Competing Visions of India in World Politics

India's Rise Beyond the West

K. Sullivan

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9781349679829, 9781137398659
• eBook ISBN: 9781137398666
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Management
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This edited collection presents an alternative set of reflections on India's contemporary global role by exploring a range of influential non-Western state perspectives. Through multiple case studies, the contributors gauge the success of India's efforts to be seen as an alternative global power in the twenty-first century.

1

India’s Ambivalent Projection of Self as a Global Power: Between Compliance and Resistance

Kate Sullivan

This introductory chapter aims to set up a broad template against which to position the subsequent chapters, whose collective task is to explore a range of country readings of India’s global role. Since a central rationale of the volume is to determine the extent to which external perceptions of India match its projection of self, this chapter examines some of the ways in which Indian elites have discursively constructed India as a prominent global power in the contemporary post-Cold War era.

I begin, in the first section, by exploring a central ambivalence within India’s attempts to position itself as a prominent global actor. India’s key challenge in engaging with the world, I argue, is to reconcile a quest for recognition from established major powers with a desire to maintain relations of solidarity with developing country allies of the Cold War era. As a result, several behavioural and discursive elements of India’s rising power strategy can be read as in compliance with many of the hegemonic norms and institutions of the existing international political and economic order, including those that pertain to major powers. Meanwhile, other aspects of India’s rising power strategy can be seen as enacting or discursively producing important forms of resistance. I suggest that, in view of India’s desire to maintain positive relations with its former developing country allies, Indian elites often attempt to discursively reframe Indian aspirations and behaviour away from compliance with dominant behaviours of global prominence—that is, those behaviours typically associated with the great powers¹ of the twentieth century—in the perceptions of developing countries.

Against the backdrop of this conceptual framing of rising power ambivalence, I elicit and interpret three central themes within some of the official rhetoric that projects India as a particular kind of global power. These self-projections are normative, in the sense that they delineate a core set of values and behaviours that Indian elites consider both appropriate and legitimate for a rising India. First, India is conceived of as a synthesising power, reflecting its aspirations to bridge global divides through non-aligned and multilateral engagement in a globally interdependent and economically integrated world. Second, India is framed as a didactic power, reflecting a vision of it as a norm-setter by example, rather than coercion, and as an innovator or inflector of particular forms of global knowledge and values. Third, India self-projects as an alternative power, that is, as a recognisable but distinctive global actor to the great powers of the twentieth century. In other words, India seeks legitimacy both from the established powers and from non-top-tier states, in particular India’s developing country partners within the Global South.

Compliance and resistance: India’s strategy as a rising power

Since the end of the Cold War, India has pursued a rising power strategy that contains some apparent contradictions. On the one hand, India has shifted to seeking international status in a manner that places it in the company of an oligarchy of powerful states.² India is now a nuclear-armed state, has undertaken conventional military expansion,³ has built a closer relationship with the United States and is proactively seeking a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). On the other hand, India claims to remain a champion of equality between states and is apparently unwilling to abandon a traditional Southern vision of developing country solidarity. Within negotiations over the terms of world trade, for example, India continues to seek common cause with developing countries,⁴ accommodating the ‘expectations and preferences’ of a Global South followership (Efstathopoulos, 2012, p.269). Within the India–Brazil–South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), India joins two other Southern powers in laying claim to a leadership role centred on shared historical experiences of colonial and imperial resistance and Third World activism, as well as on the basis of shared interests in the reform of global governance structures (Vieira, 2012). Indeed, as Amrita Narlikar (2010, p.113) argues, ‘India’s commitment to coalitions involving developing countries remains steadfast.’

