Power-Sharing and Consociational Theory

Brighid Brooks Kelly

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9783030141905
• eBook ISBN: 9783030141912
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Comparative Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Fifty years ago, academics and policymakers throughout the world agreed that it was impossible for certain sets of historically antagonistic groups to coexist peacefully on a long-term basis. This book examines the system of consociation, which was identified by Arend Lijphart and ended that pessimistic consensus. Lijphart's specific observations concerning the impact of consociation are assessed quantitatively and qualitatively, facilitated through careful operationalization of his descriptions of consociation's four components: grand coalition, minority veto, proportionality, and segmental autonomy. Insights derived from a dataset representing the experiences of eighty-eight countries are examined further through case study analysis of the seven societies most often discussed in relation to consociation: Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland, South Africa, and Switzerland. The components of consociation are found to promote lasting peace in divided societies most successfully when combined with additional incentives for the encouragement of cross-cutting cleavages and shared loyalties.

© The Author(s) 2019

Brighid Brooks KellyPower-Sharing and Consociational Theoryhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14191-2_1

Begin Abstract

1. Introduction

Brighid Brooks Kelly¹

(1)

Andrea Mitchell Center for the Study of Democracy, University of Pennsylvania, Swarthmore, PA, USA

Brighid Brooks Kelly

End Abstract

Violent clashes between the groups in divided societies which appear to be culturally incompatible command substantial media attention because the international community finds it difficult to understand their motivations and how their antagonisms can be resolved. News reports commonly contain very limited information concerning the historical relationships between these antagonistic groups and often give the impression that either the groups have no comprehensible motive for fighting and/or ancient hatreds exist between them which cannot be quelled. These observations seem to intrigue the public even more, since it is difficult to understand why people continue to fight if they are not doing so for any rational reasons and thus seem unlikely to gain anything beneficial from their feud. Not long ago, those who believed that the most antagonistic divided societies could achieve long-term stability were commonly derided as hopelessly naïve. The current surge in academic interest concerning historically intense conflicts reflects a fundamental reversal of expectations, the initiation of which can be attributed very plausibly to the pioneering role of Arend Lijphart and his system of consociation. Acknowledging that his advocacy of this system “challenge[d] the pervasively pessimistic mood,” Lijphart asserted that “it may be difficult, but it is not at all impossible to achieve and maintain stable democratic government” in diverse, antagonistic societies.¹

The academic consensus against which Lijphart rebelled in the 1970s is exemplified well by one of the few theoretical treatments of conflict in divided societies existing at that point. Following their exploration of the causes of such instability, Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle conclude that “[h]istory shows that democratic stability and cultural diversity are often incompatible in the post-independence politics of many plural societies.”² They believe that certain combinations of “colonial experience, exogenous events, and… ethnic configuration[s]” inevitably yield substantial instability.³ This is thought to occur when the greatest political success is awarded to those politicians who attract support by “outbidding” their rivals through “‘ethniciz[ing]’ politics, to ‘fan the flames’ of ethnic chauvinism.”⁴ Lijphart has argued for decades that consociation promotes stability in such divided societies. The extensive analysis of consociation presented here confirms that his optimism regarding the potential of institutional engineering is completely justified.

The aim of this book is to ascertain whether it is true that consociation promotes stability in plural societies, through quantitative analysis of 88 potentially or actually antagonistic plural societies over 20 years, and qualitative analysis of some societies which have been widely considered to have benefitted from consociation. The cases examined qualitatively were chosen primarily because they have been cited often by scholars as providing evidence that consociation does perform the role ascribed to it by Lijphart . However, the selection of these case studies should not be interpreted as implying that consociation performed this function in all of them or even that consociation operated in all of them. These cases also are focused upon here because a wealth of literature regarding their experiences with consociation is available, with which to compare this study’s other findings. They are analyzed qualitatively to evaluate the role of apparently influential phenomena, such as those involving popular attitudes, which could not be tested quantitatively because of the unavailability of comparable, international data. Some of the cases are also examined qualitatively because they could not be represented in the dataset. This project emphasizes the greater explanatory value derivable through comparison of statistical findings and appropriate case studies.

