Finnish Military Effectiveness in the Winter War, 1939-1940

Pasi Tuunainen

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781137446046
• eBook ISBN: 9781137446060
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Eastern European History
• Index: History

This book analyzes the multi-faceted phenomenon of Finnish military effectiveness in the Winter War (1939–40). Drawing on a wide array of primary and secondary sources, Pasi Tuunainen shows how by focusing on their own strengths and pitting these against the weaknesses of their adversary, the Finns were able to inflict heavy casualties on the Red Army whilst minimizing their own losses. The Finns were able to use their resources for effective operational purposes, and perform almost to their full potential. The Finnish small-unit tactics utilized the terrain and Arctic conditions for which they had prepared themselves, as well as forming cohesive units of well-motivated and qualitatively better professional leaders and citizen soldiers who could innovate and adapt. The Finnish Army had highly effective logistics, support and supply systems that kept the troops fighting.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

Pasi TuunainenFinnish Military Effectiveness in the Winter War, 1939-194010.1057/978-1-137-44606-0_1

Begin Abstract

1. Introduction: Understanding Military Effectiveness

Pasi Tuunainen¹

(1)

Department of Geographical and Historical Studies, University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, Finland

End Abstract

On the morning of 30 November 1939 the Red Army launched an all-out attack on its small neighbor, Finland. This unprovoked invasion marked the outbreak of the Winter War, the only contemporary armed conflict in the age of total war fought in its entirety in Arctic conditions. The odds were badly against Finland. Yet the unexpected happened. A country with a population of 3.9 million lasted for 105 days against a 170 million-strong nation. The hostilities ended on 13 March 1940 in a negotiated settlement. The Finns ceded territories and leased a naval base to the Soviet Union. The Finnish armed forces had been able to frustrate Soviet plans to occupy Finland. Thus Finland avoided capitulation, and survived the conflict as a democratic and independent nation.

The conclusion that the Finnish Army performed effectively on the battlefields of the Winter War has often been reached simply by judging its outcome. In many works on the Winter War, Finland’s relative military success is attributed to the determination, training and equipment of the Finnish soldiers. Some authors have commented on the problems of the Red Army, especially on how weather and terrain worked against the Soviet troops and their heavy weapons, rendering them unable to exploit their personnel and technical superiority. After becoming apparent that it was not going to be an easy undertaking for the attacker, the Finns received a great deal of international sympathy and admiration but very little tangible support. Reports by foreign war correspondents contributed to the widespread image of a little nation fighting together for a common cause against a formidable foe. ¹

Without rebutting these rather simplistic interpretations of Finnish relative military effectiveness, I argue that they are not based on thorough research since the authors rarely have had access to the full range of the belligerent’s own sources or the linguistic abilities to use them. There must be more to Finnish military effectiveness than is presented in these previous accounts of the Winter War. It is a truly multifaceted phenomenon.

The Winter War in a Nutshell

The subtitle of Olli Vehviläinen’s political history Finland in World War II, Between Germany and Russia, ² aptly encapsulates the larger security environment and the context of European power politics facing Finland in the late 1930s. After the signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Non-aggression Pact on 23 August 1939, Finland became part of the Soviet sphere of influence. The Soviet Union threatened Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with invasion unless they granted the USSR military bases. Subsequently, in June 1940, Soviet troops occupied the territories of the independent Baltic nations and put in place pro-Soviet governments. The Soviets had envisioned a similar future for Finland. According to the Soviets the security of Leningrad was jeopardized by the proximity of the Finnish border. ³

While negotiations for territorial concessions were still going on in early October 1939, Finland mobilized its entire army under the guise of ‘special maneuvers’. The Finnish Army, Navy and Air Forces initially consisted of some 280,000 men with considerable material shortages of heavy weapons and munitions. Prewar defense budgets had been strained, affecting procurements. The Finns had some 400 useful artillery pieces, mainly of small caliber, and just 32 obsolete tanks. Their Air Force consisted of 110 aircraft, of which only 75 were suited for air combat. The Finnish Navy was small but possessed reasonably modern vessels. At the outset of the war, the Leningrad Military District, which was responsible for the Finnish campaign, had a half million troops at its disposal to execute its offensive plans. They had the support of 5700 field guns, over 6500 tanks and 3800 planes. The Red Navy (Baltic Fleet) was also powerful. ⁴

The Finnish strategy rested on the basic assumption that national survival was at stake in the event of a large-scale war against the Soviet Union, which was deemed the only possible enemy. Everyone at the highest politico-military levels, as well as the majority of the population, understood this. The Finns generally trusted their democratically elected leaders, and their army enjoyed popular support. They highly treasured their freedom, territorial integrity and independence, which had only been achieved in 1917. The Soviet Union had installed a puppet government headed by the Finnish communist O. W. Kuusinen, which made the Finns question Soviet motives. The extensive bombings of civilian targets also deepened these sentiments among the Finnish population. ⁵

