Wittgenstein and the Creativity of Language

Sebastian Sunday Grève, Jakub Mácha, Sebastian Sunday Grève, Jakub Mácha

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781137472533
• eBook ISBN: 9781137472540
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Linguistics

This volume is the first to focus on a particular complex of questions that have troubled Wittgenstein scholarship since its very beginnings. The authors re-examine Wittgenstein's fundamental insights into the workings of human linguistic behaviour, its creative extensions and its philosophical capabilities, as well as his creative use of language. It offers insight into a variety of topics including painting, politics, literature, poetry, literary theory, mathematics, philosophy of language, aesthetics and philosophical methodology.

Part I

Introduction

1

The Good, the Bad and the Creative: Language in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy

Sebastian Sunday Grève and Jakub Mácha

This introductory chapter presents the reader with various ways of approaching the topic ‘Wittgenstein and the creativity of language’. It is argued that any serious account of the questions arising from this joint consideration of, on the one hand, this great genius of philosophy and, on the other, the varieties of speech, text, action and beauty which go under the heading ‘the creativity of language’ will have to appreciate the potential of both, in terms of breadth as well as depth. First, the chapter points out a way of understanding Wittgenstein’s discussion of rules and rule-following in relation to meaning and normativity which, in virtue of respecting Wittgenstein’s own creativity as a writer, does not fall prey to a widespread source of misunderstanding. Next, Wittgenstein’s uses of language receive some additional attention (i.e. his use of analogies, metaphors, punctuation and other literary and rhetorical devices), before a glimpse is offered of an unravelling of the knot that is Wittgenstein and the creativity of language. The multiple interrelated threads here lead into areas of human concern ranging from the philosophy of language and logic through to ethics, aesthetics and politics. Finally, the chapter offers an overview of the contents of the book from the perspective of its editors.

Creativity is generally regarded as a good thing; to say of someone that they are creative is usually meant as a compliment. This is most certainly true in the arts but also, to a certain degree, in the sciences: think of the revolutionary work of Galileo, Einstein and Darwin, for instance. But what if what we are aiming to achieve is less the creation of something new but, rather, rigour and analysis, as is the case, for example, in mathematics? And what of philosophy? Again, generally, creativity would definitely seem a good thing for anyone engaging in these kinds of activity. And, indeed, it generally seems to be agreed nowadays that creativity broadly construed includes novelty and value.¹ – But things begin to appear more involved once we take a closer look. Someone who has written a philosophical paper offering a detailed analysis of a complex argument is going to be very disappointed if, upon having handed their paper to a colleague or friend for comments, the main reaction they receive is a well-meaning smile and an assuring ‘Oh you have been very creative!’—which might be a literal compliment or, instead, an ironic criticism. Now, obviously, creativity is not therefore a bad thing either – and not even with respect to the most analytic of tasks in philosophy or mathematics. However, one may want to object here, if not earlier, that all these things we call ‘creativity’ are in fact very different. And this seems to be quite true. This, then, is why, in the present volume, you will not find any such general remarks. The authors in this volume do not offer treatments of the question ‘What is creativity?’ – or, more specifically, ‘What is the creativity of language?’ – in any such general manner, but rather, like Wittgenstein, they point out various possibilities and examples (centres of variation, as it were) which truly bring the topic under investigation into view in the form of particular instances and objects of comparison, so that its distinctive richness may shine through: ‘For if you look at them, you won’t see something that is common to all, but similarities, affinities, and a whole series of them at that.’ (PI, 2009, §66)

Ludwig Wittgenstein is considered by many to have been the most important philosopher of the 20th century. Arguably, creativity and in particular – given his unique approach to the subject, as reflected in the questions he asked and the methods he employed – kinds of creativity having to do with language were of outstanding importance to Wittgenstein’s philosophising: namely, both in the form of his own creative language-use and in the form of his critical attitude towards what he saw as the pernicious outgrowths of a pervading irresponsibility in our dealings with this human ability of linguistic creativity – in philosophy, in the sciences and in our private and social lives with language more generally.

