Reagan Faces Korea

Alliance Politics and Quiet Diplomacy

Chae-Jin Lee

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN:
  9783030304997
• eBook ISBN:
  9783030305000
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: North American History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This is a unique and definitive study to reassess the complex dynamics of US-Korea diplomatic relations during the Reagan presidency. It examines the goals, methods, and legacy of Reagan's policy toward Korea with emphasis on the realities of alliance politics and the tactics of quiet diplomacy. It questions a widely held view that Reagan showed simplistic, inattentive, and rigid approaches toward foreign affairs, arguing that his actual policy, as demonstrated in the Korea case, was more sophisticated, nuanced, and pragmatic than commonly assumed. Based on a vast amount of confidential diplomatic documents, especially in Korean, and interviews the author has conducted with US and Korean leaders, Lee sheds new light on Reagan's role in promoting democratization in South Korea as well as his engagement with North Korea.

© The Author(s) 2020

C.-J. LeeReagan Faces KoreaThe Evolving American Presidencyhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30500-0_1

Begin Abstract

1. Introduction: Ronald Reagan’s Foreign Policy

Chae-Jin Lee¹

(1)

Department of Government, Claremont McKenna College, Claremont, CA, USA

Chae-Jin Lee

Email: [email protected]

End Abstract

Even though many books have been written on President Ronald Reagan’s foreign policies, there is not a single book in English that specifically addresses the goals that Reagan espoused in his relations with Korea, the methods and procedures employed to achieve such goals, and the legacy he left for the subsequent unfolding of diplomatic and strategic relations between the United States and Korea. This book is designed to fill this lacuna, with emphasis on the realities of “alliance politics” and the tactics of “quiet diplomacy.”

It is widely asserted that Reagan showed a simplistic, inattentive, and rigid approach toward foreign affairs during his eight-year tenure. He was even castigated as an “amiable dunce” and a dangerous warmonger. As illustrated in the examination on US-Korea relations, however, his actual foreign policy was far more complicated, nuanced, flexible, and moderate than commonly assumed. My study demonstrates that Reagan was not an irresponsible and dangerous demagogue who would lead the United States toward war or even push the nuclear button.¹ Nor did he show a completely detached and unengaged style in managing his foreign policies. It is postulated that this apparent gap between popular perception and specific records in regard to Reagan’s foreign relations is largely due to the interplay of three philosophical or theoretical tendencies—realism, moralism, and pragmatism—that characterized his approaches toward international issues. At times this interplay led to the apparent paradox of his foreign policy and confused his supporters and critics alike.

As testified by his two secretaries of state, Alexander M. Haig Jr. and George Shultz, Reagan was a realist in the sense that he wanted to carry out his policy from a position of strength and that he recognized the primacy of military alliances. In his memoirs, Reagan recalled, “Our policy was to be one based on strength and realism. I wanted peace through strength, not peace through a piece of paper.”² As to the Cold War with communists, for example, he held a zero-sum conviction, and his mantra was “We win and they lose!”³ The Reagan Doctrine was indeed to support all forms of anti-communist crusade.

He exhibited a remarkable degree of policy consistency in nurturing a strong military alliance with South Korea and in pursuing a position of deterrence against a possible threat from North Korea. For his purpose, he unequivocally adhered to the Mutual Defense Treaty signed by US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and South Korean Foreign Minister Pyun Yong Tae on October 1, 1953, at the conclusion of the Korean War (1950–1953). The United States assumed a vast array of regional and global military responsibilities and could not afford to give sustained attention to a relatively small, albeit important ally. Yet South Korea, primarily engaged in a military confrontation with North Korea, expected the United States to continue to uphold its security commitment, provide substantial military assistance, and keep US troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula. Any actual or potential deviation from this expectation tended to generate a sense of disappointment and anxiety among the South Koreans. As examined by Richard Neustadt in a classic study, Alliance Politics, intimate military alliances tend to breed paranoia.⁴ The South Koreans were constantly worried that the United States might modify its alliance with them or even abandon them altogether. In particular, they underwent a traumatic experience in dealing with Richard Nixon’s and Jimmy Carter’s announcements to withdraw US ground forces from South Korea.⁵ Unlike his predecessors, Nixon and Carter, Reagan attempted to practice alliance politics in such a way that the South Koreans, as junior partners in an asymmetric alliance, felt comfortable about the US defense commitment. Mutual trust in security matters was a necessary foundation for America’s effective diplomacy toward South Korea. Yet realism as manifested in military alliance was not a panacea for managing an unequal and hierarchical relationship between the United States as a super power and South Korea as a middle power.

