On the 25th March 2017 the leaders of the EU’s Member State governments met in Rome to mark the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome, establishing both the European Economic Community and EURATOM. This original 1957 blueprint for Europe had envisaged its member states working closely together to bolster economic prosperity, promote democratic values and secure areas of joint policy cooperation. Few then might have dared to imagine just how these treaties would transform the continent’s political landscape by building a new and innovative European institutional architecture, agreeing on new areas of policy cooperation and laying the foundations for the European Union. This new ‘Roman’ order would create its own currency and be responsible for the longest period of peace between the members of EU Europe since the fall of the Roman Empire. The popularity of this vision of Europe was evident in the rise of membership from the 6 founding states in 1957 (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany) to the arrival of Croatia as the 28th member state in 2013. The EU’s territorial expansion was not the result of war and subjugation, but driven by the desire of liberal democratic states to create a new form of political cooperation.
The EU has been an incredible example of voluntary cooperation between states. Its efforts at promoting greater understanding and reconciliation within Europe even secured the EU the Nobel Peace prize in 2012. The construction of EU Europe has on occasions been difficult and at the start of the twenty-first century it faces a range of new challenges. There has indeed been a sense of the EU in crisis (Dinan et al. 2017). Three particular issues will dominate the EU agenda over the next five years; efforts to strengthen the euro, a much needed determination and cohesive approach to resolving the migration crisis and reaching agreement on the UK’s departure from the European Union (Brexit). The decision by the British public to vote in a referendum on 23rd June 2016 for the UK to leave the European Union marks a decisive moment in EU history. No member state has previously ever left the European Union and there are many issues to be resolved about the nature of the UK’s divorce, the financial settlement and the future relationship between both parties.
Amidst the celebrations in Rome there was sadness and regret that the United Kingdom government, now intent on leaving the EU, had absented herself from the summit. It is so important not to lose sight of the wider context. Politics is in a state of flux across the western world and a strong popular disaffection and dissatisfaction with the political class and their priorities is being expressed by many people from particularly although not exclusively traditional blue collar backgrounds who feel increasingly left behind and forgotten. Many have used the opportunity of recent referendums and elections to vent their frustrations and ‘anger’ (Garry 2017) by opting for populist outsiders offering new promises of hope and prosperity. The advance of these populist forces have impacted most on the fortunes of the traditional centre left parties. The vote for Brexit provides an apt illustration as much of the highest recorded support for leave was expressed by former supporters of the Labour party in the Midlands and North East of England who found their living conditions difficult, possessed few educational attainment levels and were worried for the future of their children. These same anxieties propelled Donald Trump into the White House as President of the United States in November 2016 and fed into the rejection of the referenda in the Netherlands on the EU-Ukrainian accord and in Italy on the government’s attempt to reform the senate.
In retrospect, the vote for ‘leave’ must in part be understood as a backlash against the establishment and the liberal elites from many voters who felt disadvantaged and let down by successive governments. The lure of life outside the EU, presented by leave supporters, offered a seemingly better alternative. The emergence of such an anti-establishment sentiment has unnerved the political elites who now find themselves trying to respect the desires of the electorate.
By 2016 political manifestations of euroscepticism were not only evident in most EU member states but formed a core feature in the party programmes of a number of parties on both the left and right of the political spectrum. It had been the steady growth of euroscepticism in Great Britain primarily in the form of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the electoral risk UKIP posed for the Conservative Party that had actually propelled David Cameron’s government to hold a referendum on the country EU’s membership. The task of convincing the public to support Cameron’s desire for continued EU membership was always going to be difficult given the very low levels of knowledge about the EU in the UK and public attitudes that had been shaped, misshaped and reshaped by a largely eurosceptic press and a surge in ‘fake news’ reports. The first substantive analysis of media coverage has illustrated how the referendum campaign was ambushed and how the politics of fear not just pervaded the campaign but was also marked by mutual accusations of lying, concerns over health and repeated and extensive reports on immigration (Moore and Ramsey 2017). Migrant blaming certainly made for sensational headlines but it did not aid understanding of the issues at stake.
