Men, Masculinity, Music and Emotions

Sam de Boise

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN:
  9781349566501
  9781137436085
• eBook ISBN:
  9781137436092
• Topic: Media & Performing Arts
• Subtopic: Music

This book looks at the historic and contemporary links between music's connection to emotions and men's supposed discomfort with their own emotional experience. Looking at music tastes and distaste, it demonstrates how a sociological analysis of music and gender can actually lead us to think about emotions and gender inequalities in different ways.

1

A History of Sex and Gender Differences in Emotion

Introduction

Emotions are relatively recent historic ‘discoveries’ inasmuch as the ways of understanding why we feel jealous, angry, happy, sad, euphoric or afraid in Western societies, are now informed almost entirely with reference to biological processes, located within individual bodies. A highly developed (and profitable) industry has sprung up, dedicated to studying the genesis of, and helping to manage, emotions and feelings (Illouz 2007), with much of the most influential research into the nature of emotions conducted in laboratories in the belief they can be objectively studied and measured through detached scientific methods. The most commonly invoked arguments, explaining how emotions come to be are therefore biological, psychological, physiological or neurochemical in nature and tend to be studied predominantly through these disciplines.

It is also clear when we hear about people ‘getting too emotional’, ‘falling madly in love’, being ‘blinded by rage’ or ‘overcome by sadness’ that we have come to associate emotions with irrational actions. This belief, in no small part, has coloured attempts to find the source of emotions. However the idea that emotions are things that ‘our bodies do to us’ (Barbalet 2001: 34), that ‘interfere’ with rational judgment or our cognitive faculties was not always the case. Whilst Western societies from the 17th century onwards tended to contrast rationality with irrationality, cognition with emotion and thinking with feeling,¹ what we currently understand as emotions have been conceptualised in different ways throughout history.

Whilst it may be tempting to write off older accounts to a lack of ‘sophisticated’ inquiry or to less ‘developed’ societies, our understandings of what we consider to be emotions shape our responses to them (Reddy 2001), how we label behaviour in others (Lewis 2000; Warner and Shields 2009) and how we come to see the actions of those who, incorrectly, we believe use their emotions to guide them. What is even more important for the purpose of this book is how closely the ‘discovery’ of emotions goes hand-in-hand with attempts to treat male and female bodies as capable of fundamentally different things (see Introduction). This is a still-pervasive view on men’s and women’s emotions; that men are far less emotional and women are less rational.

This chapter first traces how the idea of emotions as rooted in individual physiology developed from philosophical notions of the passions. It details how Descartes’ particular understanding of the passions and of the body paved the way for thinking about natural sexual difference in emotions as ‘hardwired’ into bodies. It highlights how this perspective was developed significantly through evolutionary and psychoanalytic frameworks, inspired largely by Darwin (Petersen 2004), which have tended to suggest that men are naturally ‘less emotional’. The chapter then moves on to explore some of the evidence for these differences before critiquing the theoretical premises underpinning much research on ‘hardwiring’. It looks at how findings from much feminist psychological and social psychological research, in contrast, has tended to argue that there may not be biological differences in terms of the types of emotions that men and women feel, yet men either experience emotions less intensely or engage in forms of public emotional suppression due to socialisation. It finally outlines how sociological insights further complicate the notion of gender difference in emotion. This discussion foregrounds the subsequent chapters and provides a precursor to many of the arguments outlined later in the book.

What is an emotion?

Descartes’ passions

The idea that human behaviour is influenced by things beyond direct, amenable consciousness has a legacy in Western societies, extending back at least as far as Plato and Aristotle (Solomon 2003 [1984]). Debates around the status of the self, of knowledge and of human existence, in classical thought, were often implicated in how far people were responsible for their actions. These questions were, and still are, fundamental to thinking about humanity. The ‘conventional’ history of emotions (Dixon 2005) tends to proceed from the idea that what pre-Enlightenment philosophers were describing when they talked about ‘passions’ was a kind of linguistic precursor to emotions (see de Sousa 1990; Oatley and Jenkins 1996; Solomon 1993). For example, we see throughout Plato’s Republic (published around 360 BCE) the idea of strong feelings that compel people to act in immediate, ‘immoral’ or ‘inappropriate’ ways. Philosophers’ ideas on what the passions were have heavily influenced current understandings of emotions. Therefore, in order to understand emotions in relation to masculinity and men’s bodies, it is therefore necessary first to outline how passions came to be thought of as distinct from reason before we can consider the evidence for supposedly inherent sex differences.

