The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories

M. Dentith

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781137363169
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Political Philosophy

Conspiracy theories are a popular topic of conversation in everyday life but are often frowned upon in academic discussions. Looking at the recent spate of philosophical interest in conspiracy theories, The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories looks at whether the assumption that belief in conspiracy theories is typically irrational is well founded

1

Introduction

Three putative conspiracies

One: Former American presidential candidate Lyndon LaRouche believes that the psychedelic rock group ‘Grateful Dead’ were a front for the Occult Branch of the British Secret Service. They were sent to the USA – under orders from the queen of England – to secretly promote drug use and licentiousness in American youth. The purpose of this conspiracy? The destruction of the USA and all it stands for by its own citizenry.

Two: In 1774 Adam Weishaupt, a Bavarian philosopher, founded a secret society, the Illuminati. His aim was, ostensibly, to promote equality and fraternity for all men (for in the 18th century the Enlightenment was still solely the domain of the Western male). To do this, the Illuminati starting infiltrating and taking over influential Freemason lodges in Bavaria. However in 1785, when the Bavarian government came to know about the Illuminati’s activities, they issued an edict and officially disbanded the society. According to the orthodox histories, this brought about the end of the Illuminati and their plan for equality for all.

Conspiracy theorists claim, however, that they merely went to ground and focused their attentions elsewhere. Some went to France and helped orchestrate the French Revolution of 1789. Weishaupt, meanwhile, emigrated to the Americas and took the place of George Washington (of whom he was the spitting image) at the Constitutional Convention of 1787. By playing on settler antipathy towards the British Crown, the Illuminati brought about the American Revolution and guided the formation of the USA. Focusing mostly on the fledgling nation of America, which was supported by the new French Republic, a set of scandals around the ownership of slaves was created to bring the loosely knit coalition of the States into one federally controlled Union. An economic depression was then orchestrated in the early 20th century, in order to ensure that American-made goods would proliferate overseas. Once the world was reliant on American industry, a global system of financial control was established. Medical experimentation on ethnic minorities quickly followed until, by the late 20th century, a global, American-run pharmaceutical concern was in existence. Its purpose? The introduction of fluoride – a chemical agent known to make humans docile – into water supplies around the world.

Three: In September 2001, 11 Middle Eastern nationals hijacked four flights over the continental USA. Two of the hijacked planes were flown into the World Trade Center in New York, destroying the Twin Towers. A third plane crashed into the side of the Pentagon in Washington, DC, while the fourth plane crash-landed in a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The masterminds behind the attack – members of the Osama bin Laden-led group known as ‘Al-Qaeda’ – admitted responsibility for the attacks. They claimed that their purpose was to show the government of the USA just how vulnerable it was to external threats.

These are all stories about conspiracies. The first two are what we typically call ‘conspiracy theories’, while the third – depending on your theory about conspiracy theories – either is also a conspiracy theory or has some conspiracy theories associated with it.

Conspiracy theories are a popular topic in everyday conversation. However, many of us take a dim view of conspiracy theories, deriding and judging those who believe them. If someone accuses of us of believing a conspiracy theory, many of us will splutter: ‘But I’m no conspiracy theorist!’ (even if we are willing to admit that conspiracies have occurred). Sometimes we even dismiss the arguments and explanations of our friends, family or colleagues as ‘just conspiracy theories’. Often this is not because we know the theory on offer is unsound, but, rather, because it goes against the conventional wisdom, or, if the theory were true, we might have to reappraise many of our other beliefs, say about the way our society operates or just how trustworthy certain institutions are thought to be. Other times we might start out by saying ‘I’m not a conspiracy theorist, but ... ’ an expression that typically means we want to put forward some conspiracy theory without having to suffer the ignominy of being called a ‘conspiracy theorist’.

