Equality, Citizenship, and Segregation

A Defense of Separation

M. Merry

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781137033703
• eBook ISBN: 9781137495006
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Education Curricula
• Index: Social Sciences

Merry argues that most voluntary separation experiments in education are not driven by a sense of racial, cultural or religious superiority. Rather, they are driven among other things by a desire for quality education, not to mention community membership and self respect.

1

Introduction

The provocative thesis I argue for in this book is that many forms of segregation are compatible with the liberal democratic ideals of equality and citizenship. More specifically, I aim to provide a philosophical justification for what I shall call voluntary separation. Many will stumble on this choice of words. Owing to the manner in which structural barriers often restrict what the members of some minority groups can do, many will be inclined to view separation as either a resignation to nonideal circumstances or, worse, a refusal to engage with the mainstream. I understand the reasons some have for holding this view. However, to the first point I will argue that there is far more agency involved in separation that cannot—indeed, should not—be explained merely in terms of resignation or defeat. To the second point I will show that separation does not preclude engagement with the mainstream, but in any case the terms and expression of that engagement do not hinge on integration.

Over the next several chapters, voluntary separation will refer to a pragmatic and only partially institutionalized response by certain minority groups to existing segregated conditions. The minority groups for whom my argument may have relevance are all stigmatized in some important way. By stigmatized, I suggest strong disapproval of some unspecified person or the group(s) they belong to by most members of the relevant majority group(s). Stigmas will vary from one context to another, and the meanings attached to them will evolve over time. Stigma may be attached to race, ethnicity/culture, religion, occupation, mental illness, speech patterns, social class, weight, disability, or sexual orientation. Notwithstanding the negative associations, even stigmatized groups nevertheless may manifest—or, at any rate, aim to cultivate—important forms of equality and citizenship. To build this case, I first identify relevant principles bearing on segregation and integration and then examine a number of sociological facts about each. I then scrutinize integrationist arguments before providing two prima facie justifications for voluntary separation. I then turn my attention to particular case studies.

Segregation

In its broadest sense, segregation refers to separation—or spatial concentration—as defined by some characteristic, such as race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, political affiliation, gender, religion, employment status, or language.1 Moreover, as a number of researchers observe, “social divisions based on religiosity, political ideology, family behaviours, and socioeconomic standing [in] some cases rival racial segregation in their intensity.”2 While I shall maintain that segregation per se does not augur harm, it almost inevitably will entail involuntary background conditions. That is, many of the opportunity structures, choice sets, and social networks at one’s disposal are not of one’s choosing; they are imposed or inherited.

But even in arguably mixed settings (e.g., malls, schools, neighborhoods, restaurants), it is often our segregated experience that shapes our expectations and behavior. This observation is so familiar and so common that it surprised no one when Beverly Tatum published a book called Why Are All the Black Kids Sitting Together in the Cafeteria?3 The title would neatly capture a phenomenon mirrored throughout the world in both mixed and nonmixed environments. The same phenomenon is nicely captured in the ethnographic portrait provided by Gerd Bauman in south London: “There are pubs where Irish and Afro-Caribbeans, English and South Asians mix freely or even prop up the bar in daily cliquish companionship. Other pubs are favoured by some clienteles more than others. On the whole, an impression of segregation, or at least separateness, is inescapable in most pubs.”4 What can be said of London is of course also observable in Amsterdam, Buenos Aires, Cape Town, Delhi, and Jakarta. And what can be said of pubs can certainly be said of countless other environments. Of course, not all spatial concentrations are stigmatized; nor are the opportunity structures for all spatial concentrations the same. But irrespective of its manifold causes, in this book segregation will refer to the de facto situation of spatial concentration. It describes the situation as it is, the state of affairs into which many of us are born and grow up.

Separation

Conversely, and as its name suggests, separation entails a voluntary response to one’s state of affairs. Now of course there is a sense in which all our voluntary actions are structured by involuntary forces. As Michael Walzer puts it, the involuntary “is historically and biographically prior—the inevitable background of any social life, free or unfree. We move toward freedom when we make escape possible; divorce, conversion, withdrawal, opposition, resignation, and so on. But mass escape is never possible.”5 Notwithstanding this interplay of the voluntary and the involuntary, and a fortiori the many involuntary causes6 of segregation, voluntary aspects often do simultaneously or subsequently occur. Even segregation, as Iris Marion Young points out, occurs “partly as a result of voluntary clustering and partly because of processes of exclusion.”7

To illustrate the inextricable relationship between the voluntary and the involuntary, consider a number of middle-class examples: we may enthusiastically vote for our preferred political party, but most of us will have inherited ideas about politics from our parents, and in any case, the political options being offered are restricted; we may select courses from our university, but the credit structure necessary for graduating is predetermined; we may seek a job in our field of expertise, but the labor market is indifferent to our needs; we may recycle, but our habits are reinforced by laws, cultural norms, and others doing the same; we may use bicycles for transportation, but our choices are shaped by other factors, including the existence of bike lanes, the cost of gas, and the difficulties of finding parking in the city; we may want to live in the city, but our ability to do so is reduced by the price of rent; we may want our child in a Montessori school, but if there are no more spaces we are forced to make another choice.

