Perceptions of the EU in Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa

Looking in from the Outside

V. Bachmann, M. Muller, V. Bachmann, M. Muller

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781349680702, 9781137405463
• eBook ISBN: 9781137405470
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: African Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This collection examines how the EU is seen in the two regions that are at the centre of its geopolitical interest. Focusing on Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, it provides a critical assessment of how their external perceptions relate to EU policy towards them.

Part I

EU in Crisis: External Relations and External Perceptions

1

Studying External Perceptions of the EU: Conceptual and Methodological Approaches

Ole Elgström and Natalia Chaban

The European Union’s (EU’s) leadership capacity in the international arena is not determined by only the EU itself. It is also influenced by external actors’ perceptions of the EU’s roles and by their reactions to EU initiatives. Is the EU perceived as a legitimate actor that has something valuable to contribute? Are its promises seen as credible? Are its policies and actions perceived as coherent? In the coming years, the EU will face a number of important international negotiations, which will shape future global governance structures: new efforts to save a free trade agreement within the World Trade Organization (WTO), attempts to decide on global rules to regulate the emission of greenhouse gases, and the EU’s aspirations to become a strong global energy governance player, just to name a few. In all these cases, outsiders’ perceptions of the EU will be key to the Union’s impact on the outcome. The EU’s economic and financial crisis adds to the uncertainty surrounding EU influence: in what ways may the crisis change other actors’ images of the Union?

The aim of this chapter is to present a conceptual foundation for the study of external perceptions. Apart from definitional issues, this involves an explication of why such analyses are important to carry out, but also a discussion of links between this field of study and other theoretical constructs, such as credibility and legitimacy, and to the field of study of EU coherence. We also emphasise important variations in external perceptions of the Union, in terms of perceptual layers, geography, and issue areas, and provide a brief overview of existing research, with an emphasis on methodologies and data sources.

We argue that an analysis of outsiders’ views of the EU is essential because it a) contributes to our understanding of the EU’s self-identification and the roles the EU plays in international politics and b) provides insight into how these roles influence what impact EU policies have on external actors. Roles are based on both an actor’s own role conception and others’ expectations (role prescriptions) and shaped in continuous interaction with other actors. The effect of EU actions is influenced by its perceived credibility, legitimacy and coherence. It is difficult to lead if your promises are not credibly backed up. It is improbable that you can be a normative power if outsiders do not perceive your ideas as legitimate. Perceived incoherence – between words and deeds, but also across EU institutions – may create obstacles to the EU’s effective action.

External perceptions can refer to elites or public opinion, as well as to media imagery, all of which are dealt with in this book. Elite perceptions are key to understanding EU effectiveness in multilateral negotiations. They are also crucial for informed dialogue-based EU public diplomacy, which prioritises dealings with selected cohorts of external stakeholders (such as business, media, and civil society [Lynch 2005, 4]). Mass perceptions – partially shaped by media images – also have a direct bearing on the new public diplomacy of the EU. Media is a powerful opinion shaper able to activate selective communications in a given society. It is a key channel for spreading ideas related to foreign policy and international relations, from elites to the public and vice versa (Entman 2003, 420). Finally, we emphasise the huge variation that exists in external images of the EU across different domestic societal groups, geographical regions and issue areas. The EU may be seen as a leader in commercial negotiations, and perhaps in climate change, but not in the military field; it may be seen as a global power and an international leader by local decision-makers, but not by the general public in the same location; and it may be seen as a normative power whose messages are adopted or adapted in some geographic surroundings, but resisted and rejected in others.

Some conceptual issues

Perceptions that derive from images belong to the ‘psychological milieu’ of decision-makers – the world as the actor sees it (Jervis 1976, 13). They can be conceptualised as mental pictures composed of our cumulated experience-based knowledge about the surrounding world and beliefs about desirable behaviour (Vertzberger 1990, 114–27; Stein 2002). There is also often an affective component, as one can expect a consistent set of affective responses to cognitive images (Cottam 1992, 13–14). We submit that policy-, decision- and opinion makers have identifiable political world views, with images of self and relevant ‘Others’ as key ingredients, and use these as a basis for making judgements and for selecting strategies. According to Jervis (1976, 28), ‘it is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision-makers’ beliefs about the world and their images of others’. Perceptions of self, others and of the situation they are facing help ‘movers and shapers’ interpret and understand a complex reality and assist them in structuring – but may also distort – what they see.

In contrast to national decision-makers, who tend to have a more intensive direct exposure to foreign policy events, locations and actors, the general public’s representation in foreign policy remains challenging and selective. Nevertheless, national elites still need to identify and measure the public stand on a pressing foreign policy issue – not least to ‘delegitimize and silence the opposition’ (Entman 2003, 420). In both democratic and undemocratic settings, tracking public opinion on foreign policy is a valuable exercise. In the former case, the voters’ opinion will impact the outcomes of political processes. In the latter case, ‘governments are constantly polling the public to understand their aspirations and pre-empt them’ (Krastev and Leonard 2007; website: https://www.opendemocracy.net/article/globalisation/visions_reflections/global_poll_IBSA). In either scenario, an external actor will benefit from a systematic account of its images among the domestic public in order to devise efficient and cost-effective public diplomacy strategies.