There seems to be a common sense intuition shared by a great many people that conspiracy theories are prima facie examples of irrational beliefs. Conspiracy theories – according to this intuition – are bunk, bogus, irrational, the result of paranoid ideation or, frankly, just weird. The term ‘conspiracy theory’, many argue, picks out a class of suspicious, possibly paranoiac, beliefs. Certainly, many people think the theory that the Grateful Dead were part of the British Crown’s plan to corrupt the youth of America is not worth taking seriously. Most people are also highly skeptical of the claim that the Bavarian Illuminati still exist and control the world from behind the scenes. When it comes to the events of 11 September 2001 (known commonly as ‘9/11’), things get more heated. Some claim that, despite the conspiratorial nature of the terrorist activity of that day, the well-accepted, official explanation is by no means a conspiracy theory. Others, however, claim that the official theory is a conspiracy theory – but one that we are justified in believing – or that it is the result of a conspiracy covering up what really happened.

Conspiracy theories can be divisive. We might ask: ‘Why are so many people skeptical of them?’ This question seems all the more pertinent today due to our increasing awareness that conspiratorial (or, at the very least, conspiracy-like) activity happens more regularly than previously thought. From leaks about mass surveillance programmes to pharmaceutical companies hiding trial data that show certain drugs are ineffective, people in influential institutions look as if they are conspiring here and now. So, can we tell a story that justifies our dim view of theories about conspiracies?

Philosophising about conspiracy theories

This book is an analysis of what some might take to be a very curious situation: the case in which we think some theory about a conspiracy might be worth taking seriously. While this book is mostly concerned with the philosophical – particularly epistemological – questions about belief in conspiracy theories, the theories we will look at will not be restricted solely to theories by philosophers. As such, in Chapter 2 we shall look at some of the definitions of these things called ‘conspiracy theories’, including work in history, philosophy, political theory, psychology and sociology. There is much to be learnt from the work of academics of all stripes when it comes to their various definitions of what counts as a ‘conspiracy theory’, and what belief in them entails.

In Chapter 3 we will analyse whether a general and non-pejorative definition of conspiracy theory – any explanation of an event that cites a conspiracy as a salient cause – helps in the analysis of conspiracy theories. As we will see, certain features of this general definition will turn out to be useful for the development of the analysis of the warrant of specific conspiracy theories while also explaining why it is some theorists take it that belief in conspiracy theories generally is irrational.

In Chapter 4 we will look at some of the problems faced by a general and non-pejorative definition of conspiracy theory. For example, this definition implies that any account of the organisation of a surprise party would count as a conspiracy theory. This definition also allows that there could be conspiracies of goodness, and, thus, we do not need to consider conspiratorial activity as necessarily sinister. However, as we will see, these are not problems for such a general definition. Rather, they point towards problems to do with certain kinds of conspiracy theories and how we analyse them.

In Chapter 5 we will look at how we talk about the intentions and goals of conspirators and who a qualified conspiracy theorist – the kind of expert who can work out the identity or motivations of such conspirators – might be. However, as we will see later in this book, even if we can appeal to qualified conspiracy theorists, there are still worries to do with the kinds of evidence used for and against conspiracy theories.

In Chapter 6 we will look at the question of whether we live in what Sir Karl Popper called an ‘open society’. If we live in a properly open society, conspiratorial activity on the part of the influential institutions should be rare. The benefit of living in such an open, democratic society is that it should be a society in which it is hard generally to conspire successfully. So, just how open should we think our society is? Is our belief that we live in an open society really justified by the evidence?

In Chapters 7 and 8 we will look at another set of reasons that are often put forward for claiming we have a justified and prima facie suspicion of conspiracy theories: such theories often have explanatory rivals with official status. However, it turns out that it is not altogether clear what role ‘officialness’ plays in the analysis of theories in general, since what we might term ‘official status’ is a vague and ill-defined concept. In order to work out what role official status might play in the warranting of any theory, we will look at the role endorsements play in the accreditation of theories, and how having official status from one influential institution tells us little about its official status with regard to some other institution.

In Chapter 9 we will examine the role evidence plays with respect to conspiracy theories. Sometimes the evidence used against particular conspiracy theories ends up being what is called ‘disinformation’: fabricated information put forward to either discredit some explanatory hypothesis or to make some other explanatory hypothesis look plausible. Occasionally the evidence used for or against some conspiracy theory is selective in character: the evidence has been manipulated in order to make it support some explanatory hypothesis. Some evidence, for or against a conspiracy theory, might even be fortuitous, in that the evidence turns out to be too good to be true.

