The principal subject of this book is a term that is, philosophically speaking, dubious, and yet indubitably significant: âsubjectivationâ. As a term that circulates with increasing frequency in a number of critical discourses ever since Michel Foucault discussed it in the early 1980s (see Foucault, 1990, pp. 28â32; compare Butler, 1997, pp. 83â105), and that is of theoretical and practical relevance for a variety of academic disciplines ranging from Sociology via Aesthetics to Psychoanalysis, âsubjectivationâ appears ambiguous to the extent that it designates and mediates tensions. What becomes literally manifest as âsubjectivationâ is most notably the tension between the promising âideaâ of autonomous subjectivity on the one hand and the discouraging ârealityâ of heteronomous subjection on the otherâtwo opposites that are amalgamated into a unique and confusing term.
In consideration of this elementary tension, it may be argued that the currency of the expression âsubjectivationâ is raising a number of crucial questions in the wider context of its repeated invocation: does it perhaps make sense to maintain that âsubjectivityâ and âsubjectionâ are not belonging to separate traditions of reasoning, but instead intertwined in complex scenesâof âsubjectivationââthat either suspend or cross the fictitious distinction between autonomy and heteronomy? Or is it rather reasonable to assume that âsubjectivationâ is the monstrous progeny of an illicit crossbreed of conjectural extremes that should better be kept apart and not conflated? In short, how could we engage with the enigmatic subject called âsubjectivationâ given that it confronts us with an apparent contradiction in terms that concerns the emergence of the subject itself?
A Subject at Risk
Such abstract questions do matter in a concrete sense if we consider that a plurality of scholars are suggesting that what is at risk in contemporary so-called
post-modern society is the âsubjectâ itselfâa subject that is risking its own exhaustion as much as it tends to âburn outâ on the threshold of subjectivity
and subjection. Alain Ehrenberg, for example, argues in his study
The Weariness of the Self, first published in 1998, that depression is not just a pathological state affecting single individuals, butâparadoxicallyâa collective sensation of subjective
inadequacy prevalent in âa society whose norm is no longer based on guilt and discipline but on responsibility and initiativeâ (Ehrenberg,
2010, p. 9). Whereas the society in which Sigmund Freud cultivated a psychoanalytic âmetaphysics of the Subjectâ (Ehrenberg,
2010, p. 216) reflecting his seminal thoughts on the conflicted, that is,
neurotic structure of the human psyche, was a typically
modern society defining itself with respect to laws (inhibition) and hierarchy (obedience), in
a culture of performance and individual action, in which energy breakdowns can cost dearly, and in which we always have to be running at top speed and efficiency, inhibition is pure dysfunction, an inadequacy. The individual has an institutional need to act at any cost by being able to count on his inner strengths. He inhabits initiative more than obedience; he is caught in the question of what it is possible to do and not what it is permissible to do. That is why inadequacy is to the contemporary person what conflict was to the person of the first half of the twentieth century. (Ehrenberg, 2010, p. 217)
In brief, Ehrenberg argues that the âyielding of neurosis to depressionâ corresponds to âa sea change in the subjectivity of modern humanityâ (Ehrenberg,
2010, p. 161)âand, as might be added in the context of Paolo Virnoâs study
The Grammar of the Multitude, in its subjection too. For the âpost-Fordist regimeââwhich, as Virno writes, would be the proper name of this complex re-arrangement of both subjectivity and subjection under the auspices of postmodernityâincessantly demands âvirtuosic activityâ (Virno,
2004, p. 68) from a growing number of people who are more often than not summoned to commercialize their â
intellectual labor-powerâ (Virno,
2004, p. 107) in favor of the celebrated âknowledge societyâ. This demand invested in Post-Fordism as a neo-capitalist matrix of socialization ultimately âshows itself as universal
servile workâ, argues Virno (
2004, p. 68). In this sense then, the radical transformation of subjectivity, to which Ehrenberg primarily dedicates his investigation, involves also âa viscous personalization of subjectionâ (Virno,
2004, p. 68). It is even the case, emphasizes Virno (
2004, p. 63), that â[n]obody is as poor as those [âvirtuousâ post-Fordist workers] who see their own relation to the presence of others, that is to say, their own communicative faculty, their own possession of a language, reduced to wage laborâ.
