Migrant Mobilization and Securitization in the US and Europe

How Does It Feel to Be a Threat?

A. Chebel d'Appollonia

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781349678327, 9781137388049
• eBook ISBN: 9781137388056
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Immigrants and minorities in Europe and America have responded in diverse ways to security legislation introduced since 9/11 that targets them, labeling them as threats. This book identifies how different groups have responded and explains why, synthesizing findings in the fields of securitization, migrant integration, and migrant mobilization.

CHAPTER 1

The Securitization of Immigration and Integration Governance

The immigration and counterterrorism policies implemented after 9/11 have had severe consequences for specific groups identified as “security threats” by the general public. These policies have collectively produced what has become known as the “securitization of immigration governance.” It is a process through which Western political elites (such as governments, leading political parties, and associated policy networks), public opinion, and the media construct immigration as a security threat. Typical aspects of securitization measures include the introduction of restrictive border controls intended to fight terrorism, accompanied by those intended to curb illegal migration flows and to police minorities. The security-immigration nexus is therefore apparent, visible in the ways in which politicians and bureaucrats view policies on the integration of migrants and of ethnic minorities as a means to counter threats. This nexus is further consolidated by negative stereotypes propagated by the mass media and official public discourse that, in turn, fuels concerns about the willingness of immigrants to integrate into their host societies. Furthermore, the securitization process has given legitimacy to a range of narrative frameworks that, as Sarah Scuzzarello noted, “have strong normative implications for how we conceive of a society, its citizens and the values that are honorable in it” (2011: 4). From the state’s perspective, these normative implications are translated into the distinction between “wanted” and “unwanted” immigrants, as well as “good” and “bad” citizens. From society’s perspective, the relationship between immigrants and members of the receiving country is based on acculturation attitudes that represent beliefs about the “best way” for minorities to adapt to the culture of the dominant group. From the perspective of immigrants and minorities suspected of being a threat, the main challenge is to achieve integration despite the presence of discrimination.

Pointedly, and perhaps paradoxically, these three agendas since 9/11 may clash as part of the changing policy landscape. In substantiating this claim, I focus on three interrelated trends in evaluating the recent changes in institutional structures that today channel trajectories of integration. The first trend is that government officials and minority groups do not share the same conception of integration: The former focus on loyalty (a law-and-order approach) and, notably in Europe, on conformity (by which a minority group’s identity is replaced by an identification with the dominant culture). The latter anticipate full acceptance into the mainstream political process, better socioeconomic inclusion, and cultural integration (in which minority identity is retained while valuing the dominant culture). Discrepancies between these two conceptions of integration are illustrated by a “clash of perceptions” and fuel debates about the willingness of immigrants and minorities more generally to join the mainstream. The second trend is that the process of the securitization of integration has led to mismatches between what immigrants want and what the dominant group in several host societies expects from them. This, in turn, affects the adaptive strategy adopted by immigrants and the complexities they encounter in attempting to do so—as illustrated by the polarization of identities and the increasing social distance between majority and minority groups. The third and final trend is that concerns about “societal cohesion” and disintegration have fostered the adoption of further integrative policies that may have exclusionary effects. This cycle is potentially problematic in that it reinforces the pattern it seeks to address.

Setting the Context

The security-driven measures adopted by the US and European governments since 9/11 have strengthened the policy linkage between terrorism and immigration, leading to a huge expansion in border and interior enforcement. In the United States, the war on terror was conducted on a basis of a new legislation authorizing law enforcement with broad powers to investigate all offenses related to terrorism. The USA Patriot Act (2001), the REAL ID Act (2005), and the Protect America Act (2007) expanded the definition of “terrorism” and enlarged the federal government’s power to conduct criminal investigation. The laws allowed the detention of suspected aliens if there were “reasonable grounds” to believe suspects were involved in terrorist activities. The main objectives of the new legislation were to increase the number of suspects apprehended (using “sneak and peak” searches) and detained, and to expedite the process of deportation (by limiting judicial review). These and additional measures (such as the “mass interviews” program and the “special registration” program) have targeted specific groups, mostly persons of Arab ethnicity or of the Muslim faith. The State Department imposed a mandatory 20-day suspension of all visa applications submitted by men aged 18 to 45 from 26 Arab and Muslim countries. Under the “absconder apprehension initiative,” noncitizens from Middle Eastern countries were tracked down and deported. Finally, delays in the naturalization process were implemented for Arabs and Muslims. The intensification of domestic antiterrorist activity involved an extensive use of racial profiling, as well as significant infringement upon civil liberties in the name of security. The enactment of new statutory provisions designed to identify and apprehend foreign terrorists was actually followed by a “catch-up strategy” that targeted all Muslims (and persons who “look like” Muslims) living in the United States. In the New York area, a surveillance unit was created in 2004 in order to collect information about mosques and Muslim civic associations by recruiting informants among Muslims arrested for minor offenses. The New York Police Department (NYPD) also monitored North East universities between 2006 and 2012 by sending undercover agents to spy on students who were members of Muslim student associations.

