A Sociology of Culture, Taste and Value

S. Stewart

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN:
  9781137377074
• eBook ISBN:
  9781137377081
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Art General
• Index: Social Sciences

This book explores sociological debates in relation to culture, taste and value. It argues that sociology can contribute to debates about aesthetic value and to an understanding of how people evaluate.  

1

Culture in a Rationalizing World

Introduction

Whereas Karl Marx decried without hesitation or reticence what he saw as the ‘dominance of things over men’ in capitalist society, the German social theorist Max Weber (1864–1920), born 46 years after Marx, deployed the more ‘neutral’ notion of rationalization to describe a process that both opened up the way to purposive rational action and led us into an ‘iron cage’ (Lowith, 1993[1960]).¹ In the following two chapters, the argument is made that Max Weber’s work on rationalization has much to tell us about the fate of cultural values in the late modern world that we inhabit. Weber perceived a world in which cultural values were in retreat and impersonal forces had come to dominate (Gronow, 1988). If the rationalization of thought and action had yielded material wealth and, to some extent, a greater scope for freedom and responsibility of action, Weber was also acutely aware that accompanying such developments were, as Alan Sica (2000, p. 42) comments, ‘seedbeds of pathology that affected individuals as much as the societies in which they struggled, vainly … to maintain their individuality and freedom’. Distinctive cultural values and ways of being, whether creative or morally purposeful, whether aesthetic or ethical in orientation, whether serving the ‘demons’ of an artistic or a moral value sphere, were threatened by the very same purposeful rationality that enabled them to find an emboldened form in the first place. What troubled Weber was that the modern culture he saw was one in which humans had come to serve institutions rather than vice-versa, where the means of making money had become an end in itself and where the money economy with its emphasis on quantitative reckoning and calculation increasingly served to exile qualitative differences. Although many of his key writings were produced more than 100 years ago, Weber’s work, which has been described as a ‘science of man’, has considerable purchase in enabling us to understand the late modern world we inhabit (Hennis, 2000). The concept of rationalization has at its heart something that is all too apparent: the formally rational, impersonal structures that dominate our everyday lives. Formal in this sense refers to the impersonal ways in which we measure the value of things and in the impersonal nature of so many of our daily interactions, whether in our exchanges with other human beings or in our dealings with the labyrinthine bureaucracies, online and offline, of the private and public sectors.

Rationalization

Rationalization, according to Weber, is a historical process unique to the Western world that involves an increasing mastery of reality by means of calculation, technical procedure, and methodical planning. It involves an increasing mastery of the natural world, of society, and of individual action. As reality is made increasingly ‘knowable’, science, law and medicine are in the ascendancy and the world is stripped of the magical belief systems that had hitherto dominated. According to Derek Sayer (1991, p. 114), rationalization ‘connotes systematicity, consistency, method: whether as a cast of mind, or as the principle on which organizations are structured, it implies the exclusion of arbitrariness and above all of what he [Weber] refers to as “magic”’. Many Weber scholars have disputed the extent to which rationalization is the ‘key’ to Weber’s thought (see, for example, Hennis, 2000), but it is another matter altogether to deny its significance as a dominant theme running through his vast and disparate body of work. Kenneth H. Tucker (2002, p. 161) argues that whereas for Marx the master process of modernity is class struggle, for Weber it is rationalization, ‘the march of the bureaucrat, not the proletariat’. Karl Lowith (1993, p. 49) argues that Weber’s concept of ‘rationalization’, like Marx’s ‘alienation’, is a characterization ‘of the fundamental meaning of capitalism’. For Marx, the driving force of history is the mode of production of a given society. In Weber’s analysis of history, there is no singular ‘driving force’ of history nor is there a sense of inevitability regarding the direction in which historical events are taking us. Rather, Weber seeks to understand the various factors, material and ideal, that have played a part in shaping the course of events, and, for example, in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism he seeks to ‘clarify the part which religious forces have played in forming the developing web of our specifically worldly modern culture, in the complex interaction of innumerable different historical factors’ (Weber, 2001[1904], p. 49). Jukka Gronow (1988, p. 320) argues that for Weber, rationalization is a two-fold process. First, ‘a rational and methodical conduct of life originally ethically motivated and embedded in a religious and metaphysical world view becomes detached from the ethics of calling’ so that this conduct is institutionalized and comes to dominate the individual in the form of impersonal rules and modes of conduct. Second, the various spheres of life, whether concerned with ethics, law, art or science, are detached from each other, become independent, and, as we will see below, ‘the values ruling in them … change their quality and become mutually incompatible’ (Gronow, 1988, p. 320). As we will see below, rationalization is also characterized by the increasing dominance of formal rationality, which ‘destroys all genuine cultural values in the modern world and … petrifies culture into a mechanical apparatus resembling that of a machine’ (Gronow, 1988, p. 321). So as to get a clearer idea of rationalization, as Weber perceived it, let us now look at some examples.

