Russia in the Changing International System

Emel Parlar Dal, Emre Erşen, Emel Parlar Dal, Emre Erşen

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN:
  9783030218317
• eBook ISBN:
  9783030218324
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This volume seeks to explore Russia's perceptions of the changing international system in the twenty-first century and evaluate the determinants of Russian motives, roles and strategies towards a number of contemporary regional and global issues. The chapters of the volume discuss various aspects of Russian foreign policy with regard to key actors like the U.S., EU and China; international organizations such as the BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Eurasian Economic Union and Collective Security Treaty Organization; and a number of regional conflicts including Ukraine and Syria. The contributors seek to understand how the discourses of "anti-Westernism" and "post-Westernism" are employed in the redefinition of Russia's relations with the other actors of the international system and how Russia perceives the concept of "regional hegemony," particularly in the former Soviet space and the Middle East.

© The Author(s) 2020

E. Parlar Dal, E. Erşen (eds.)Russia in the Changing International Systemhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21832-4_1

Begin Abstract

1. Russia and the Changing International System: An Introduction

Emel Parlar Dal¹ and Emre Erşen²

(1)

Department of International Relations, Marmara University, Istanbul, Turkey

(2)

Department of Political Science and International Relations, Marmara University, Istanbul, Turkey

Emel Parlar Dal (Corresponding author)

Emre Erşen (Corresponding author)

Keywords

Russian foreign policyRising powersInternational orderGlobal governanceRussia-West relations

End Abstract

Introduction

What kind of an actor is Russia in the current international system, which has recently been marked by substantive structural and normative changes as a result of the ongoing power shift from the Global North to the Global South? Should Russia be conceived as a great power or a rising power in world politics? Or should it rather be categorized as a “near” great power? How can Russia’s perceptions about the changing international order be critically assessed? What are Russia’s motives, roles and strategies with regard to key regional and global issues? Does the Russian leadership have an alternative interpretation of the international order that significantly differs from the “liberal” understanding of the Western states? This volume seeks to address these questions and attempts at scrutinizing Russia as a unique actor, which plays the dual role of a traditional great power and a rising power in the international system. The implications of this duality in Russia’s actorness are important in terms of not only understanding the Russian elites’ response to the emerging post-hegemonic international order but also evaluating the development of Moscow’s policies in the sphere of global governance.

There is a growing literature on Russia’s vision of the changing international system (e.g. Sakwa 2017; Radin and Reach 2017; Miskimmon and O’Loughlin 2017; Tsereteli 2018). However, the existing literature still lacks a comprehensive study that evaluates Russia’s interactions with the international system in the light of its policies with regard to multiple regions and various state and non-state actors. On the other hand, the Russian foreign policy literature is dominated with country-specific, geography-oriented and issue-based studies. This volume, in contrast, aims to provide a broader and more integrative approach to understand the evolution of Russian responses to key regional and global issues and Russia’s engagements with a number of international institutions including the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and BRICS.

This volume also seeks to diversify the conceptual and empirical accounts regarding Russia’s evolving role in the international system. In doing so, it tries to provide answers to the following research questions:

• How do the Russian leaders view the international order and perceive their country’s role as an international actor?
• How does Russia perceive the concept of “rising powers”? What are the contradictions between Russia’s roles as a great power and a rising power?
• What are the main determinants of Russia’s claim to be a great power? Which global and regional aspirations determine the perceptions of the Russian leadership regarding their country’s great power status?
• How are the discourses of “anti-Westernism” and “post-Westernism” employed in the redefinition of Russia’s relations with other actors of the international system?
• What is the significance of the “East” or “Asia” in Russia’s views about the international system? What is the relevance of organizations such as the EAEU, BRICS, CSTO and SCO in the evolution of this perception?
• How do the issues of Ukraine, Crimea and Syria influence or legitimize Russia’s claims about the international order? How does Russia perceive the concept of “regional hegemony” particularly in the former Soviet Union and the Middle East?

The duality in Russia’s actorness in the international system creates certain confusion in the IR literature and thus must be exposed with a specific focus on Moscow’s recent foreign policy actions. It is important to approach this subject from different angles using various case studies and focus on the “realist-idealist”, “regional-global” and “political-economic” implications of Russia’s activism in the international system. What separates this volume from the previous studies on Russian foreign policy is that it elaborates on Russia’s global governance policies—particularly in the regional institutions—and adopts an encompassing perspective to the strategies pursued by Moscow in key issue areas like energy, security, regional conflicts, international political economy and international organizations. The chapters of the volume also shed a light on Russia’s perceptions about the transformation in the world order and the responses developed by Russian policymakers to the ongoing security challenges and economic issues at both the material and normative levels. Structured around various topics like post-Westernism, multipolarity and regional hegemony, the chapters offer a comprehensive understanding of Russian foreign policy in the face of regional and global challenges.

