1 Introduction
While researching this book, two of the authors undertook a number of visits to correctional centres across several Australian jurisdictions, the USA and the UK, in order to personally review the settings in which the types of corruption discussed in this book occur. During these visits, we were frequently drawn into conversation with prison staff. One of the most memorable comments we heard came from a prison manager during a visit to a large metropolitan prison, who said, in effect, âEighty percent of staff of this prison should not be working here.â This comment could not pass without our asking why this was the case. The manager replied, âBecause theyâre scared to come to work.â Later in the book, we will return to this point, as it aptly characterises the nature of correctional settings as both places of work and places to become drawn into workplace-related corruption.
This book began as a study of key forms of correctional corruption and of best practice for their mitigation and prevention. We quickly came to realise, partly owing to conversations such as the one just noted, that a focus on corruption alone was too narrow in scope. Many of the key drivers that explain how corruption arises and how it is sustained are to be found within the missions given to correctional institutions, in the ways in which these institutions are resourced and managed overall, in the kinds of settings in which they occur, and in the sets of dynamic relationships in which correctional officers (COs) are enmeshed, including with managers, prisoners and other clientele, families of clients, the media, the public and politicians. In order to tackle correctional corruption, we argue, we must first understand it properly by examining it in context. In addressing the problems raised by correctional corruption, we need to consider them as outcomes of individual, institutional and environmental factors. Guiding our approach to tackling correctional corruption is the concept of correctional integrity. We consider the challenges within correctional settings that can undermine that integrity, and the ways in which the harms arising from its loss or degradation can be reduced or prevented.
âCorrectional Integrityâ
The idea of integrity in general reflects a normative expectation of consistency between what actors (individuals, agencies) do and the approved aims and methods of the systems that they are charged with upholding and implementing (see Rose and Heywood 2013). A focus on integrity is broader and prospective, compared with most anti-corruption approaches. The latter approaches are typically retrospective in orientation and focus on particular transgressions (Heywood and Rose 2015). Integrity can also be said to refer to a wholeness of purpose among the agency, its staff and its employees, in terms of pursuing its approved mission by appropriate means (Uhr 2005). Wholeness refers not just to the idea of individuals making correct choices in specific situations (e.g., to refuse a bribe from a prisoner), but also to the articulation and adherence at a systemic level to particular performance standards. Those standards might relate to process (e.g., impartiality of treatment) or to outcomes (e.g., rehabilitation of prisoners). In both instances, the standards are defensible by reason of their regard for the well-being of others and the avoidance of self-protection and self-interest (Rorty 1999: 105).
Correctional integrity links also to idea of institutional trustworthiness (see, e.g., Warren 1999). Institutional trustworthiness, in this case correctional trustworthiness, can be seen to depend on the systemâs ability to project an institution displaying appropriate motivations and competence to achieve the requirements of the correctional domain. A focus on the proper achievement of all aspects of its mission extends, we argue, beyond the effective and safe confinement of prisoners to include their treatment in a humane manner that also supports rehabilitation and successful re-entry into society (Liebling and Arnold 2004). Pursuit of these public purposes means there are necessary limits on the advancement of private ends (self-interest). Competence as a necessary component of trustworthiness implies a level of training and resourcing sufficient to ensure the delivery of what is required under the relevant mission. Trustworthy correctional settings exhibit a commitment to the welfare of others and have the competency to reasonably meet the expectations of their clients. Many threats to correctional integrity, we shall see, arise from an inability or unwillingness to differentiate self-interest from the public purpose, whether as a consequence of ignorance or as a deliberate evasion. An area in which this problem occurs frequently is inappropriate relationships (see Chap. 3).
The Importance of the Broader Context
Although individual behaviour and choices are important, correctional integrity, and, equally, its absence or degradation, can only be adequately understood in the light of the organisational and normative systems within which individuals work and exercise their formal responsibilities. The actions of the prison guards at Abu Ghraib, for example, can only be fully comprehended by reference to those systemic features that encouraged and/or permitted those abuses to occur (see Zimbardo 2007). Such an approach is essential, especially where it is clear that instances of corruption are not isolated or that they recur over time. A correctional integrity perspective of the kind we are putting forward seeks to understand how the so-called âbad applesâ (individuals who engage in corrupt acts) were affected by the âbarrelsâ (the institutional settings in which those individuals work), and how both the actions of the âapplesâ and the âbarrelsâ in turn have been influenced by the âorchardsâ (the environments in which those âapplesâ and âbarrelsâ are to be found) (on the application of this metaphor to policing, see Punch and Gilmour 2010).
The prison managerâs surprising comment about levels of employee fear spoke to the working conditions of correctional employees (the âbarrelsâ), as well as wider systemic features (the âorchardâ) that shape the work environment in which COs make decisions about how to act. Systemic features such as overcrowding and staff shortages have been linked to occupational stress, arising in part, at least, from fears held by COs of being outnumbered and assaulted (see Martin et al. 2012). Boredom in the workplace, another systemic problem, can also trigger misconduct (Bruursema et al. 2011).
