Misunderstanding Asia

International Relations Theory and Asian Studies over Half a Century

Gilbert Rozman

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781137512918
• eBook ISBN: 9781137506726
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

In this volume, experts on East Asia focus on each of the past five decades to explain the weak predictive power of traditional IR theory as applied to the region and uncover the true forces driving change.

P A R T I

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The 1970s

C H A P T E R 1

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The 1970s: Asia’s Emergence in IR Theory

Gilbert Rozman

Asia was a sideshow in international relations (IR) theory of the 1970s, reflected in urgent appeals to bring together the separate traditions of area studies and social science analysis coming from the few area specialists entering the disciplines but feeling like outcastes. In three developments, above all, observers felt ill-served by their artificial separation. The Sino-Soviet split, the nature of the Vietnam War, and the modernization of Japan posed challenges that many recognized were not adequately addressed. As these issues aroused appeals for better theories—comparative communism, comparisons of revolutions and liberation movements, and comparative modernization—a basis was established for an upsurge in scholarship on Asia and in theorizing about it. All three of these theoretical pursuits, however, proceeded haltingly in the face of doubts on how to analyze East Asian differences from the West and their impact on IR. If comparative analyses gained a following, it did not mean that IR theory took them seriously, not only due to their shortcomings but also due to anti-area studies biases.

Discussions of all three issues fell short of academic rigor. Writings on the schism in the Communist movement were rarely well informed about internal debates in the Soviet Union or China, relying on English-language translations, especially of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, and repeating simplistic assumptions from one or the other side of the divide rather than assessing both sides at once. Analysis of the Vietnam War became highly politicized, leading to entrenched assumptions on both sides that generally overlooked the regional picture. Finally, social scientists did not, as a rule, take Japan’s modernization seriously, as if arguments about a unique process linked to cultural background were just the illusions of area specialists. If one or another of these themes drew serious attention, specialists usually narrowed the topic with little regard to IR theory, and generalists stuck to the theory without delving deeply into the facts of the situation. Scholars overcame this divide slowly.

The reality of far-reaching developments could not be brushed aside: the war in Vietnam reshaped the US role in Asia, the Sino-Soviet split led diplomacy to gain more importance than in any recent decade, and Japan’s unrelenting rise drew predictions that it could become a superpower or at least shake up how analysts understood a leading power to behave. Fundamental questions about IR theory were finally being centered on Asia.

The Cold War remained at a high pitch in the 1970s, echoed in theories on IR and in comparisons of states with powerful IR implications. Yet, in addition to Vietnam’s impact on extending research into newly developing countries and Japan’s influence on widening coverage of Asian dynamism, China’s sudden shifts in direction aroused great interest. In comparison to the initial quarter century of the postwar era, Asia gained far more prominence. This was a breakthrough decade, but that did not lead to IR theories effective in covering the themes deemed most urgent by area experts.

Three events punctuated the IR narrative of the 1970s against a solid backdrop of economic miracles in maritime Asia and economic stagnation in continental Asia. The defining development in great power relations was the two-stage normalization of Sino-US relations in contrast to the multistage deterioration of US-Soviet relations and the abject failure to make progress in overcoming the Sino-Soviet split. Second, the turning point in the postwar hegemonic US position in maritime Asia was the defeat in the Vietnam War, as it increasingly acknowledged Japan’s growing economic role in Southeast Asia while elements of Japan’s modernization model spread along with its “flying geese formation” to South Korea and elsewhere in the region. Third, East Asia was shaken by the back-to-back Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia amid a genocidal implosion and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, exposing a chaotic state in continental Asia while highlighting Sino-US common interests. China’s sudden changes raised the stakes for theory as great and middle powers alike jockeyed for advantage.

Theoretical preferences of the 1950s–1960s came under scrutiny. For modernization theory, the challenges from Asia ranged from Chinese claims during the Cultural Revolution to have found an alternative path to economic development and social transformation to Japanese claims, echoed in South Korea, to modernize without the litigiousness of the West toward a harmonious system based on distinctive values. If convergence was excluded, shared views of IR were in doubt. For balance of power theory, the assumption of a polarized world in which states choose sides persisted, but there was greater scrutiny of the notion of monolithic blocs under superpower control as triangular configurations began to draw attention. Also, for theory aimed at explaining the impact of culture and national identity, the Vietnam War awakened new interest, as did assertions across Asia on limiting the impact of westernization. The 1970s saw extensive rethinking in multiple areas of IR theorizing, but theoretical blinders limited the impact.