India stood as a leader of much of the Third World during the Cold War, particularly during the leadership (1947–1964) of India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Its leaders sought common cause with other developing and postcolonial states and societies and pressed for an end to colonialism, racialism, imperialism and political and economic inequality among states. This activism was driven, in part, by an Indian interest in renegotiating the terms of world politics away from great-power dominance, as a means of securing India’s hard-won independence and of focusing efforts on internal development. It was also informed by the moral leadership aspirations of Indian foreign policy elites, who sought to make a uniquely Indian contribution to the reframing of inter-state relations by championing peaceful coexistence, disarmament and an end to the logic of power politics (Sullivan, 2014). However, seismic shifts in India’s hard power since the end of the Cold War have, in some eyes, transformed India’s international image (Mohan, 2003). India’s long-standing disavowal of nuclear weapons and its commitment to disarmament advocacy appeared to end abruptly with its nuclear tests in 1998, and it has been accused of damaging the non-proliferation regime through its entry into civilian nuclear trade as a non-signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In addition to criticism from India’s former Third World partners, some Indian intellectuals themselves are asking whether India’s ‘increasingly successful ability to mimic the Great Powers’ has ‘come at the expense of holding on to what made India different in the first place’ (Abraham, 2007, p.4209).

I argue that ‘great-power mimicry’ and ‘Indian difference’ are both evident in India’s rising power strategy. This strategy can be understood in terms of two competing, and at times overlapping, rising power practices: compliance with and resistance to the hegemonic norms and institutions of the existing international political and economic order. I borrow the terms compliance and resistance from social anthropology’s efforts to understand the social practices of subordinate social groups, and I argue that the extension of these terms to non-top-tier actors in the international society of states can be of analytical value. James C. Scott’s (1985) seminal work Weapons of the Weak demonstrates and problematises compliance with, and resistance to, hegemony by those at a lower end of a spectrum of power. Equally, rising states, while frequently dominant in their regions, generally share a historical experience of subordination to top-tier powers and, indeed, continue to operate within a hegemonic structure of normative understandings about the appropriate attributes and behaviours of powerful states. Rising states, such as India, are therefore in the complicated position of needing to conform, at least partially, to the structures of power that have historically subordinated them. They may choose at different times and in different ways to comply with the hegemony of established powers or to resist that hegemony. Their choices underscore how rising powers exercise more individual agency than is generally predicted by International Relations (IR) theories.

Acts of compliance by rising powers with the practices and institutions of the great powers occupy an obvious, and foregrounded, position within key strands of the IR literature. A familiar Realist reading of rising powers predicts compliance to take the form of the acquisition of material capability, meaning that rising states will seek power in broadly similar ways, as a means to scale a global hierarchy conceived of in structural terms (Waltz, 1979). English School approaches understand great power as comprising, alongside material capability, the social criteria of ‘declared self-status, and status as recognized by others, particularly the top-table peer group’ (Buzan, 2004, p.67). Therefore, central to the success of rising powers is the act of recognition by existing great powers, with compliance seen in the attempts of rising powers to convince the top-tier group that they qualify for membership (Bull, 2002; Buzan, 2004). Indeed, rising states comply through the acquisition or pursuit of inter-subjective markers of international standing, that is, through ‘recognition strategies’⁵ (Suzuki, 2008). In theory, therefore, rising powers will be broadly co-opted into the social structures of the common understandings, rules, norms and mutual expectations practised by the existing great powers. Indeed, Matthew Stephen (2012, p.292) shows how, in certain issue domains, such as UNSC reform, rising powers such as India, Brazil and South Africa appear to be successfully co-opted into ‘hegemonic norms’ and ‘existing international organisations’.

The practice of compliance is inherent in certain Constructivist accounts of rising power behaviour, too: Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett (1993) ask why most Third World states—and some contemporary rising powers, such as India and Brazil, were once Third World states—have engaged in militarisation in a manner similar to that of the West. They claim that the cultural dominance structure within the society of states ‘conditions elites’ ideas about what constitutes a “modern” army, and as such affects their “preferred means” for achieving security’, thereby shaping elite efforts to gain legitimacy and status for their state within international society (Wendt and Barnett, 1993, pp.330, 329). Equally, Larson and Shevchenko (2010, p.67), in their application of social identity theory to IR, note compliance as a key part of a rising state’s strategy of social mobility, which ‘emulates the values and practices of the higher-status group with the goal of gaining admission into elite clubs’.

