This book posits moral power as a conceptual edifice built upon on intricate theoretical, policy-focused and empirical research, with the âfleshâ of moral parameters framing the âskeletonâ of power. Drawing on terms, notions and concepts from political philosophy, political science, international relations, foreign policy and European Studies, the book couples these with policy analysis and field research. 1 The identification of certain conceptual lacunae to be found within these domains and attempts to remedy them have motivated the development of a holistic explanatory framework.
Moral power is broken down into seven parameters of morality and three types of power, which are subject to operationalization. Morality-wise, the parameters can be minimized to encompass any reasonable individual moral politician or (foreign) policy-maker. They reach beyond the essential âbrandsâ of civilianness, normativity and ethics to include standards of consequentialism , coherence , consistency , balance between values and interests , normative steadiness , inclusiveness and external legitimacy . Power-wise, the political âbarâ is set at three levels, potential, actual and actualized capacity (see Chapter 2). The substance of the book centers on a case study focusing on EU policy towards the South Caucasus.
By opening up the âblack boxesâ of both the EU and the South Caucasus as the subject and object of the monograph, 2 the monograph takes stock of policy developments in a comprehensive fashion. The argument of this book is twofold. In the first place, contrary to the convictions of realists and neorealists , it posits that it is feasible for a political entity to exist and behave as a âmoral powerâ in foreign affairs and policy and/or international politics and relations. Although normative in its own right, this viewpoint has been supported and justified by political philosophers including Emmanuel Kant, whose thinking has greatly influenced this book. Since his time, this belief has been cherished by scholars of international relations and specifically idealists and liberalists, 3 not least through the impetus given by the creation of the League of Nations. More recently, it has been avowedly championed as viable by constructivists since, provided there is social agreement (including political and scholarly agreement), anything can be constructed. The second postulate, for which the European Union (EU) is the subject of the case study, while South Caucasian states are its object, is that the EU is the political entity best placed to perform as a âmoral powerâ since the triad of âpolity, policy and politicsâ upon which it rests potentially confers all the credentials required for this role (Vasilyan 2004). This triad is intrinsic to the Unionâs political constitution as it encapsulates a plethora of values, most importantly peace. The latter is crucial for the EU, which through its predecessorâthe European Communities (EC)âhas helped the European continent to rise from the ashes of war, guaranteeing peace by transforming dictatorships into democracies. In this way, the EUâs polity, that is, its institutionally organized structure, has been constructed on the premise of greater egalitarianism among states, irrespective of their size of power (great, middle or small), than has been permitted by other intergovernmental organizations. Most importantly, the Union has been built up through a voluntary pooling of sovereignty. Its politics, despite the diversity of actors and interests (defined as competition for power to determine âwho gets whatâ) is conducted through compromise and consensus whereby each agent (state, substate, non-state) benefits by receiving a âpiece of the cakeâ, notwithstanding its size. 4 The EU seen as a policy (not to be confused with a specific EU policy or policies but broadly conceived as a âproject in the makingâ) is driven through diplomacy rather than the use of force characteristic of traditional actors on the world stage.
Examination of the EUâs policyâdefined as âa course of action taken by an entity in order to attain specific goalsâ (Vasilyan and Petrossian 2013, p. 38)âis enticing since it is a novel type of an actor, different from traditional actors, and conducts its external/foreign policy in an unconventional way. There has been a tendency to assert the EUâs idiosyncrasy. 5 The EU has been branded in contradictory fashion as both a âcooperative empireâ (Whitman 2005, p. 33), and as exercising âpassive aggressionâ (Leonard 2005, p. 51). Cooper (2000, p. 22) has labeled the EU as a âpost-modernâ polity, which has fused domestic and foreign affairs, relies on mutual interference and surveillance by member states, has abandoned the use of force and prioritized alternative forms of behavior, the abolition of borders and a reframing of security based on âtransparencyâ, âopennessâ, âinterdependenceâ and âvulnerabilityâ (ibid., p. 22). Conversely, the USA is resistant to postmodernism and prefers âmodernâ means of assertion (ibid., pp. 27). As for the regional powers in the vicinity of the South Caucasus, Russia incorporates âpre-modernâ, âmodernâ and âpost-modernâ attributes, being a largely âmodernâ entity (ibid., pp. 27â28), while Buzan and Diez (1999, p. 51) viewed Turkey as a âmodernizingâ state far from the postmodern condition.
As if following the most similar systems design/method of comparison (Mill 1843), the EU has been predominantly contrasted with the USA. Hyde-Price (2006, p. 217) stated that âthere is a distinctive âEuropeanâ approach to international politics that favours diplomacy, persuasion, negotiation and compromiseâ, in contrast to the âAmerican approach, which is more prone to using military coercionâ (p. 218). Lucarelli (2006, p. 55) claimed that âmultilateralism has become a core principle of political interaction both within the EU and in EU external relations⌠while it seemed to be more a tool in the case of US foreign policyâ. Leonard (2005, p. 38) believed that the USA exercises âpower as spectacleâ, which is âalways imposed on unwilling subjects from outside, rather than changing the wiring of society from insideâ through âpower as surveillanceâ as practiced by the EU. The latter form of power is âvoluntary and mutualâ (ibid., p. 46). More specifically, âwhat makes the EU unique is that it can bring together its aid, trade and development assistance to prevent hotspots from collapsing into warâ (ibid., p. 68). It âcan deploy âtransformative powerâ to shape the parts of societies that America cannot reach with the magnet of its neighborhood policy, and the link between market access and political reformâ (ibid., p. 110). In addition, âthe US pursues short-term goals that are explicitly in its own interestâ, while âthe European responseâ has been to âhold out the possibility of integration⌠to neighbouring countries and so attempt to bring them closer to the political norms and institutional practices of the EUâ through a long-term vision (ibid., p. 52).
The case of the South Caucasus presents a puzzle in different ways. Firstly, with calibrated geography, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) has clustered countries in the South and East under the same political umbrella, but their domestic and foreign policy paths have increasingly diverged (see Chapter 3). Meanwhile, not only regionally but also bilaterally, these states differ as regards their foreign policy preferences and alliances, regime types and modes of governance, economic performance and resource capacity, social composition, etc. In other words, the South Caucasus proper is not uniform: the very term âSouth Caucasusâ is artificial as it is not a âregionâ; instead, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have adopted divergent regional priorities (see Chapter 4). Squeezed between the great power Russia and the middle powers Turkey and Iran, with the USA being a major actor developing its own policy vis-Ă -vis Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, these countries have opted for different security arrangements since the 1990s (see Chapter 5). Moreover, the area has three unresolved conflicts nested within it, in Abkhazia , South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh (see Chapter 6). In terms of political stature, Georgia is a transitional government or hybrid regime , Armenia is semi-consolidated authoritarian regime and Azerbaijan is a consolidated authoritarian regime (Freedom House n.d., see Chapter 7). What concerns their economies, Azerbaijan is resource-rich; Georgia has access to the Black Sea and is a beneficiary of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU...