Outsourcing the Global War on Terrorism

Private Military Companies and American Intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan

G. Lovewine

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9781349476350, 9781137372826
• eBook ISBN: 9781137370266
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The US military strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan made use of private military and private security companies on an unprecedented scale. In this environment, actions and operations can greatly affect the efficacy of the US military - creating unintended diplomatic and tactical consequences.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Outsourcing the Global War on Terrorism

Throughout the campaigns to win the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the Department of Defense (DoD) and other US government agencies contracted Private Military/Security Companies¹ (PMSCs) to provide several crucial functions (Kidwell, 2005:3–4; Stanger and Williams, 2004:1). These companies were tasked with supporting and augmenting the DoD’s logistical network; providing training and technical assistance; and performing protective and physical security services (Kidwell, 2005:3–4; Stanger and Williams, 2004:1). As the wars in Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom²) and Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom³) progressed, the DoD refocused these critical functions into three broad categories (Chaplain et al., 2008:4–5; Freeland et al., 2008:18–20; Becker et al., 2007:4–6; Singer, 2004a:4–6). These categories consisted of Information Operations (intelligence collection, analysis, and operational planning); Logistics and Reconstruction activities (base support operations, police and military training); and Security Operations (providing convoy security, nonmilitary site security, and personal security personnel) (Becker et al., 2007:4–6; Singer, 2004a:4–6).

By scrutinizing these categories, several companies supporting US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were selected for this book. This volume provides an examination of the following Private Military Companies (PMCs): Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR), the main logistics support PMC in Iraq; CACI International (hereafter CACI), and Titan Corporation, now part of the L3 Corporation (L3) (hereafter L3-Titan), the primary supplier of interrogators and linguists to the US Army in Iraq; and DynCorp International, the lead logistical support PMC in Afghanistan since 2008. In the case of DynCorp and KBR, these companies boasted earnings of USD 1.86–2.63 billion (respectively) by supporting US forces deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2001 and 2009, while CACI and L3-Titan are counted in the top five PMCs, contracted to provide tactical and strategic intelligence services to the US military (Connor, 2009:3; Shorrock, 2008:166–170, 209, 264; Klein, 2007:3). Several Private Security Companies (PSCs) were also selected for this study: Academi, the principal PSC supporting the US Department of State (DoS) and DoD activities in Iraq; ArmorGroup North America, which prides itself on supporting contingency operations and crisis response in the Afghanistan theater of operations; and United States Protection and Investigations (USPI), a relatively unknown company that became the most visible security company in the cities and on the roads of Afghanistan, were chosen. The activities/actions of these selected companies, while performing their contracted functions, will be used to provide context and meaning to their impact on US military operations and/or policy objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The information in this book provides sufficient evidence that the activities of the PMCs in Iraq and Afghanistan have had an impact on US objectives within these countries. The consequence of some of the impacts is not as significant as projected, especially in the case of KBR in Iraq and DynCorp in Afghanistan (Thibault et al., 2011:88–89; Maag, 2011:1–2; Fitzgerald, 2010:4–6; Minow, 2010:1–2; Rasor and Bauman, 2007:70, 159–160). Nonetheless, the activities of PMSCs have affected military operations and policies as well as US government policy initiatives (Thibault et al., 2011:88–89; Maag, 2011:1–2; Minow, 2010:1–2; Villamizar, 2010:3). These case studies will reveal that the inability of the US military to manage the activities of the PMSCs has contributed to these companies’ questionable actions in a war zone environment (Lofgren, 2007:12–13; Bailey-Grasso, 2007:8–9; Peltz et al., 2005:20–23, 25).

In order to understand DoD employment of PMSCs on the battlefield and how that employ provided the potential for PMSCs to influence US objectives, the reader must first understand why and how the US military uses PMSCs to support its military operations.