Significantly, however, compliance-centred accounts pay insufficient attention to the fact that emerging powers are not recognised as equals in the assessments of established powers. Both in material and social terms, rising powers retain a subordinate position in relation to established powers. Since the terms of global governance remain significantly skewed out of the favour of rising states, they must continue to engage in resistance to governance structures, whether overt or covert. Anthropologist David Crawford (2007, p.8) notes that ‘resistance comes as the disadvantaged press for “modification,” purposefully or inadvertently, as the relatively empowered attempt to reproduce and consolidate conditions of social inequality’. Again, the IR literature suggests ways in which rising states might resist hegemonic norms and institutions that do not serve their interests. Realists, assuming that states are generally committed to the utility of force, eventually expect rising states to draw established powers into military confrontation, with great-power status ultimately being proven in war (Mearsheimer, 2001). Yet, rising powers often do not wish, or are unable, to incur the costs of direct conflict. Instead, studies that focus on ‘signalling’ practices suggest that rising states are likely to project ‘responsible’—that is, broadly compliant—behaviours in order to downplay fears that power transition in their favour will lead to conflict (Fearon, 1994). Other strategies of resistance remain open to rising powers, including attempts to ‘soft-balance’ the power and influence of the existing powers through collective action within international institutions and efforts at ‘spoiling’, that is, hindering, the effective functioning of international institutions (Krasner, 1985; Pape, 2005; Stephen, 2012).

The forms of resistance employed by rising powers may not necessarily fall into the realm of overt challenges within international institutions, however. As Scott notes, ‘most of the political life of subordinate groups is to be found neither in the overt collective defiance of powerholders nor in complete hegemonic compliance, but in the vast territory between these two polar opposites’ (Scott, 1990, p.136). Resistance as a practice may instead be discursively enacted by actors. Scott’s (1985, 1990) concept of ‘transcripts’, that is, established ways of behaving and speaking that actors adopt in particular social settings, draws a clear link between resistance and discourse. He characterises the transcripts of actors as primarily ‘onstage’ or ‘off-stage’, that is, public or private, where resistance can be more sharply articulated in private. However, it is typically difficult—leaked diplomatic cables aside—to gain access to the ‘offstage’ discourses of, or between, the diplomatic actors who represent states (Ibid., pp.284–89). What becomes interesting in the behaviour and discourse of (the representatives of) rising powers, however, is that they often communicate through the medium of public discourse to both powerholders and subordinates within the international system, in an effort to appeal to both groups. Seeking to address multiple audiences can thus result in conflicting ‘public transcripts’, with one transcript appearing to comply with hegemonic social structures, while the other appears to resist them.

One defining example is the discourse employed by Indian leaders in the context of India’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC. Since India seeks only marginally expanded membership of the Council along elitist lines, India’s attempt could be (and indeed has been, by Mexico—see Estrada Harris, Chapter 8) read as a wholesale subscription to international oligarchy. In public forums, however, the key Indian message is that India’s permanent membership would not contribute further to oligarchy since it is uniquely positioned to solve the problem of representativeness in the UNSC (Sen, 2006). In an argument that stresses an Indian commitment to equity, which is suggested to be otherwise absent among the existing permanent members of the Council, India has declared that it would play a critical role in implementing reforms in the interest of all member states, including the modification and restriction of the use of the veto power (Ibid.). Nirupam Sen (2006), India’s former permanent representative to the United Nations, noted during the 2006 UN General Assembly debate over the ‘Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council’:

[W]e have [with the existing arrangements in the UNSC] a concentration of power and the fact of oligarchy … We do wish to end the exclusion of developing countries but through an inclusive process—this is the legacy of Gandhi and Mandela … we seek a reform not for ‘power politics, military might, division and conflict’ but for overcoming these and being, in and with the UN, a ‘global force for peace, progress and prosperity’.