It is most commonly Descartes’ treatment, and the resulting ‘Cartesian subject’ (see Chapter 2), which is credited as the most influential perspective in developing a contemporary framework for studying emotions (Barbalet 2001; Solomon 1993). In his most influential text, Passions of the Soul, Descartes argued that ‘the soul has its principal seat in the little gland in the middle of the brain, whence it radiates into the rest of the body by mediation of the [animal] spirits, nerves and even the blood’ (Descartes 1989 [1649]: 37). Unlike others who believed the passions stemmed from the heart, he infamously detailed the existence of the ‘pineal gland’ which, he argued, was a tiny organ in the centre of the brain which was moved by the soul and responsible for guiding the body into action. This exercised a strong influence over men in the direction of succumbing to fear or anger, or in the ‘commotion that takes place in the heart’ (ibid.: 44). Nevertheless, passions could be controlled, he suggested, by:

apply[ing] oneself to attend to reasons, objects or precedents that convince one that the peril is not great; that there is always more security in defence than in flight; that one will have the glory and joy of having conquered, whereas one can expect nothing only regret and shame for having fled. (ibid.: 43)

Whilst Descartes insisted on the spiritual qualities of passions, his identification of bodily responses as located in the individual’s ‘pineal gland’ indicated a broader systematic move toward a more secular, medicalised, rather than theological interpretation (Dixon 2005). His thinking represented a departure from seeing humans’ behaviour as fundamentally interconnected (dictated by God) toward a more individualistic, autonomistic conception of action. Importantly, Descartes’ approach also suggested that the passions (located in changes in physiology) impacted on the mind’s ability to make judgments, to overcome fear, to think clearly or to resist the ‘disagreeable langour’ of sadness. These immoral feelings could be regulated through the application of rational choice: logically weighing up the ‘pros’ and ‘cons’ about a given situation. This implies a fundamental separation of consciousness – the mind – from human bodies, with the former being master of the latter.² In this respect, passions have, to some extent, ‘always been treated as dangerous and disruptive forces, interrupting the clarity of reason and leading us astray’ (Solomon 1993: 10).

Passions to emotions

The prevailing view that passions were unpredictable fluctuations of the body can be found in the very origins of the term. As Sara Ahmed suggests: ‘all forms of passion have been viewed as passive; indeed, the word passion and the word passive share the same root in the Latin word for suffering, passio’ (Ahmed 2010b: 209). This notion of passions residing in the body and acting on the brain can also be found in what we would understand to be the even more medicalised understandings of the ‘four humours’,³ which persisted in medical treatment up until the 18th century and served to further ‘equate moral with physical health’ (Arikha 2007: 55).

Whilst philosophical passions were important in the development of thinking about emotions, the two are not simply interchangeable however. Passions often had metaphysical connotations, with belief about the soul, spirits or gods as shaping personal feelings and, ultimately, actions. In this respect they were different from the more secular, biological and psychological accounts offered today. Importantly, this metaphysical connection to the soul means that there was, as Dixon (2005) argues, an established link between moral behaviour and passionate conduct, whereby the soul was not reducible simply to individual, rational thought. Put simply, if prior to the 17th century passions came from God but were channelled through the body, then passions were essential aspects of human existence that could not and should not be ignored.

Descartes believed that passions, and consequently behaviours, came from the soul but there was a belief that they, and therefore human bodies, could be regulated with a rational application of thought. His rationalist philosophy, in contrast with the theologians who spoke on the passions, was therefore premised more on individuals being held responsible for their actions. His views, in line with the broader economic, social and political upheaval in many Western European states, therefore emerged alongside the construction of a more self-centred, economically minded and socially autonomous subject.⁴ Societies of individuals (see Elias 1991) who believed that they themselves alone determined their own destiny, went hand-in-hand with the growth of a capitalist economy⁵ and it is therefore no coincidence that Descartes’ indicative thinking came to dominate the way in which Western states saw emotions.

In seeing individual bodies as the site at which behaviour was determined, this enabled the establishment of a medicalised science of the body (Federici 2004: 140). In turn, such a move also helped to shape perceptions of just what emotions actually where and where they originated from. Descartes’ views therefore both paved the way for thinking more about passions as biological rather than spiritual⁶ and, as already outlined, entailed an implicit value judgment of passions, as subordinate to rational thought.

William James did not conduct the first empirical study of emotion (Dixon 2005: 204); however, despite its numerous critics, his treatise in What is an Emotion (1884) is one of the most influential essays in claiming human emotions as a topic for psychological inquiry. In the article, James (who, by trade, focused on individuals) outlines how he was concerned only with emotions which had directly observable autonomic, bodily reactions (1984: 189). What he aimed to demonstrate, was the link between behaviour, emotions and individual biology. Whilst he accepted that there were emotions which did not have any outwardly visible manifestations, being an empiricist James preoccupied himself with documenting what he thought was provable through empirical observation.