The managerâs comment also raises a fundamental feature of correctional settings that influences how systems are run, and hence how much integrity can be achieved. This is the fact that correctional managers and their staff cannot âcontrol,â at least all the time or in all respects, the institutions in which they work and hold responsibilities (Sykes 1956, 1958). Although realities vary enormously between institutions, there are times, and places, when it can fairly be said that prisoners, rather than staff, control the prisons (Morris and Hawkins 1972; McEvoy 2000). Especially in (but not confined to) the larger, higher security prisons, there is frequently an unstable accommodation of power between officers and prisoners. Both groups are capable of acts of domination and resistance, producing an existential uncertainty about âwho is in chargeâ and with respect to what aspect of institutional life. This dynamic, contingent âorderâ leaves room not just for conflict between officers and prisoners but also for cooperation and compromise. Particularly in these latter forms of accommodation, we encounter the potential for various forms of integrity breaches by officers.
Although many prison studies have examined the limits of power and control within correctional settings in relation to prison riots and prisoner misconduct, few, if any, have examined their implications for understanding different forms of corruption carried out by COs. We suggest below (in Chap. 2), that corruption needs to be seen as part of the configurations of power and the consequential ânegotiated ordersâ (Sykes 1958; Trammell 2009) between staff and clientele in nearly every correctional setting. Our contextual approach to understanding correctional integrity proposes to differentiate the organisational (1) structures, (2) cultures and (3) climates that influence and shape how officers perform their work. In brief, this framework proposes that decisions to act corruptly are made, and opportunities for corruption exist, within systems of governance and rules (structures), workplace groups (cultures) and political, social and economic conditions (climates). This framework will be developed further in Chap. 2.
Changing Correctional Scenarios
A number of contextual features and trends are of relevance. One recent change of quite broad significance in many countries has been the significant rise in the numbers of persons incarcerated and, hence, related costs. In terms of public expenditure, corrections continue to consume a large percentage of government expenditure, despite reductions in the official crime rates. For example, in Australia, with an annual national budget of around $3 billion, a workforce numbering in the tens of thousands, and a clientele approaching 100,000 on any day (persons in prison and community corrections), the correctional enterprise is a substantively large, complex and expensive social system. In the USA, the annual state corrections budget is now well in excess of USD 50 billion, with the prison population growing five-fold since 1980 to more than 1.5 million incarcerates (National Association of State Budget Officers 2013). Currently, around one in eight US state government employees work for one or another correctional system (Pew Center on the States 2011: 5).
The nature of correctional clients is also changing. Prisoners, many correctional managers and employees will tell you, are different now; they are younger, tougher, more likely to be gang members and more interested in drugs and physical fitness than previously (see, e.g., Commons 2012; Podmore 2012). The growth in terms of younger, drug-dependent clientele alone has had an undeniable impact on the demand for contraband in prison and has created untold opportunities for trafficking. The âprison underground economyâ around drugs has influenced staffâprisoner dynamics in many ways. These include the emergence of very powerful gang leaders (sometimes known as âshot-callersâ) as a regular feature of prison life, who are able to trade relative calm on the prison wings for a blind eye to their illicit trading activities (Trammell 2009; Skarbek 2014). COs in these institutions must negotiate these conditions, including opportunities (and risks) from different forms of cooperation with, and even participation in, these activities. In Chap. 4, cases in which COs have actively solicited, rather than acquiesced to, opportunities to supply clients with contraband in return for payment or other favours are discussed.
There is also ongoing uncertainty around the missions of correctional institutions. These statements of purpose in legislative or other written form also define an important part of the context. Both in philosophical and political terms, missions typically contain multiple goals; for example, for England and Wales, it is stated:
Her Majestyâs Prison Service serves the public by keeping in custody those committed by the courts. Our duty is to look after them with humanity and help them lead law-abiding and useful lives in custody and after release.
This multiplicity ensures that what is expected of those institutions, and how familiar goals (e.g., security, order and rehabilitation) are interpreted by interested parties and balanced in practice, are subject to diverse responses. Given the primacy of client control within many correctional settings, there can easily be a degree of uncertainty among correctional staff about what it means to act with integrity when control can be partial or contingent. How much emphasis on âcareâ as opposed to âcontrolâ is an existential challenge, and a source of unresolved uncertainty, for many officers (King 2009; Halsey and Deegan forthcoming). As we will see in Chap. 3, finding the right balance within relationships in correctional settings can be fraught for many officers; without appropriate guidelines and support, the changing role of officers only makes this more challenging
Scope and Definitional Matters
The definition of corruption adopted in this book essentially is the one used by Transparency International: âthe abuse of entrusted power for private gainâ (quoted in Graycar and Sidebottom 2012: 384). It needs to be added that the power in question relates to that power exercised by public officeholders, or in the case of privatised service providers, by those undertaking the delivery of a public service. This can be compared, for example, with a definition of correctional deviance as âinappropriate work-related activities in which [correctional officers] may engageâ (Ross 2013: 111). A key challenge here is deciding whether to limit our understanding of threats to integrity to instances related to self-interest or private interest, or to include the equivalent of noble cause corruption, a concept taken from police corruption, in correctional settings. This would arise, by analogy, where correctional employees or staff deliberately breach standards of appropriateness, motivated by a desire to advance ...