In a span of one decade the Asian landscape was turned topsy-turvy. Making Asia a focus of expansionism, the Soviet Union went from détente and upbeat talks with Japan to a massive military buildup and support for aggression in Afghanistan and Cambodia. Switching from the frenzied class struggle of the Cultural Revolution and isolationism mixed with revolutionary sponsorship, China absorbed the lessons of modernization in East Asia after joining the United States and Japan in resistance to the Soviet Union. By the end of the decade the Cold War in Asia and modernization as a driving force improving relations had emerged as essential issues for IR theory.

In the shadow of the Cold War, IR theory had entered the 1970s confronting the dichotomy between class struggle/ revolution and top-down, bureaucratic reform/ modernization as the driving force of social change and of inclination toward world conflict or global cooperation. This fundamental divide was reinforced by Marxists insistent on a struggle to the end with no room for compromise. Similarly, realists under the sway of theory obsessed with democracy as the basis of cooperation saw two systems in mortal combat. There was a growing school also of hybrid theorists, who saw revolution turning into modernization and class struggle giving way to the bureaucratic pursuit of reform amid acceptance first of peaceful coexistence with convergence over the horizon. This meant discerning the connection between the domestic transformation of the Soviet Union and its IR policies, notably relations with the United States. By the decade’s end, the spotlight had turned to China.

History was not in the forefront in IR theory, but it had a place in attempts to trace the roots of revolution and modernization, including to popular attitudes toward the international environment. The Sino-Soviet dispute brought new attention to causes traceable to the pre-Communist era in both states, while the rapid rise of Japan drew further interest in the sources of its modernization after earlier fascination with the causes of its militarism. In most states, a focus on national history followed the urge to impede convergence, emphasizing uniqueness and showing aloofness to drawing close to foreign partners. Yet, centering on “preconditions of modernization” or of revolution, it paved the way to visualizing a parallel transformation, portending well for cooperation. In the 1970s the role of history was often divisive for IR theory in support of more common ground, but a foundation was built for a positive role by looking to shared regional traditions, pre-Communist sources of reform, and eras prior to Cold War polarization centered on ideological and strategic divisions. For IR theory the inclusion of history was a vital step toward taking Asia more seriously. It struck a blow against deductive approaches and simplistic transfer of some Western experiences. Indeed, attention to history led the way in new criticisms of IR theories.

Visualizing the Cold War in East Asia

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa argued that the Cold War in East Asia was different, merging decolonization and revolution while propelling China into the forefront for a time.¹ In the 1970s, however, an insecure Soviet Union went on the offensive in Asia while a defeated United States retreated in Southeast Asia as a refocused China saw Asia in a new light. The Cold War in Asia sparked more trouble spots, raised the stature of more actors, and posed strikingly new challenges for IR theory. By the end of the 1970s China was newly active in what it called the “second world” (not just with the superpowers and the countries of the Third World it had targeted for revolution), Japan’s foreign policy was deviating more from that of the United States in Asia, and the Soviet Union was pressing for an advantage in Asia as it stirred a wide backlash. With the United States seeking full normalization with China and an alliance-like opposition against the Soviet Union, and with Japan tilting toward China as it turned its back on the Soviets, the decade ended with the semblance of regional cohesion against a sole adversary and its now marginalized allies—a parallel to Europe. Explanations centered on aggressive Soviet policies that had aroused this coalition of countries.

IR theories had to adapt to the greater complexity of the 1970s, but it is tempting to simplify the story into that of a rising power challenging the status quo and meeting a concerted response. The Soviet Union was the big loser, requiring more theoretical clarity about why it acted so recklessly.² Japan was perceived as a winner by some, but it ended the decade failing to maintain its omnidirectional foreign policy and finding (after agreeing to China’s language opposed to Soviet hegemonism) that ties with China were not as good as expected and tightening its US alliance was the best means to greater security. Similarly, US hopes for China were unrealized. Japan’s reticence about drawing close to the United States requires theoretical explanation. The allure of a strategic triangle, the fear of convergence’s effect on identity and IR, and the weight of Asianism in Japanese thinking are ideas of theoretical salience.

