State, Society and Memories of the Uprising of 17 June 1953 in the GDR

R. Millington

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN:
  9781349487028
  9781137403506
• eBook ISBN:
  9781137403513
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

Condemned as a fascist putsch in the East and praised as a 'people's uprising' in the West, the uprising of 17 June 1953 shook East Germany. Drawing on interviews and archive research, this book examines East German citizens' memories of the unrest and reflects on the nature of state power in the GDR.

1

Introduction

1.1 The Uprising of 17 June 1953 in the German Democratic Republic

On 17 June 1953 an uprising against the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) took place in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Up to one million people took part in the unrest which spread to over 700 localities across East Germany, including major cities, towns and rural areas (Dale, 2005, p. 9). Demonstrators called for the resignation of SED leader Walter Ulbricht and his government, free elections, better living and working conditions and the reunification of Germany (Diedrich, 2003, p. 143). A combination of a lack of preparation, uncertainty and chaotic management, as well as the sheer number of demonstrators, contributed to the failure of the East German security forces to quell the unrest (Diedrich, 2003, pp. 173–80). Visible symbols of the regime, as well as buildings housing state authorities, were attacked and destroyed. Protesters also laid siege to prisons in the hope of freeing political prisoners. The arrival of Soviet tanks and troops to restore order in the late afternoon of 17 June 1953 effectively signalled the end of the uprising. Protesters could offer little resistance to their machine-gun bullets (Dale, 2005, pp. 27–33). In the course of the demonstrations, approximately 15 SED functionaries, members of the State Security Service (Stasi) or policemen had been killed, apparently at the hands of demonstrators (Mählert, 2003, p. 10). Approximately, a further 80 people died while either taking part in the protests or simply passing by the wrong place at the wrong time (Kowalczuk, 2003, p. 104).

The causes of this first uprising in the Soviet Bloc can be traced back to the SED’s second party conference in July 1952. At this conference Walter Ulbricht declared that conditions were right for the ‘construction of socialism’ to begin in the GDR (Hagen, 1992, p. 24). This meant that the SED would take measures to reshape East German industry and society according to the model implemented by Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union (Loth, 1997, p. 148). Money was poured into heavy industry in order to modernise society, at the expense of investment in consumer goods. Farmers were forced to collectivise, and private entrepreneurs were put under pressure to nationalise. Non-compliance was answered with heavy fines or prison sentences. Moreover, the SED increased the repression of ‘class enemies’, such as the Church and the middle classes. Citizens’ rights in general were also restricted as the Party (SED) took ever-harsher measures to root out suspected opponents (Kowalczuk, 2003, pp. 28–59).

By 1953 the GDR’s economy was at breaking point. Not only was the SED investing more and more money in heavy industry, but it was also trying to fund the recruitment and armament of a national army. This had been ordered by Moscow, but not factored into the SED’s programme to construct socialism (Hagen, 1992, pp. 24–8). The SED’s lack of surplus funds was creating shortages in supplies of fuel (Sperber, 2003, p. 623). Moreover, food was also in short supply because a significant number of those ‘voting with their feet’ and moving West to escape the SED regime were farmers (Buchheim, 1990, p. 428). A lack of consumer goods was also increasing dissatisfaction amongst citizens. However, instead of easing the pace of its programme, the state decided to put pressure on citizens to work harder under the slogan, ‘First produce more, then live better!’ (Hagen, 1992, pp. 24–8). On 14 May 1953 the SED decreed that working quotas in heavy industry were to be increased by 10 per cent. This meant that industrial workers would have to work harder to meet their quota and earn their quota-fulfilment bonuses, which many relied upon to get by. Not only did the SED hope that this measure would improve the economy by encouraging more production and increased efficiency, but the Party also hoped that it would save money by bringing down the average wage paid to industrial workers (Buchheim, 1990, p. 429). However, the only thing that this measure achieved was workers’ further alienation from the Party that was supposed to represent their interests.

With Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953, a troika of leaders comprising Nikita Khrushchev, Lavrenti Beria and Georgi Malenkov took control in Moscow. In April 1953 they attempted to ease the situation in the GDR by relaxing policy on war reparation payments paid by the SED regime to the Soviet Union, as well as relaxing other economic restraints that had been imposed (Hagen, 1992, p. 31). However, conditions in the GDR continued to worsen. On 2 June 1953 Walter Ulbricht, his Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl and fellow Politburo member Fred Oelßner (to act as translator) were called to Moscow to discuss the situation. The Soviet leaders condemned the SED’s political course since the second party conference. According to Heinz Brandt, SED secretary for agitation in Berlin at the time, the coercive and repressive means by which these policies were introduced had brought all classes of citizens in the GDR to the verge of revolt (Loth, 1997, p. 149). The Soviet ambassador to East Germany, Vladimir Semenov, warned Ulbricht that if the current state of affairs continued, the GDR would cease to exist by the middle of June 1953 (Haupts, 1992, p. 390). The Soviet leaders demanded that the measures taken against farmers, private entrepreneurs, the middle classes, the Church and other groups be immediately rescinded. Thus a complete political volte-face was ordered (Pritchard, 2000, p. 206).

Upon returning to the GDR, Ulbricht and his Politburo complied with Moscow’s orders and drew up the ‘New Course’, a new political programme that abolished or mitigated the repressive measures of the last 12 months. The New Course was announced to citizens via the state newspaper and mouthpiece Neues Deutschland on 11 June 1953. The Politburo statement read that ‘on the part of the SED and government a series of mistakes have been made’. It stated that these mistakes had led to the neglect of certain groups in society and that many citizens had left the country as a result (Kowalczuk, 2003, pp. 85–9). The SED then asserted:

For these reasons the Politburo of the Central Committee of the SED deems it necessary that a series of measures will soon be implemented in connection with corrections to the Plan for Heavy Industry, which will correct the mistakes made and improve the living conditions of workers, farmers, the intelligentsia, craftsmen and other levels of the middle class.

(Jesse and Mitter, 1992, p. 51)

The statement angered many citizens. They had had to suffer under the policies of the SED’s attempts to build socialism, but were now being told that these measures had all been mistakes. The fact that the SED and Walter Ulbricht would be remaining in power, despite their declaration of political bankruptcy, also caused a great deal of consternation (Diedrich, 2003, p. 140). Sporadic protests and strikes broke out across the GDR (Kowalczuk, 2003, p. 96).

However, the SED’s announcement of its mistakes and the resultant anger on the part of citizens did not lead directly to the uprising of 17 June 1953. The initial spark came on 16 June 1953 from construction workers in East Berlin who were angry that the New Course did not include anything about the increase in working quotas increase that the SED had imposed upon them (Hagen, 1992, p. 35). The SED had not rescinded the increased working quotas because they were now even more necessary for increasing productivity to meet the improved living standards that the New Course promised (Baring, 1957, p. 31). Since the New Course was announced, workers had been discussing the omission of the working quotas issue, and sporadic strikes had taken place (Kowalczuk, 2003, p. 96). On 15 June 1953 construction workers building the Stalinallee in East Berlin even formulated a resolution to Otto Grotewohl complaining that others in the GDR had benefitted from the Party’s new policies, while workers had not. They felt that they were being penalised and demanded that the working quotas increase be rescinded immediately (Dale, 2005, p. 19). Although the SED responded the next day by decreasing the quotas to their previous level, workers had become increasingly agitated and impatient at the delay in receiving a response. Moreover, they were further angered by a newspaper article in the trade union newspaper Die Tribüne on 16 June 1953, titled ‘Yes, of course the decrees about raising the working quotas are completely correct’ (Kowalczuk, 2003, pp. 111–2). Despite the fact that the SED sent loudspeaker cars through the streets of East Berlin announcing that the working quotas increase had been repealed, it was too little too late, and the news failed to reach many.

