This book serves as a sequel to my previous work, Metaphors in International Relations Theory (Marks 2011). In that volume I chronicle how metaphors are integral to the study of international relations (IR). As is true in other academic disciplinary and interdisciplinary pursuits, metaphors in IR frame research and shape analysis throughout the field.1 Far from serving only as linguistic devices to illuminate abstract ideas, conceptual metaphors constitute the main categories in the study of IR. They form the ontological bases that distinguish IR as a distinct area of academic inquiry, delineate the epistemological practices that inform debates, and support the methodological tools that are chosen by scholars who conduct research and provide analyses of their findings.
Since the publication of Metaphors in International Relations Theory, I have continued to investigate how metaphors guide scholarship in the study of world affairs. I have come to the conclusion that virtually every area of IR is understood with the use of metaphorical concepts.2 This book expands the findings of the one that precedes it. It not only delves into additional concepts that were not examined in the first volume but also extends the analysis of how metaphors are essential elements in the study of IR. Thus, the book is not only an appendix to my previous work, but it also deepens the understanding scholars can have of how the metaphors they rely on inform every aspect of their work.
Beginning Again with an Anecdote
In my previous book (Marks 2011, 7) I began with an anecdote which illustrates the importance of IR metaphors in the form of a quote by former United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright who likened global politics to the well-known metaphor of billiards balls on a pool table. The purpose of including that quote was to show how metaphors in IR theory make their way into mainstream discourse and thus influence how practitioners and non-practitioners alike think about world affairs. Since the publication of the earlier volume I have continued to encounter how the metaphors of IR theory frequently figure into the written and spoken words of all manner of individuals who are not actively engaged in the scholarly study of IR but who nonetheless play a part in framing and perpetuating the discourse that gives meaning to the empirical context of global interactions.
It thus seems appropriate to begin this book similarly to illustrate how metaphors in the scholarly literature of IR theory often make their way into how world affairs are understood. In this instance I take an article from The New York Times about the death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. In that article reporters from the newspaper referred to North Korea metaphorically as a āfailed state with nuclear weaponsā (Landler and Sang-Hun 2011, A1). Just as Madeleine Albrightās observations about states as metaphorical billiard balls revealed something about her view of the world, the Times reportersā reference to North Korea as a āfailed stateā highlights the ways in which metaphors in IR theory have a wider impact for depicting world affairs. In academic writings a metaphorical āfailed stateā is one that is understood to lack institutionalized political authority to the extent that the country is ungovernable using conventional political structures. North Korea , by contrast, is what most scholars would consider on the opposite end of the spectrum, that is, a total state where all political authority is concentrated in governing institutions that affect every aspect of civic life. For The New York Times reporters, the metaphor of a āfailed stateā had a nice ring to it because it seemingly depicts a country that does not live up to the standards established by legitimate political authority as it is recognized in most places around the world. For the authors of the article, North Korea had āfailedā in the sense that it did not succeed in rising to the standard of governance that legitimate governments enjoy. However, it should be obvious that this sense of the term does not adhere to standard scholarly usage, which employs the notion of āfailedā states to conceptualize the absence of centralized political authority, a condition that clearly would not apply to the North Korean state.
Why does this matter? Metaphors are integral to how IR scholars conceptualize their field. They provide the narrative structure through which facts are sorted into categories, assumptions are made, hypotheses are derived, and theories are formulated. They thus encapsulate the core ontological, epistemological, and methodological debates, which represent the main theoretical divisions within academic circles. As these metaphors make their way into other discursive contexts, for example the journalistic field, they provide insight into the ways that these metaphorical representations are not derived from an unambiguous reading of facts, but rather are indicative of the various cognitive frames of reference scholars bring with them to their work. That is to say, there is no ārightā or āwrongā way to convey what is meant by a āfailedā state because the concept itself is not a material category; it is instead a frame of reference that reflects one of any number of ways of thinking about political authority. Beyond their ability to guide empirical research to verify hypotheses about patterns of causation, the āutilityā of IR metaphors is that they allow scholars to gain insight into those concepts that IR scholars deem worthy of study and what they are intended to mean. There are no āfailed states,ā only systems of government that exist in various states and which can be conceptualized metaphorically as failed states (whatever that means), or something else.
The New York Times reportersā use of the term āfailed stateā in a way that is different from its standard usage among scholars also highlights the intellectual imprecision that is possible when metaphorical concepts are reified to the point that their meanings become ambiguous. As in my previous book, this volume contains chapters that analyze metaphors as they are used in a variety of theoretical approaches to the study of IR. As the āfailed stateā metaphor illustrates, among the problems with metaphors in IR theory is their imprecision and vagueness. A concept such as a āfailed state,ā even when not misconstrued as it was in The New York Times article, can be problematic because its imprecise nature makes it difficult to associate the concept with a specific set of empirical criteria against which it can be measured. Furthermore, hypotheses that follow from a vague metaphor such as āfailed statesā can lead to non-falsifiable or tautological claims because any evidence can be used to verify them. Part of the goal of this book is to further interrogate the utility of IR metaphors and subject them to additional analytical scrutiny beyond what was accomplished in my previous work on this topic.3
One of the main observations in Metaphors in International Relations Theory is that research in the field of cognitive linguistics has established that metaphors are an essential part of human cognition.4 In the conclusion to my previous book I opined that because metaphors are a fundamental element in human reasoning, IR scholarship cannot be disentangled from those metaphors that influence scholarsā view of the world. In recent years, cognitive researchers have taken this line of reasoning one step further. In a highly influential article in the journal Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber contend that human reasoning has evolved not so much to acquire knowledge for knowledgeās sake, but to foster the types of argumentation skills that are necessary for survival.5 The human brain has evolved not to recognize the veracity or factual accuracy of a statement, but rather, how persuasive it is. Mercier and Sperber caution that this does not render human cognition āirrational.ā Instead, their thesis āputs such well-known demonstrations of āirrationalityā in a novel perspective. Human reasoning is not a profoundly flawed general mechanism; it is a remarkably efficient specialized device adapted to a certain type of social and cognitive interaction at which it excelsā (Mercier and Sperber 2011, 72). That is to say, humans have evolved successfully because they have become proficient at convincing others to think in a particular way.
Based on my findings in Metaphors in International Relations Theory I would argue that Mercier and Sperberās thesis extends to the role of metaphors in how academics persuade other scholars to accept particular arguments and theoretical perspectives throughout academic inquiry including in the field of IR. What qualifies as a good argument in scholarly discourse includes the metaphors that persuade others to accept certain assumptions, follow certain hypotheses, and investigate certain types of evidence leading to certain types of causal logic. Part of Mercier and Sperberās thesis is that scholars are not immune to confirmation bias; scholars accept particular findings because they fit within the theoretical arguments that to date have been persuasive. My observation about IR in specific, although one would surmise this is true in other disciplines as well, is that metaphors are part of the argumentation process that produces such analytical bias. Scholars are inclined to accept conclusions that fit within the metaphorical frames to which they have become accustomed.
Foreign Policy by Metaphor: Barack Obamaās āRed Lineā
Much like the metaphor of āfailed states,ā foreign policy strategies such as deterrence rest on conceptual metaphors and thus provide for political leaders a way to think about fo...
