âInformation is the key to sound decision-making, to accountability and development; it underpins democracy and assists in combatting poverty, oppression, corruption, prejudice and inefficiencyâ (Kennedy v The Charity Commission 2014) . Lord Manceâs remarks in the UK Supreme Court accompanied the dismissal of an application from a Times journalist for disclosure of details of a Charity Commission inquiry into the Mariam Appeal, established by a former member of parliament, George Galloway. In his judgment, Lord Mance included a 43-paragraph discussion on how the European Court of Human Rightsâ case law applied Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (guaranteeing freedom of expression) to rights to access to information. Apparently conflicting decisions were, he observed, âneither clear nor easy to reconcileâ.
These issues form the background to this book, which explores use of freedom of information legislation in social research, with a particular focus on the conflict this can generate with rights to privacy and the protection of personal information. Difficulties in establishing clarity in jurisprudence reflect the intensely socially contested character of underlying issues. An important context is the tension between pervasive concerns about threats to privacy and simultaneous suspicions of concealment and deception by those in authority. As I write this, in late December 2018, there have been widespread media reports of a couple arrested at Gatwick airport just before Christmas on suspicion of flying a drone disrupting travel plans of thousands. Released without charge, their arrest had received prominent media attention, including a Mail on Sunday front-page on 23 December displaying a photograph of them alongside the headline, âARE THESE THE MORONS WHO RUINED CHRISTMAS?â One of the couple later explained to a newspaper their feeling of being âviolatedâ, adding, âour home has been searched and our privacy and identity completely exposed ⌠We are deeply distressed, as are our family and friends, and we are receiving medical careâ (Kelner 2018).
On 6 December, the
Daily Mail ran a front-page headline: âIS
NOTHING PRIVATE ANYMORE?â On the same day other headlines included:
âHOW FACEBOOK SPIED ON YOU ⌠AND YOUR PALS.â (Metro)
âFacebook discussed cashing in on user data, emails show.â (The Guardian)
The Daily Mail story ranged wider, but most were prompted by release of confidential emails between senior figures at Facebook by a House of Commons committee investigating âfake newsâ. Contested boundaries between media investigation and intrusion have definitions of âpublic interestâ at their core. This contestation reflects its socially constructed character in a period of mistrust in authority. Such mistrust exists across many dimensions. Two days before these news stories, for the first time in modern British parliamentary history, government Ministers were held to be in contempt of parliament by the House of Commons for failing to publish the full Attorney Generalâs legal advice on the EU Withdrawal Agreement. The sharing and disclosure of information has long been a significant source of conflict, but this intensifies as developments in digital technology make its collection and storage so much easier. One particular feature of this landscape is explored in this book. This concerns the relationship between transparency and accountability on the one side, and secrecy and personal privacy on the other. Specifically, it develops a discussion on opportunities for social research to use Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests as a method, and tensions this may generate with the protection of âpersonal informationâ under the Data Protection Act.1 Through this, the boundary between âpublic informationâ and âpersonal informationâ becomes a contested area.
It is a truism to describe our age as one of declining public trust in authority, fed by suspicion of scandal and corruption. Meanwhile, with dominant neoliberal discourses of responsibility and transparency, our public reputations become commodities, marketable through the type of âimpression managementâ described in a very different time by Goffman (1959). Successful outcomes are what matter, as âpersonal brandingâ keeps failures âback-stageâ. But this is an unequal process. Becker used the term âhierarchy of credibilityâ to describe circumstances where âmembers of the highest group have the right to define the way things really areâ (Becker 1967: 241). For some, constructions of the âneoliberal selfâ, âtransforms civil society, in that citizens are constituted as individuals whose identities must be defined in and through the marketplace, whose influence comes to pervade all social domainsâ (Vallas and Cummins 2015: 297). While there is a considerable research literature suggesting the âenterprising selfâ model did not get internalised to the extent some predicted (see Watson 2008), it nonetheless provides one influential form of discourse that can be âreceived and interpreted in the particular and complex contexts that individuals move through in their everyday livesâ (Halford and Leonard 2006: 658). In these contexts, an uncertain boundary can develop between the safeguarding of privacy and the protection of what Goffman called âdark secretsâ (Goffman 1959). If privacy mutates into secrecy, generating further public mistrust, the cycle continues. A consequence has been populist attacks on elites accompanied by allegations of âfake newsâ from the âMainstream Mediaâ. Secrecy by those in authority is matched by suspicion among the public: âtheyâre all the sameâ, âtheyâre corruptâ and so on. And when things go wrong, as they will, the immediate response from those in charge all too often appears defensive and self-serving. No doubt prompted by fear of media and public hostility, it merely compounds the problem.
