Small State Behavior and Proliferation
What is the nature of small state proliferation behavior? Answering this question involved working from the individual through the international environment and identifying a structural relationship between a small state’s ruling elite and the security dilemma. This relationship creates incentives/constraints on the small states, which produces decisions which may or may not be strategic (action designed to dominate another state). Instead, we found the ruling elite’s behavior is an attempt to gain domestic legitimacy by increasing international status. This study’s findings are significant since it increases our understanding of small state behavior when issues of proliferation create crises between states. Therefore, if decision-makers are aware of the incentives/constraints being placed on small state’s ruling elites by the security dilemma, this information concerning this phenomenon may prevent a crisis from escalating into war.
We arrive at these findings by examining the relationships starting with the individual, in our case the state’s ruling elite, and moving through larger units of synthesis to the small state, great power, security dilemma, and the international environment.
The Organization of This Study
As we have stated, our synthesis was centered on small states acquiring nuclear and missile technology. Our objective is not only to answer the nature of small state proliferation, it is also to build a theoretical framework. This framework will aid in future studies in order to build Strategy and Intelligence studies into a stronger academic field in the United States. We organized this work into eight chapters to answer the research question. In Chapter 2, we start by defining the units of inquiry, enable the development of a theoretical matrix in which we can operationalize these variables and draw case studies to determine the nature of proliferation in the world, and particularly why small states are more inclined to expend limited resources in these endeavors.
Following the theoretical relationship, we begin a synthesis of the case studies, which are organized by incorporating John Boyd’s Observe, Orient, Decision, and Action (OODA) Loop; we concentrate on the section labeled Orient, and create the dynamic which serves as a design for a role for intelligence, as a function of strategy. The case studies again are organized by examining each of the subject state’s ruling elite, strategic culture, and pseudo-environment, these concepts influence how a state perceives it security situation. There are two case studies which are organized differently. The first is the American case. Yes, we include the American experience not because they are a small state, despite this the Americans are included because they invented the technology which led to the problem of proliferation mainly nuclear weapons. Plus, they innovated and improved missile technology, and made it possible to marry the payload capacity of an ICBM to a hydrogen bomb in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In this case study, we explore the phenomenon of pseudo-events, those events which are used to select political leaders in the United States, and how the attitude of great powers known as great power autism discounts the actions of small states.
The second case study with a different organization is Chapter 7; in this case study we synthesize our concepts and explore the actions of both Iran and North Korea. The conclusions we reach may be counter-intuitive to the prevailing attitude of conventional wisdom. Furthermore, in this chapter, we explain the important role intelligence has in the development of strategy as a useful theory. In an effort to be clear on the idea of strategy as a theoretical field, we will define how we view theory as it relates to this study.
Theory as Grammar
Julian S. Corbett, in his book: Some Principles of Maritime Strategy quotes Carl von Clausewitz: “It [theory] should educate the mind of the man who is to lead in war or rather guide him to self-education, but it should not occupy him on the battlefield.” The scholars of the 1800s argued theory is a tool for education and not a prescription for policy. Strategic theory will not produce automatic victories in war, just as a theory of psychology will not make mental illness go away, nor a theory of nutrition make us all thin and healthy; but the knowledge of the theory can give us the motivation to change or modify behavior. Theory is useful in creating a culture of communication. One can think of theory as a common grammar; a person uses grammar to communicate up and down the chain of command. This grammar is useful when a person must communicate the action of others, this ability to communicate is essential in cases, where everyone must be on the same page, sharing the same operational premise, definitions, and variables explained and understood throughout the organization. Having a theory, and understanding it as a grammar entails everyone in the organization is in the same communication network. The network acts as a unifying element which adds cohesion in times of crisis and stress. This aspect of the grammar of theory gives us the application of a ‘unified’ theory. The unification of perspective derives from the ability to communicate inside the theory. Furthermore, if we are examining a theory of Strategy , and the focus of our synthesis is on the military means of the state, and if the state has military allies, the theory must also extend to the allies as well. A strategic theory enables understanding to occur across national cultures, if the training is universally applied and accepted, the theoretical grammar can overcome misunderstandings and operational ineffectiveness.