The chapters in this volume seek to illustrate just a few of the ways in which Wittgenstein’s philosophy and questions concerning the creativity of language can be seen as being closely, at times inextricably, related. Along the way, as is only natural for this kind of project, some common misreadings of ‘creativity of language’ in Wittgenstein receive instructive rejection. Topics that are positively addressed include: the relation between poetry and philosophy; Wittgenstein’s writing of philosophical texts, their composition and his techniques and possible intentions as an author; accordingly, how to read Wittgenstein’s texts if one wants to take their literary form seriously; Wittgenstein’s criticisms of various instances of nonsense, especially instances of linguistic creativity gone too wild; Wittgenstein’s own reflections on the creativity of language, early and late; the potential of his philosophical approach as applied to the arts; and, moral, ethical and political implications of Wittgenstein’s philosophical dealings with the creativity of language.

In the remainder of this introductory chapter, we offer a brief discussion of a few more or less specific issues that are of particular relevance to the theme of the volume, before preparing and clearing the stage for the various pieces that are presented in individual chapters: finally, in Section IV, we offer a short, subjective introduction to each chapter and suggest how it relates to the broader themes of the book.

I. Linguistic creativity beyond ‘rule-following’

It has seemed to some readers of Philosophical Investigations that the paradox that Wittgenstein mentions in section 201 would present a major difficulty for any genuinely Wittgensteinian approach to phenomena of meaning or normativity. Wittgenstein begins this section as follows:

This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule. The answer was: if every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule, then it can also be brought into conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here. (PI, 2009, §201)

Saul Kripke famously thought that ‘[t]he “paradox” is perhaps the central problem of Philosophical Investigations’ (1982, p.7). It is not.² However, it has come to seem to many that indeed ‘perhaps’ it might. Moreover, the fact that it has come to seem thus is surely not a mere historical coincidence (but is indeed part of the reason why Wittgenstein takes such an interest in rule-following). If, then, one further agrees with Kripke that linguistic meaning itself is fruitfully viewed as an inherently rule-governed affair, then this paradox might even be ‘regarded as a new form of philosophical scepticism’, and it might be thought that ‘the relevant sceptical problem applies to all meaningful uses of language.’ (ibid.)

Now, if one holds, much as Kripke and many others have held, that Wittgenstein resolved this paradox of rule-following in such a way as to avoid, or accommodate, the apparent scepticism about all meaningful uses of language, then another paradox might seem to follow: namely that of linguistic creativity. For if one holds that linguistic meaning is essentially constituted by rule-following activity—whether these rules, in turn, may be thought of as being constituted by the agreement of some relevant community, as Kripke argued, or by certain facts of regularity, as for instance argued by Peter Hacker and the early Gordon Baker—it becomes questionable how any genuinely new meaning, i.e. new rules, could ever be created by anyone.³ How could our language possibly extend beyond the existing rules which are said to constitute it? Are there perhaps rules – meta-rules? – for the creation of new rules? Contrariwise, how could language ever even have evolved into the existing system of rules which it would thus be held to be? But all of this seems absurd – and yet many intelligent people have felt the need to find some satisfactory set of answers to these questions.

There is a related issue which is equally familiar. For, again, if one is in the grip of such a picture of Wittgenstein on rules and language, does this not, in any case, also lead straight into the arms of some obscure version of linguistic conservatism? — The charge of linguistic conservatism is an old one.⁴ But, again, it would be mistaken to believe this was a mere historical datum. It can perhaps be seen just how inherently difficult it is not to fall prey to objections of this sort from the following passage from an essay by Peter Hacker which appeared in an edited collection titled Wittgenstein, Theory, and the Arts:

[1] ‘Following according to a rule’ is fundamental to the institution of language. [2] To learn a language is to master the rule-governed techniques of the uses of its expressions. [3] To understand the meaning of an expression is to be able to use it correctly [viz. to have mastered its rule-governed techniques]. [4] One cannot follow a rule which one does not know or understand. [5] Hence the rules which determine and are constitutive of the meanings of expressions cannot be unknown, awaiting future discovery. (Hacker, 2001, pp.60–1, our insertions)

