French and US Approaches to Foreign Policy

A. Alarcón

• Publisher: Palgrave Pivot
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN:
  9781137358783
• eBook ISBN:
  9781137400789
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Comparative Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Based on document analysis, and on the evaluations, perceptions and judgments of people involved in framing, making, and applying foreign policy in both countries as foreign affairs officials, law makers, or think tanks' associates, this book presents the differing worldviews and concepts for establishing an international order. It is argued that the differences between U.S. and French approaches to foreign policies and international affairs are historically entrenched in political cultures, and could transcend other elements such as economic interests, or the political inclinations of the individuals or parties who control their governments. Many of the findings could be applied to the differences and similarities between the U.S. and other European countries.

1

Introduction

Abstract: This chapter includes: a brief introduction to the relations between France and the United States; an explanation of the theoretical framework, objectives, and methods employed in the study, including the key questions examined in the interviews; and a brief description of the book’s contents.

Menéndez Alarcón, Antonio V. French and US Approaches to Foreign Policy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. DOI: 10.1057/9781137400789.

France and the United States have been allies for most of the twentieth century, and their relationship goes back to French support of the Americans in their war of independence against the British. Particularly, since the end of World War II, both have played important roles in the international community (e.g., they are key members of the United Nations Security Council, G8, NATO and many other international organizations). Most scholarly analyses suggest that the United States and France share common vital interests, such as preventing violence and promoting peace and stability in the world (Institut Français des Relations Internationales [IFRI] 1999; Cogan 1999; Védrine 2003). Therefore, their agreement and understanding when addressing these and other international issues are considered fundamental (especially in light of the fact that France is also a major country member of the European Union). However, their governments’ interpretation and implementation of the actions needed to realize those goals have often been quite different. Indeed, relations between the United States and France have been historically ambivalent, oscillating from diplomatic agreements and united military interventions (e.g., the 2011 operation in Libya), to open confrontation (e.g., de Gaulle pulling France out of the military command of NATO, which he saw as serving mostly US interests), to sharp disagreements over international issues (e.g., the ABM treaty, social and economic rights, and, in particular, the Iraq invasion of 2003).

Traditional approaches explained these oscillations as the result of changing interests or political sympathies between Washington, D.C., and Paris (Styan 2006). For instance, some commentators have suggested that French–US relations in the twenty-first century have been influenced by the mutual dislike between President Jacques Chirac of France and President George W. Bush of the United States, and between President Nicolas Sarkozy and President Barack Obama. Others blamed the change in US foreign policy from multilateralism to unilateralism under President George W. Bush (Blumenthal 2006). I argue that although these factors might play a role, we need to go further to interpret the causes of disagreements. Indeed, although the blatant unilateralism of George W. Bush’s administration irritated French and other European leaders, US administrations have often acted in a way that could be considered unilateral (see, e.g., Liu 2006; Cane 2006; Rogers 2002). The United States has failed to ratify major treaties or conventions over the last 30 years. Even during the Clinton presidency “there had been other examples of a unilateralist approach, including opposition to the proposed international criminal court, criticisms of negotiations on a land mine ban, and a Senate refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty” (Rogers 2002, 1). Robert Kagan (2004), a strong defender of US foreign policy, also suggests that George W. Bush’s foreign policy was not so different from his predecessors. In fact, US foreign policy has always been a mix of the multilateral and unilateral. This was well expressed by Charles Krauthammer, a right-wing commentator, writing in the Weekly Standard of June 4, 2001:

Multipolarity, yes, when there is no alternative. But not when there is. Not when we have the unique imbalance of power that we enjoy today—and that has given the international community stability and essential tranquility it had not known for at least a century. The international environment is far more likely to enjoy peace under a single hegemon. Moreover, we are not just any hegemon. We run a uniquely benign imperium. (Cited in Rogers 2002, 2)

This view might appear to contrast with the view from Europe, and particularly from France. For instance, the controversy over the Iraq invasion could be interpreted as the most visible sign of the differences between these two allies on the role of the international community and how to address international conflict and security, but this needs further clarification. Were these confrontations due to the influence of Gaullist views in the French government and, therefore, could the situation have been different if non-Gaullists had been in power, such as Sarkozy? I argue that the differences between the United States and France in dealing with international issues have not been properly addressed in mainstream analyses. Indeed, most attempts to explain the differences between Western European countries and the United States in addressing international issues have concentrated on national interest and traditional frameworks of international relations, such as realism (i.e., Kennan 1985; Morganthau 1960) or international liberalism (i.e., Mitrany 1966; Noel-Baker 1978; Zimmer 1969).¹ These theories should certainly be considered, but in this book I have tried to look beyond circumstantial situations and to focus on the cultural mindset that influences contrasting approaches over the long term. In sum, although traditional approaches to international relations are useful and important heuristic tools, a comprehensive analysis of transatlantic differences should also incorporate the role of beliefs that are the product of political culture, including historical experiences that shape views on how to resolve conflict. International policies—and officials’ attitudes about other countries—are highly contingent upon principles and values in each political culture (Jodelet 1991; Smith 1998). However, the analysis of contrasting cultural approaches must go beyond general statements, such as those that equate the United States to ancient Rome and Europe to Athens (Bender 2003), or those that portray Europe’s “Venus-like” war weariness in contrast to the missionary military spirit prevalent in the United States (Kagan 2003b). In this book, I try to achieve an inclusive analysis and avoid the intellectual divide that has often characterized the study of international relations. I will examine the ideas expressed by political elites regarding international phenomena and their views on the interactions between the national and the global without excluding the practices of the institutions and actors within political structures and organizations. Lyn Boyd-Judson’s (2011) book on moral diplomacy, and the analysis of national identities by John Borneman (2003) and Krishan Kumar (2008) offer a useful framework for the research on which this present book is based. Robert Putman’s (1976) research on elite beliefs and the work of Marck Peffley and Jon Hurwitz (1993) and of Mark Peffley and colleagues (2003) on foreign policy attitudes have also informed the direction of this research.

