The Rise of the Far Right in Europe

Populist Shifts and 'Othering'

Gabriella Lazaridis, Giovanna Campani, Annie Benveniste, Gabriella Lazaridis, Giovanna Campani, Annie Benveniste

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781137556790
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

The results of the last European Elections of 2014 confirmed the rise of right and far right 'populist' parties across the EU. The success of a range of parties, such asDenmark's Dansk Folskeparti, Slovenia's Slovenska demokratska stranka, France's Front National, Greece's Golden Dawn, the United Kingdom Independence Party, Beppe Grillo's Five Star Movement in Italy and the Austrian FPÖ, has been perceived as a political wave which is transforming the face of the European Parliament, and challenging at some level the hegemony of the 'big four' well-established European political forces that lead the Strasbourg's assembly: the ALDE, EPP, S&D and Greens/ALE.

As 'populism' has become a major issue in many EU countries, this collection aims to provide a critical understanding of related trends and recommend ways in which they can be challenged both in policy and praxis, by using the gender-race-ethnicity-sexual orientation intersectionality approach.

This international volume combines extensive transnational comparative data analysis, as well as research at discursive, attitudinal and behavioural levels.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

Gabriella Lazaridis, Giovanna Campani and Annie Benveniste (eds.)The Rise of the Far Right in Europe10.1057/978-1-137-55679-0_1

Begin Abstract

1. Introduction

Populism: The Concept and Its Definitions

Annie Benveniste¹ , Giovanna Campani² and Gabriella Lazaridis³

(1)

Department of Educational Science, University of Paris VIII, Saint-Denis, France

(2)

Department of Education and Psychology, University of Florence, Florence, Italy

(3)

University of Leicester, Leicester, UK

This publication has been produced with financial support from the Fundamental Rights and Citizenship Programme of the European Union through the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs for the project ‘Hate Speech and Populist Othering in Europe through the Racism, Age, Gender Looking Glass’ (Grant Number Just/2012/FRAC/AG/2861) and from the EU’s Daphne initiative for a project on E-Engagement Against Violence (Grant Number JUST/2011/DAP/AG/3195). The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Commission. We would like to thank the RAGE and E-EAV teams for their work and support for this book.

End Abstract

The most recent European elections in 2014 saw the rise of parties labelled ‘populist’ across the European Union (EU). The prominence in Denmark of Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party), in Slovenia of Slovenska Demokratska Stranka (Slovenian Democratic Partry), of Front National in France,¹ the high scores of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and Beppe Grillo’s Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five-Star Movement) in Italy, the new MEP seats won by the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ, Freedom Party of Austria) have all been perceived as turning points that are changing the face of the European Parliament, and challenging at some level the hegemony of the ‘big four’ well-established European political forces leading the Strasbourg assembly (ALDE, EPP, S&D, Greens/European Free Alliance).² In this context, the surprisingly weak performance of the Dutch PVV (Partij voor de Vrijheid or Party for Freedom) appears to be the single exception to the visible trend of EU political life: ‘populism’ has become a major issue in many countries of the European Union. A ghost is haunting Europe, the ghost of ‘populism’.

It is hard to identify many characteristics these figures of contemporary populism have in common. Can Marine Le Pen and Beppe Grillo really be united under the same political banner? Does it make sense to compare gay rights supporter Geert Wilders, the Catholic Conservative Timo Soini and the neo-Nazi Michaloliakos, or to associate the Cinque Stelle with the anti-immigration Dansk Folkeparti? Even if we focus on the organisations traditionally considered radical right or far right, the difficulties of contracting alliances and building a parliamentary group to gain influence show that their links are not obvious: a far cry from the idea of similarity suggested by an umbrella concept such as ‘populism’. For example, Front National and Lega Nord are rejected by UKIP, Front National rejects Golden Dawn, the Five-Star Movement denounces the fascist threat represented by far-right parties such as Front National or Jobbik in Hungary.

This book aims to provide a critical understanding of current European trends and considers the complex phenomena covered by the notion of populism, focusing especially on right-wing populism. It also recommends ways these can be challenged both in theory and in practice by using the gender–race–ethnicity–sexual orientation intersectionality approach.