In similar terms, also Maurizio Lazzarato stresses in recent publications that the rampant economy of
debt, which regulates local as well as global interdependencies in terms of a devastating financialization of all sorts of transaction, is cruelly âcreativeâ in a double sense: it valorizes subjectivityâwhat Lazzarato (
2012, p. 34) calls âthe primary and most important form of production, the âcommodityâ that goes into the production of all other commoditiesâ in his essay
The Making of Indebted Man from the year 2011âand, parallel to that, it experiments with ânew forms of subjectionâ (Lazzarato,
2012, p. 86) too. The novelty of this debt economy, which disrupts the everyday life of people as much as it interferes in the balance of states, consists in a set of imperatives that paradoxically require the subject to permanently invest in its own subjection in the name of a âmanagerialâ subjectivity, as Lazzarato claims in
Governing by Debt (2013):
The order and command must appear to issue from the subject, because âyouâre in control!â because âyouâre your own boss!â because âyouâre your own manager!â Contemporary subjection subjects the individual to âinfiniteâ evaluation and makes the subject his own primary judge. The injunction to be a subject, to give oneself orders, to negotiate permanently with oneself, is the fulfillment of individualism. (Lazzarato, 2015, pp. 186â7)
It is against the background of such diagnoses that Luc and Christian Boltanski initiated a joint projectâinvolving poetry, photography, and discourseâthat explores the contemporary situation as an ordinary âlimboâ (see Boltanski/Boltanski,
2006). In a short reflection at the end of what may be called a paradigmatic âcantata for plural voicesâ (
cantate Ă plusieurs voix), Luc Boltanski notes that contemporary societies resemble a limbo (in the plural), since countless people are nowadays living a marginalized life on permanent âstand-byâ: people who are waiting to be selected (after a unfavorable job interview), people who are expecting a verdict that hardly ever comes (in an strenuous asylum procedure), people who are forced to adapt to niches (as they have no valid permits at hand), people who are abandoned to misery (in fragile shadow economies)âpeople, in short, who are treated as if they were âunbaptized infantsâ trapped in a nebulous zone besides âheavenâ and âhellâ. As Luc Boltanski further comments, such limbos, in which people are enduring life at the margins of society, are âunfortunateâ zones disjoined from modernity with its utopias and dystopias, with its teleological transition from the past to the future, and also with its emblematic confidence in the subject.
In a short essay entitled
What Is an Apparatus? from the year 2006, Giorgio Agamben too comes to the conclusion that âin the current phase of capitalismâ (
2009, p. 20) theâtypically modernâtension between subjectivity and subjection, which resulted in the generation of a range of subjects, is irrevocably severed. Whereas âin a disciplinary societyâ (Agamben,
2009, p. 19), such as the one repeatedly investigated by Foucault (see, e.g.,
1978,
1995), the apparatus (
dispositif) is âfirst of all a machine that produces subjectificationsâ
1 in the sense that it âproduces, as a more or less unforeseen consequence, the constitution of a subjectâ, current apparatuses are rather corresponding to what Agamben refers to as âprocesses of [âŠ] desubjectificationâ (Agamben,
2009, p. 20). In other words, they are void of subjects. As much as contemporary societies are not anymore capable of evoking particular subjects, âexcept in a larval or, as it were, spectral formâ (Agamben,
2009, p. 21), also an entire tradition of politics is at risk of falling apart, concludes Agamben:
Hence the eclipse of politics, which used to presuppose the existence of subjects and real identities (the workersâ movement, the bourgeoisie, etc.), and the triumph of the oikonomia, that is to say, of a pure activity of government that aims at nothing other than its own replication. The Right and the Left, which today alternate in the management of power, have for this reason very little to do with the political sphere in which they originated. They are simply the names of two polesâthe first pointing without scruple to desubjectification, the second wanting instead to hide behind the hypocritical mask of the good democratic citizenâof the same governmental machine. (Agamben, 2009, p. 22)
Such concerns, shared by others more (e.g., Crouch,
2004; Michelsen/Walter,
2013), are disturbing insofar as the various critiques of an impending exhaustion of the subject inevitably call into question the traditional inventory and institution of politics (see, in this respect, especially Virno,
2004, p. 51), and, with it, subjective chances of communicating, negotiating, and disputing political interests. If it is truly the case, as scholars like Ehrenberg, Virno, Lazzarato, Boltanski, or Agamben are respectively contending, that it is more than ever dubious what a subject is or could be, given that contemporary economic conditions are so depressing, then we can no longer assume that politics is what itâsupposedlyâonce was: a privileged domain of inter-subjective agreements.
In consideration of said risks that need to be taken seriously, we shall thus return to our initial questions regarding the enigmatic subject called âsubjectivationâ and explore responses that challenge current discourses of de-politicization, but without favoring an uncritical narrative of the survival of âtheâ subject after its demise. Perhaps an alternative discussion of contemporary struggles that are globally interconnected vis-Ă -vis the declared crisis of the subject will allow us to provide a more nuanced comprehension of the theoretical and practical significance of the term âsubjectivationâ.