The voluntary and the involuntary intertwine all the time in ways perceptible and imperceptible. Though its moral significance is highly variable, each of us unconsciously adapts our preferences according to myriad constraints. While those with more education and financial resources certainly have more options than those with less, we continue to recognize volition even when choices are restricted. Segregation and the choices that arise within segregated contexts are no different. So while real estate prices and realtor behavior may combine to restrict where I am able to live, I also may want to live near others with whom I share things in common or from whom I might expect some assistance. Living close to others with whom there is a shared cultural, linguistic, and even socioeconomic background provides a sense of familiarity and comfort. That is not to say that comfort is the overriding priority. As we will see soon enough, other things matter. The point here is simply that even when restricted or adapted to less-than-ideal circumstances, the choices we make do not count for naught.

Given the interplay between the voluntary and involuntary, some may be more comfortable with alternate labels: pragmatic or responsive separation come to mind. While I have no objection to either of these alternatives, I consciously employ voluntary separation (VS)—not only because choice is involved. More important, in my view, VS captures something that the other labels do not. As I explained earlier, segregation occurs for a variety of reasons, not only because members of particular groups have had to lower their expectations or “make do” with involuntary constraints. There is every reason to believe that most Sikhs, for example, actually prefer to live near other Sikhs (in Punjab or in the Diaspora) for the same reason that other groups8 do, even if and when segregation is one of the consequences. It seems to me that this is a recognizable tendency applicable to any number of groups or group members defined by a shared set of characteristics or interests.

VS, as I will defend it, does not seek to camouflage or deny involuntary structural forces. Rather, it describes efforts to resist, reclaim, and rearrange the terms of one’s segregation when those terms are counterproductive to equality and citizenship. To formulate my core argument succinctly, the end or purpose of VS is to make life more pleasant, but its justification hangs on its ability to enhance the conditions necessary for equality and citizenship. Empirically speaking, the forms VS might take will depend on the groups in question, the circumstances they face, the experiences or ideals that guide their separation, and the resources at their disposal. But normatively speaking, sometimes the most desirable and effective response to involuntary segregation is not to integrate neighborhoods or schools but to change the conditions under which one’s segregated experience occurs.

I am certainly aware that some of these ideas, owing to their historical provenance and abuse, either resonate or fail to resonate with certain readers. Using separation and equality in the same sentence is a good example. In the Netherlands, where I live and work, the association to many has for decades seemed intuitively correct given the long history of institutional separation by political affiliation, social class, and religion. Under the Dutch pillarization (verzuiling) system, separate communities were governed by different social, religious, or ideological values, and with the exception of elites representing the respective groups, little interaction took place. Hence Catholics could grow up attending Catholic schools, participating in Catholic sport clubs, having only Catholic friends, listening to Catholic radio programming, and reading Catholic newspapers. Even as attitudes have begun to shift in recent decades, many continue to believe that separation can facilitate an important type of social and political emancipation.

Conversely, to many American readers the same association immediately evokes a strong emotional response—and for good reasons. Many will understandably associate the word separation with the 1896 Plessy decision (Homer A. Plessy v. Ferguson 163 US 537), in which all but one Supreme Court justice voted in favor of “separate but equal,” effectively securing the de jure protection of institutional racism in all areas of public American life. Sixty years later, the Brown decision (Brown v. Board of Education 347 US 483) unanimously and effectively repudiated the logic of its predecessor. The finding that all-black schools were “inherently unequal”9 in terms of material resources was beyond doubt, but the more far-reaching claim of inherent inequality associated with black space—a view with currency even today—rests on more dubious assumptions.10 Even so, given this historical background, “equality under terms of segregation” will strike some readers as absurd if not offensive. Here I can only ask that the reader be willing to consider the argument and evidence on its own merits and bear in mind that the juxtaposition of separate and equal in other contexts does not necessarily evoke the same thing. Nor, in my view, must it mean what some of us take it to mean, even in the United States. In Chapter 4 I elucidate these matters in detail.

While there is a strong pragmatic element in my prima facie defense of VS, my arguments are situated against a broad theoretical framework of liberal democratic theory. Naturally, as an expansive and complex theory, it contains many—often conflicting—elements. Among its more passive elements we find respect for the rule of law, toleration, equal liberties, a willingness to reciprocate with fellow citizens, and at least a minimal level of loyalty to the political community. But liberal democratic theory also contains elements less focused on shared values and interests—among them, associative membership (in its many forms), contestation, and dissent. A healthy democracy will not merely replicate that which came before but will actively and consciously reproduce it.