On 16 June 1953 the workers on the Stalinallee in East Berlin could no longer contain their anger with the government. They decided to march to the House of Ministries to demand that the working quotas be decreased. Within a few hours, a crowd of 10,000 people had gathered in front of the building. This crowd consisted not only mainly of workers but also of other citizens who had joined the workers as they marched past. The demonstrators demanded to speak with either Ulbricht or Grotewohl. However, the only functionaries who dared to come out to speak to the crowd were junior officials who were shouted down. The protesters wanted to speak to someone in a position of authority. Nevertheless, when Minister for Mining and Metallurgy Fritz Selbmann finally appeared, he failed to appease the crowds who were mistrustful of anything an SED official had to say (Dale, 2005, pp. 20–1).

Angered by the lack of a convincing response from their government, the scale of the protesters’ demands escalated. Calls for the resignation of the Politburo, as well as better living conditions, began to echo around the streets of East Berlin (Fulbrook, 1995, pp. 182–4). A builder addressed the crowd and demanded that the government reduce the working quotas, decrease prices in state-owned shops, improve the standard of living, abandon rearmament, free all political prisoners and hold free pan-German elections. Another worker then spoke and called for a general strike to take place the following day, 17 June 1953. The crowds cheered their approval before dissipating in order to spread the word across East Berlin with the help of several hijacked SED loudspeaker cars (Dale, 2005, pp. 21–2). A few workers made their way to the building housing the radio station RIAS in West Berlin and requested that their demands be broadcast. The radio station complied (Sperber, 2003, p. 628).

On the morning of 17 June 1953 there was only one topic of conversation in factories and other workplaces throughout the country: the strike in East Berlin (Kowalczuk, 2003, pp. 117–9). Workers on the early shifts across East Germany declared solidarity with their colleagues in East Berlin. Moreover, they decided to follow the Berliners’ example and protest about the working quotas hike. Other citizens dissatisfied with living conditions and angry with the SED were stirred into action by the sight of the protests and joined the demonstrating workers (Hagen, 1992, p. 201). As had happened in East Berlin, the nature of the protests quickly mutated, encouraged by the participation of citizens from other sectors of society. What had started as a limited demonstration about working quotas developed quickly into a nationwide uprising against the SED and its policies (Diedrich, 2003, p. 143).

As Soviet troops arrived in the late afternoon to put an end to the unrest and restore order, the SED was already formulating its official explanation of what had occurred. The regime rejected any claim that problems within East German society, as well as mistakes on the part of the Party, had provoked protests amongst citizens. Instead, the SED depicted the uprising as an attempted ‘fascist-counterrevolutionary putsch’ instigated by West German and American ‘imperialists’. This official version of events appeared in newspapers, propaganda texts, history books and school textbooks. It remained more or less unchanged until the demise of the regime in 1989. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and its allies rejected the claims made by the SED. In the days that followed 17 June 1953, West German politicians compared the events to the storming of the Bastille in revolutionary France in 1789 and drew parallels with the 20 July 1944 plot to kill Adolf Hitler. They not only equated the demonstrators with Claus von Stauffenberg and his plotters but also equated the SED regime with the Third Reich. West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer vowed never to rest until East German citizens could live in freedom (Eisenfeld, Kowalczuk and Neubert, 2004, pp. 384–5). On 3 July 1953 all members of the West German parliament (Bundestag), except those representing the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), voted in favour of a motion to make 17 June a national holiday and called it the ‘Day of German Unity’ (Tag der deutschen Einheit) in the Federal Republic (Brockmann, 2006, p. 253). Despite some West German academic and political debates regarding the actual extent and participants of the unrest in the GDR, a collective memory of the events of 17 June 1953 as a ‘people’s uprising’ (Volksaufstand) against the repressive SED regime passed into popular consciousness in West Germany (see Wolfrum, 1999).