Other measures have addressed the perceived security risks generated by immigrants though enhanced border security and interior immigrant enforcement. Legislation designed to improve border security and prevent the entrance of unauthorized immigrants included the reorganization of the federal policy system under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2006. Under DHS, US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) was given the task of intercepting terrorists, enforcing immigration laws, and collecting custom duties at the ports of entry and preclearance stations. Increasing staffing has been accompanied by huge spending on supporting technologies such as radar, sensors, and unmanned aerial vehicles (Meissmer et al., 2013; Totten, 2013). In December 2005, the House of Representatives adopted the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Act (HR 4437) that required the federal government to take custody of undocumented aliens detained by local authorities and mandated employers to verify workers’ legal status. It made it a felony to be in the country without proper documents or to assist someone to attempt to enter or remain illegally in the United States. It made a conviction of drunk driving a deportable offense as well. Finally, it called for an estimated $2.2 billion worth of fences to be erected along part of the southern border. The Act was strongly opposed by a broad range of organizations and NGOs. Huge protests took place in 2006 in Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, and other cities—with at least a million marchers nationwide. The HR 4437 did not pass the Senate. The Congress, instead, passed the Secure Fence Act of 2006 that allocated funds for 700 miles of fencing along the southern border. It deployed thousands of National Guard members to assist the CBP and added thousands of new beds in detention facilities.

The militarization of border controls has been complemented by tougher enforcement of immigration laws within the country, as illustrated by the 287(g) program and the Secure Communities Program. The former expanded the role of state and local authorities in immigration enforcement under the supervision of DHS. In December 2012, more than 1,300 state and local officers in 19 states were involved in this program. The latter, created in 2008, was expanded by the Obama administration to nearly all the nation’s 3,200 jails. Under this initiative, law enforcement authorities have been asked to submit the fingerprints of arrestees to immigration databases in order to better manage the deportation process of illegal immigrants—even when they are not violent criminals or do not pose a threat to public safety. As a result, deportations have risen to record levels in recent years, from 165,168 in 2002 to 391,953 by 2011 (DHS, 2011). Other measures included new change of address requirements, restrictions on the issuance and acceptance of identification documents, and a renewed emphasis on worksite enforcement.

A number of states and local governments have pursued their own enforcement strategies, including anti-vagrancy laws, mandatory verification of employment eligibility for new hires through the E-Verify program, training of state troopers to arrest illegal immigrants, and reassigning troops to the Mexican border. The Clear Law Enforcement of Criminal Alien Removal (CLEAR) expanded state and local police immigration enforcement authority. A report from the National Council of State Legislatures indicated that 30 states enacted restrictive measures under the guise of preventing terrorism in 2006. Since then, states such as Alabama, Arizona, and Oklahoma have passed laws that go as far as making it a criminal offense for an immigrant to fail to carry official documents. The adoption in 2010 of the law SB 1070 in Arizona ignited a national controversy. Its key provision gives police the authority to check the immigration status of individuals during a “lawful stop, lawful contact, detention or arrest” where there is “reasonable suspicion” they were not in the country legally—a provision upheld by the US Supreme Court in 2012. Three dozen copycat bills facilitating racial profiling against Hispanics and others presumed to be “foreign” have been introduced in state legislatures across the country since 2010.

In Europe, the linkage between terrorism and immigration was illustrated by a series of initiatives at the EU level, such as the Common Position of December 2001 and the Framework Decision of June 2002. Designed to strengthen cooperation among member states, the EU legislation expanded cross-border operational initiatives, such as the European arrest warrant, Europol, and Eurojust. The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted in November 2005, partly as a response to the London bombings. It listed the main measures under the four headings of Prevent (radicalization), Protect (EU citizens and European values), Pursue (terrorists and other criminals), and Respond (to threats). It stated that the EU had to enhance the protection of its external borders to make it harder for suspected terrorists to enter and operate within the EU. Many European states added their own counterterrorist packages to the EU framework. These packages gave broad powers to law enforcement agencies for the surveillance of individuals suspected of being members of terrorist groups, as well as the prosecution of anyone promoting or assisting a terrorist organization. In addition to the creation of new criminal-law offenses related to terrorism, varied national legislations extended the period of detention without formally charging suspects who have been arrested (for up to 28 days in Great Britain). As in the United States, Muslims have been targeted by security-driven measures such as increased police surveillance, banning of groups, and deportation.