This book suggests that perceived national interests and the personal character of leaders do influence responses to particular international issues, but it also shows that, overall, the differences between US and French approaches to foreign policy are historically entrenched in political cultures and transcend the personal hostility of leaders or the political inclinations of the individuals or parties who control their governments. In short, French and US policymakers differ on ideology and foreign-policy schemata, even though all express similar visions on promoting democracy, the rule of law, and freedom in the world.

Purpose of the book

This book analyzes the cultural foundations that underlie interpretations of international relations and foreign policy among French and US political leaders, and attempts to explain the social and political context as well as the cultural mindset that influence prescriptions for conducting politics in the international arena. In addition, it compares the different approaches adopted by political leaders in these two countries with regard to addressing worldwide issues and regional conflicts. The book interrogates the cultures through which international policies are conceived and enacted, including the mandate of preemption and interventionism by which these two countries act in the international arena.

To this end, I studied US and French leaders’ explanations and definitions of international issues and the underlying values, ethical principles, and cultural memories that have guided their assessments. In other words, the book is based to a large extent on the actual voices of the political leaders, with all the stereotypes, clichés, and ideological interpretations. In addition, I analyzed differences and commonalities according to the political philosophies within each country as well as between each country. Thus, the book suggests the sources of the political leaders’ differing worldviews and concepts for establishing an international order. Accordingly, the differences in the belief systems of French and US leaders about international issues are addressed. After considering the historical period included in the analysis, it becomes clear that there are overall fundamental policy directions that have superseded different administrations in both countries. However, in the US there were some considerable variations in the responses to crisis, in terms of more or less unilateral or multilateral actions.

In sum, this book attempts to explain the deeper roots and foundational beliefs that are the sources of these countries’ approaches to address international issues. It presents a comparative map of the structure of the US and French political elites’ belief systems concerning foreign policy and international relations in general. By reproducing the ideas and opinions expressed by political leaders, the book presents the reader with some apparent contradictions, but this is part of attempting to remain faithful to the interviewees’ statements without attempting to reify their points of view in favor of a logical flow of arguments.

I expect this book to contribute to a better understanding of the differing approaches in France and the United States in addressing global issues, particularly the leaders’ assumptions and beliefs that drive their decision-making. Improved understanding might help to coordinate approaches and actions to prevent and preempt international conflicts. The book also sheds light on important theoretical questions, such as the nature of the responses to international conflict, possible causes of misunderstanding and confrontation, and the dynamics of making foreign policy among important Western players. Finally, it provides some critical analysis for reflecting on the relations between the West and the rest of the world. In addition, this book also demonstrates the relevance of sociological analysis—particularly from the perspectives of comparative and cultural sociology—for understanding international relations.

Methodology

A comparative qualitative approach was used to interpret perceptions, opinions, and written texts. Indeed, qualitative research was necessary to make sense of the “life-world through symbols, social structures, social roles, and so forth” (Berg 2004). In the discipline, the use of multiple methods is considered the best approach for scientifically interpreting social phenomena (for an overview of recent sociological research, see Jacobs 2005). The evidence was based on two major methodological approaches: (a) document analysis and (b) in-depth interviews with political leaders. The document analysis followed the concept of the aggregation of meaning (suggested by the “English School”), which is considered by contemporary researchers as the most prominent scientific research approach for the study of international relations and for comparing countries (James 2002; Little 2000). Indeed, this approach facilitated comparison and enhanced the prospects for the accumulation of data.

I examined a sample of important recorded public statements and speeches of presidents, parliamentary resolutions, and other documents reflecting key issues in international relations, with emphasis from the 1980s to the present. Although the book refers to historical influences beyond these years, particularly during the 1950s and early 1960s, I found it sufficient for my purposes to focus on specific cases of the last 30 years. Some of the most recent documents are available via the Internet, but older documents required research in the archives of political parties, Congressional and newspaper archives, and libraries. Comparisons were made cross-country (United States/France) but also over time within each country (e.g., from Mitterrand to Sarkozy in France, and from Reagan to Obama in the United States).

In addition, in-depth semi-structured personal interviews with key informants provided empirical data that helped me understand the normative and political cultural foundations underlying beliefs about security and international conflict. In total, 62 individuals in leadership positions were interviewed (30 in the United States and 32 in France), including individuals within political parties ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• 1  Introduction
• 2  Continuity and Variation of French Foreign Policy since 1945
• 3  The Dynamics of US Foreign Policy: Exceptionalism and Providentialism
• 4  Two Models of Universalism: Contrasting Findings
• Bibliography
• Index