Rational capitalism

Weber (2001, p. xxxi), in common with Marx, held the belief that capitalism is ‘the most fateful force in our modern life’. Let us, then, discuss the rise of this key vehicle for rationalization, namely that which Weber (2001[1904], 2003) identified as rational capitalism, which emerged in Europe (and subsequently, the United States of America) from the sixteenth century onwards. In his General Economic History, he drew attention to six key factors associated with rationalization which played a major part in the development of rational capitalism in the West (Weber, 2003[1927]). The first factor is the use of rational accounting as the norm for large scale industrial concerns which ‘determine … income yielding power by calculation according to the methods of modern bookkeeping and the striking of a balance’ (Weber, 2003, p. 275). The second factor is the emergence of a free market not limited by class monopolies or restrictions on access to trading or the ownership of property. The third factor is the increasing use of rational technology such as mechanization so as to make calculable, as much as possible, the production and distribution of goods with view to enhancing profits and increasing levels of production. The fourth factor is the emergence of calculable law which can be readily administered and which offers a reliable means of adjudication, thus contrasting with forms of law, for example, in patrimonial societies of Asia and in the West ‘down to the Stuarts’, where the prominent and the wealthy all too often had recourse to ‘cheap justice’ and could readily buy their way out of trouble (Weber, 2003, p. 277). Although rational law, as Weber understood it, is also subject to abuses and tampering by the powerful, it is far more likely to be fair than is a system based entirely on personal favour or hereditary rule. The legal authority that serves to enforce this type of law is claimed by the state, which is administered by salaried, appointed officials and has a monopoly on the use of violence. The fifth factor in the development of rational capitalism is free labour. This means that there is a property-less class that is formally free, but is compelled to sell its labour in order to meet its needs. The sixth factor associated with rationalization is the commercialization of economic life, meaning ‘the general use of commercial instruments to represent share rights in enterprise, and also in property ownership’ (Weber, 2003, pp. 277–278). Other related factors associated with the development of rational capitalism include the widespread deployment of instruments of financial rationalization such as tax farming and the free transferability of shares (Weber, 2003).

Crucially, Weber argued that in addition to the above factors, a particular type of economic conduct particular to the occident played a key role in the development of rational capitalism. This conduct has cultural roots in Protestantism, and in particular, in Calvin’s doctrine of salvation. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism is Weber’s most famous work, and in the section that follows, we can only briefly sketch out its main thesis. Weber sought in part to provide explain a phenomenon that was widely discussed in the Catholic press at the time he was writing: why was it that in countries with mixed religious composition, the prominent business leaders and the most technically and commercially adept employees in business enterprises tended to be, overwhelmingly, Protestants rather than Catholics? Why had Protestants ‘shown a special tendency to develop economic rationalism which cannot be observed to the same extent among Catholics’ (Weber, 2001, p. 7)? Central to Weber’s argument is that the doctrine of Protestantism, as espoused by Martin Luther and John Calvin, inspired a mode of conduct in the world that ‘favoured the development of a rational bourgeois economic life … It stood at the cradle of the modern economic man’ (Weber, 2001, p. 117). Protestantism emerged as a separate branch of Christianity out of attempts to change the Catholic Church during the Reformation (1517–1648). The relationship with God of Catholic laymen was mediated by the Church; they were caught up in a perpetual cycle of sin, repentance, atonement, release, and return to sin. The Priest, as mediator, was a figure to turn to in the hour of need, ‘a magician who performed the miracle of transubstantiation, and who held the key to eternal life in his hand’ (Weber, 2001, p. 71). Catholics could thus, by means of the system of the confession and penance, envisage salvation in spite of an imperfect and unsystematic life, so long as the balance of merit was in their favour. There was no such comfort for Protestants. Inspired by Reformation-era theologians such as Martin Luther and John Calvin, religious faith became a private matter between the individual and God. These theologians sought to strip religious practice of all superstitious, magical and sacramental elements. In short, the Protestant doctrine of predestination, which was emphasized by Calvin and his followers, was crucial in the formation of an ethic compatible with rational capitalism. It held that by the decree of God, mankind was divided into two groups: those who were predestined to be saved, to have everlasting life, and those who were damned to everlasting death. This decision had already been made and there was no means of adjusting one’s merit or gaining the favour of God by means of one’s behaviour on earth. According to Weber (2001, p. 60) this had the consequence of ‘a feeling of unprecedented inner loneliness of the single individual’. It led, inevitably, to salvation anxiety: the question that emerged for each Protestant individual was ‘Am I one of the elect?’ (p. 65). The solution for the Calvinist was sola fide, meaning faith alone. The Calvinist sought, by means of a life of good works, an engagement with intensely worldly activities, or, in Luther’s terms, the pursuit of one’s ‘calling’, was a means of ridding oneself of the fear of damnation and gaining confidence that one’s success in such activity was a sign of election. This ascetic tendency had a revolutionary impact: it meant that after the Reformation, Protestant individuals proved their worth by means of an intensive self-regulation of conduct in mundane, worldly occupations. Whereas Catholic monks sought their path to salvation in monasteries, isolated from worldly endeavours, the ascetic Calvinist slammed the doors of the monasteries and ‘strode in to the market-place of life’ (Weber, 2001, p. 101).