In the article, James critiqued those who have privileged cognition at the expense of emotions or looked purely at the ‘reasonable’ aspects of human action. Rather than seeing an emotional response as being dictated by a cognitive (i.e. rational) appraisal of the situation, he instead insisted that the perception of the reaction was the emotion (1884: 189–190) arguing:

Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that the one mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must first be interposed between, and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble ... We might then see the bear and judge it best to run, receive the insult and deem it right to strike, but we could not actually feel afraid or angry.

Emotions, according to this perspective, preceded thinking logically about the situation before a response was initiated. Nevertheless, he still maintained that emotions and cognition were distinct and that emotions were characterised by discrete physiological changes in the body; what has come to be known as the ‘arousal approach’ to emotion (Becker 2012: 138).

Descartes’ influence on James was clear (Irons 1895) and James’ work, in turn, has influenced the development of cognitive-psychological empirical studies of emotions. This is something which we can clearly see in the passage above. Firstly, there is a belief that the body is often moved toward a certain reaction which individuals are not (immediately) able to consciously control. Secondly, emotions are about bodily changes which are interpreted by the brain, thus maintaining some separation between the unconscious, feeling body and the conscious, thinking brain.⁷ Thirdly, the examples that both Descartes and James use – fleeing in terror, striking out in anger – are responses which are understood as functionally adapted for human survival and therefore hardwired into human biology. Fourthly, in divorcing emotions from their spiritual connotations, emotions are about what the individual personally and subjectively experiences. Thus a combination of all these factors meant that emotions came to be seen as ‘built-in’ to a more mechanistic idea of individual, human physiology.

Sex differences in emotion

Evolutionary explanations

We will look at different interpretations of emotions throughout, however I want to note that this is still the pervasive view of what emotions are: biological processes that involve changes in an individual’s body and orient their actions toward ‘irrational’ behaviour.⁸ Emotions came to be understood to be connected to, yet different from, instincts, reflexes and drives (Izard 1977),⁹ and feelings, moods and sentiments (Thoits 1989: 318–319)¹⁰ but they were, and still are, seen as fundamentally biological processes which are activated by the brain. To this end, Turner and Stets’ (2005: 4) argument is indicative of how we currently understand emotions:

Emotions emerge as the brain activates four body systems: the autonomic nervous system, the neurotransmitter and neuroactive peptide systems, the more inclusive hormonal system, (including the neuroactive peptides), and the muscoskeletal system, which interacts with all of the other systems to generate observable emotional responses ... These systems are more than passive motors that are driven by culture and social structure. They are engines which have independent effects on the arousal and expression of emotions.

Owing to the influence of Descartes and, later, cognitive psychologists who often relied (and still do) on a dualist Cartesian approach (see Chapter 2), emotions came to be conceptualised as subjective, individual experiences (Reddy 2001). Thus, if everyone has the potential to feel emotion how different people respond to different situations, what emotions they feel in those situations and to what extent their actions are governed by emotional intensity, by extension came to be seen to be indicative of a particular individual’s constitutive, biological makeup.

Where emotions also differ from a Cartesian concept of passions is that whilst failure to control passions came to be seen as an individual’s inability to apply reason, perhaps due to a lack of education, failure to control emotions came to be seen as a failing in the individual. This perspective helped to justify the idea that different bodies were more or less intrinsically suited for different social roles. For example, if one person was more likely to lash out in anger than another, surely they would make a better soldier than a politician. If another was more prone to ‘hysterical’¹¹ outbursts then surely they cannot be trusted to make judgments which affect millions of people?

It is important to note that in seeing emotions as fundamentally linked to behaviour but separate from cognition, it also becomes possible to discount, as well as account for the behaviour of those who are believed to be acting on their emotions. Behaviour which is presumed to be driven by emotions therefore comes to be seen as a by-product of a mind that is ill-equipped to control the body, an individual moral failing or a biological predisposition toward certain states....

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction
• 1  A History of Sex and Gender Differences in Emotion
• 2  Boys Don’t Cry? Men, Masculinity and Emotions
• 3  Masculinity, Music and the Mass Market
• 4  Music Listening, Emotions, Age and Context
• 5  Distaste, Discourse and the Politics of Emotional Authenticity
• 6  Affect, Embodiment and Masculinity
• Conclusion: Rethinking Men, Masculinity, Music and Emotions
• Appendices
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index