Building US Military Capabilities in the Post–Cold War Era

Throughout the 1990s, the US military sanctioned several studies⁴ to examine its force structure and determine the most appropriate size of and capabilities needed to meet current and future military requirements (Bartholomees, 2006:307–308; Kagan, 2006:22; Larson et al., 2001:83–84). These studies focused on plans to develop a force structure that maintained combat capabilities, while ensuring that critical military functions were sourced either with military personnel or by other means (Larson et al., 2001:127–134). The catalyst behind these studies was the US military’s concern that the force structure recommended by the US Congress, in the early 1990s, would be insufficient in size (enough airmen, sailors, soldiers, and Marines) or capability to meet operational needs (Eland, 2001:9–11; Jaffe et al., 1999:23–24). The US military believed that with these studies, it could develop a viable plan to ensure that the future military force structure would be able to successfully complete an increased number of military missions and host of nonmilitary activities (US involvement in nonmilitary activities became the norm in the post–Cold War security environment) (Eland, 2001:9–11; Jaffe et al., 1999:23–24).

Between 1991 and 1994, the US Army, which bore the brunt of the post–Cold War deployments, conducted an internal study, concluding that its current end strength⁵ was insufficient to meet its assigned military missions or the operational focus of the US government (Hawkins and Carafano, 1997:22; Schuster et al., 1997:9–10, 52–53). Based on the findings of this internal study, DoD and US Army policymakers concluded that one method to ensure that the US Army achieves its assigned military missions or supports the operational focus of the US government would be to design a force structure that could fill nonwarfighting⁶ positions with personnel from the private sector (Kapp, 2005:15; Nardulli, 2003:34–35). Through this strategy of converting nonwarfighting positions into contracted civilians and/or federal civilian employee billets, the US Army would maintain sufficient combat strength (Kapp, 2005:15; Nardulli, 2003:34–35).

Through the implementation of this strategy, the US military force of the twenty-first century became more robust, lethal, and technologically advanced but with one significant Achilles’ heel—it needed to employ PMSCs as a force multiplier to support the logistical and security requirements of US forces deployed to the contingency operations of the GWOT (Solis et al., 2008b:3–4, 13, 21–23; Walker, 2008:3–4; Cordesman et al., 2007:347–348, 362–363). PMSCs provided the US military a prescription for its increasing mission requirements and decreasing personnel levels (Eland, 2001:9–11; Jaffe et al., 1999:23–24). The DoD hoped that with this strategy, the US military would be able to maintain the required levels of combat preparedness, which was an essential ingredient to meeting its global military mission requirements (Williams and Schandelmeir, 1999:15).

Introduction of PMSCs—Resourcing the US Military

American academics, policymakers, and military policy experts have debated the issues and problems related to rebuilding and resourcing the US military. The experts have claimed that the use of PMSCs (also known as US defense contractors⁷) was, and still is, the most appropriate means of ensuring that the US military has enough combat power to meet its wartime obligations in the face of congressionally mandated restrictions. The US military’s use of PMSCs, chronicled through modern literature, reveals that this relationship matured during the Vietnam War (1959–1975)⁸ and expanded throughout the mid-1990s, creating a symbiotic relationship between the military and the private sector (Watts, 2008:21–22; Isenberg, 2007:82; McCallum, 2007:78;Singer, 2004b:523). In the words of Robert M. Friedman, US Army policy analyst, “Contractors [PMSCs] on the battlefield [of Vietnam War] had become a major part of the U.S. Army’s logistical capabilities” (2002:3–5). These words have become a reality with the DoD’s use of contracted civilians during the Gulf War and through the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Throughout the Gulf War, the US military steadily increased its use of contracted civilians to the extent that PMSCs became the primary elements providing technical support or conducting logistical support activities during the war (Camm and Greenfield, 2005:1–2, 65).