On the eve of the March 2017 summit in Rome Pope Francis had warned against the ‘false forms of security’ promised by populists and made a plea for greater European solidarity. Jean Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, described Europe as a ‘continent of stability and peace, but that the EU is not in the best form and shape we could be in’ (BBC interview with Juncker, 24 March 2017 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-39375966). There was an ever growing realisation that the EU needed to be able to connect more with the public and demonstrate why the European project still mattered. The EU’s room for manoeuvre here has always been limited, and support from both Member State governments and the media have always been essential as information providers and opinion formers. In March 2017 the leaders of the 27 EU member state governments agreed on a new Declaration of Rome. This recognised ‘these times of change and aware of the concerns of citizens, we ….pledge to work towards a safe and secure Europe, a prosperous and sustainable Europe, a social Europe and a stronger Europe…..we as leaders working together within the European Council and among our institutions, will ensure that today’s agenda is implemented, so as to become tomorrow’s reality. We have united for the better. Europe is our common future’ (European Council, Rome Declaration, 25 March 2017). The declaration emphasises the need to listen and respond to citizens’ concerns while reaffirming commitment to further developing the European integration project. Agreement on this text and the latter goal might have been impossible had the UK attended the summit.
The win for ‘leave’ was certainly neither the outcome wanted nor expected by David Cameron’s government. Few observers of the political scene had predicted this result. Had Cameron realised that leave was a real possibility, it is very unlikely that he would have called the referendum in the first place. The significance of this decision to leave the EU cannot be underestimated. It truly represents a seismic moment in post war British politics. David Cameron fell on his sword and quickly resigned as Prime Minister. The British political scene of late June/early July was in some turmoil as the realities of the decision dawned. A new Conservative administration led by Theresa May wasted little time in following the guidance of the referendum result. She had declared her intention during her campaign to lead the Conservative party when she stated that ‘Brexit means Brexit’. She added that ‘there will be no attempts to remain inside the EU, no attempts to rejoin it by the back door, and no second referendum…. The country voted to leave the European Union and as prime minister I will make sure that we leave the European Union’ (14 July, Birmingham speech). She was suggesting a trajectory of action that was to overturn the European policy of all successive governments since Harold MacMillan’s first formal bid for British membership of the European Economic Community in 1961. It was a policy choice, however, that further crystallised throughout the second half of 2017.
On 29th March 2017 Theresa May, formally submitted some nine months after the UK referendum on EU membership the UK government’s intention of withdrawing from the EU (including EURATOM) to the European Council. After 44 years of membership the UK was declaring her intent of seeking a divorce from the EU. The process as laid down under Article 50 TEU involved negotiations between the UK and the EU and within a fixed two year timetable to complete the exact terms, costs and meaning of the separation. The institutional interplay was laid out in Article 218.
On the face of it the goal of securing the UK’s exit from the European Union (the so-called ‘Brexit’) may have seemed to the electorate as a binary decision of ‘either’ in or ‘out’. Winning a vote to leave was one thing, but the process of disentangling the UK from the EU was never ever going to be as straightforward as many Brexiteers had alluded to during the campaign. What did an exit actually look like? The dual tasks of both exiting the European Union and establishing a new partnership with Brussels were always going to require skilful and careful navigation to secure the best result for the UK, and especially given the strict timetable ahead. Both sides were always going to have to be realistic about their expectations and be prepared for compromise. There was little sign of this and after a supposedly frosty evening dinner reception in 10 Downing Street between May and Juncker on 26 April 2017 the Commission president stated that he felt ten times more sceptical about reaching a special deal (Frankkfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 30 April 2017). The following day Juncker informed the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel that Theresa May was living in ‘another galaxy’, prompting Merkel to add later that the UK was experiencing ‘Brexit delusions’. May dismissed the story as Brussels gossip (Telegraph, 1 May 2017) but the episode aptly illustrated the tensions at the outset.
Few people had fully comprehended just how difficult the tasks of exiting and negotiating were going to be. Some excellent reports from bodies such as the House of Lords clearly did (House of Lords 2016), but received little coverage in the tabloid press. Ahead lay real differences over the exact nature of ‘leave’ and over the attitudes of the EU27. There is also an internal angle to the negotiations and the May government found itself facing demands from the devolved administrations to be much more actively involved in the process. The Prime Minister needs to ensure that the very process of negotiating withdrawal does not unsettle the constitutional fabric of the British state itself. May’s hopes of uniting the United Kingdom are a well-intended response to a general unease which s more likely to intensify. Already there are signs that the ‘remain’ activists and voters are being demonised in the press and bullied at work. Brexit leaves the country more divided than ever. It has become the pre-eminent issue in modern day British politics. It will overshadow every other policy and it looks set to divert the government’s attention away from a raft of other issues.
