1.1 Introduction
Over a coffee in Chevy Chase, Maryland, in October 2014, an Italian ham exporter was explaining the stack of paperwork, and four different agenciesâ inspection processes, required of his company before he could ship his product to the US. Meeting during a week of negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)âwhen he was in the US to advocate regulatory changesâhe lamented that once his product arrived in America, another five federal and state agencies had to conduct the same inspections as their Italian counterparts. This meant long wait times, often several weeks, during which he had to pay for the refrigerated containers with his products to sit at port. On top of the costs of shipping, storing, and inspections, he also faced a tariff (a duty, or import tax) rate of 4.1¢ per pound, all adding to the cost of the final product consumers purchase in supermarkets across the US. An American exporter to Europe would face a similarly burdensome process, and the additional requirement that all pork be free of hormones and antibiotics.
To address these and many other obstacles the European Union (EU) and the US in 2013 began negotiating the TTIP, the largest trade and investment agreement ever attempted. The EU and the US jointly heralded the benefits that would flow from a transatlantic effort aimed at addressing stagnant growth and unemployment, while setting global standards at a time of rising global competition from emerging powers.1 Deep transatlantic economic interpenetration and interdependence meant most sectors on both sides of the Atlantic would be affected by TTIP, with macro-economic gains projected for both sides.2 Heralding a comprehensive TTIP as an economic âbig bang,â the estimated boost to EU and US gross domestic product (GDP) from removing all tariffs, along with half of all non-tariff measures (NTMs, e.g. rules, regulations, or requirements), stood at between half and three-quarters of a percent, the equivalent of $100â150bn each on an annual basis.3
The asserted economic benefits were touted as vital for transatlantic business, and given the size of the transatlantic relationship (âŹ980bn/$1.1tr in annual bilateral trade, 39% of global GDP, 28% of trade, and 60% of foreign investments worldwide in 2016), any agreement would also have significant global repercussions for standard setting, trade, and investments. For example, from 1990 to 2011, American investments in Ireland alone exceeded those in Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) combined.4 Just the value of the increase in American investments in Europe in 2011 exceeded the total value of all American investments in China, and the total 2015 American investment stock in China was 10% of that held in Europe. Europeans invest nearly twice as much as Americans in China, and yet this cannot match Europeansâ investments in the US. Europe accounted for 90% of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the US in 2011, divided between the EU (72%) and Switzerland (18%), and 63% of cumulative investments.5 Europeâs appeal was confirmed in 2012 when 800 executives from across the globe predicted that by 2015 Europe would remain the top investment destination along with China; by 2015, the EU remained at the top, closely followed by the US.6 The importance of the respective markets for third countries (e.g. China, India, and others) thus meant that any agreed transatlantic standards would become globally dominant. Furthermore, by removing bilateral barriers and promoting regulatory coherence, TTIPâproponents claimedâwould represent a strategic vision of transatlantic relations, including job creation, global leadership, and establishing high international standards.7 Nevertheless, the negotiationsâalways predicted to be challengingâachieved only piecemeal progress between June 2013 and November 2016.8
Civil society organizations (CSOs) politicized TTIP as they mounted their opposition campaign, focusing on specifically chosen issues and framing their arguments in ways that maximized their intended effect on the public, and indirectly, public officials and political parties. Politicization is âan increase in polarization of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards the process of policy formulation within the EU.â9 To achieve politicization, opponents (or supporters) of change need to persuade public opinion of the value of preventing the change (or of fostering it). To do so, political actors use rhetoric, that is, a set of argumentative methods to convince the public to identify with a position. As discussed in Chap. 3, we use a novel combination of theory and methodology to assess proponents and supportersâ rhetoric. While we do not look specifically at CSOsâ lobbying strategies, we show the messaging strategy through which both sides sought to expand public support. Opponents maintained their positions, while supporters modified their rhetoric in hopes of lessening polarization and reducing TTIPâs salience.
Before presenting a general overview of the book, we present a summary of the evolution of public opinion on TTIP. Public skepticism of and opposition to TTIP grew over the course of negotiations , correlating with CSOsâ anti-TTIP campaign. However, general support for free trade (not a specific agreement) held steady, again signaling that arguments appealing to beliefs and emotions, focusing on specific norms, values, and regulations, held sway with the public. This helps justify the focus on rhetorical analysis, the value added of our study.
1.2 The Evolution of Public Opinion
The European public was generally favorably inclined toward a transatlantic accord before the negotiations beganâ57% of Germans and 75% of Italians, with the Brits and French in-between, supported a trade agreement in 2007.10 Moreover, according to Pew (2013), Europeans supported âharmonization or mutual recognition of national regulations on goods and services, everything from food standards to insurance. Overwhelmingly Italians (87%), Br...