We are sexual beings, or at least we can be. Even though virtually all of us are born with sexual organs, what we choose to do or not do with our genitalia is up to us. This ability to choose appears unique to human sexuality. We have the ability to decide how to act sexually depending on our understanding of the situation, our role in it, and our current desires. If we do not see that sexual behavior is appropriate or necessary on our part for whatever reason (e.g., lack of desire, vow of abstinence, something in the situation is askew), we can avoid any type of sexual involvement or action. We are bound neither by instincts nor innate drives to reproduce, to engage in sexual behavior for the sake of pleasure, or to behave sexually in any way. Throughout our lives, there are innumerable reasons why we act in a sexual manner or refrain from any behavior that could be interpreted as sexual in any way. We will develop a position here that cognition is much more important to human sexuality than sexual physiology. Cognition and language, two related abilities that we tend to possess in spades, are fundamental to our sexuality and to all sexual behavior. While cognition, or at least one aspect of it, will be discussed throughout this book, language will be considered to a much lesser extent. A brief word on languageâa system of verbal, manual, or written signs and/or symbols used to communicateâmight be useful here to help to introduce our position on sexuality.
âMale versus female,â âvirgin versus slut,â and âheterosexual versus homosexualâ are just a few of the contrasts used by contemporary English speakers to refer to various aspects of human sexuality. In many quarters, a contrast such as âstraight versus bent,â or the more frequently encountered today âstraight versus gayâ, has replaced the âheterosexual versus homosexualâ distinction; and in some academic circles, âconstructionism versus essentialismâ is used to distinguish particular theories or positions concerning sexuality. No doubt such contrasts have been useful in the cause of making sense of human sexual reproduction, sexual behavior, sexual differences and similarities, social roles and relationships, and other related matters, but they have been, and continue to be, confining in terms of interpreting sexuality. What happens if, instead of viewing social actors as either male or female, we begin to understand them as male or not male, and female or not female? How about changing âgay versus straightâ to âgay versus not gayâ and âstraight versus not straightâ? Imagine the world of possibilities created by a simple change in wording. But this is thought rather than a simple linguistic manipulation. We can interpret our sexual world in different, more complex and multi-layered, and, frankly, much more interesting ways by rejecting rigid or traditional means of categorization and considering, or inventing, novel ways of construing sexuality.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to argue that evolution and biology have no relevance to contemporary human sexual interests, desires, and behaviors. Collectively, we are the sum of all that has happened to us ancestrally up to this point in time, and our biological make-up determines what we are capable of within any given environmental context, and sets limits on what is possible. There is, however, a significant difference now between human and infrahuman sexual behavior, and such a difference needs to be taken into account in any satisfactory theory of human sexuality. Human evolution, if nothing else, has provided us with an incredible and unique advantageâthe brain and central nervous system. To deny its evolutionary development is nonsensical, but to focus on the brain as the source of, say, sexual behavior is far too narrow. It is not brain structures or processes that account directly for the wide range of human desires, attractions, and responses. Taking the mind into account in a serious fashion is required or, if a computing metaphor is acceptable, an understanding of the software that operates within the confines of the hardware is essential. As humans, and unlike infrahuman species, we are free from biophysical markers and instinctual demands (Masters, Johnson, & Kolodny, 1988). Human sexual behaviors are not simply immediate responses to particular colours, smells, or sounds; sex among humans is not simply a case of instinctive or automatic responses to various stimuli. We have no overarching âbiological imperativeâ, although we may have personal, psychosocial imperatives related to sex. We take a vast array of contextual features, including both external and internal factors, into consideration before behaving in a sexual manner. It is not just the naked body of a desirable individual, however attractive, that elicits a sexual response from the human observer. After all, a sexual response is much less likely should a naked individual be pursued by a knife-wielding attacker, or sitting on a concrete floor of a grimy institution among other naked individuals, and we are experiencing anxiety due to the knife or the dirty place full of naked bodies. The setting or the situation is important to human sexual behavior âindeed, all human behavior. We tend to think, and interpret, before we act, although certainly not in every instance. Understanding what kind of behavior is required in a particular situation permits survival and adaptation and, while some may question the quality of our thinking both individually and collectively on many occasions, it is certainly a key human characteristic.
Our so-called sex hormones (e.g., estrogen, testosterone) play vital roles in sexual functioning, but they do not determine our sexual behaviorâat least not directly. Testosterone, for example, is required by men in order to produce viable sperm cells, but it is present in both males and females because it is a releaser hormone (i.e., it promotes the release of epinephrine into the blood stream). Epinephrine or adrenaline increases blood flow, which provides more available energy to the body. What is done with the available energy, however, remains a matter of choice for both sexes. If we are in a situation where danger appears imminent, we may choose to run, to fight, or to employ some other strategy. Similarly, if we are in a situation where sexual contact appears imminent, we may choose to run, to engage in sex, or to engage in some other behavior (e.g., âAnyone for a game of darts?â). Regardless of the cues, and regardless of our serum testosterone or serum epinephrine levels, we will consider our options and choose what we think is the best course of action, which may or may not prove to be the best, depending on the outcome of the act.