The book explores how we can make ‘populism’ a tangible concept. What is it supposed to express: a value system, an ideology, a political style or a way of using narratives? Populism does not actually appear to fit into any classical classification of political parties, which challenges its intelligibility. To avoid the temptation of using it, depending on the context, as a synonym for ‘nationalism’, ‘racism’, ‘euroscepticism’ or sometimes even ‘anti-establishment’, we first question the concept itself, aiming to deconstruct it and go beyond (Wittgenstein 1953).

In exploring the literature on populism, we face the same complexity. The sheer variety of political parties and movements labelled ‘populist’ has led some scholars to call the phenomenon itself a ‘chameleon’. Karin Priester, for instance, chose the subtitle ‘approaching a chameleon’ for the 2012 book in which she references Paul Taggart (2000), who writes of the ‘chameleon-like quality’ and the ‘empty heart’ of populism. The complexity is increased by the assertion of authors such as Margaret Canovan (1982) or Pierre-André Taguieff (1984, 1997) that fieldwork offers a definition rather than the theoretical baseline. An empirical grounded approach seeks to overcome the fluidity of the definitions by providing many ethnographic heuristic texts about populist formations all across Europe, even if these contain no references to theory. This book is an empirical study exploring the flexible application of the meaning of ‘populism’ in eight different countries in Europe (Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Slovenia and the UK) with diverse historical trajectories and various political party systems, each with its own rules, languages and political games.

Populism: A Problematic Concept

The term ‘populism’ has become a common way to describe many very different movements in politics both in Europe and outside the European continent. Since the 1980s, it has been used to evoke the transformation of political ideology and practices with rhetoric, style or ‘narratives’ designed to conquer electoral audiences.

In Europe, the contemporary success of this notion is linked to the rise of new kinds of far-right movements in the 1980s and the emergence of leaders as Jean-Marie Le Pen (Taguieff 1984), Jörg Haider or Umberto Bossi. In the 1990s, it was used to describe the rise of Latin American leaders claiming to oppose neoliberalism, such as Hugo Chavez in Venezuela or Evo Morales in Bolivia. Mudde and Kalwasser (2013) speak of inclusionary populism in Latin America, as opposed to exclusionary populism in Europe. It is now a common way of speaking about European radical left forces as Oskar Lafontaine’s Die Linke in Germany or Jean-Luc Mélanchon (Front de Gauche) in France, or Alexis Tsipras (SYRIZA) in Greece. And populism is no longer associated solely with parties situated in the periphery of the main positions of power: even the mainstream party leaders are facing the risk of being discredited by the label ‘populists’.

At the intersection of the media and academia, ‘populism’ quickly invaded the political field and in certain electoral circumstances was used as a pejorative term. Because of its wide-ranging application and its common meaning, the technical content of the notion seems to be problematic. It is difficult to agree on a consensual definition of ‘populism’. In addition to ideological issues, several historical references position various kinds of movements in a situation of conceptual uncertainty that has been summed up by Diamanti (2010):

Populism is one of the words that appear the most (…) in the political discourse for some time now. Without much difference, however, between the scientific environment, public, political and everyday life. Indeed, it is a fascinating concept, able to “suggest” without imposing too much precise and definitive meaning. In fact, it does not define, but evokes. (Diamanti 2010)

The invasive and normative extension of the concept tends to obscure its theoritical value. How can ‘populism’ become an heuristic notion under these conditions? Nowadays, it seems to be impossible to completely avoid the term, but the disparity of the contexts makes it hard to agree on a common definition that transcends borders and national peculiarities. Several authors such as Margaret Canovan (1999) give preference to empirical classifications; others (Zaslove 2008) define populism by its emphasis on the people and the elite, a supposedly homogeneous people standing against an elite, not only within a particular country but also on the EU and global levels (financial capitals) and against ‘others’ defined by race, religion, ethnic origin or sexuality. As Pelinka (2013: 9) writes, contemporary populism is directed ‘against elites who have opened the doors to foreign influence and to foreigners’. But as an ideology, populism does not tell us who the elite and the people are, what they do and what they think; so it can be found in many forms, contingent on the existing relationships between government and society. The widespread acceptance and the ‘populist’ label given to many organisations not only contributes to the inflation of neologism around populism already pointed out by Dezé (2004)—neopopulism, national populism, euro-populism, modern populism, new populism—it also explains the profusion of definitions available in the literature. Nowadays, there is a common diffusion that creates a singular situation: it seems to be impossible to completely avoid the term, but the disparity of the contexts makes really hard to arrive at a common definition that can cross borders and national particularities. It also explains the profusion of definitions available in the literature, each author often having their own.