A special place in external image formation belongs to the news media. Spreading and activating ideas related to foreign policy, the media are located in the intersection of the flows of information between elites and the public (Entman 2003). Moreover, their ‘regularity, ubiquity and perseverance ... make them first-rate competitors for the number-one position as international image-former’ (Galtung and Ruge 1965, 64).

Why it is important to study external perceptions of the EU

Experts on EU foreign policy have for many years commented on the relevance of outsiders’ perceptions of the EU. Bretherton and Vogler (2005, 45) noted that ‘the relationship between internal coherence/consistency ... and perceptions of the EC’s presence ... is of central importance’, and Hill (1993) made others’ expectations a key component of his ideas on a ‘capabilities-expectations gap’, when claiming that there was an alarming mismatch between the hopes other actors held of the EU as an international actor and its relatively limited ability to deliver. Still, there has been a dearth of structured and focused analyses of the role external perceptions play for EU foreign policy. While a number of important empirical works have appeared in recent years (for two excellent overviews, see Lucarelli 2013 and Chaban and Holland 2014), it is still the case that – as we observed already in 2006 (Chaban et al. 2006, 246) – ‘there is a lack of theoretical explorations in this area’ and a need for studies that focus specifically on the theoretical foundations for research on perceptions.

We see two main reasons why scrutinising external perceptions is an important endeavour. First, external images of the EU form a vital part of a process of self-identification of the EU as a political grouping and of shaping the roles of the EU in international politics. Lucarelli (2013, 430) submits that ‘political identity is not only constructed inside, around aggregating factors such as the recognition of a common past and future, the sharing of values, the legitimisation of common institutions, and the definition of policies /but/ ... is also constructed in the interaction with the outside ... who grant (or not) recognition to the EU and its role in the world, project their own representation of the Union and interact with it accordingly’. Roles are by definition shaped both by an actor’s own role conception and by other actors’ expectations and role prescriptions, often chiselled out in processes of negotiation with other actors (Holsti 1972; Elgström and Smith 2006; Harnisch 2011). Outsiders tend to hold relatively persistent views of what role(s) the EU should play in a certain context, determined by previous experience, prevalent images of the EU (partly influenced by the EU’s own declarations) and what is perceived as appropriate EU behaviour (based on normative expectations). These role prescriptions serve to mould EU roles and actual role performance: it is difficult to be a leader if you do not have followers. Strong expectations of a mediator role tend to strengthen such propensities among EU policymakers. Examining external perceptions thus helps us gain an understanding both of the general importance of the EU in the world and of its roles in different negotiation contexts.

Second, external perceptions impact upon the effectiveness of EU policies (cf. Chaban et al. 2006). What the world thinks about the EU is an important factor in facilitating or opposing the achievements of EU policies (Lucarelli 2013). Studying external images of the EU helps us assess whether the EU is considered as exceptional, as a ‘different great power’, nota bene if other actors see it as a normative power. The existing literature on EU foreign policy has to a large extent focused on internal EU decision-making processes, relations between various actors (including Member States, the Commission, the European Parliament and others), EU actor capacity, and the impact of EU policies. Adding an examination of outsiders’ perceptions of EU foreign policy to this analytical toolkit provides us with another key explanatory instrument. In our view, outsiders’ reactions to EU policy initiatives are often determined by the extent to which they are perceived as legitimate, credible and coherent. This is why we devote the next section of this chapter to the connections between external perceptions and these theoretical constructs.

External perceptions: Legitimacy, credibility and coherence

When examining the impact of external perceptions, there are three qualities of foreign policy that we consider to be of particular importance: outsiders’ perceptions of legitimacy, of credibility and of (in)coherence.

Legitimacy is ‘a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’ (Suchman 1995, 574). It is thus a subjective, relational quality and defined by an actor’s perceptions (Hurd 1999, 381). Following Hurd’s (1999, 379) general reasoning, there are three generic reasons why an actor may follow the policy advice of another actor: (1) because the actor fears the consequences of not following the advice, (2) because it sees the advice to be in its own self-interest, (3) because it feels that the other actor and its recommendations are legitimate. Legitimacy is thus a source of social influence (as a component of ‘soft power’): the greater legitimacy an actor has, the easier it will be to persuade others to follow one’s policy recommendations (Nye 2007, 177). It is also a relatively ‘inexpensive’ type of influence, as the actor does not have to use its tangible power resources.

In the literature on the EU, a distinction is often made between input and output legitimacy (Scharpf 1999). We propose to add a third dimension, which we call normative legitimacy. Input legitimacy refers to the perceived legality of an actor’s involvement in decision-making, and thus to institutional design, in this case to whether or not the EU is a recognised player in an institution, an actor who is part of the decision-making machinery. Output legitimacy concerns the perceived achievements of an actor, if it is seen as providing effective outcomes that benefit others. Finally, normative legitimacy refers to whether the norms an actor pursues, or is associated with, are regarded as ‘right’, just and appropriate.