The relationship between the US military and PMSCs flourished during the regional conflicts, such as in the Balkans of the 1990s, ensuring that the US military’s reliance on PMSCs—particularly for logistics support to deployed forces—would continue (D’Angelo et al., 2008:41; Solis et al., 2008c:1; Grimes et al., 2006:287; Wisniewski et al., 2003:21; Larson et al., 2001:44; Schuster et al., 1997:39). Nevertheless, this same US military–PMSC relationship can become perilous, especially if PMSCs fail to fulfill the necessary or vital support missions for which they were hired (Krishnan, 2008:134–136; Cordesman et al., 2007:190–193). The failure of a PMSC to perform could cause the failure of a military mission (Krishnan, 2008:134–136; Cordesman et al., 2007:190–193). In reviewing the US military’s involvement with PMSCs, and the manner in which it has privatized some of its military functions, there is no doubt that the US military has gone further than any other country’s armed forces⁹ in privatizing most of its noncombat functions (Wiggins et al., 1998:4, Dickinson, 2005:138). This is demonstrated through the commitment of PMSCs to the ongoing combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Without these companies, the robust logistical support structure capable of supporting deployed forces would not exist.

As stated earlier, the DoD’s reliance on PMSCs can be traced back to the outsourcing efforts of the 1990s, and the US military’s efforts to privatize many of its military logistical support functions deemed nonmission essential (Camm and Greenfield, 2005:136; Guay, 2007, 34–35; Markusen, 2003:471). In theory, this effort and others were used to maintain US military capability during a period of military downsizing by realigning military support billets to combat-related positions (infantry, armor, and field artillery). This realignment is one of the reasons the DoD is currently using PMSCs, not only as logistical support providers, but also as trainers, planners, and fillers for other support functions. The assertion that the DoD is overly reliant upon PMSCs has been the focus of current policy analysis, suggesting that PMSCs provide the US military a means of maintaining combat capabilities, while giving cover to the supposition that the current force structure is insufficient to fight and win a conflict. This analysis is supported by numerous academics, policy, and military studies that describe the current use and employment of PMSCs in Iraq and Afghanistan as a means, in US Army language of “manning the force,”¹⁰ by replacing soldiers with contracted civilians to enhance military support functions (Pickup, 2008:2, 7; Lock, 2006:5; US Department of Defense, 2006a:70–72). The US military’s strategies to acquire and deploy contracted civilians—the calculated process of replacing soldiers in noncombat specialties with civilian employees—appears to be the DoD’s latest attempt to resolve the challenge of adequately obtaining a sufficient number of fighters to support its operational plans (Terry, 2003:5; Woody, 2003:3–4; Heiser, 1974:3).

The employment of PMSCs on the battlefield has not discontinued the debate on overreliance, but has also generated a new question of whether the activities of PMSCs can influence US military capabilities or even undermine (or influence) US policy efforts in Afghanistan or Iraq. It is unmistakable that the US military’s reliance on PMSCs revolves around the dilemma of maintaining full operational capabilities while limiting the functions and impact these private companies could have on strategic and tactical operations (Curtin et al., 2004:11–12). The activities of PMSCs, lawful or unlawful, can affect the legitimacy of the US government and the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan in the eyes of their respective populations, negating the US policy objective of reconstruction and the building of good governance.

PMSCs and GWOT

As a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the US government initiated two separate military operations: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan (2001 to present) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq (2003 to 2009) (Cook, 2006:29; Kapp, 2005:1; Perl, 2006:2; Mathieu and Dearden, 2006:5, 7; Singer, 2004b:536–538; Curtin et al., 2004:11–12, 20–23). To support these military operations and their strategic objectives, the US government deployed more than 15 thousand troops in Afghanistan and another 132 thousand combat personnel in Iraq (Katzman, 2008:6; Dale, 2008b:10–11; Walker, 2006:5; Katzman, 2002:19). Deploying approximately 147 thousand troops required the support of 107 PMSCs, tasked with ensuring that logistical and material support for US combat forces were available (O’Keefe, 2009:10–12; McCallum, 2007:57–59; Williams, 2003).