The concept is so frequently used that studies already exist which begin with a review of the scientific literature about the issue (Canovan 1999): indeed it would be possible to assemble a review of the reviews.

In some cases, ‘populism’ does not fit into the political situation. In several countries, it needs to be divided into different categories to make it suitable for academic research. In these cases the concept ‘populism’ makes sense as a way of distinguishing between several forces. In Denmark, the Dansk Folkeparti, now the third largest party in the country, illustrates pragmatic and ‘respectable’ populism far from the radical anti-Islamic views diffused by networks and ‘right’ groups as the Free Press Society. In Bulgaria, ‘soft populism’ is used in connection with the comeback of the former king, Simeon Saxcoburgotski, who won an election by capitalising on his own name and personal resources, while ‘hard populism’ is symbolized by the organisation Ataka, producer of hate speeches and supporter of discrimination against ‘others’.

The wide range of populism definitions makes it hard to express all the criteria that are considered essential to a firm explanation of the concept, except that populism has always been used in a negative sense by governing elites to characterise any form of opposition that claims to represent the ‘people’s voice’ without basing its policy declarations on real facts and viable solutions to actual problems (Liakos 1989; Mouselis et al. 1989; Pappas 2013). All definitions show the constitutive ambiguity of the concept, while scholars tend to regard it as a style of political argument that can be found in virtually all parties. Whatever the case, Pels (2012: 31ff) argues that it would be dangerous to reduce new right-wing populism to a ‘frivolity of form, pose and style’ and ‘to think that there is no substance between its political style’ (ibid.: 32). Hence, the fundamental question remains: what is populism? How, can we make ‘populism’ a solid concept? What situations can it explain? What is it supposed to express: a system of values, an ideology, a political style or a way to use narratives? How far is ‘populism’ from fascism, for example, in all its aspects? In this book, the Italian chapter presents the academic debates around the connections that can be made between fascism and populism. Is fascism populism? Is ‘populism’ a modern acceptable term to evoke similar issues and evolution? Even if it is more localised in the countries which have known fascist or Nazi regimes, the reference to the ideologies of the 1930s appears to be omnipresent in academic debate.

What is populism supposed to characterizse? Should populism be considered an ideology? An individual political style? Does the concept more usefully describe a certain position inside politics? Many theoreticians of the field raise all these dimensions. Karin Priester (2012) organises definitions of populism into three groups according to whether it is understood as an ideology, a strategy to attain and stay in power or a discursive practice, but without attempting an overarching definition. This is also true of Smilov and Krastev (2008); the criteria they use for ‘populism’ are: the appeal to the ‘people as a whole’ as opposed to ‘corrupt’ and ‘impotent’ political elites; opposition to the key idea of liberal democracy (that the political majority should be limited in important ways by constitutional constraints); and the rejection of the ‘political correctness’ of liberalism, meaning a challenge to at least some elements that are seen as the ‘liberal consensus’ of the transition period—market-oriented reforms, integration in Euro-Atlantic organisations, rejection of nationalistic language and behaviour.

Clarification is important here. Depending on the category ‘populism’ fits into, it can be linked to certain conceptual channels. If ‘populism’ is an ideology, it belongs in the system of values it aims to defend. What are the foundations of this ideological trend? In this case, the differences between ‘populism’ and other classical and historical ideological standpoints of the radical right must be questioned. How far is, for example, ‘populism’ from racism, in all its aspects? Big differences on the issue can be seen between countries, and most of the time between different organisations and case studies presented by the same country. The biggest parties and structures (e.g. FPÖ, Front National, Danske Folkeparti, UKIP) usually tend to avoid visible direct racist speeches, whereas the smaller groups, which often remain on the edge of institutional politics (like the Italian Forza Nuova), are more radical. But most of them, even when they eliminate classical racist vocabulary, defend nationalist ideas and values.

By the same logic, in Italy ac...