Official recognition of the EU as a player, which is key to input legitimacy, varies across international institutions. In the WTO, the EU is a full member, represented by the Commission. The EU as such does not have membership in most other intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), but it still often acts as a unitary actor where its positions are presented by the country holding the EU Presidency or by Commission spokespersons. Nevertheless, outsiders’ positions regarding EU actorness may vary considerably in different contexts, and this, coupled with the perceived internal unity of the Union (see below), obviously may have an impact on the effectiveness of EU policy initiatives.

Regarding EU output legitimacy, we expect that major economic contributions from the EU, for example, in terms of development assistance, increase its perceived legitimacy. We know that countries that are major recipients of EU aid tend to view the EU as a leader and a great power (Chaban et al. 2013). The Union’s unilateral initiatives in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and its economic support to less developed countries for climate change mitigation have contributed to its position as a perceived leader in environmental negotiations (Elgström 2014). When, on the other hand, EU initiatives are not backed up by financial aid, this tends to result in decreased credibility (see below). A dilemma for the EU is that once it has started to give economic support, or to make unilateral concessions, external expectations tend to rise, resulting in problems in keeping contributions on pace with expectations (cf. Hill’s capability-expectations gap).

The EU’s normative legitimacy is closely linked to the debate on the EU as a normative power (Manners 2002), as the Union’s potential to shape others’ perceptions of what is good is based on the normative acceptability of the values and ideas that it seeks to promote. This is a topic to which we will return in detail later in this chapter, when we investigate variations in images of the EU across themes and geographical regions.

Like legitimacy, an actor’s credibility is a subjective quality. It depends, we suggest, on perceptions of resource availability, of (dis)unity and of (in)coherence. If threats, promises or other types of commitments are not perceived as being backed up by fungible resources (that is, resources that are ready for use in addressing the issue at hand), other actors are not likely to take them seriously. One potential obstacle to resource availability is domestic resistance to policy decisions. If your domestic political situation is such that your parliament, or national veto players, can be predicted not to support a decision to commit resources for a certain purpose, this will affect your external credibility. In the special case of the EU, disunity may also refer to the distribution of preferences among Member States and institutional actors. Positions taken by the Commission or by the Presidency in an international negotiation, which are in the eyes of others not likely to have the support of a Council majority (or, in case of unanimity decisions, by Member State veto players), are not credible, and this will weaken your bargaining power. Finally, incoherence over time (shifting positions or behaviour from negotiation to negotiation) will have an impact on your bargaining credibility and therefore hurt your negotiation strength. For example, if you have the reputation of unpredictably carrying out some threats, but not others, external actors will be less likely to obey than if you have a consistent record of fulfilling your commitments.

In the case of the EU, its ‘failure’ in the 2009 Copenhagen climate change negotiations, in which the Union was marginalised in talks leading up to the final deal, has been explained with reference to outsiders’ perceptions of Member State unwillingness to support further unilateral concessions, diminishing the credibility of EU negotiating positions (Elgström 2014). In negotiations with developing countries – nota bene the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) talks with African, Caribbean and Pacific states – a lack of credible commitment to additional funding has been seen as an impediment to progress. In the absence of credible promises of economic support, the EU’s repeated assurances that it will be a ‘partner for development’ are seen as mere rhetoric (Sheahan et al. 2010). The marginal role of the EU in many areas of ‘high policy’ has often been explained by a perceived absence of EU internal unity, with major Member States having differing preferences, diminishing the credibility of united EU action.

The final quality of foreign policy to discuss is coherence (or consistency). Nuttall (2005) makes a distinction between three types of coherence in the EU system: horizontal, institutional and vertical. To this can be added two other categories: chronological and implementation coherence. Horizontal coherence means that policies with external implications, pursued by different parts of the EU machinery, should be consistent with each other. Institutional coherence refers to external relations positions being coherent, regardless of whether decisions are taken in a supranational or an intergovernmental context. Vertical coherence addresses coherence among member states and between member states and EU institutions. Chronological coherence refers to consistency over time (see above), while implementation coherence means consistency between words and deeds.

Existing empirical research on the EU as an actor in multilateral negotiations indicates that institutional coherence does not seem to pose any major problem: the EU is mostly pictured as one, monolithic actor across the board. Nor is chronological incoherence mentioned as a problem. Vertical incoherence is alluded to in the EU literature as a major type of consistency problem in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, while it is seldom referred to in trade or environmental negotiations (Elgström 2006). In general, the major irritants seem to be horizontal and implementation incoherence. In trade negotiations, the gravest concerns are caused by the perceived inconsistency between the EU’s principled free trade approach and its protectionist agricultural policy (Elgström 2007), but also by its insistence on bringing environmental and human rights elements into trade discussions, reflecting pressures from various strong domestic constituencies. The Union’s ‘policy coherence for development’ has been addressed as another problematic area, in which commercial interests and sustainable dev...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction: Global Europa? How, When and to Whom?
• Part I  EU in Crisis: External Relations and External Perceptions
• Part II  Perceptions of the EU and Its Crisis: Self-Perceptions and External Perceptions from Georgia, Ukraine, Kenya and Senegal
• Conclusion: Looking from the Outside In Looking from the Inside Out
• Bibliography
• Index