The wide-ranging exploration presented here confirms that institutional engineering has enhanced stability within even extremely divided societies. Multiple regression tests confirm the positive role of the consociational component corresponding to highly inclusive governance executives. In models including all independent variables found to exert statistically significant effects on stability, one corresponding to a consociational component remains significant. This component is minority veto power, but its coefficients in all regression tests indicate that its influence is destabilizing. In regression models finding statistically significant effects by segmental autonomy and proportional representation electoral systems, the signs of these variables’ coefficients also indicated that they were destabilizing. Scatterplot analyses confirm the positive effects of highly inclusive executive coalitions, emphasize the nuanced roles of the other three consociational components, and draw attention to the fact that a sizeable proportion of countries whose constitutions provide minority veto power are also less democratic. Factor analysis indicates that most of the variables representing consociational components, as well as multiple conditions identified by Lijphart as favorable to the system’s success, are influencing factors underlying the dataset. It seems possible that these two underlying factors imply that consociation is not less conducive to stability than other democracies and that somewhat inclusive executives help facilitate stability when countries with large populations face external threats. This body of quantitative analysis suggests that specific types of segmental autonomy, minority veto power, and proportionality may exert substantially different effects on stability. The insights discovered through this project’s case studies also suggest that the effects of these consociational components also may be profoundly impacted by conditions Lijphart identified as favorable to the success of consociation but which could not be represented quantitatively here.

These qualitative case studies suggest that certain manifestations of segmental autonomy and proportional representation are, in fact, conducive to stability in plural societies. They illustrate the beneficial roles played by two of Lijphart’s favorable conditions, overarching loyalty to a shared state and cross-cutting cleavages. Collectively, the qualitative and quantitative analyses suggest that it is a specific type of proportional representation called the single transferable vote (STV ) system which is conducive to stability in plural societies, rather than all proportional representation electoral systems. STV and other phenomena which have optimized stability in conjunction with components of consociation do so by combining guarantees for group autonomy with incentives for intergroup political appeals. This book shows that the ethnic cleavages identified as destructive by Rabushka and Shepsle are not incompatible with democratic stability, if the groups which comprise them are given permanent group autonomy and political rights, as well as reasons to avoid “‘fan[ning] the flames’ of ethnic chauvinism.”⁵

The extent to which a deeply divided political landscape can be transformed through adoption of carefully tailored institutions is illustrated well by the recent experience of a society specifically identified by Rabushka and Shepsle as incompatible with democratic stability. They cited Northern Ireland as providing particularly “[v]ivid,” “instructive,” compelling evidence that “dominant majority societies” are highly conducive to outbidding political dynamics and consequent extremism.⁶ Some of the most persuasive examples identified by them to support this theory are the “successes of” of Ian Paisley , a Northern Irish political entrepreneur who built his career on the cultivation and representation of intergroup hatred.⁷ Rabushka and Shepsle’s conclusion published in 1972, that some divided societies are incompatible with real democracy, reflected widespread public opinion at that time. Even as Lijphart was prescribing consociation for other divided societies in the 1970s, he believed that Northern Ireland was an especially intractable case and surmised that the “only” course of action capable of “result[ing] in a durable solution” for Northern Ireland was its dismantlement through partition.⁸ The pessimistic prediction offered by Rabushka and Shepsle seems obviously incorrect now, precisely because various power-sharing reforms, including elements of consociation, have demonstrated in Northern Ireland and elsewhere that democracy is possible in even the most divided societies. Incentives and protections provided through a power-sharing system motivated Northern Ireland’s population, ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• 1. Introduction
• 2. What Is Consociation?
• Part I. A Quantitative Assessment of Consociation
• Part II. A Qualitative Examination of Consociation’s Role in Seven Cases
• Back Matter