It is worth noting that Reagan’s realism was not always consistent with the Hobbesian concept of bellum omnium contra omnes, “the war of all against all.” It was balanced by his subscription to Wilsonian moralism. He believed that since the United States enjoyed the exceptional moral superiority in the world, it should assume a universal responsibility to spread the messages of freedom, democracy, and human dignity to other countries, especially its authoritarian allies, as far as possible. He was instrumental in adopting the Republican Party Platform, “Morality in Foreign Policy,” in July 1976. It praised a Russian dissident, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, as a “beacon of human courage and morality.”⁶ Speaking before the British Parliament, the cradle of democratic institutions, in June 1982, Reagan stated: “We must be staunch in our conviction that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few, but the inalienable and universal right of all human beings.”⁷ He declared that “if the rest of this century is to witness the gradual growth of freedom and democratic ideals, we must take actions to assist the campaign for democracy.” It was Reagan’s view that the United States had “a tremendous heritage of idealism, which is a reservoir of strength and goodness” and that the world should see America that “is morally strong with a creed and vision.” “For us,” he remarked, “values count.”⁸ In Diplomacy, Henry A. Kissinger, who had reservations about Reagan’s foreign policy, recognized Reagan’s fidelity to classic Wilsonianism and American Utopianism.⁹ In The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan, James Mann characterized Reagan as moralistic by having absorbed the small-town Midwestern values in his youth.¹⁰

“For Ronald Reagan,” according to Jack Matlock Jr., who served as senior director of European and Soviet Affairs in the National Security Council and as ambassador to Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, “improving respect for human rights was one of the foremost goals of his foreign policy.”¹¹ In this context, Reagan expressed his opposition to all forms of tyranny—of the left and of the right. However strongly Reagan espoused his personal moral conviction, he was bound to face a difficulty in implementing it in all cases. Impressed by the “Kirkpatrick Doctrine,” however, he held an optimistic view that, unlike communist tyrannies that were not malleable, US allies that were dictatorial or authoritarian would be encouraged to become free and democratic with America’s patient, proper, and purposeful tutelage. Sensing that South Korea under President Chun Doo Hwan was authoritarian, repressive, and inhumane, the Reagan administration pursued a goal of inducing the Chun government’s reluctant but ultimate accommodation of democratic principles.

In order to achieve his moralistic goal, Reagan eschewed ideological fundamentalism or a big-nation chauvinism, but adopted a pragmatic and persuasive approach by seeking a judicious balance between goals and means in his foreign policy. He preferred to solve international conflicts through persuasion, dialogue, and compromise as far as possible. One of Reagan’s long-time political associates, Richard Nixon, felt that Reagan was a “lightweight,” who should not be taken seriously, but was a “pragmatic” person.¹² Barry E. Cater, a prominent legal scholar, characterized Reagan as a “principled pragmatist” and a “pragmatic internationalist.”¹³ It was well known that Reagan was cooperative with the Democratic House Speaker Tip O’Neill; they developed mutual respect and personal rapport across the aisle. As Michael Schaller’s book Ronald Reagan illustrates, he showed pragmatic flexibility: to achieve 75 percent of what he wanted in a pending bill, he was happy to give up 25 percent.¹⁴ He was patient to wait for another opportunity to fulfill the remaining 25 percent.

In dealing with its highly authoritarian allies that violate democratic values and human rights, the United States had a choice among three possible approaches. The first option was “benign neglect,” which Richard Nixon pursued with respect to the violations of democratic principles and human rights in an allied nation so long as the ally’s national security and political stability were sustained. This approach was often couched in the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. Realists such as Nixon and Kissinger may pay lip service to the importance of democratic practices and human rights, but do not put much real emphasis on them. The second option is “public voice,” which Jimmy Carter employed in openly condemning the abuses of human rights and democratic values among his allies and friends. This approach was often used as a kind of shaming tactic. Disgusted with the bad behavior of an authoritarian leader, the United States may be tempted to give up an alliance altogether or at least to withdraw or reduce US troops or to deny economic assistance or diplomatic support. The tactics of public voice may be used as leverage to extract concessions or accommodation from a reluctant ally. For all practical purposes, however, it is extremely difficult for the United States to abandon an alliance simply because of a serious disagreement over human rights abuses perpetrated by an autocratic leader. Guided by an idealistic prescription, Carter tried to wi...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• 1. Introduction: Ronald Reagan’s Foreign Policy
• 2. Embracing the Primacy of Alliance and Stability
• 3. Dealing with Tragedies and Crises in Korea
• 4. Kim Dae Jung: Exile in America and Its Aftermath
• 5. Protests, Succession Struggles, and Economic Relations
• 6. In Pursuit of Democratization and Engagement
• 7. Conclusion: The Legacy of Reagan’s Korea Policy
• Back Matter