Eastern Orthodox Encounters of Identity and Otherness

Values, Self-Reflection, Dialogue

A. Krawchuk, T. Bremer, A. Krawchuk, T. Bremer

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN:
  9781349480180
  9781137382849
• eBook ISBN:
  9781137377388
• Topic: Theology & Religion
• Subtopic: Biblical Studies

From diverse international and multi-disciplinary perspectives, the contributors to this volume analyze the experiences, challenges and responses of Orthodox Churches to the foundational transformations associated with the dissolution of the USSR.

Part I

The Ecclesial Self: Traditional Identities and the Challenges of Pluralism

1

Russian Orthodoxy between State and Nation

Jennifer Wasmuth

Introduction

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 there has been an astonishing development of religion in Eastern Europe. In contrast to the predominant atheist doctrine in Soviet times, a massive religious renaissance has taken root since the early 1990s. The increasing influence of religion is especially true in the case of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). Polls conducted by diverse organizations indicate a high level of acceptance of the ROC. More than 70 percent of Russians (more than 80 percent, according to some sources) consider themselves Orthodox.¹ Also, 40 percent of the population declare that they completely trust the church² and 53 percent (including Muslims) praise the public efforts of Patriarch Kirill.³

The aim of this study is to demonstrate how the ROC defines its role in the present situation. Of particular interest here is the question of the extent to which it is able to fulfill political and social expectations. In focusing on the self-assessment of the ROC, our analysis is based on official church documents and on statements of leading representatives of the ROC. Such an approach seeks to avoid the risk of imposing Western theoretical frameworks and concepts, which may not apply to developments in Russia.⁴

The ROC and Service to the World

In 2000, the Bishops’ Council of the ROC adopted the Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church (hereafter, Social Concept; for text references, SC). For the first time, the ROC issued a comprehensive statement dealing with the most relevant political and social issues or, as the Social Concept put it, setting forth “the basic provisions of her teaching on church-state relations and a number of socially significant problems.”⁵

Although it may be a stereotype to think of Orthodoxy primarily in categories of liturgy and piety and of Orthodox belief as an attitude totally directed to “another world,” there is certainly a strong ascetic tradition within Orthodoxy that is oriented toward a withdrawal from the world. A case in point was the movement of the “Non-Possessors” (Нестяжатели), which opposed ecclesiastical land ownership at the turn of the fifteenth–sixteenth centuries. Very telling in this regard was the way in which Patriarch Nikon (1605–1682) defended

the ideal of contemplative monasticism, arguing that the goal of monastic life was personal salvation through continual prayer and purification of one’s heart. Though critics might call this egoistical, Nikon declared that it was “holy egotism” and that monasteries served the world precisely by providing a refuge from the turmoil of the world—and not for the monks only, but for the faithful as well.⁶

The Orthodox tradition thus contains a well-established conviction of its own “otherworldliness,” a “holy egotism” that can potentially impede social concern and social assistance.

In light of this tendency and the legal prohibition on social service by the ROC during Soviet times, it seems all the more remarkable that the Bishops’ Council of the ROC adopted the Social Concept. In doing so, the ROC affirmed that the “Church is called to act in the world in the image of Christ, to bear witness to Him and His Kingdom” and likewise “the members of the Church are called to share in Christ’s mission, in His service of the world” (SC I.2). Scott M. Kenworthy describes the Social Concept as a “deliberate attempt of emancipation from the mystical-ascetical stream of Orthodox tradition, an attempt to articulate the Church’s relevance to modern society in a language that is still conservative and imbued with tradition.”⁷

It is important to understand that the Social Concept “deals primarily with fundamental theological and ecclesio-social issues” (SC Introduction), and that it does not work out a detailed social-ethical program. Consequently, many questions are left open. However, the document does outline the ROC’s basic ideas of engagement in the service to the world “at the end of the 20th century and in the near future” (SC Introduction).

In this study we will focus on the chapters in Social Concept relating, first, to church-state and, then, church-nation relations.

