Partnerships, Power and Peacebuilding

NGOs as Agents of Peace in Aceh and Timor-Leste

T. Dibley

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9781137369697
• eBook ISBN: 9781137369703
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Asiatische Politik

By highlighting the scope and limitations of local NGO agencies, this book presents a unique perspective of the relationship between peacebuilding theory and its application in practice, outlining how well-educated, well-connected local decision makers and thinkers navigate the uneven power dynamics of the international aid system.

1

Landscapes of Partnership

The interplay of geopolitical circumstances, historical precedence and the particular qualities of conflict has determined the parameters around which local and international NGOs in Timor-Leste and Aceh collaborate. These factors have influenced the extent of the international attention received by local movements in both places as well as the expectations that local and international NGOs working in partnership have of one another. As a consequence there were considerable differences between the kinds of peacebuilding projects that local and international NGOs have been able to work on together in Timor-Leste in the aftermath of the 2006 crisis and in Aceh after the signing of the Helsinki peace agreement.

This chapter examines three periods in the history of Timor-Leste and Aceh, with a particular focus on the roles of local and international NGOs in each of those periods. The story begins during the New Order period (1966–98), when Timor-Leste was part of Indonesia. The New Order regime had considerable influence during this time over the operation of international and local aid agencies in the two places. The fall of Suharto in 1998, followed by the independence referendum for Timor-Leste, led to some considerable changes for NGOs. Independence for Timor-Leste led to greater freedom for local NGOs, but also new challenges as these organizations had to negotiate the arrival of hundreds of international agencies. In Aceh, this same period was characterized by a brief opening up of political space followed by a severe restriction of freedoms, which affected the way international and local NGOs worked together.

By 2005–06 – the period during which the Helsinki peace agreement was signed in Aceh and violent conflict erupted in Timor-Leste – NGO partnerships in Timor-Leste were built on a longer history of collaboration than those in Aceh. The relationships in Timor-Leste were also less restrained by state structures. By contrast, in Aceh, NGO partnerships for peacebuilding projects developed in the aftermath of two events in which the Indonesian state was heavily involved: the post-tsunami humanitarian recovery effort and the signing of the Helsinki peace agreement. Issues of conflict were initially sidelined, and then implemented in such a way that marginalized local NGOs. These factors played a central role in shaping the decisions made by local NGOs in the partnerships discussed in the subsequent chapters.

Negotiating the New Order

Partnerships between international and local NGOs in Timor-Leste and Aceh occurred in the context of two separate but long histories of separatist conflict. Superficially the separatist conflicts in Timor-Leste and Aceh shared many similar characteristics, yet each had emerged from a unique set of circumstances. Importantly, they were of a different order of significance at a geopolitical level. The invasion of Timor-Leste in 1975 by Indonesia was directly linked to global Cold War tensions, and the ongoing occupation was never recognized by the UN. Aceh, on the other hand, had been incorporated into Indonesia from the time of independence in 1945, and was recognized internationally as being part of the Indonesian nation. As a result, the separatist conflict in Aceh was shaped less by international political factors, driven instead by issues of unaddressed grievances combined with religious, political and national identity struggles within Indonesia (Aspinall 2009). This distinction became particularly important when the end of the New Order period – a 32-year period of authoritarian rule by President Suharto – came in May 1998.¹

These conflicts differentiated the experiences of NGOs in these places from those in other parts of Indonesia. In particular, international and local NGOs in these two areas had to be far more strategic about how they framed their work so as not to attract the ire of the New Order government. For international NGOs this meant focusing primarily on humanitarian and welfare type projects; whereas for local NGOs, particularly those with more political agendas, this meant developing strategies for maintaining a low profile. For NGOs in both places, but particularly local organizations, working during times of extreme repression had a considerable impact on their experiences after the fall of the New Order government.

Separatism in and out of the international spotlight

The New Order period was well under way when Indonesia invaded Timor-Leste in December 1975. The collapse of the fascist Caetano regime in Portugal in April 1974 led to a tense period of decolonization in Timor-Leste, ending 450 years of Portuguese colonial rule (Taylor 1991, Jolliffe 1978). Indonesia, worried about the rise of the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente, FRETILIN), a political party which was an advocate of immediate independence, encouraged the Timorese Democratic Union (União Democratica Timorense, UDT), which supported autonomy within a broader Portuguese community, to stage a coup on 11 August 1975 (Dunn 2003, Jolliffe 1978). FRETILIN overthrew this coup, forced UDT to retreat to West Timor and declared independence on 28 November 1975 (Taylor 1991, Hill 1976).

These events were a cause of concern for Indonesia because of the political ideology of FRETILIN, the mission statement of which contained an explicit commitment to the doctrines of socialism (Taylor 1991). The President of Indonesia at the time, President Suharto, had gained power and established his anti-communist credentials in 1965 with a nation-wide massacre of Communist Party members and supporters (Crouch 1978, 224–228, Cribb 1990). Under his staunch anti-communist leadership Indonesia gained the support of key Western nations like Australia and the United States (Crouch 1978, 336–341, Bertrand 2004, 142, Jolliffe 1978, Dunn 2003, 103–137). These countries sanctioned Indonesia’s invasion of Timor-Leste on 7 December 1975 because of their own security interests and economic concerns, and because they wanted to support their strong anti-communist ally in the region (CAVR 2005, Taylor 1991, 74–77).