1.2 Remembering 17 June 1953

This book is not a study of the unrest of 17 June 1953 per se. Historical writing on the uprising is dominated by studies detailing the course of the events, examining their protagonists and concluding on the nature of what happened (see, for example, Hagen, 1992; Koop, 2003; Kowalczuk, 2003; Mählert, 2003). Rather, I investigate the existence and nature of memories and awareness of the uprising in GDR society.

When scholars have addressed memories of 17 June 1953 in the GDR, they have focused particularly on the SED and concluded that such memories haunted the Party until the fall of the regime in 1989 (see Mitter and Wolle, 1993, pp. 155–62; Steininger, 2003). Regime policy makers, desperate to avoid angering the populace as they had done in 1953, formulated and adapted state policy accordingly. For example, when isolated strikes broke out in Magdeburg in 1956 one member of the SED city leadership noted in a meeting: ‘If you act like they did on 17.6.53, simply trying to regulate the situation by changing the working quotas, then that will create difficulties for us.’¹ Moreover, memories of the unrest influenced the state’s internal security doctrine. Permanently afraid that any hint of opposition might lead to a second uprising, the regime took extensive measures to nip any signs of opposition in the bud. These measures included massive expansion of the Stasi and the means by which the state could keep tabs on its citizens. Nevertheless, the trauma of the 1953 uprising remained in the back of Party functionaries’ minds. Minister for State Security Erich Mielke exemplified this when, in August 1989, he worriedly asked his advisors: ‘Do you think that there will be another 17 June tomorrow?’ (Mitter and Wolle, 1993, p. 500).

Using oral history interviews with former East German citizens, as well as archive research, this book investigates whether memories and awareness of the uprising of 17 June 1953 were equally prominent in the minds of ‘ordinary East German citizens’ who experienced the unrest first hand, as well as those born after 1953. It also examines the extent to which the SED regime succeeded in shaping ordinary citizens’ memories and awareness of the 1953 unrest. The citizens included in this study were ‘ordinary’ to the extent that they were not in political office, did not shape policy and were not prominent in the political hierarchy of the GDR. However, these are the only characteristics that they had in common, for there is no such thing as an ‘ordinary citizen’ in a general sense. As is made clear, the citizens in this study were born at different times, experienced different things and grew up in varying circumstances (Fulbrook, 2011a, p. 3).

Scholars have given little attention to memories of the 1953 uprising amongst ordinary citizens in the GDR. Where this issue is addressed, it is often done so only in passing as part of a broader study of the course and nature of the events of 17 June 1953. Sweeping and general conclusions tend to be drawn. Armin Mitter and Stefan Wolle have written that, despite its best efforts, the SED ‘could not eradicate the GDR population’s memory of the uprising’. They claim that citizens always remembered the uprising:

When one posed the question in workers’ pubs about what had actually happened on 17 June, one received the whispered answer: ‘We gave it to those at the top good and proper … one day it will kick off again, but the next time we will do better.’

(1993, pp. 155–62)

Others, such as Bernd Eisenfeld, Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk and Ehrhart Neubert have written that memories of the unrest and the manner of its termination in particular prevented citizens from attempting a repeat of the uprising (2004, p. 361). Mary Fulbrook and Stefan Wolle have concluded that memories of 17 June 1953 were often evoked and/or verbalised every time citizens became unhappy with the regime (Fulbrook, 1995, p. 78; Wolle, 1996, p. 119). However, Kowalczuk has also claimed that eyewitnesses rarely spoke to others about their experiences and that the content and frequency of these conversations depended on the extent of an eyewitness’ participation in the unrest (2003, p. 270).