Discussions of the Cold War in East Asia apart from the strategic triangle, which is covered below, focused on Vietnam through the decade, on Afghanistan at decade’s end, and, from time to time, on North Korea. In the case of Vietnam, China was seen at first as aligned with the Soviet Union in opposing the United States, and in 1979 as appealing for US support for punitive action to rid Cambodia of Vietnam’s troops supported by the Soviet Union. In contrast to Sino-US joint opposition to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, China and the Soviet Union backed North Korea against the United States and its ally, South Korea. While the Soviet military buildup and assertiveness was intensifying the Cold War, there was little clarity on the lines of division. Still, the Soviet Union in isolated intransigence confronted the United States, its allies, and China. In IR theory the expansionist state provoked a broad coalition against it, although Indian cooperation with the USSR and the reasoning behind China’s opposition proved puzzling. The intensification of the Cold War gave the edge to realist alarm over liberal hope even as IR were growing messier.

Analyzing the Strategic Triangle

Realist theory predominated, regarding the Soviet Union and the United States as adversaries striving to shift the balance of power in their favor. The US edge grew with the breakthrough with China. The Soviet side countered with further military buildup and assertive policies, especially in Asia. This simplistic narrative may have satisfied many IR theorists, but others saw the need to reach out to area studies. The main question marks were China and the Soviet Union and what motivated them.

Over the decade theorists faced a string of developments or lack thereof that kept the focus on the quality of their analysis. Given the poor state of Sino-Soviet ties and the sense that the Soviet Union was on the offensive while drawing closer to the goal of overtaking the United States, would China, the weak leg in the strategic triangle, turn to the United States for balancing purposes? Once Sino-US ties had improved, and notably after Mao Zedong’s death, would the Soviet Union woo China in order to rebalance the strategic triangle? Finally, after Soviet policy grew more assertive late in the decade, would China and the United States solidify their side of the triangle? In the postwar era this decade was the first chance to look closely at theories of the strategic triangle. This should have given a big boost to IR theorists, who earlier had been preoccupied with the Cold War in Europe and now, finally, had Asia in their sights.

In this context IR theory faced challenges in predicting both bilateral and trilateral relations, on the one hand, and varied domestic factors driving them, on the other. In the face of the 1969 Sino-Soviet battle over an Amur River island on the heels of the Soviet Union’s new Brezhnev Doctrine for intervening in the internal affairs of states in the socialist bloc, starting with Czechoslovakia, what would be the impact on the Sino-US relationship? Furthermore, after the Sino-US breakthrough, what would be the effect of domestic developments, such as the death of Mao Zedong, on the relationship between the two Communist giants? At the decade’s end, the focus changed to how the aggressive Soviet posture would impact Sino-US relations as economic interests were boosting them. Much was written about these three bilateral relations, each drawing rapt attention at times over the decade, but interpreting them as part of a triangular context proved to be a daunting theoretical challenge into the 1980s. The poor quality of strategic triangle analysis from a realist perspective of balancing the power of other world leaders and from a constructivist perspective of interpreting the perceptions driving Moscow and Beijing left a blemish on IR theory at this time.

Leonid Brezhnev and the leaders around him were decisive in shaping the strategic triangle while being alert to the changing US administrations and developments in China, from the US reconciliation to Mao’s death to the consolidation of power by Deng Xiaoping at the end of the decade. Nixon offered both states détente and a cooperative role in managing the end of the Vietnam War. Carter gave them a democratic leader eager to reduce tensions. Mao’s death removed the key source of the Sino-Soviet split and the target of Soviet diatribes, while Deng’s ascent and his abrupt policy redirection eliminated the rationale for charges against revisionism in the Soviet Union. If IR theory could have been expected to predict serious overtures to China, there were few advocates of this interpretation. Some saw Chinese national identity as fixated on the humiliation by Tsarist imperialism, manifest in Soviet occupation of vast territories that China claimed. Such thinking trumped strategic triangle balancing, it was assumed. This obsession also was presumed to be independent of socialist ideology; so that when Deng jettisoned much of the ideology, Soviets supposedly had no reason to see a new opportun...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Introduction
• Part I   The 1970s
• Part II   The 1980s
• Part III   The 1990s
• Part IV   The 2000s
• Part V   The 2010s
• List of Contributors
• Index