Buddhist temples are generally certified as âreligious corporationsâ (shĆ«kyĆ hĆjin) , and their organisational activities are presumed to be âreligiousâ in their nature and purpose. There is a widely shared assumption that Buddhist priests have a duty to specialise in âreligious activitiesâ (shĆ«kyĆ katsudĆ) as âreligious professionalsâ (shĆ«kyĆka). The meaning of the term âreligiousâ in the discourse of âreligious activitiesâ is highly ambiguous. Nevertheless, there seems to be a normative presumption that âreligious activitiesâ must be coupled with âpublic benefitâ (kĆeki).
As discussed in chapter âCritical Reflections on the Category âReligionâ in Japanâ, the term shĆ«kyĆ is encompassed by the category of kĆeki . For example, âreligious corporationsâ (shĆ«kyĆ hĆjin) is a subtype of so-called âpublic benefit corporationsâ (kĆeki hĆjin), which include âprivate school corporations,â âsocial welfare corporations,â âmedical corporations,â and âreligious corporations.â This classification presumes that shĆ«kyĆ is kĆeki. In this light, âreligious activitiesâ (shĆ«kyĆ katsudĆ) are supposed to be kĆeki in their nature . This chapter examines the assumption of shĆ«kyĆ as kĆeki in the context of a variety of activities engaged in by Buddhist priests and temples.
Religious Activities (shĆ«kyĆ katsudĆ) as Public Benefit (kĆeki)
The equation of shĆ«kyĆ katsudĆ as kĆeki has been presumed by commentators of Temple Buddhism in general as if it is a natural order of things or a state of being. There are a couple of publications which symbolise this. The first one is Shakai kĆken suru shĆ«kyĆ [Religion Which Contributes to Society], which is a collection of essays edited by Keishin Inaba and Yoshihide Sakurai (2009). At the time of the publication, Inaba was an associate professor at Kobe University, and Sakurai a professor at Hokkaido University. These two editors and other academics who contribute to this book discuss various examples of âsocial contributionsâ (shakai kĆken) by âreligious organisations.â What is implicit throughout the book is the normative assumption that âreligionâ should contribute to society. This echoes the idea of religion as kĆeki.
In the context of Temple Buddhism , the Institute of Engaged Buddhism (RinshĆ BukkyĆ KenkyĆ«jo) has facilitated the discussion on kĆeki. It hosted a symposium in 2008. The presentations and discussions which took place at the symposium were later published in the book Naze jiin wa kĆkyĆsei o towarerunoka [Why are Buddhist temples asked about their public benefits?] (RinshĆ BukkyĆ KenkyĆ«jo 2009). Here again, it is assumed that Buddhist temples should be involved in kĆeki activities. Each contributor to this volume expresses a different understanding of kĆeki. One claims priestsâ everyday prayer has an element of âpublic benefitâ on its own, while some regard priestsâ involvement in mortuary rites can be public benefit, when it functions to support people going through grief. However, overall the notion of kĆeki is interpreted as âsocially engaged activities.â This echoes the phrase âengaged Buddhism â which is referred to in the name of the Institute .
Some others assert âpublic benefitâ of âreligious activitiesâ carried out by a religious corporation in the sense that âreligionâ is by nature beneficial for the public. A professor in commercial science at Keio University , Takanobu Nakajima (2005) argues in his Otera no Keizaigaku [The Economics of Buddhist temples] that âreligionâ nurtures and vitalises âpious heartâ (shinkĆshin) which, he believes, belongs to the realm of human instinct. He continues that âreligionâ stabilises emotional fluctuations and heightens the morality. Nakajima assumes that these functions of âreligionâ give positive impacts to society in general. Given this, he claims that âreligionâ as public benefit. This is the most common understanding of shĆ«kyĆ as kĆeki, which is also shared by other commentators of Temple Buddhism and Buddhist priests themselves as well as government agencies as such the former Ministry of Education, which was historically involved in the writing of Religious Corporation Law .