Weber found the apotheosis of Protestant asceticism in the writings of Richard Baxter, a seventeenth century Puritan theologian. Baxter repeatedly advocated the moral worth of ‘hard, continuous bodily or mental labour’ (Weber, 2001, p. 105). The ascetic tendency of Calvinism involved ‘a life of good works combined into a unified system’, a rationalization of everyday conduct (Weber, 2001, p. 71). Crucially, the asceticism of the Puritan meant an attitude hostile to idleness, to wasting time, to the pursuit of pleasures or luxuries, to idle talk and sociability. Curiously, it was not, however, hostile to the making of money. So as to illustrate this point, Weber (2001, p. 36) drew a comparison between Catholic attitudes in fourteenth and fifteenth century Florence and those in the eighteenth century Pennsylvania, USA. In Florence, which had a highly capitalistic culture, there was a sense of unease and guilt associated with the making of money, and the rich often donated wealth to the Church so as to salve their consciences. In Pennsylvania, where the Puritan influence was strong, capitalistic acquisition became, for the rising strata of the middle-class, a sign of election, a sign of God’s blessing. Making money was now, as part of one’s calling, an utterly respectable pursuit as long as this money was saved prudently, acquired legally, and not used as a means of pursuing the temptations and pleasures of an idle life. The order of the day for the emergent Protestant middle-classes was now acquisition for its own sake, and such profits came to be seen as a sign of blessing.

Weber’s argument, that the rational pursuit of profit was unique to the West, is contentious. He insisted that auri sacra fames, the greed for gold, was no less present in earlier periods of history, in the Ancient world, in China, India, in Babylon, than in the modern world, but what differentiated rational capitalism from these forms of capitalistic activity was the particular ethos, namely the spirit of capitalism, informed by Protestant asceticism, characterized by the rational, cool-headed and systematic pursuit of gain, with labour pursued as end in itself. Although, as has been established above, Weber did not seek to argue that the ascetic tendency in Protestantism was the causal factor in the development of rational capitalism, he clearly believed that it played a major role in the emergence of the spirit of capitalism, contending that

the religious valuation of restless, continuous, systematic work in a worldly calling, as the highest means to asceticism, and at the same time the surest and most evident proof of rebirth and genuine faith, must have been the most powerful conceivable lever for the expansion of that attitude toward life which we have called the spirit of capitalism (Weber, 2001, p. 116).

This argument is controversial: although all the popular religions of Asia allowed for capitalistic activity, none of them, according to Weber, developed this ‘capitalist spirit’ which he associated with Protestantism. This is because, Weber explained, ‘they all accepted this world as eternally given, and so the best of all possible worlds’. In other parts of the world, the development of rational capitalism was hindered by a reliance on superstition and magic. In Economy and Society, Weber (1968[1913], p. 630) stated that,

No path led from the magical religiosity of the non-intellectual strata of Asia to a rational, methodical control of life. Nor did any path lead to that methodical control from the world accommodation of Confucianism, from the world-rejection of Buddhism, from the world-conquest of Islam, or from the messianic expectations and economic pariah law of Judaism.