The DoD conducted both operations (OEF and OIF) under a strategy concept that focused on deploying a limited military footprint (Dale, 2008b 10–11; Johnson, 2006:92; Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004:21–22). This expeditionary approach¹¹ to the use of military force was espoused in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) issued in 2002, and reinforced by the National Military Strategy (NMS) published in 2004 (Dale, 2008b:7–8; Meinhart, 2006:310; Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004: 11, 14–17, 25–26; Bush, 2002:29–30). The 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS) furthered codified concept of the expeditionary approach to warfare into military doctrine (Dale, 2008b:7–8; Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005:24). Through integrating the strategies outlined in the NSS, the NDS and the NMS developed an operationally-focused, expeditionary approach to the use of military force, which was a shift from the Weinberger–Powell Doctrine of “decisive force” (Dale, 2008b:7–11; Record, 2007:79–81, 90–92; Meinhart, 2006:310).

The strategies outlined in the NSS, NDS, and NMS facilitated the development of an operational environment where the US military worked under internal restraints regarding the number of troops it would/could deploy to meet its operational objectives (Dale, 2008b:10–13; Meinhart, 2006:310). However, nowhere in these documents is it written a directive to the US military to limit the number of troops allocated to fight in the military operations of OIF and OEF; nor are there instructions to implement a force cap on the number of troops that could deploy to achieve US military objectives. Nevertheless, based on the deployment of forces to both Iraq and Afghanistan, from 2002 through 2007, the US military attempted to limit its military footprint by deploying a smaller, but more lethal force and defaulted to using PMSCs to support logistical and another support activities (Noetzel et al., 2007:2–3; Troxell, 2006:3, 10–12; Walker, 2003:16–19; Stewart, 2003:19–20).

This perspective of employing a small and limited force that achieves its military objectives, while its logistical, construction, and other support needs would be provided by PMSCs, developed during the US military’s experience,¹² from 1995 through 2004, in the Balkans (Nardulli, 2003:34; Croft, 2001:49; Zamparelli, 1999:8). The US military’s experience in the Balkans not only reinforced the concept of using PMSCs to support military operations, but also reversed the lesson learned from the Gulf War—that is, not to be dependent on PMSCs to maintain operational support needs during combat operations (Wayne, 2002:8; Croft, 2001:49; Zamparelli, 1999:8). Nevertheless, the US military’s experience in the Balkans created a mindset that PMSCS could adequately provide logistics capabilities to support deployed forces (Hornstein, 2006:14–15; Nardulli, 2003:34; Wayne, 2002:8; Croft, 2001:49; Zamparelli, 1999:8).

The DoD’s Use of PMSCs in Iraq

In Iraq, from 2004 through 2008, the number of civilians working for PMSCs supporting both the US military and US diplomatic offices rose to approximately 163 thousand (Neuman, 2009:64–65; Defense Contract Audit Agency, 2008:1–2; Goure, 2007:3–4). This increase followed the ever-changing operational requirements and support needs of the US military needs (Elsea et al., 2008:2, 7–10; Griffin, 2007:2; Lock, 2006:5–6; Schreier and Caparini, 2005:22; Novak, 2004:2–4). With the end to major combat operations in Iraq, the US military and the DoS transitioned into the reconstruction phase of the operation, which involved the hiring of American and foreign PMSCs to support capacity-building and reconstruction projects as well as the security requirements needed to safeguard those operations (Pascal, 2006:5–6; Barakat, 2005b:577). As the insurgency in Iraq grew, ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Chapter 1  Introduction
• Chapter 2  The Impact of the Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Companies on US Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
• Chapter 3  Analysis of the Effects of Private Security Companies on US Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
• Chapter 4  The Impact of the Department of Defense’s Use of Private Military Companies on US Efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan
• Chapter 5  Analysis of the Effects of Private Military Companies on US Efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan
• Chapter 6  Conclusion
• Appendix 1  US Military and Policy Objectives in Afghanistan
• Appendix 2  US Military and Policy Objectives in Iraq: Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn
• Appendix 3  DoD Policy and Guidelines—Contingency Contracting
• Glossary
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index