Hence, it seems to follow that [6] we know all the rules, hence we have all the meanings already; in other words, there can be no genuinely new meanings of expressions because there can be no new rules, ‘which determine and are constitutive of the meanings of expressions’ (ibid.). But, one might ask, what then are we doing when interpreting a poem, for instance? Clearly, then, there must be something wrong with this talk about rules and meaning. However, Hacker probably did not really intend to say anything remotely as controversial as this when he wrote that passage.⁵ So this shows that it really is extremely difficult to avoid misunderstanding in addressing these questions (and perhaps it is especially difficult when addressing these questions in written form).

There are of course many ways in which one might attempt to solve or dissolve such an apparent paradox of linguistic creativity (maybe Hacker meant something rather special by ‘unknown’ and ‘future discovery’ in that passage).⁶ However, with regard to our current concerns, it is perhaps of more direct interest to note that this difficulty of seeing Wittgenstein’s perspective on the creativity of language can be shown to stem from a failure to actually see his own creative use of language in the relevant passages of the Investigations.

For Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following, insofar as they bear on linguistic action, are meant primarily as an analogy. It is therefore exegetically inaccurate to understand them in any straightforward fashion as, for instance, Kripke does. — In section 81, Wittgenstein remarks the following:

in philosophy we often compare the use of words with games, calculi with fixed rules, but cannot say that someone who is using language must be playing such a game. (PI, 2009, §81)

Thus, the string of remarks spanning from section 138 to 242, when viewed in relation to linguistic action, turns out to be the exploration of one gigantic analogy. It seems noteworthy that the passage just quoted constitutes the most explicit disclaimer that we find in the entire text of the Investigations.⁷ In that same section, however, we do also find a hint at one reason for employing such an analogy:

All this, however, can appear in the right light only when one has attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning something, and thinking. For it will then also become clear what may mislead us (and did mislead me) into thinking that if anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it, he is thereby operating a calculus according to definite rules. (§81)

In commentaries on Wittgenstein’s work, one is more likely to be told that his remarks on rules and rule-following are intended to help clarify concepts such as ‘understanding’, ‘meaning something’ and ‘thinking’—which of course is quite true. But here Wittgenstein is apparently saying that we first need to better understand those very concepts in order to thoroughly understand his form of representation when he writes about rules and rule-following. How wonderfully circular! – which lets us begin to see at least part of what might have been Wittgenstein’s motivation for employing the analogy of rule-following on such a large scale in the Investigations. For, Wittgenstein says, we will ‘only’ be in a position to thoroughly grasp the logical function of this analogy within the greater system of his album of remarks, once the analogy has already helped us to achieve some additional ‘clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning something, and thinking’.

Now, once we have come full turn in our understanding of this particular feature of the text, not only will we have come to appreciate the philosophical meaning of one remarkable instance of Wittgenstein’s own creative use of language, but furthermore we shall be free to see that Wittgenstein’s discussion of rules and rule-following is in no obvious way incompatible with our common understanding of the creative potential of our language; and, hence, that it is only as a result of misreading the text that Wittgenstein’s reflections on rules and linguistic meaning in the Investigations might appear to amount to some paradox or anti-creative conservatism.

II. Wittgenstein’s creative language

There are, of course, countless other instances of Wittgenstein’s own creative uses of language that do not tend to receive nearly as much attention in the scholarly literature as, arguably, their philosophical significance would merit.

In addition to Wittgenstein’s rule-following analogy, here we might further mention analogies such as the ones between games and language (§7), chess and language (§31; §108), or meaning and use. Or just think of ‘language-games’, his powerful neologism.⁸ We might further mention his use of metaphor, e.g. language as an ancient city: ‘a maze of little streets and sq...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Part I  Introduction
• Part II  Overture
• Part III  Reading: Wittgenstein: Writing
• Part IV  Philosophy and the Arts
• Part V  Creativity and the Moral Life
• Bibliography
• Index