One of the objectives of this study is to contribute to our understanding of strategic theory and for it to be understood by the amateur as well as the professional. The comprehensive understanding of Strategy, by all is essential if a democracy goes to war. Democratic states, educated in strategy, will have the ability to understand, communicate, and execute the needs and objectives of the military situation. Strategic theory encapsulates what everyone understands as the regular or normal military and political circumstance. Moreover, strategy provides a person with a lexicon in which they can determine the strategic policies of their leaders and determine to retain or terminate their leadership. Today, a vocabulary of understanding would eliminate some of the ideas the public has about the nature of the international environment , preventing politicians and political intellectuals to use language which has little meaning in theory or practice.
Our concept of the role of theory generally and strategy specifically, is different than in the natural science traditions. In the natural sciences (and some social sciences) theory is used to test hypotheses.
Thomas Kuhn ’s famous work on paradigm shifts is a foundational work for anyone studying in the social sciences,
Lawrence Freedman writes about Kuhn ’s
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in his book
Strategy :
A History:
Its core precepts would be taught to students and research encouraged and celebrated which followed its framework and validated its conclusions. Eventually, challenges would appear as observations threw up apparently inexplicable anomalies. The cumulative impact of these anomalies would eventually become overwhelming.
This Kuhn described as a ‘scientific revolution,’ when everything scientist thought they knew would be reassessed, all the prior assumptions and information reappraised, often against fierce resistance from the old guard. Eventually, the new paradigm would usurp the old. 1
This relationship described by Kuhn and written by Freedman, demonstrate even in supposedly objective and rational arenas such as the natural sciences, factors that influence synthesis can be non-rational and subjective as to the comfort level of a paradigm by a given generation. So much more so, in the social sciences, where there is a confrontation between “approved political strategies [which] no longer sufficed at revolutionary times.” 2 This study contends, the effort to influence and implement Kuhn’s ideas of scientific revolutions and introduce a new paradigm to replace the old, during primarily the 1960s, has created a pseudo-scientific aura around political intellectuals . These people have designed and implemented America’s failed strategic policies, because the use of force offends their ideological (theoretical) paradigm. The development of a paradigm shift in the understanding of historical case studies has been done by non-academics and academics before in the fields of International Relations and History. A case in point is the examination of the causes of the First World War.
As late as 1965, Rene Albrecht-Carrie, whose publisher describes him as “an authority on modern history” and was Chairman of the [History] Department and Professor at Barnard College at Columbia University
3 wrote the cause of the First World War was Imperialism. Carrie writes:
Put it another way: the little Eurasian peninsula that was Europe, which had conquered the world and was its powerhouse, contained too much energy and power for the narrowness of its confines. The very process of imperial activity had simultaneously furnished occasion for clashes and crises and served the function of safety valve for the overflowing energy of Europe. There was in 1914, no more room in the world for fresh conquests. 4
This argument has its roots in the Marxist-Leninist synthesis claiming responsibility of the First World War is due to Capitalism and more specifically on Imperialism. The concept and argument have various forms. It is generally nicknamed the ‘Merchant of Death’ theory. This theory, which was believed by many during the 1920s and 1930s served as the foundation of America’s isolationist’s policy. Disagreeing with the conclusions produced by this theory were the realists who were instrumental in agitating against the proponents of the isolationists who organized themselves as the American First Committee.
Three years before Carrie’s book was published; a non-academic, changed the way people viewed the outbreak of the First World War. Barbara Tuchman’s treatise: The Guns of August, changed the popular attitude or one could say, She changed the paradigm of why the First World War had begun. Instead of following the ideological understanding of the merchants of death, or a Leninist-Marxist argument; Tuchman, changed the conventional wisdom through her work. This work which establishes the primary cause of the First World War as inherent human failings which include: incompetence, lack of nerve, petty jealousy, bureaucracy, doctrinaire thinking, racial prejudice, and fatigue. The lesson from Tuchman’s work war is not a product of any system. Wars start as the result of human failings in times of crisis is accepted by most politicians and academics.
The utopian perspective of both the Realist and Liberals which produce the paradigms and policies have steered examination of issues surrounding war to the behaviors of Great Powers. This use or misuse of theory was not the fault of theorists , it was done inside the paradigm and being inside the discipline, theory controlled the questions asked and answers given. 5 Unlike the theorists of the 1930s; the contemporary theorists ignore the essential ingredient in any synthesis of politics, society, and conflict; which is the human element.
Sheldon Simon wrote during the Cold War the international environment was seen as a competition between the Superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union ) to collect ‘territorial aggrandizement’ and ‘client states.’ 6 However, during the Cold War, could one observe small state behavior that did not follow the objectives of territorial aggrandizement and the collection of client...