Theresa May’s decision to call a snap General Election on 8th June 2017 caught political commentators by surprise. This unexpected move, and one that she had ruled out previously on several occasions, was determined directly by the uncertainty surrounding the Brexit process. The Prime Minister stated that the holding of a general election originally (scheduled for May 2020) while the government was locked in the final stages of negotiations with the EU would prove an unnecessary distraction. Three other and more salient reasons for holding an election three years ahead of schedule are suggested here: Firstly, the Prime Minister was seeking a larger government majority in the House of Commons to strengthen her hand in the negotiations with the EU27, secondly, May needed to have sufficient support on the Conservative backbenches should the negotiations prove tougher than expected and lead to compromise solutions that some of the hard Brexiteers such as Iain Duncan Smith, Bill Cash and John Redwood will find objectionable and thirdly, some argued that with worsening economic conditions in 2018/2019 and manifest in rising inflation, lower economic growth, high levels of personal debt and growing food prices, bringing the election forward made much more sense. Her every public utterance referred to the need for a strong and stable Britain. May remains wedded to the Brexit cause. Sound-bites such as creating a strong and stable Britain were never followed up with any discussions on further details.
The Conservative Party manifesto for the June 2017 General Election identified responding to Brexit and a changing world as one of the five great challenges facing the country. May stated at its launch that ‘every vote for me and my team will strengthen my hand in the negotiations to come. Every vote for me and my team will be a vote for a stronger more prosperous Britain’ (BBC News, 18th May 2017 and at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/election-2017-39945597). Those who may have been seeking further clarification about the content and priorities of the negotiations were once again disappointed.
Two core points should be made at the start of this book. Even though the poll lead for remain had narrowed between March and June 2016 and had ‘leave’ with a small majority a week between the referendum, it was assumed that some of those who have favoured Brexit, being risk averse, would vote to remain and tip the vote in Cameron’s favour. The vote for Brexit, therefore came as more than a surprise. The margin of victory for ‘leave’ was rather narrow (with some 51.9 opting for exit and 48.1%. One of the most striking facts about voting in this referendum was overall turnout. Some 2.9 million more people voted in the EU referendum in June 2016 than in the general election the previous year. Turnout was most pronounced in England where turnout was at its highest since the 1992 general election. Turnout in Wales was likewise stronger than at any time since 1997. Both England and Wales opted for ‘leave’. Did these ‘new’ voters use the referendum to voice their frustration and anger towards the EU, the government or the elites? Discussions on turnout should also reference the fact that only some 37% of the actual eligible electorate voted for exiting the EU, while 35% voted to remain. The rest abstained.
There were many questions to ask. An analysis of the referendum result reveals just how far Brexit had divided the country. The result pitched younger pro-remain voters against older Brexit minded people, showed clear demarcations between high educational attainment and those holding professional jobs who advocated remain while those with the fewer or no qualifications and in blue collar/manual employment were drawn more heavily to support leave. Voting patterns differed markedly across the constituent parts of the UK with England and Wales returning majorities to leave but Northern Ireland and Scotland voting in even stronger terms to remain.
Whoever had inherited the keys to 10 Downing Street following David Cameron’s swift departure was always going to find the triple pressures of actually realising Brexit, uniting the Conservative Party and healing divisions across the country extremely difficult. Much was going to depend on how the government came to visualise Brexit. While the Cameron government had urged the electorate to support its line of the UK remaining in the EU, the advocates of Brexit had never indicated a clear vision for the UK outside the EU and simply castigated as scaremongerers all those who demanded greater clarity on such issues as tariffs, free trade agreements and customs unions. The leave campaign had presented ‘leave’ as relatively simple and straightforward and means to allow the UK to regain control and sign its own trade deals with the outside world. No serious consideration was ever given to the policy domain and how much Brexit could impact on a range of public policy issues such as agriculture, the environment, energy and trade. It was assumed that the UK had sufficient civil servants and experts in place to secure a Brexit. The frustration among David Cameron’s strategists at the antics and half-truths of the leave campaign over the UK’s contributions to the EU budget, immigration control and sovereignty were real as the leave campaign tapped much more successfully into emotions and came to trump the remain campaign’s focus on the economic benefits of membership.
Immediate questions arose in July 2016: Should advisory referenda dictate government policy? Was the referendum result too close? Does it matter that the vote was fractured and both Northern Ireland and Scotland voted to remain in the EU? Why did England and Wales vote for ‘Leave’. What does the UK’s departure from the EU to look like and can such expectations be delivered. Ultimately, the task of meeting Brexiteers expectations while recognising political sensitivities in Westm...