Currently, few serious thinkers take an analytic unit such as sexual instinct very seriously when it comes to human sexuality. In many circles, unfortunately, we still embrace related notions like personality traits. Such units, if they refer to hard-wired and innate behaviors, are wholly inadequate in explaining the range and adaptability of human sexual responses, desires, and behaviors. So-called evolutionary theories, such as sexual strategies theory (Buss, 1994, 1998), which rely on traits are very limited in explaining human sexual variation. All evolutionary approaches, as Singer (1985) noted, including sexual strategies theory, suffer from the problem that they cannot be evaluated directly, and the support for theories that promote evolutionary or genetic arguments is flimsy at best. Studies that rely on autopsy differences in a single brain structure in a handful of corpses of people who died of different causes and were assumed to have a particular sexual orientation (LeVay, 1991), or on results from various âsexual strategyâ surveys conducted on US college campuses over the past two or three decades (Buss, 1994), let alone one that relies on simplistic and static units like traits, or even needs and drives, should not convince a serious thinker of the adequacy of any theory. A dynamic unit that can capture both change and stability of desire and behavior appears to be a necessary component of any adequate theory that can account for human sexuality. Fortunately, dynamic units of analysis do exist in psychology.
One striking aspect of human sexual desire and expression is variety. The labile nature of sexuality across both the species and the lifespan of individuals must be accounted for by any adequate theory. Just as the timing of human sexual expression is virtually limitless, the range of sexual interests and behaviors performed by people is vast. Whether alone or with others, we engage in a wide range of activities that can be construed as sexual, and not all of these behaviors result in an orgiastic finaleâalthough many do. Sexual practiceâindeed, gender itself (see Weeks, 1995)âis much more complex than many once believed, and explanations require a corresponding complexity. With this in mind, if we adopt a simple, biological, hedonistic position that seems to be at the basis of some views of human sexuality (e.g., Buss, 1994), how are we to explain variations? Theories have been developed, including a few long-standing and rather intriguing efforts (e.g., Freund, 1990), but most have proved to be too general or sometimes too limited, too vague, or too descriptive to be of much use. How can we account for the complexity of this sexual expression at the appropriate level of analysis? This appears possible only if we consider all possibilities in terms of human sexual outcomes. In other words, people do not engage in sex for a single purpose such as reproduction. In reality, we do not engage in sex for reasons strictly of reproduction, physical pleasure, or any single purpose; rather, as meaning-makers, we engage in sexual behavior, and all behavior, in response to a broad and varied set of possible meanings of the actions. The meanings of human sexual behavior or the reasons for human sexual thoughts, feelings, and action are likely as varied and unique as there are individuals. For some individuals, sex may be only about reproduction and, for others, only pleasure, but sex canâand probably doesâstand for much more for the majority of individuals. The purpose of sexual thoughts and behavior can be for expressing love, expressing hate, expressing disgust, wanting to fall asleep, needing distraction from regularity, needing regularity, confirming attractiveness, advancing a relationship, achieving intimacy, and many other understandings or reasons. A survey of university students (Meston & Buss, 2007) found 237 distinct reasons for human sexual behavior, including âGetting closer to Godâ and âWanting to humiliate the personâ, and it is doubtful that teenaged undergraduates at one Texas university are all that experienced or sophisticated in sexual realms. It is possible, if not probable, that a single sexual act can have multiple meanings and purposes. We need to consider not only personal attitudinal and emotional factors, but also larger cultural and sub-cultural contexts (Masters et al., 1988).
It appears as if sexual expression and sexual orientation are far more fluid than fixed throughout the course of life (e.g., see Diamond, 2008). Kinsman (1991, 1996) has argued that sexual interest in same-sex and opposite-sex individuals waxes and wanes over time for many individuals to the extent that he is reluctant to talk of dominant individual sexual orientations, and he is certainly unwilling to ascribe significant genetic or biological roots to such notions as âhomosexualityâ or âheterosexualityâ. We plan to address these and other issues about sexuality in this book by engaging in an ambitious project. We will present a rather unique theory that, we believe, can account for the rise, development, change, and stability of sexual desires, interests, and identities. Contrasts such as âgay versus straightâ form not only a means of interpreting sexuality or making sense of sexual actors, but part of a much broader process by which all people make sense of or construe experiences in the world and, as such, come to form personal and social identities. Everyone appears to develop a unique, yet related, system of bipolar contrasts that is the fountainhead of all behavior, not just sexual behavior. Our chosen social science theory, personal construct theory (PCT), places an emphasis on the manner in which we describe, explain, predict, and eventually come to control our experiences and our everyday lives (see Kelly, 1955, 1963, 1970). The theory has at its core a very dynamic unit of personality analysis, the personal construct. Personal construct theory appears to us to be a helpful approach for both understanding sexuality and assisting those whose sexual encounters and experiences are not what they, or others, hope that they could be.
We intend to present an expansion of this theory but, before attempting to develop what began as an individual, psychological theory into more of a psychosocial theory, we need to lay some groundwork. At least a couple of topics seem necessary to include in an introduction to a theory of human sexuality. First, we will discuss briefly the terminology across disciplines that will be encountered in this book, and elsewhere for that matter, in reference to sexuality topics. This appears essential because, as mentioned, and as we will argue, language is important. Second, we will provide a brief historical overview of sexuality research and theory over the past two centuries. While this historical sketch will be both brief and somewhat selective, it will provide some context for the effort that we will make in the second chapter to describe in detail PCT and our theory and position, which we will elaborate in subsequent chapters.
Sexuality Terms and Constructs Across Disciplines
While this book presents a theory of sexuality rooted in PCT that is largely informed by psychology, we will also draw on constructs from social theories and concerns from social movements. Clarity of the language of sexuality cannot be taken for granted within disciplines, let alone across disciplines. At a fundamental level, the biological and physiological meanings connoted by many contemporary psychological terms can be at odds with the historical and social contexts that are subsumed under sociological terms. The territory where these two disciplines overlap is of the most interest and value to our purposes, although we feel the need to identify distinct cross-disciplinary differences in the language of sexuality. ...