An Ontology for Social Reality

Tiziana Andina, Sarah De Sanctis

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN:
  9781137472465
• eBook ISBN:
  9781137472441
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

This book explores the complex domain of social reality, asking what this reality is, how it is composed and what its dynamics are in both theoretical and practical terms. Through the examination of some of the most important contemporary theories of social ontology, the book discusses the fundamentals of the discipline and lays the foundations for its development in the political sphere. By analyzing the notion of State and the redesign of ontology, the author argues in favor of a realist conception of the State and shows the reasons why this promotes a better understanding of the dynamics of power and the actualization of a greater justice between generations. This book captures the relationship between different generations within the same political context, and presents it as a necessary condition for the re-definition of the concepts of State and meta-State.

© The Author(s) 2016

Tiziana AndinaAn Ontology for Social Reality10.1057/978-1-137-47244-1_1

Begin Abstract

1. The Domain of Social Ontology

Tiziana Andina¹

(1)

Department of Philosophy and Educational Sciences, University of Turin, Turin, Italy

End Abstract

1.1 Conflicting Intuitions: Antigone’s Paradox

The origin of the story we are about to tell can be found in two things: a natural predisposition and a conflict of intuitions. The predisposition was captured and described by Aristotle in his Politics: human beings are by nature “political animals”—in other words, they are oriented, by natural inclination, to live a common life.¹ Forcing them to live a life in isolation is equivalent to imposing an unnatural condition on them. Aristotle does not delve into too much detail, but imagines that if there were a human being who chose to stand outside of the social forum, such a person would resemble a god or an animal.

It is not hard to imagine what Aristotle had in mind. It is sufficient to think of Edgar Rice Burroughs’ Tarzan stories. Tarzan was born on the edge of civilization, to a young English couple who found themselves in the African forest after the mutiny of the crew of the ship Fuwalda that was taking them to the African continent. Extremely weakened by childbirth, Tarzan’s mother died after a few months, while his father was forced to defend himself and the child from the attack of a group of gorillas. The man did not survive, but Kala, a giant gorilla, saved the baby. Tarzan was then raised as an ape: he learnt how to move, to survive in the jungle and to speak ape language. At the end of many vicissitudes caused by encounters with humans, Tarzan will choose to return to the animal dimension, as if to symbolize that once the path of socialization is inhibited or interrupted, this fracture will remain open forever.

So, if the disposition to social life is very natural, social reality is complex and much more than “instinctive”. It is made up of objects, relations, relationships, structures and superstructures that are intimately connected. Some parts of this structure are invariant and necessary, that is, constitutive of the part of reality we call “social”; others, instead, are the result of contingent choices and options. Therefore, one of the tasks of social ontology is to distinguish the first from the second, identifying the elements of the social world that are not subject to negotiation and those with a stipulative character. Following a research of this kind, it will be possible to discuss to the so-called normative aspects of social reality.

As much as human beings are predisposed to social life, some see the latter as the cause of profoundly conflicting dynamics. While it is true that man is a social animal, it is also true that a non-accessory character of his being is defined by freedom, that is, his right/duty to self-determination. Freedom is the reason for his ethical and moral responsibility, both as a single and as a social individual. Now, these two traits, both constitutive of human nature, often seem to be opposed. The task of social ontology is also to identify the causes of this conflictuality and, possibly, find a remedy.

The main agents of social reality are people, and its most important objects are relations and boundaries: between people, between people and institutions, and between institutions. Relationships can be of different kinds: some are little binding while others are extremely binding. They depend on the structure of social reality.

A significant example is that of the stipulation of pacts. It is no coincidence that Dante Alighieri, in his Divine Comedy (cantos xxxii, xxxiii and xxxiv), places the betrayers of trust and pacts² in the depths of Hell, in a place far away from sight and memory: namely, the Cocytus, a frozen lake divided into four concentric zones. Traitors to their own relatives (the case is of two brothers of the lineage of the Alberti who slew each other) are immersed up to their necks in Caina. In Antenora, in a similar position, but with the head raised up so that it is more exposed to frost, are located the traitors to the homeland. In Ptolomea the betrayers of guests lie supine. Finally, in Judecca, completely immersed in the ice and in the most diverse poses, we find the traitors to benefactors.

Dante’s disdain unfolds in the harsh and unforgiving description that runs through these pages: there is no room for mercy. Justice is manifested in the sentence that the poet chooses to inflict upon those souls. It is easy to imagine that the reasons for Dante’s severity are not only of a moral order: those who betray trust and break pacts put social stability to a serious test, as it is based on trust between people in the first place, among people and institutions in the second place, and finally between institutions themselves. So, what simply cannot be tolerated in a social system is that people should not honor deals.

Dante seems to be certain that deals require absolute respect. It seems that he really knows in all cases what it means to comply with a pact, just as he seems to know a fortiori what we are talking about when we talk about pacts. However, even this matter, which seems so fundamental to social reality—pacta sunt servanda said the ancients—is somewhat controversial. So let us ask ourselves what a pact is, and if respecting a pact is always equivalent to doing justice. Things are not as simple as Dante takes them to be, and it is not difficult to show how this matter hides conceptual as well as ethical conflicts.