Certainly, India’s claim to seek a permanent UNSC seat in order to better serve the interests of non-top-tier states may sound hollow to developing countries, just as it may sound moralising to the established powers. This raises the question of whether India is merely seeking legitimacy from developing countries on an instrumental basis, in order to secure support to bridge India’s transition to major power status. Alternatively, India may be engaging in ‘false compliance’ with the hegemonic norms and institutions of the established powers, that is, feigning conformity in form, but not substance (Scott, 1985, pp.278–79). For example, while India’s relatively recent projection of hard power may appear to contradict its traditional rejection of the logic of military aggression, the possession of hard power is not the same as the strategic intent to actually use force or other coercive means (Cohen and Dasgupta, 2010). False compliance in this sense may entail India developing material capability in order to appear powerful, while resisting the attendant behavioural logic of coercion or confrontation that Realist logics predict. Indeed, prior normative frameworks within Indian foreign policy-thinking have led to distinctive meanings becoming attached to the status markers that India has sought over the past two decades, delinking them, at least nominally, from the hegemonic social structures and practices that it has long struggled against. With regard to nuclear weapons, for example, India has sought to project itself as a non-coercive nuclear possessor state by emphasising its unique restraint in, for example, arsenal size, nuclear development and declaratory policies (Horsburgh and Sullivan, 2013).

Resistance behaviours are therefore not simply confined to the instrumental pursuit of material interests but enmeshed with the identities of rising powers. Larson and Shevchenko (2010, p.94) argue that ‘major powers may not want to emulate the values of the established states, but may instead want to maintain distinctive identities’. Reproducing historically grounded discourses of resistance to established power hegemony is one way of doing this. Indeed, Emma Mawdsley notes how powerful states of the Global South engage in discourses that invoke Southern solidarity ‘as a means of persuading, symbolising and euphemising claims to particular identities and social relations’ (2012, p.265). Inherent within such discourses is ‘the normative agenda of the South’, that is, ‘the wider struggles and moral claims of post-colonial nations regarding a radical reform of international governance structures’ (Vieira, 2012, p.312). The discursive resistance of rising powers may well contradict behaviours that appear to comply with hegemonic social structures. Yet Julia Strauss (2009, p.779) acknowledges that ‘[r]hetoric is part of a complex of critical appeals between the state and significant audiences it wishes to attract, persuade, mobilize or consolidate support within’. She concedes that ‘reality in policy implementation often departs from stated ideals, but the grounding rhetoric continues to matter to a range of different audiences, both domestic and international’ (Ibid.). This is helpful in understanding why India has only partially chosen to behave in ways which have resulted in the elevation of its international status in the eyes of the established powers. It also explains why India engages contemporaneously in alternative strategies of discursive production that aim to appeal to developing country constituencies. However, no matter how convinced Indian elites may remain of the moral rectitude of their intentions towards less powerful states, a concern of some of the latter is that India is feigning its ongoing commitment to the developing world. The credibility of India’s rhetoric and action in the eyes of the developing world poses a particular, and understudied, challenge to its future as a global power. In the brief analysis that follows, I focus on the official discourse produced by Indian foreign policy elites that seeks to address this challenge.

Delineating India’s projection of self as a global power

Having laid out a conceptual framework that identifies, and complicates, two key practices in India’s rising power strategy—compliance and resistance—I address three central questions that seek to sketch out the broad contours of India’s envisaged global role: How does India position itself in relation to the rest of the world? By what means and in line with which values does India seek to create change in the world? Finally, what ‘brand’ of global leadership does India claim to offer? In surveying the answers to these questions, I delineate three central themes that characterise India’s self-projection as a global power: a view of India as a synthesising power, a didactic power and an alternative power. All three themes a...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Figures
• Foreword
• Acknowledgements
• Notes on Contributors
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction: Creating Diversity in Readings of India’s Global Role
• 1. India’s Ambivalent Projection of Self as a Global Power: Between Compliance and Resistance
• 2. Chinese Views of a Nuclear India: From the 1974 Peaceful Nuclear Explosion to the Nuclear Suppliers Group Waiver in 2008
• 3. India in Climate Change: The View from Tokyo
• 4. Just Another Regional Superpower? A Cautious South Korea Watches India’s Rise
• 5. From Imperial Subjects to Global South Partners: South Africa, India and the Politics of Multilateralism
• 6. What Does ‘Development Cooperation’ Mean? Perceptions from India and Africa
• 7. The ‘Eastern Brother’: Brazil’s View of India as a Diplomatic Partner in World Trade
• 8. ‘The Other Pacifist’: Mexican Views on India’s Quest for Great-Power Status
• 9. India in the Iranian Imagination: Between Culture and Strategic Interest
• 10. Views of India from the Conflicting Parties in Syria
• 11. Russian Views of India in the Context of Afghanistan
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index