In contrast, in finding a justification for being among the chosen by means of the rational pursuit of a worldly vocation, Protestantism was, according to Weber (1968, p. 630), the only religion able to rid itself of magic and the supernatural quest for salvation. In making this argument, Weber has been accused by many scholars of taking up the Orientalist position of his contemporaries in underestimating the Eastern economic ‘mentalities’ (see Said, 2003[1978], p. 259). Furthermore, it has been suggested that Weber uses the term ‘rational’ very liberally when referring to developments in the West just as he tends to over-use ‘magical’ when referring to the East (Parkin, 2002, p. 68). He has also been accused of choosing to ignore elements of economic rationalism in non-Western religions (Rodinson, 1974; Singer, 1972; Turner, 1974) and in Catholicism (Giddens, 2001, p. xxii). Furthermore, it has been suggested by some that there is no affinity between Calvinism and the spirit of capitalism (Sombart, 1915, p. 252). There have also been a number of criticisms of Weber’s method in his Protestant ethic thesis (see Giddens, 2001), notably regarding his over-reliance on Baxter’s sayings as evidence for his claims. What is missing from Weber’s analysis, according to Frank Parkin (2002, p. 62) is ‘the proto-typical Calvinist capitalist’. These criticisms need to be taken into account in any twenty-first century reading of Weber’s work. However, what is significant for the purposes of this chapter is the latter part of Weber’s thesis and in particular his observation that the religious roots of rational capitalism, which he carefully traced, had, by the time he was writing, in the early part of the twentieth century, pretty much died away (Weber, 2001, p. 119).

Over time, Weber argued, wealth has a secularizing tendency and with the spirit of asceticism no longer present, what remained after the religious roots died was ‘utilitarian worldliness’. Victorious capitalism, he argued, no longer needed the support of this religious spirit, ‘since it rests on mechanical foundations’ (Weber, 2001, p. 124). The instrumentally rational pursuit of profit had now become an end in itself. From now on, the attainment of such wealth would still be a sign of blessing, but such blessing would have more to do with prestige in the eyes of others and less to do with a doctrine of predestination. More significantly, values would increasingly be measured in accordance with quantitative criteria. Regarding the element of hubris in this new materialist culture ruled by abstract godheads, Weber (2001, p. 124) cast aside his scholarly caution and wrote, memorably, that regarding ‘the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: “Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved”’. One wonders what he would make of our consumer society in which participation is obligatory if we are not to fall behind and become ‘failed consumers’, and where consumer patterns ‘embrace all life’s aspects and activities’, penetrating to the very core of our lives (Bauman, 2005a; Bauman, 2005b, p. 88). What would he make of the rapacious demands of capital, with its relentless motion, reaching from continent to continent, in pursuit of new markets, creating advantage out of new products, and innovative ways of producing things at whatever cost to humanity and the environment (Buck, 2007)? What would he make of the excesses of the world of under-regulated financial capitalism with its complex products, its tax-havens, its Ponzi schemes and its crises, a culture in thrall to impersonal godheads such as ‘the markets’ ‘economic growth’ and ‘GDP’? The consequences that attend the serving of impersonal ‘godheads’ will be explored below.

Rationalized culture

Let us now look at some examples of cultural phenomena that, according to Weber, have been profoundly altered as a consequence of the rationalization process. Again, contentiously, these examples are considered to be unique to the West. First, let us further consider religion. Weber (1946a[1918], p. 153) argued that ‘[a]ll theology represents an intellectual rationalization of the possession of sacred values’. This rationalization is expressed in the widespread significance of doctrine, whether the Indian doctrine of Kharma, the Catholic doctrine of the sacrament or the Calvinist doctrine of predestination. There is also a strong rational element in religious hierocracies, which were organized by officials into institutions, paralleling the rise of secular bureaucracy. Within each organized religion, whether the Anglican church or the Confucian cult, the officials that made up the hierocracies stood in contrast to the charismatic possessors of spiritual values, the religious virtuosos (such as shamans, sorcerers, ascetics) against whom they struggled (Weber, 1946b[1915], p. 288). However, as we have seen above, Weber argued that only in the West has there emerged a religious spirit that has been rationalized to the extent that it has eliminated its magical elements and is entirely compatible with rational capitalism.

Music is another cultural phenomenon to which Weber turned his attention (Weber, 1958). Although in other parts of the world, there are forms of music that involve the combination of a number of instruments and vocal parts, Weber (2001, p. xxix) argued that it is only in the West that, since the Renaissance, there has emerged a ‘rational harmonious music’ supported by a ‘system of notation, which has made possible the composition and production of modern musical works, and thus their very...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 Culture in a Rationalizing World
• 2 The Fate of Cultural Values
• 3 Why Do We Like What We Like?
• 4 Expressing Taste
• 5 Evaluating Culture
• 6 Culture in a Globalizing World
• 7 The Local on the Global Stage
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index