In this respect, it might be useful to recall Sophocles’ Antigone, which presents an exemplary case. At the very beginning, Sophocles makes it clear that this is a situation in which the private and public spheres intertwine and are at one. Affections are tied to power in an inextricable tangle. Antigone exemplifies the essence of the conflict hiding between the lines of social reality: on the one hand there is the search for sociality as a constitutive dimension of human life, on the other hand there is the loss of individual self-determination, which has also consequences under the moral profile. This is a sharp conflict that invests the very foundations of social reality.

We are in Thebes, and the curse that fell on Oedipus does not appear to have ceased to be: this time it is his sons, Eteocles and Polyneices, who are affected by it. The facts are simple. Following Oedipus’ exile, due to the devastation he inadvertently caused, Creon—brother of Jocasta, Oedipus’ mother and wife—became regent of Thebes for a short period. As soon as the two twin sons of Oedipus come of age, being unable to claim a priority in the succession to the throne, they established a diarchy: each would rule for a year, on a strict rota basis. Everything seemed to work well, until Eteocles broke the pact. The day came in which his brother Polyneices was entitled to succeed to him, but Eteocles expelled his brother, accusing him of incompetence and wickedness. Polyneices’ exile led to serious violence, and the city of Thebes was beset by a bloody war. The brothers came to a final direct confrontation, and the outcome of that fight, leading to the death of both brothers, provides the background for the story of Antigone.

Antigone and Creon—respectively, the sister of Eteocles and Polyneices, and the new king of Thebes—in addition to being the protagonists of the narrative, express two opposite but (at first sight) equally well-founded insights. Now, imagine we had the opportunity to ask the two about the foundations of social life. From Antigone we could get an answer like this:

The social world as seen by AntigoneWhat is the foundation of social reality? People, of course. To expand, social reality is based on both the respect for the written and unwritten agreements of men, and on the respect for other agreements: those between men and their gods. Not complying with this basic principle is equivalent to showing arrogance and contempt for the gods. If ever a king, a father who should administer public life and pursue justice for the welfare of his subjects, failed to comply with those laws, he would also show that he did not care for justice, nor for his subjects’ future. Woe to the city that should know a king of such kind. He would give rise to irreconcilable tensions in the hearts of his citizens; contradictions so radical as to force them to choose between the freedom to determine their own moral principles and the need to obey the laws of the state. Thebes had the misfortune to be ruled by such a king and underwent injustice and pain. You certainly recall the story:

What, hath not Creon destined our brothers, the one to honored burial, the other to unburied shame? Eteocles, they say, with due observance of right and custom, he hath laid in the earth, for his honour among the dead below. But the hapless corpse of Polyneices—as rumour saith, it hath been published to the town that none shall entomb him or mourn, but leave unwept, unsepulchred, a welcome store for the birds, as they espy him, to feast on at will.

Such, ’tis said, is the edict that the good Creon hath set forth for thee and for me, —yes, for me, —and is coming hither to proclaim it clearly to those who know it not; nor counts the matter light, but, whoso disobeys in aught, his doom is death by stoning before all the folk.³

The world that Antigone bears in her mind and heart has three characteristics: (1) it is founded on the idea of justice; (2) it is based on a relationship between individuals (and their memory) that, as such, precedes the relationship with the state and its institutions; and (3) this relationship is primarily based on the respecting of pacts, invisible but very real constraints that develop between people and, in the case of Antigone, between people and gods.

Justice is achieved in compliance with the laws, and the laws of the gods precede and ground the laws established by people. Therefore, no human decision, no political power, although inspired and descending directly from the gods, can justify breaking them. No political power may limit the individual’s right/duty to self-determination, especially when it comes to ethically delicate matters. For this reason, the way the king treats one of the two brothers, in Antigone’s view, is intuitively unfair, whatever the wrong he may have committed.

Now let us see how things are for Creon, for whom Antigone’s actions foreshadow an open threat to his power.

The social world seen by Creon

You ask for what reasons I decided to put Antigone to death? Do you believe I cannot imagine what pain this will bring to Haemon, my hapless son betrothed to her? Antigone has committed serious wrongs that no king could forgive. The main lies in having deliberately violated my commandment. In doing so, not only has she called into question the authority and the power of her king, but even worse, she has questioned the reasons for my commandment, namely my commitment to the good of the community. And what reasons could there be that pushed me to act as I did, other than a concern for the fate of my people? Thebes has already unjustly suffered too much, and a king, if worthy, always prefers the good of the community to his own or that of his friends and relatives.

For since I have taken her, alone of all the city, in open disobedience, I will not make myself a liar to my people—I will slay her. So let her appeal as she will to the majesty of kindred blood. If I am to nurture mine own kindred in naughtiness, needs must I bear with it in aliens. He who does his duty in his own household will be found righteous in the State also. But if any one transgresses, and does violence to the laws, or thinks to dictate to his rulers, such an one can win no praise from me. No, whomsoever the city may appoint, that man must be obeyed, in little things and great, in just things and unjust; […] But disobedience is the worst of evils. This it is that ruins cities; this makes homes desolate; by this, the ranks of allies are broken into head-long rout; but, of the lives whose course is fair, the greater part owes safety to obedience.⁴

The arguments presented by Creon are interesting. Disaster is a step away, but he does not notice. The world that the sovereign has undertaken to defend has two characteristics: (1) it is founded...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Frontmatter
• 1. The Domain of Social Ontology
• 2. Theories
• 3. State and Justice
• 4. A Cross-Section of Power
• Backmatter