Failures are not scandals. Nor are errors a signal of corruption. While there can be many reasons for conflation of these categories, a route to disentangling them is to consider the close relationship between two issues: implications of the public/private boundary for personal privacy and public accountability; and constructions of explanations for failures in organisation in terms of people and systems. In exploring these themes, this book suggests a contribution by social research to these debates. Although the distinction between âpublicâ and âprivateâ has been described as âa central and characteristic preoccupation of Western thought since antiquityâ (Weintraub 1997: 1), it is a complex and not a straightforward binary division. Discussing alternative approaches, Weintraub notes how these âreflect deeper differences in both theoretical and ideological commitments, in sociological assumptions, and/or in sociohistorical context. Partly for these reasons, debates about how to cut up the social world between public and private are rarely innocent analytical exercises, since they often carry powerful normative implicationsâ (Weintraub 1997: 3).
An underlying theme in this book, the decline of public trust in those holding positions of authority, is examined through a lens that focuses on a paradox in the neoliberal project, between âresponsibilizationâ and transparency. Support for both principles extends beyond neoliberalism, but more distinctive is the model of the âenterprisingâ or âentrepreneurial selfâ. Public debate on how much other people should know of our actions and decisions is frequently cast in terms of surveillance, Big Data and the like, an issue I address, but my main interest is rather different. It concerns the transparency of actions performed, not by private citizens, but by public officials and those in authority, bringing questions about the boundary between the public and the private centre-stage.
As context for later discussion on the âresponsible selfâ, I begin with two examples, both involving the deaths of young children:
There are no words strong enough to express Sun readersâ anger at the buck passing and blame-dodging over the horrific death of Baby P ⌠Sun readers demand SACKINGS for all who share responsibility for allowing Baby Pâs appalling death ⌠Heads must roll. Nothing else will do. Sharon Shoesmith, the smug Haringey director of childrenâs services, must be fired. (The Sun, 13 November 2008)
âHow can she live with herself?â â Mother of Downâs syndrome boy who died from sepsis slams âdisgustingâ decision to let doctor convicted of his manslaughter to work againâ. (Daily Mail, 14 August 2018)
Deaths of children are among the hardest of events to comprehend or explain. If it appears they could have been avoided, sadness and despair will easily turn to anger. The following account considers ways in which questions of personal errors, culpability and system failure were constructed, starting with Peter Connelly (Baby P) who died aged just seventeen months in August 2007 having suffered over fifty injuries. These were received during a period when he had regular contact with the National Health Service (NHS) and the local authority childrenâs department. Urging action to identify those holding organisational responsibility, David Cameron MP, then Leader of the Opposition, wrote in the London Evening Standard, âWeâve had a raft of excuses and not one apology. Everyone says they followed protocol to the letter and that the fault lies with some systemic failure. But we cannot allow the words âsystemic failureâ to absolve anyone of responsibility. Systems are made up of people and the buck has got to stop somewhereâ (quoted in Warner 2015: 31â32).
The theme was continued the following day, with a Daily Mail editorial lambasting professionals, managers and politicians whose, âonly thought, it appears, is to insist that âcorrect proceduresâ were followed ⌠Baby Pâs case is a damning indictment of a bureaucratic system that could almost have been designed to ensure buck-passing ⌠The guilty must be identified, heads must roll and the mistakes which led to Baby Pâs entirely preventable death must never happen again. And Baby P? On his little coffin should be a plaque which bears the legend: âThe correct procedures were followed.ââ
Within a few weeks, the Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families, Ed Balls MP, ordered the dismissal of the Haringey Director of Childrenâs Services (DCS) (Gammell
2008). This decision was later declared unlawful by the Court of Appeal in 2011, primarily on the grounds that âthe Secretary of State did not afford Ms Shoesmith the opportunity to put her caseâ (R (
Shoesmith) v OFSTED and Others, 2011, EWCA Civ 642) . In forming this view, the Appeal Court noted these comments in a report by OFSTED into Haringey childrenâs services, ordered by Mr Balls MP in November 2008:
Our concern was how the system worked as a whole. We were involved in a wide ranging evidence-gathering exercise in order to try to reach an overall assessment of the way in which the different childrenâs services in Haringey were working, and working together. We were looking across the board at the quality of safeguarding practice at all levels of the relevant organisations. We were not seeking to make, or test, allegations against any particular individuals.
In his judgment, Lord Justice Maurice ...