All of these worries about evidence – which are concerns as to when evidence really is evidence – are commonly associated with conspiracy theories. However, as we will see, these worries come up when we are appraising non-conspiracy theories as well. The general lesson is that, when it comes to appraising evidence, there are a lot of issues we need to keep in mind, whether or not the evidence is being used to support or dismiss some conspiracy theory.

In Chapters 10 and 11 we will look at the question: ‘When, if ever, is it justified to infer that a conspiracy theory is the best explanation of some event?’ As the previous chapters will show, even if there is some general argument that justifies taking a dim view of conspiracy theories, this does not give us grounds for dismissing the possibility that some particular conspiracy theory can be warranted. We will look at how sometimes people infer to any old explanation rather than the best, and what it means to infer that a conspiracy is the best explanation of some event. This being said, showing that a conspiracy exists can be difficult: even if a conspiracy theorist can give an argument to the extent that a conspiracy exists, they need to provide some argument that gives us reason to think there is a tight connection, such that the conspiracy is the best explanation.

When, if ever, is it rational to believe a conspiracy theory?

The central question which underpins the analysis that follows is this: ‘When, if ever, is it rational to believe a conspiracy theory?’ As we will see, a case can be made to say that belief in particular conspiracy theories can be warranted.

It is important to note that what follows is not a defence of any particular conspiracy theory. Rather, all that is going to be argued here is that the supposed problems with belief in conspiracy theories are really problems common to explanations of complex social phenomena. As such, the argument that will be presented in this volume is:

1.A defence of belief in conspiracy theories as long as you can tell a good story about why particular conspiracy theories are likely to be warranted and

2.A defence of the view that the fact that some theories are conspiracy theories is not itself a reason for rejecting them.

The underlying question we should always ask when someone proposes a theory is: ‘What should I believe, given the evidence?’ A proper understanding of how we answer such a question shows that it is sometimes rational to believe particular conspiracy theories. The first moral of this book is that we should not automatically dismiss belief in conspiracy theories merely because they are called ‘conspiracy theories’. Rather, if we are going to dismiss belief in a conspiracy theory, it will be because we have grounds for thinking either that the alleged conspiracy does not exist or that, even if a conspiracy does exist, it is not the best explanation. The second moral is that sometimes we will be able to infer that a conspiracy exists and that it is the best explanation: sometimes belief in particular conspiracy theories turns out to be rational.

2

Conspiracy Theory Theories

We can all cite examples of conspiracy theories: they are the kinds of things David Icke travels the world advocating, or Glenn Beck presents on his own – widely syndicated – American television network.

David Icke thinks that the world is controlled by alien shape-shifting reptiles, whose sole purpose is to control humanity and, occasionally, feast upon our young. Icke argues that there is an all-embracing conspiracy which includes the mainstream media and our governments. Its purpose? To hide the fact that our lives and social institutions are controlled by the reptiles.

The conspiracy theories of Glenn Beck seem much more sober in comparison. Beck merely believes in the existence of a large-scale, long-term socialist conspiracy – encompassing elements of both the Democratic and Republican Parties – to deny American citizens their God-given rights to liberty and freedom from taxation. Beck, who follows in the mould of conspiracy theorists such as W. Cleon Skousen and Alex Jones, does not believe in aliens (well, not the extraterrestrial type); the conspirators behind the plots to curtail the liberties of his fellow Americans are either fallible or malevolent human beings.

Beck’s claims are not as ‘out there’ as Icke’s. Typically, people take a dismissive view of Icke’s conspiracy theories, claiming they are simply the product of extreme paranoia. However, while many people disagree with the specifics of Beck’s theories, they will agree that he is, at the very least, on to something, even if his claims of conspirators being in control of the White House are far-fetched.

Icke and Beck are what we might call ‘prototypical’ conspiracy theorists: their particular conspiracy theories are often taken to be representative of conspiracy theories as a class of belief. People tend to distance themselves from such theories, even if they do find them interesting. In part this is because Icke, and to a lesser extent Beck, are cons...