The annexation of Timor-Leste as Indonesia’s 27th province was not considered valid by the UN, but the half-island remained part of Indonesia for a further 24 years. Two weeks after the invasion, the UN unanimously passed Security Council Resolution No.384 (1975), which recognized Portugal as the official administrator of Timor-Leste and called upon Indonesia to withdraw its troops from the territory (CAVR 2005, Part 7.1, 42, Lloyd 2000, 77). This campaign within the UN as well as the existence of vocal solidarity groups supporting independence for Timor-Leste, particularly after the Santa Cruz Massacre of 1991 – when the Indonesian military opened fire on hundreds of young Timorese marching from the centre of Dili to the Santa Cruz cemetery where Sebãstio Gomes, a student shot two weeks previously by the Indonesian military, was buried – ensured that this issue remained firmly on the international agenda.²

The fall of Suharto in May 1998 brought an end to the New Order regime, presenting the opportunity for significant political change across Indonesia, including for Timor-Leste (Aspinall 2005c, Bertrand 2004). The person appointed by outgoing President Suharto to manage this change was his Vice President, and loyal supporter, Dr Baharuddin Jusuf Habibie. His desire to differentiate himself from the former regime, the feeling that Timor-Leste was becoming a thorn in the side of Indonesia’s international relations and the financial cost of the occupation prompted him to offer the people of Timor-Leste the opportunity to choose whether they wanted autonomy within Indonesia or independence (Greenlees and Garran 2002). This surprise decision set Timor-Leste on a trajectory which was significantly different to Aceh, another province in the archipelago that had long been struggling for independence.

The separatist conflict in Aceh did not receive the same level of international attention as the conflict in Timor-Leste, reflecting the process by which it became part of Indonesia. It took 30 years of war before the Dutch could contain Aceh, and unlike in other provinces, the colonial occupiers were forced to maintain control using military means rather than economic or political strategies (Reid 2006). The Acehnese eventually defeated the Dutch in 1942, and the extra military skill and resources it cultivated as a result, a relatively united Acehnese community combined with income from trade with Malaysia and Singapore meant that Aceh played a key role in helping Indonesia achieve independence (Bertrand 2004). Its contribution to Indonesian independence meant that there was a far weaker case for independence for Aceh in the eyes of the UN and other states than for Timor-Leste.

The first overt signs of tension between the Acehnese and Indonesia’s central government appeared in the form of the Darul Islam Rebellion. The movement, which had its roots in West Java in 1948, was established in response to the decision that Indonesia would be a secular state (Cribb 1999). The rebellion, though violent, was not a secessionist movement; nevertheless, its resolution did contribute to the formulation of an Acehnese identity distinct from a broader Indonesian identity (Aspinall 2009). Aceh’s sense of separateness was further cultivated with the formation of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) which was established two decades after the Darul Islam Rebellion was crushed (Aspinall 2009). Led by Hasan di Tiro, and with the help of individuals who had been part of the earlier rebellion, GAM made a claim to independence based on an interpretation of history that positioned Aceh as a state where independence was violated first by the Dutch colonizers, and then by the Javanese (Aspinall 2009, 69). Although di Tiro actively lobbied the US and countries in the Middle East for support (Aspinall 2009), this argument gained little traction with the international community because – unlike Timor-Leste – Aceh was not widely recognized as having the right to self-determination. Indeed, the only forms of international support the independence movement in Aceh received were from Libya, which offered to train GAM soldiers between 1986 and 1990 (Nessen 2006), and from the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), which was the only international organization that recognized Aceh’s right to self-determination (Aspinall 2009).

The Indonesian government’s main strategy for dealing with the situation in Aceh was to use military force. In 1989 the province was declared a Military Operations Zone (Daerah Operasi Militer, DOM), a status that remained in place until after the fall of Suharto in 1998. An apology for military excesses by General Wiranto in 1998 and a statement in support of a referendum for independence in Aceh by presidential candidate Abdurrahman Wahid in 1999 suggested that the Indonesian government was open to alternative approaches to manage the conflict in Aceh. Statements such as these raised expectations among activists that Aceh, like Timor-Leste, would be given the opportunity to decide whether or not to secede; however, the referendum for independence in Timor-Leste in September 1999 – in which the people of Timor-Leste made the choice for independence – closed the door on that possibility. The outcome of the referendum in Timor-Leste fed fears of Indonesian national disintegration and meant that any possibility of a referendum in Aceh was quickly dismissed (Bertrand 2004). Similar views were also held by the international community, which recognized that Indonesia had lost face over the violence in the aftermath of the referendum in Timor-Leste. There was little interest in putting further pressure on Indonesia, particularly not for a province for which the case for independence was not as straightforward or convincing.