Church-State Relations

The chapter on church-state relations sets forth the differences between the church, a “divine-human organism,” and the state, “which exists for the purpose of ordering worldly life” (SC III.1), and acknowledges a need for the state: “God blesses the state as an essential element of life in the world distorted by sin” (SC III.2). Despite their fundamentally different functions, the church and the state must work together. The ROC defines its relationship toward the secular state, “not bound by any religious commitments,” as follows: While cooperation with such a state should be “limited to several areas and based on mutual non-interference into each other’s affairs,”⁸ this does not imply “that religion should be radically forced out of all spheres of social life.” In sum, the principle of a secular state “presupposes only a certain division of domains between church and state and their non-interference in each other’s affairs” (SC III.3). This “new symphony”⁹ distinguishes the domains far more than the classical Byzantine model ever did and formulates a right to resistance: “If the civil authorities force Orthodox believers to apostatize from Christ and His Church and to commit sinful and spiritually harmful actions, the Church should refuse to obey the state. Following the will of his conscience, a Christian may refuse to fulfill commands of the state that could force him into a grave sin” (SC III.5). From the perspective of the ROC, the view that it is becoming more of a state church has no basis in fact. As Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, head of the Synodal Department for Church and Society Relations, explained, the

fact that the Church is growing and becoming more active by no means implies a change in its position on relations between the state and religion . . . the Church is not trying to substitute some state or form some politicized ideology . . . We do not want [the Church] to become part of the state apparatus, state machinery, or to assume secular functions.¹⁰

Church-Nation Relations

In the chapter on the relationship between church and nation, the ROC formulates a complex position, which is not without tensions and contradictions. Two principles, which were the subject of fierce controversies, are set forth here. These principles were previously voiced in the Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church, which declared: “1. The Russian Orthodox Church is a multinational Local Autocephalous Church in doctrinal unity and in prayerful and canonical communion with other Local Orthodox Churches. [ . . . ] 3. The jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church shall include persons of Orthodox confession living on the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church.”¹¹ The principles of a multinational church and a canonical territory are of central importance to the ROC, and we examine them more closely in the following sections.

The ROC as a “Multinational Church”

In its official statements, the ROC describes itself as “the great and multinational Russian Orthodox Church.”¹² Though the term “multinational church” is not used in the Social Concept, its biblical foundation is found in the chapter “Church and Nation”: “By His Blood Christ ‘hath redeemed us to God out of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation’ (Rev. 5:9).” Upon this soteriological base the Social Concept points to the universal, supranational nature of the church:

In the Church “there is no difference between the Jew and the Greek” (Rom. 10:12). Just as God is not the God of the Jews alone but also of the Gentiles (Rom. 3:29), so the Church does not divide people on either national or class grounds: in her “there is neither Greek, nor Jew, circumcised nor uncircumcised, Barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free: but Christ is all, and in all” (Col. 3:11). (SC II.1)

The Social Concept draws upon the biblical notion of a new community, united in faith:

The community of the children of God, “a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, an holy nation, a peculiar people . . . which in time past were not a people, but are now the people of God” (1 Pet. 2:9–10) . . . The unity of this new people is secured not by its ethnic, cultural or linguistic community, but by their common faith in Christ and Baptism. (SC II.1)

The reference to biblical texts situates the ROC’s reflection in a framework that is shared by all Christians. The emphasis on the universal nature of the church is especially relevant in relation to the risk of “phyletism,” or national tribalism within the church, a phenomenon to which Orthodox churches are particularly sensitive. The classic historical reference point for this has been the 1872 Council in Constantinople, which condemned the establishment of a Bulgarian Exarchate as a case of phyletism and a negation of the catholicity of the church.¹³

Further, the ROC necessarily stresses its universal and supranational nature because it truly is a multinational church. Its members include Karelians, Komi, Mordovians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Chuvash, Yakuts, Armenians, Tatars, and Buryats. The ROC thus must cope with ethnic diversity and also the tensions that arise when some minorities define their own identities in contradistinction to the ROC.¹⁴

This challenge is by no means new. The ROC is traditionally a multinational church. Ever since Muscovy became an imperial power in the sixteenth century and had to integrate non-Russian people, the ROC has had to develop a strategy to deal with ethnic and religious differences. In spite of the widespread opinion that in those times the ROC left nothing undone to strengthen its position in proclaiming the idea of Moscow as the “Third Rome,” recent research has shown that the ROC acted very pragmatically and focused its “modest efforts not on the conversion of pagans or Muslims, but on bringing a more perfect faith to the Russians who were already Orthodox.”¹⁵ In practical terms, the idea of Russia as the “New Israel” has been far more important than the idea of Moscow as “Third Rome.”

Today the ROC responds to ethnic and religious tensions arising from diversity within the ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction
• Part I   The Ecclesial Self: Traditional Identities and the Challenges of Pluralism
• Part II   Perceptions of the Religious Other: Difference and Convergence
• Part III   Orthodox Critiques of the West
• Part IV   Encounters with European Values
• Part V   Prospects for Religious Encounter, Consensus, and Cooperation
• Part VI   Emerging Encounters and New Challenges in Post-Soviet Central Asia
• About the Contributors
• Index