As is well known, two of its core principles—liberty and equality—are distinct yet intertwined. Each complements one another in the sense that many forms of political and moral equality imply liberty. Or to put it the other way around, there is equality based on the extent to which liberties that should be available to all are available to all. Citizenship, too, is fundamental. As a liberal democratic principle, citizenship captures something important about liberty and equality. The relationship might be captured in the following way: liberal democratic citizenship entails equal liberty entitlements. More will be said about each of these principles in Chapter 3.

But because this book is not about these concepts per se but rather about the ways in which segregation facilitates or fails to facilitate equality and citizenship, I distinguish them in the following way: I assign both equality and citizenship a principled role with respect to integration. Moreover, I will use these same principles in framing the prima facie case for VS. Accordingly, both equality and citizenship will serve as the framing principles. Liberty, too, plays a principled role in liberal democratic societies and has a complimentary relationship to both equality and citizenship. Equality without liberty is little more than uniformity. Nor is citizenship without liberty much more than rhetoric. Either of these in the absence of liberty implies the renunciation of much of what it means to be human.11

However, with respect to the focus of this book, liberty—of conscience, movement, and association—conspires with partiality to produce and maintain segregation. That is to say, unless restricted or steered in certain directions, its exercise does not generally facilitate integration. In short, liberty is a nonfacilitative principle. So rather than setting up a predictable opposition between liberty and equality in which integration relies on equal citizenship while separation relies on liberty, both the case for integration that I examine and the prima facie argument for VS will focus on the role that the two framing principles play.

Integration

As I suggested earlier, many of us understandably associate segregation with inequality, particularly as this relates to inequality of resources and opportunities. Yet despite the clear linkage between some forms of segregation and social inequality, most scholarly accounts remain notably one sided, some going so far as attributing both the presence of discrimination and the structural causes of inequality to segregation itself. After providing detailed and lurid—but also rather selective—accounts of the harms of segregation, many scholars who write on the subject implicitly or explicitly embrace the belief that in order to remedy problems associated with social inequality, stigma, and discrimination, society must become more integrated.12

Noteworthy in most academic studies is how imprecise the concept of integration is. Conservative and liberal scholars alike employ the term to mean different things, though it is safe to say that the demand of ‘integration’ is nearly always directed at minority groups and is meant to signify things like first language, religious preference, educational success, labour market participation, endorsement of mainstream cultural values, and even favorable attitudes and dispositions with respect to various institutional norms. Empirically speaking, by ‘integration’ most persons appear to imagine environments that are spatially mixed on many fronts, but also mixed in terms of more substantive interaction—formally and informally—as well as greater levels of social cooperation across various markers of status and identity. Morally speaking, integration has become a proxy for justice in the kingdom of liberal ends—if not an end in itself.

While I too believe that integration under certain conditions can promote equality and citizenship, it is not integration that I defend but rather the best—and most realistic—means of fostering and realizing equality and citizenship under nonideal conditions. So while I do not repudiate integration, I also do not accept the belief that integration is always or even often the most sensible or effective strategy to achieve equality and citizenship. I call that belief integrationism.

To illustrate, consider an educational application. An integrationist will argue, for example, that segregated schools are bad for a society that values citizenship and opportunity on equal terms. Rather, it is far better for children of different backgrounds to come together and focus on what they share in common. But this belief is fraught with inestimable obstacles and difficulties. For starters, neighborhoods and cities on every continent are segregated (to be sure, some more than others) along many lines, and schools typically reflect this. In part due to the nonfacilitative role that liberty plays—in choosing both where to live and which schools to attend—both voluntary and involuntary features of segregation persist. Second, even if we all were to agree on the integrationist ideal, integration invariably entails far less sacrifice for members of majority groups whose backgrounds more closely correspond to the institutionalized habits, norms, and values of the mainstream. Unsurprisingly, as we will see in more detail in later chapters, even so-called integrated schools in fact are asymmetrically organized to benefit members of the majority group.

Integrationists remain blithely optimistic about the good that integrated school environments can or will accomplish. But very often this is a comforting illusion. For the integrationist ideal in the education example to be compellingly true, its proponents at a minimum must demonstrate (1) that integrated schools supply important goods unavailable in segregated schools and, further, (2) that they are more important than children being educated where they feel welcome, which is often within their own communities. Of course, being educated within one’s own community is not a guarantee of feeling welcome or receiving an appropriately challenging education, but the point here is simply that in the absence of relevant enabling conditions in...

Table of contents

• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Foreword
• Acknowledgments
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Integration
• 3. Foundational Principles
• 4. Voluntary Separation
• 5. Religious Separation
• 6. Cultural Separation
• 7. Social Class Separation
• Afterword
• Notes
• References