Civil society’s demands for a referendum were instead met with the offer of a Special Autonomy Law (Law No. 44/1999) (Aspinall 2009, 145–149). The main elements of this law drew on legislation developed in 1959 in response to Aceh’s participation in the Darul Islam rebellion. While the 1999 law represented a major shift in the Indonesian government’s position, it was based on the premise that the contemporary conflict in Aceh was a consequence of the failure to effectively implement the 1959 law (Miller 2006). As a result, it included provisions for local autonomy over matters of religion, culture and education, including a provision for the implementation of Syaria’ah law. However, GAM, which remained convinced that it would be able to achieve independence, was not open to the autonomy provisions. Additionally, the law did not address the human rights concerns of student groups and had little support from the public (Schulze 2006, 260). As a consequence, the prospects of peace, and hopes for independence in Aceh, quickly dissipated as hostility between GAM and the Indonesian military increased.

International and local NGOs in New Order Indonesia

The political landscape during the New Order period oscillated between periods of severe repression punctuated by moments of openness. These periods, which corresponded with fluctuations in the Indonesian economy and the extent to which President Suharto was able to maintain unity among the ruling elite, had important consequences for NGOs in Indonesia.³ The first Indonesian NGOs were established in the 1970s and were initially accepted – or at least tolerated – by the Indonesian state because of their non-confrontational approach. Many of these early NGOs were established by activists who had supported the rise of Suharto, and shared a similar desire to modernize Indonesia (Aspinall 2005c, Fakih 1995, 113). The main approach used by these NGOs was that of directly engaging with poor communities, for example by running community development projects targeted towards alleviating problems of poverty. As a consequence during this period NGOs were considered relatively benign by the government.⁴

Over time, however, NGO practices and attitudes towards the central government became more radical and oppositional, attracting hostility from government officials and the military. The NGOs’ more radical stance developed during the period of political openness (keterbukaan) experienced between 1989 and 1994. The period of keterbukaan, during which the Indonesian government experimented with a more accommodating and liberal approach, was characterized by an open press and increased student and labour activism. During this period NGOs developed increasingly radical approaches to working with communities, engaging in advocacy around a range of human rights issues as well as directly mobilizing villagers and helping them coordinate public campaigns about issues of concern to them (Aspinall 2005c, Fakih 1995, 121).

These same patterns of NGO behaviour were echoed in the context of Aceh and Timor-Leste. In both places, international NGO partners and donors played a role in the establishment and support of local NGOs. The periods of most significant NGO development in both places occurred towards the end of the New Order period. However, their experiences of conflict created some important differences to other parts of the country. In both locations, international donors and NGOs were highly dependent on good relations with the Indonesian government for permission to work. Similarly, the political space available for local NGOs was much less than in other parts of Indonesia. These constraints made it challenging for international NGOs and their staff to freely collaborate with local organizations or to identify, design and fund projects that they believed were most important. For local organizations, these constraints were a challenge, but at the same time offered a level of freedom from scrutiny by their donors that they would not enjoy during less repressive times.

Maintaining a humanitarian focus

Prior to 1998, very few international organizations had a presence in Aceh. Save the Children, one of the earliest to work in the province, opened an office in 1976 from which it ran programs that were primarily concerned with welfare issues like poverty reduction and livelihoods (Yunis 2000). Throughout the DOM period, international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and TAPOL conducted research and published reports about human rights violations; however, these organizations did not have any sort of long-term presence in the province (Human Rights Watch 2001, Amnesty International 1993, 1994, TAPOL 2000).

While having a more significant presence than in Aceh, international aid organizations in Timor-Leste were also restricted by the Indonesian government, particularly in the period between 1975 and 1989. Catholic organizations were permitted to maintain the links they had developed with the Church in Timor-Leste prior to the invasion, which they used to run welfare, health and education programs. The Indonesian government also permitted two USAID-funded organizations, Catholic Relief Service (CRS) and the Church World Service to run similar programs. Beginning in 1979, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) funded small-scale community projects, and throughout the occupation the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was permitted to have a presence (Nest 1999). International NGOs with a presence in Timor-Leste tended to focus on projects that were aligned with the interests of the Indonesian state. The activities of the ICRC and CRS – for example the provision of relief for victims of a famine that developed in the mid-1970s as a result of the forced relocation of people from their villages and farming land to resettlement camps – typify the nature of the relationship between international NGOs and the Indonesian government in this period (CAVR 2005, Part 7.3).⁵

In November 1988, Suharto announced that from January 1989 Indonesians and foreigners would have access to eight of the 13 subdistricts in Timor (Taylor 1995). This decision corresponded with the Indonesian government’s keterbukaan policy, and led to many more international aid agencies entering the province (Nest 1999). These agencies were not, however, given unfettered freedom. The Australian Government’s aid program, AusAID (then the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau), started its Timor-Leste program in 1992 following the Santa Cruz Massacre. By 1997 AusAID’s program was the largest source of aid to Timor-Leste. According to Lance Taudevin (1999), the project representative in Timor-Leste, AusAID’s final decision about the programs was driven by the need to ‘[help] the Indonesian government carry out its own programmes’ rather than ‘alignin...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 Landscapes of Partnership
• 2 Contract Relationships
• 3 Partner-Driven Relationships
• 4 Networked Relationships
• Conclution
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index