This understanding of religionâs public benefit constructs another layer of assumptions that Temple Buddhism as a âreligionâ should have public benefit, and a Buddhist temple as a religious corporation should be involved in public benefit activities. Then, this kind of thinking turns into the argument which associates the current non-taxable status of religious corporationsâ revenue from âreligious activitiesâ with religious corporationsâ classification as âpublic benefitâ corporations . It is widely believed that âreligious corporationsâ were granted âtax exemptionâ (rather than ânon-taxationâ) on the incomes from âreligious activities,â because of âpublic benefitâ nature of their âreligious activities.â This naturalises and authorises the way of thinking that a Buddhist temple as a religious corporation , and a Buddhist priest as a religious professional , must direct their activities to public benefit, and otherwise their ostensibly privileged status within the current tax system cannot be justified.
There has been academic discourse, however, against this kind of understanding, which relates the non-taxable status to the category of âpublic benefit.â For example, in his lecture at the Japan Buddhist Federation, Osamu Tanaka (2004) explained in a convincing way that the current non-taxation on public benefit corporations (including religious corporations) are nothing to do with âpublic benefit.â Having traced the history of the corporation taxation in Japan, he claims that it is intimately associated with profit makings and shareholder dividend of commercial corporations. According to Tanaka, corporate tax is instituted against the profit which can be shared by individuals. In contrast, public benefit corporations (including religious corporations) are not taxed in the same way because their profit cannot be shared by individuals. Any profit made by a public benefit corporation must be invested for its charitable aim. Thus, Tanaka does not see any logic in the argument that demands religious corporations to be publicly beneficial in order to justify their non-taxable status. He argues that the non-taxability of religious corporations are related to their non-profit nature of corporations, where any surplus has to be invested towards their organisational aims as religious corporations .
Although Tanakaâs argument makes sense in its own light, it seems to be powerless against the dominant force which relates non-taxation on the income from religious activities to the idea of public benefit. Yoshio Takeuchi (2017) in his review article shows that the categorisation of âreligionâ as public benefit has been the norm in Japanese legal discourse since the late nineteenth century. The term kĆeki first appeared in Japanese legal discourse in 1890. It meant âcharity,â in the sense of helping the poor. By the mid-1890s, the term was utilised to mean âpublic welfare.â The category of âreligionâ was first integrated to the idea of kĆeki in 1899, in the context of religionâs role in indoctrinating the people of Japan to support the value orientation of the state. As explained in chapter âCritical Reflections on the Category âReligionâ in Japanâ âreligionâ in this context meant three âreligionsâ of Buddhism , Christianity, sectarian Shinto . By the late 1920âs, kĆeki of religion became measured by its contribution towards the ideological goal which had been enshrined by the state. And this was the basis on which âreligious organisationsâ at that time were regulated by the state under the Religious Organisation Law .
After the Second World War , when the Religious Organisation Law was abolished under the Allied Occupations , those who had been recognised as âreligious organisationsâ under the pre-war legal framework demanded a new law to ensure their corporate and tax status. When the new legal framework was negotiated between the Ministry of Education of the Japanese government, on the one hand, and the Civil Information and Educational Section (CIE) led by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) , on the other hand, it became apparent that the two sides had different understandings of âreligious organisations.â The Ministry of Education was expecting âreligious organisationsâ to possess characteristics which promote âpublic benefit,â while CIE was only interested in conferring legal capacity on religious organisation, without making any judgement on their âpublic benefitâ characteristics (Koga 1990). The Ministry of Educationâs view was rejected by CIE , and as the end product of this negotiation, the Religious Corporation Law reflects CIEâs view on âreligious organisationâ (Koga 1990). Its Article 1 claims: âThe purpose of this Act is to confer legal capacity on religious organisations.â
Although the assumption about religion as kĆeki was not included in the Religious Corporation Law , this assumption has been still implicit in the legal discourse during the postwar era. It is still alive as the classification of âreligious corporationsâ as a type of âpublic benefit corporations.â In more recent decades, as Takeuchi (2017) demonstrated, the normative assumption about religious corporations to contri...