In the meantime, the securitization of immigration policy was reinforced at the EU level with the creation of the European Agency for the management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (Frontex) in 2005. A number of EU information systems were developed, such as Eurodac in the field of asylum; the Schengen Information System in the field of police and judicial cooperation; and the Europol Information System in the field of criminal law. All these new measures reflected the linkage between terrorists, immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees. They also significantly contributed to the militarization of border controls. EU member states introduced their own legislation in order to tighten immigration and asylum procedures. In Germany, for example, provisions introduced in 2005 created the option of issuing a deportation order on the basis of an “evidence-based threat prognostic.” The British government implemented new regulations design to refuse asylum to anyone with “possible terrorist connections” the same year. A comparable tendency to ease the terms whereby aliens could be removed was illustrated by the adoption in Italy of Law 144. It provided for deportation if there was any reason to believe that aliens might pose a security threat. Furthermore, efforts to attract highly skilled workers both at the national and EU levels were balanced by additional restrictive measures designed to make family reunification more difficult, as well as access to citizenship and social benefits for the “unwanted” immigrants. This latter category has been expanded over time and now includes immigrants (either legal or illegal) who are perceived as a threat to societal cohesion and public security. Issues raised by discriminatory practices against Roma (citizens and EU nationals alike) provide a dramatic example of the varied restrictionist policies currently implemented in Europe.

The Immigration-Security Nexus

Security governance has been consolidated by the development of a framework of communicative actions (public discourse, images, stereotypes) involving political leaders, state and local agencies, political parties, and the media (Balzacq, 2005; Williams, 2003). The securitization and politicization of the discourse on immigration has included the formulation of a systematic linkage between immigrants and all the “dangers” any nation might ever experience—such as the erosion of national identity, threats to employment, public order, and domestic security (Korkut et al., 2013; Bird et al., 2010; Warner, 2005; Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002). In the United States, “security concerns” were raised by restrictionists opposed to a comprehensive reform agenda during the immigration debates of 2005–2006 and 2007. The most virulent controversies focused on undocumented immigrants—often depicted as taking jobs away from Americans, as welfare dependents, criminals, or potential terrorists. In his book entitled In Mortal Danger: The Battle for America’s Borders and Security (2006), Tom Tancredo, then Republican member of the House of Representatives, actually synthesized the common arguments made by leaders of the Tea Party and some other Republicans in language reminiscent of Pat Buchanan’s pamphlets about Mexicans nearly two decades earlier. After his unsuccessful candidacy for the 2008 Republican presidential nomination, Tancredo endorsed Mitt Romney—who supported a similar anti-migrant agenda. Anti-migrant propaganda has been more effective at the state level, as illustrated by the election of Jan Brewer (who garnered national attention by signing the SB 1070) as governor of Arizona in December 2010, and the adoption of laws banning Islamic Sharia law in various states (including Oklahoma, North Carolina, Kansas, South Dakota, and Tennessee).

In Europe, Alessandra Buonfino noted, “immigration as a threat and a security concern has become the hegemonic discourse in government policy” (2004: 24). This discourse targets all categories of “others”: legal and illegal immigrants, resident foreigners, asylum seekers and refugees, as well as cultural and religious minorities (such as native-born Muslims and Roma). Political leaders instrumentalized fears raised by immigration not only to legitimize their security-driven policies but also, and above all, to secure the electoral support of their constituents. Political parties, mainly from the far right but from the center as well, have played a key role into the construction of immigrants as “enemies,” by claiming that immigration was connected with many security problems (from petty delinquency to fundamentalist jihadism) in addition to posing a threat to national culture and identity. In Germany, for example, Chancellor Merkel took a harder line toward immigrants who showed a “resistance to being integrated,” stating in October 2010 that attempts to create a multicultural society have “utterly failed.” This statement reignited a controversial debate initiated by Thilo Sarrazin, a prominent Social Democrat and then member of the German Central Bank. In his book, Deutschland schafft sich ab/Germany does away with Itself, he argued that Muslim immigrants were undermining national prosperity and the national stock of human capital (because of their “low intelligence quotient”).