Closer studies of memories of 17 June 1953 amongst East German citizens, while useful, have been limited in scope. The 1987 oral history project carried out by Lutz Niethammer, Dorothee Wierling and Alexander von Plato with citizens of the GDR provides more insight into eyewitness memories of the events (1991). They asked every interviewee how they had experienced 17 June 1953. The youngest of these interviewees was born in 1935. Thus all interviewees were at least 18 years of age in 1953. In his later analysis of interviewees’ responses to this question, Niethammer divided the interviewees into three groups. The first group either claimed that they had experienced nothing on the day or refused to respond to the question. They did not want to risk talking about a subject that was recognised as politically controversial. The second group was relatively small and consisted of interviewees who admitted to having taken part in demonstrations. Niethammer concluded that these interviewees had no desire or ability for social advancement. Thus they were not afraid of any possible consequences of talking about the uprising with a West German historian. The third and final group was the largest and consisted of interviewees who had seen and heard a lot on 17 June 1953, but who claimed that they did not want to take part in the unrest. Niethammer called such interviewees ‘the informed non-participants’ (die informierten Nicht-Beteiligten). They portrayed themselves as distanced spectators to the uprising. Niethammer surmised that this may actually be how they experienced the unrest. But he also suggested that the perceptions of at least some of those questioned must have been much more complex before they were filed away to a corner of the mind. Niethammer called this the ‘escape into the passive’ (Ausweg ins Passive). Due to the failure of the uprising and the SED’s account of ‘fascists’ and Western agents, it became necessary for citizens to distance themselves from what had occurred. Thus citizens’ memories of the uprising became reports of what others had done. They recast themselves as passive bystanders on the day. Niethammer concluded that the majority of those who experienced the unrest relegated the memories of their experiences to a corner of their minds where they remained unshared, either because the threat of the consequences for speaking about such experiences was too great, or because conditions in the GDR improved after the uprising (Niethammer, 2008).

In 1999 Annette Leo investigated memories of 17 June 1953 amongst workers from the steelworks in Hennigsdorf. Leo asked them what they had told younger colleagues about their experiences of the events. She found that the SED’s attempts to restrict information regarding the events had not completely extinguished workers’ memories of them. Workers had passed on fragmentary and vague information about their experiences to younger colleagues. However, Leo found that workers only passed on details that were acceptable within the parameters of the SED’s official account. Nevertheless, she writes that the passing on of any information about 17 June 1953 represented a residual rebellious conscience (Leo, 1999). This suggests that, as Mary Fulbrook has written, citizens regarded 17 June 1953 as a ‘symbolic talisman’ of opposition to the SED, even if they did not dare to contradict openly the regime’s claims or carry out their threats of a ‘second 17 June’ (Fulbrook, 1995, p. 178).

Bernd Eisenfeld has examined further the role of memories and awareness of the uprising amongst East German citizens. In 1999 and 2003 he investigated whether 17 June 1953 served as an inspiration for opposition amongst ordinary citizens toward the regime in the GDR. In 1999 Eisenfeld questioned seven citizens of the former GDR who had been part of the opposition scene between 1978 and 1982. In 2003 he again led discussions with eight former members of various 1980s opposition movements. Of those interviewed, 4 were between 8 and 13 years old in 1953, the others were under 5. Eisenfeld also researched whether opposition groups made reference to 17 June 1953 in samizdat publications produced in the 1980s. Eisenfeld concluded that oppositionists in the GDR only felt some sort of connection with the events of 17 June 1953 if the uprising had directly affected them or if eyewitness stories had made some sort of impact on them. Generation does not appear to have played a role i...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Day X: Fascists, Spies and Thugs
• 3. Tales of That Day
• 4. Watching the West
• 5. Remembering and Discussing the Uprising of 17 June 1953
• 6. 17 June 1953: A Symbolic Talisman of Opposition in the GDR?
• 7. Remembering 17 June 1953 in 1989
• 8. Conclusion
• Appendix A: Interviewees
• Appendix B: Publishing Figures of the Novels Featuring Scenes of 17 June 1953
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index