Origins and Evolution of the US Rebalance toward Asia

Diplomatic, Military, and Economic Dimensions

H. Mejier, H. Mejier, Kenneth A. Loparo, Hugo Meijer, H. Mejier, Hugo Meijer

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9781349494453, 9781137440365
• eBook ISBN: 9781137440372
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Social Sciences

This book provides a multifaceted analysis of the so-called US 'rebalance' (or 'pivot') toward Asia by focusing on the diplomatic, military, and economic dimensions of the American policy shift in the Asia Pacific region.

P A R T I

Drivers and Rationale of the Pivot: Diplomatic, Military, and Economic Dimensions

C H A P T E R O N E

The Origin and Evolution of the Rebalance

Michael Mcdevitt

Why the Rebalance?

In November 2011, the Obama administration explicitly announced its new vision of a strategy to rebalance America’s efforts and investments toward Asia. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton published an article entitled “America’s Pacific Century” in the periodical Foreign Policy, which for all practical purposes was an “official” statement of strategic intent. In this article, Clinton indicated that Washington believed that the epicenter of global power is no longer the Atlantic but the Pacific and that the Asia-Pacific region was more important to the United States than ever before. She asserted that much of the history of the twenty-first century would be written in Asia. In her words, “As the war in Iraq winds down and America begins to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, the United States stands at a pivot point.”¹ She explained:

Asia’s growth and dynamism is central to American economic and strategic interests and a key priority for President Obama. Open markets in Asia provide the United States with unprecedented opportunities for investment, trade, and access to cutting-edge technology. Our economic recovery at home will depend on exports and the ability of American firms to tap into the vast and growing consumer base of Asia. Strategically, maintaining peace and security across the Asia Pacific is increasingly crucial to global progress.²

To pursue these interests she identified six discrete but interrelated areas that in combination would make the primary strands of policy activity aimed at accomplishing the rebalance strategy.³

1. Strengthening bilateral security alliances. Alliances were described by Secretary Clinton as the “fulcrum of our strategic turn to Asia.”

2. Deepening the working relationship, and in some cases have new partnerships with the emerging powers of China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam.⁴

3. Engaging with Asian multilateral institutions.

4. Expanding trade and investment: FTAs with Singapore and South Korea while moving out on Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) free-trade agreement. TPP is the centerpiece of the economic/trade portion of the rebalance.

5. Forging broad-based military presence, which means broadening US military posture to include Southeast Asia, Australia, and Guam.

6. Focusing on a rules/legal based behavior, which facilitates the advancement of democracy and human rights.⁵

It is important to note that these six policy lines of effort are not novel; in fact they are virtually identical to the post–Cold War policy approaches of the preceding three presidential administrations. A significant difference between what Clinton outlined and that of the preceding Bush administration is a much greater emphasis on engaging Asian multilateral institutions (discussed in chapter 2), which included making sure that senior officials actually participated in forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and being more supportive of the East Asia community building process in general.⁶

While the policy agenda has a great deal in common with the past two decades of post–Cold War Asian policy and strategy, the administration’s intent is to invest more energy and senior leader time in pursuing those policies. The rebalance implies a much more forward leaning, proactive policy presence in the region that is intended to convey a very strong message of reassurance—reassurance that the United States remains committed to East Asia.

The Clinton article received considerable attention because of the use of the term “pivot,” which implied to observers in the Middle East and Europe that the United States was pivoting away from those regions. This was an incorrect assumption, as the administration was quick to point out.⁷ To those who were watching the policy process closely however, the Obama administration made no secret of the fact that it intended to focus on the Asia Pacific. From the earliest days of President Obama’s first term, there was a focus on Southeast Asia.⁸ This was evidenced by Secretary Clinton’s visit to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) secretariat in February 2009 and Washington’s accession to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2009, which then made it possible for the United States to become a member of the annual heads of state meeting called the East Asian Summit (EAS).⁹ In addition, in 2009, the United States opened a mission and announced an ambassador to ASEAN in Jakarta; it also held the first US-ASEAN summit that year.

Secretary Clinton publically involved the United States in the South China Sea (SCS) issue at the July 2010 meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi. She surprised China by indicating that Washington was willing to facilitate multilateral discussions on the disputed territories of the South China Sea. She also said that the United States is opposed to any use of coercion or threats of force to resolve conflicting claims. Clinton justified her statement of concern by stating, “The United States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons and respect for international law in the South China Sea.”¹⁰

This policy step directly involved the United States in the South China Sea disputes in a sense that was different from merely urging peaceful resolution while maintaining neutrality on sovereignty claims. Not surprisingly, China was furious over Clinton’s comments, not least because previously it had succeeded in keeping the sovereignty issue off the ARF agenda and other Asian multinational meetings. Chinese officials denounced Clinton’s efforts to “internationalize” the issue; both the Chinese foreign and defense ministries criticized her for intervening in the South China Sea dispute.¹¹

By inserting itself more directly into SCS sovereignty issues, Washington was responding to a perceived demand signal from Southeast Asian nations,¹² which were worried about Chinese assertiveness in the SCS.¹³ Washington was also worried about Chinese behavior following the USNS Impeccable incident in the spring of 2009.¹⁴ As a result, the Clinton statement at the Hanoi ARF meeting accomplished two objectives. First, it reminded the participants, including China, that the United States intended to remain a serious strategic player in East Asia and that peace and stability in the SCS was a US interest. Second, it added one more policy landmark along the path leading to the unveiling of America’s new Asia strategy.

Other important landmarks on the way to the official 2011 announcement of the rebalance strategy included important speeches by Secretary Clinton making the case that Asia was the future and the United States intended to become more involved. In two speeches in Honolulu, Hawaii, in January 2010 and again in October 2010 she made all the points that appeared in her Foreign Policy article a year later. In Hong Kong in July 2011, America’s economic diplomacy was at the heart of her presentation, indicating that the United States was a resident economic power in Asia and was “here to stay.”¹⁵ In combination, these three speeches were a preview of the aforementioned Foreign Policy article “America’s Pacific Century.”

This record makes it clear that the White House had put the State Department “in the lead” when it came to setting the stage and formulating the basic tenants of the rebalance strategy. Obviously the Defense Department was preoccupied with the ongoing Middle East conflicts, but this is not to say that they disagreed with the basic trend of disengaging from conflicts on the ground in the Middle East. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary Clinton were clearly thinking along the same lines.

Perhaps the best example is the speech that Gates made in early 2011, when he forecast the nation’s future environment as one in which “the most plausible, high-end scenarios for the US military are primarily naval and air engagements—whether in Asia, the Persian Gulf or elsewhere.”¹⁶ He went on to say that the odds of the United States becoming involved in invading, pacifying, and administering another large third-world country ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction   The Reconfiguration of American Primacy in World Politics: Prospects and Challenges for the US Rebalance toward Asia
• Part I   Drivers and Rationale of the Pivot: Diplomatic, Military, and Economic Dimensions
• Part II   Regional Reactions to the US Rebalance toward Asia
• Conclusion   The US Rebalance toward Asia: Whither Sino-American Relations?
• Biographies
• Index