In Great Britain, Prime Minister David Cameron presented his immigration reform proposals in March 2013. He contrasted immigrants who deserve acceptance (mostly highly skilled workers, the “brightest and the best”) to those people “who take advantage of our generosity without making a proper contribution to our country,” and who “put pressure on public services”—low-skilled workers who come with their dependents, illegal immigrants, bogus refugees, and bogus foreign students (Cameron, 2013). In Spain, the dramatic growth of the immigrant population (from 1.5 million in 2000 to 6.5 million in 2009) did not lead to a significant backlash. However, the economic crisis that began in 2007 increased anti-migrant sentiments and led political parties to adopt a tougher immigration platform. The Popular Party (PP), for example, put anti-immigrant rhetoric at the center of its electoral propaganda, notably in Catalonia where the main targets have been Romanian Roma and Muslims. In 2011, a PP candidate was elected as mayor of Badalona (near Barcelona) on a xenophobic platform—one that was approved a year later by the entire Catalan branch of the PP. The question of urban insecurity has dominated recent electoral campaigns in France, Belgium, and Italy—leading mainstream parties to support a “zero tolerance” policy designed to control “minorities at risk.” According to Fabio Quassoli, “governments and their power apparatuses seem to find in the fight against insecurity and crime an opportunity to act strong—or at least to show a strong determination to do so—against all the threats to their voters’ security” (Quassoli, 2004: 1176). Whether this strategy actually improves security remains to be seen. But it certainly reinforces negative stereotypes and generates a climate of social anxiety.

Finally, the media has regularly fueled the fear of foreigners, supporting the claims of some political parties in the search for sensationalism. A review of British media since 2000, for example, found that two-thirds of its coverage has focused on Muslims as a terrorist threat, a cultural threat, or both (Moore et al., 2008). As a result, Anastassia Tsoukala argues, “we witness the establishment of a dialectical relation between political and media discourses, which are thus mutually reinforced.” Furthermore, “the media structure ‘a’ reality that ends up influencing, to various degrees, public opinion” (Tsoukala, 2005: 168, 173). This “securitarian” discourse in turn fuels, and is fueled by, concerns expressed by public opinion—which affects the type of policies a government will initiate. In addition, governmental rhetoric, social discourse, and media discourse have, as noted by Maurice Crul and Jens Schneider, “an influence on the political and social climate, directly affecting immigrants’ and their children’s quest for a place and position in the host society” (2012: 117). The vicious cycle is thus complete and is likely to last if we consider the evolution of public opinion in the United States and European countries.

Immigration indeed remains an important source of anxiety for natives who regard it as more of a societal problem than an opportunity. Fifty-three percent of US respondents and 50 percent of European respondents shared this negative perception of immigrants according to a German Marshall Fund Report issued in 2011 (up to 68 percent in the United Kingdom). Sixty percent of respondents in the United States and the United Kingdom then believed that immigrants take jobs away from native workers and additionally depress wage levels. Majorities on both sides of the Atlantic believed that most immigrants were in the host countries illegally (a perception shared by 58 percent of respondents in the United States, 59 percent in France, 74 percent in Spain, and up to 80 percent in Italy) (GMF, 2011). These findings are consistent with those provided by previous studies. A survey conducted by the Pew Hispanic Center in 2006 revealed that 48 percent of US respondents believed that the growing number of newcomers threaten traditional American values and beliefs (Pew, 2006).

Perceptions of immigration are not uniform in the 28 EU member states, but there is evidence that the overall sentiment has been increasingly negative throughout Europe. A report from the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) suggested that the dominant perception of immigrants and minorities in Western and Central Europe (58 percent of respondents) was that they constitute a “collective ethnic threat.” Furthermore, 60 percent of the respondents expressed a “resistance to multiculturalism” (Coenders et al., 2005). Consistent with these findings, an Ipsos MORI poll conducted in 2011 found that 77 percent of respondents in Russia, 72 percent in Belgium, 71 percent in Great Britain, and 67 percent in Italy agreed that there are “too many” immigrants in their respective countries. Large majorities believed that “immigration has placed too much pressure on public services” (including 76 percent in Great Britain, 70 percent in Spain, and 66 percent in Belgium) (Ipsos Mori, 2011). Another study conducted in 2011 by Andreas Zick and his colleagues ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction
• 1  The Securitization of Immigration and Integration Governance
• 2  Securitization and Discrimination
• 3  Securitization and Integration
• 4  Securitization and Conventional Mobilization
• 5  Securitization and Unconventional Mobilization
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index