The bulk of the fighting in the Winter War occurred in cold weather and deep snow. The Finns were familiar with the terrain and weather conditions and had been trained and equipped for winter warfare, but the Red Army was not equally prepared in field-craft and survival skills. Moreover, many Finnish soldiers had unmatched local knowledge as many were literally defending their homesteads. Understandably, this boosted their morale and increased their already high level of determination not to give in. The battlefield performance of the Finnish Army was enhanced by the fact that the majority of Finnish soldiers were—on average—better marksmen than the Soviet soldiers. ⁶

Finland was a ‘nation in arms’. There was a long tradition of voluntarism in Finnish defense. Many had voluntarily improved his fighting skills in the 100,000 strong Civil Guard Defense Corps paramilitary organization. Most of the reservists had received refresher training since 1935 and thus they knew their wartime tasks. The troops had been formed on a territorial basis, which gave the units cohesion. The firing methods of the Finnish artillery were far more sophisticated than those of the Soviet artillery. Yet the Finns had problems integrating all arms. ⁷

The Finnish–Soviet border regions comprised one theatre of operations. Within it the areas of operation were different in terms of military geography. The Finns had accurately anticipated that the Karelian Isthmus, between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga, would be the location for the main Soviet thrust because it was closest to Leningrad and the terrain with its road network was suitable for tanks. The nature of the war there would be trench warfare and attrition. In the northern sectors the Finns were surprised that the Soviets dispatched large formations along almost every road. Yet in these vast forests the Finnish troops had more space to maneuver and in most areas the operations became mobile (Map 1.1). ⁸

Map 1.1

The Battles of the Winter War, 30 November 1939–13 March 1940

After crossing the border the Red Army operating on the Karelian Isthmus had orders to advance and reach the Finnish capital, Helsinki, in three weeks. Their main offensive was to be supported by an attack north of Lake Ladoga aimed at the rear of the main Finnish forces. In the central part of Finland the Red Army had orders to cut the country in half. The first phase of the war was characterized by Finnish withdrawal from the border to prepared, and sometimes well-fortified, positions. During this phase the Finnish forces employed delaying tactics and conducted counter-attacks. On the Karelian Isthmus, where Finnish troops were mainly on the defensive, the situation was stabilized as the Finns were able to bring the Soviet offensive to a halt. The second phase constituted trench warfare at the main defensive position, the Mannerheim Line, named after the Finnish Commander-in-Chief Marshal C. G. E. Mannerheim. After the Red Army had twice attempted in vain to breech the Finnish defenses, the Finns launched an ill-fated major counter-attack just prior to Christmas on the Karelian Isthmus. Meanwhile, elsewhere during December 1939, the Finns managed to defeat a couple of Soviet divisions with their over-snow mobility. These first victories, and the fact that the Soviet attacks were successfully contained, restored Finnish confidence in their own capabilities and thus were psychologically very important. ⁹

The situation for the Finns was sometimes critical in many sectors. Along the long Finnish–Soviet border Finnish operations were based on active defense, flanking attacks and envelopments, even in the Soviet territory. In order to spare their main resources, the people, the Finns avoided frontal attacks. Instead their ski troops conducted many encircling attacks by which the road-bound Red Army columns were hemmed in from all sides into pockets or mottis. The cut-off units were split into smaller segments to be destroyed piecemeal. These stormed mottis yielded them large quantities of war booty. Yet due to a lack of men and heavy weapons, the Finns were not always capable of defeating the encirclements. ¹⁰

In mid-February the Red Army, after having made considerable reforms, started its well-prepared major offensive on the Karelian Isthmus, which led to a breakthrough at the central sector in Summa. During this third and final phase of the war the Finns, conducting a strategic retreat, fell back to the middle position and after two weeks to the rear position, where the onslaught was repelled. The Gulf of Finland rarely froze completely, except suddenly during the extremely harsh winter of 1939–40, thus in March these special conditions allowed the advancing Red Army to seize the initiative by opening a new front on the ice cover of the Bay of Vyborg. The Finns were able to send their troops from Lapland, where a brigade of Swedish volunteers had taken responsibility. The Finnish leadership had, in vain, entertained the idea of large-scale Swedish support. Germany, the Soviet Union’s partner at the time, also watched from afar, and held some weapon shipments to Finland until the end of the Winter War. ¹¹

The Finnish war effort depended on the total support of the home front. The women and other non-combatants freed men from the farms and munitions factories to the firing lines. Similarly, the 100,000 members of the Lotta Svärd, the Women’s Voluntary Auxiliary Corps, served in various supply, headquarters (HQ) and air surveillance duties. The transportation system was based on utilizing the Finnish State Railways. The maintenance system to keep the troops fighting generally functioned. The training centers sent fresh units into battle, and the total strength of the Finnish Army peaked at 340,000 against one million Soviet soldiers. Finland’s abili...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Frontmatter
• 1. Introduction: Understanding Military Effectiveness
• 2. The Origins of Political and Strategic Effectiveness
• 3. The Roots of Operational and Tactical Effectiveness
• 4. Professional Leaders and Citizen Soldiers as an Effective Fighting Force
• 5. The Logistics and Maintenance of Effectiveness
• 6. Conclusion: The Sources of Finnish Military Effectiveness
• Backmatter