The Law of Peoples and Beyond
• Chapter: 9 Peace, Justice and International Order: A Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index