In this introductory chapter, we argue that Russia’s role in the changing international system as well as its main motives and instruments in its regional and global engagements should be evaluated in accordance with its multiple actorness in the international system, its distinct interpretation of the international order and its mixed approach to multilateralism. It is clear that Russia’s reading of the present world order differs significantly from the interpretation of its Western counterparts. In fact, the Russian vision of world politics is far from being “Western” at the normative level, since it does not act as a “norm taker” in the current international structure and rather tends to impose its own norms by challenging the norm diffusion strategies initiated by the Western powers. Against this background, it is important to grasp how Russia’s “illiberal” approach to the international order shapes its foreign policy outcomes as well as its problematic relations with the West.

Russia’s Multiple Actorness in the Changing International System

Russia is traditionally regarded as a great power in the IR literature due to its large geographical size, rich energy resources, advanced nuclear capabilities and permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). These capabilities enable Russia to project significant geopolitical influence in various regions including Eastern Europe, Asia-Pacific, Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia. Yet, it should be recalled that Russia has been struggling with major economic and social problems. Its population has been in decline since the collapse of the Soviet Union, while its economic indicators have been deteriorating due to the fluctuating energy prices as well as the ongoing Western economic sanctions. This has urged Russia to associate itself in a more visible way with groupings such as BRICS and SCO, through which it has successfully developed stronger political and economic links with rising powers such as China and India.

At the same time, however, Russia itself can be viewed as a rising power, since it has some significant similarities with other rising powers in terms of its positional, behavioural and functional power. More importantly, it shares a strong ideological affinity with other rising powers in terms of challenging the Western supremacy in international relations and strives to create an alternative to the Western-dominated world order (Oğuzlu and Parlar Dal 2013). Moscow also tries to use its strategic realignment with the rising powers to advance its influence in global and regional politics.

In short, Russia can be defined as a “multifaceted actor” that is capable of playing different roles depending on the context as well as the changing global and regional circumstances. Yet, it should be noted that Russia’s adaptation to post-bipolar world order has not been without tensions, as it has pursued different status policies at two different fronts. On the one hand, it has sought to maintain its great power status despite the domestic political, economic and social difficulties it has encountered since the early 1990s. Its military involvement in the disputes in Georgia and Ukraine, in particular, proves that Russia pursues policies that aim to challenge the existing rules and norms of the international order. On the other hand, Moscow has striven to upgrade its status in the hierarchy of states and chosen to act as a rising power in the multipolar international system—in a very similar way with other rising powers like China, India and Brazil.

It can be claimed that this duality of roles in the international system gives significant leverage to Russia in global governance as it is able to pursue different policies depending on the type of its actorness. For instance, in the field of security governance, Russia prefers to act more like a great power, while in economic governance or in other global governance issue areas, it acts as a rising power that holds limited power capacity in both material and ideational terms compared with other great powers—particularly the US.

Russia’s evolving relationship with China is especially important in terms of understanding the contradictions between its roles as a great power and a rising power (Charap et al. 2017). Compared with China, Russia has limited capacity to expand its influence outside its borders mainly due to its relatively weak trading state posture as well as the lack of adequate resources in financing and infrastructure investments in extra regional geographies. For instance, China’s influence in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and the Persian Gulf is much more prominent than the Russian influence. Partly due to this factor, Russia seems to have been following a two-layered policy towards China that is simultaneously based on cooperation and rivalry (Kaczmarski 2015). Moscow and Beijing pursue similar status-seeking strategies in international institutions like BRICS, G20 and SCO, while Central Asia, for instance, is perceived as a theatre of great power competition by the Russian leaders where China is treated more like a rival than a partner. Still, it should be noted that the Russian strategy towards China is not in the form of direct confrontation, and Moscow seeks more advantageous terms of cooperation with China in regional and global politics. In short, it can be argued that Moscow follows a highly pragmatic and multi-approach policy towards China.

Encountering the Liberal International Order: The Russian Way

A second question that needs to be addressed is what kind of an international order Russia hopes to preserve in the post–Cold War period. Answers to this question, however, vary depending on the four key features of Russia’s interpretation of the existing international order.

1. (a)
   Normativeness: The normative dimension of Russia’s understanding of the international order can be regarded as a reaction to the Western rules and norms about international law. Yet, it should be mentioned that Russia does not propose a concrete alternative to the West in this sphere. It rather prefers to advocate a flux model of normative order which it claims to be more comprehensive and fairer than the Western model (Romanova 2018). For instance, Moscow rejects the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and views this doctrine against the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention (Averre and Davies 2015). In a similar way, it does not view the norms that are related with human rights and liberal democracy as supreme. Thus, Russia’s normativeness is actually quite thin, communitarian and limited.
2. (b)
   Emphasis on sovereignty: State sovereignty is a key principle in Russia’s understanding of the international order which means that no state is permitted to intervene in the internal affairs of another state with the claim that basic human rights are violated by national governments. In this sense, Russia views the R2P doctrine as a pretext of the Western powers to achieve regime change in other countries by the use of military force. It should also be noted that Russia’s dedication to the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention in this regard is quite similar with the approach of other rising powers.
3. (c)
   Revisionism: Russia constantly demands the revision of the international order in accordance with the principles of justice, fairness and equality. In Georgia and Ukraine, this has even resulted in direct military intervention which has been defended by President Putin on the grounds of challenging the US-led international order. Revisionism in this regard is a key element of the Russian leadership’s populist discourse regarding international relations (Allison 2017). However, it should be emphasized that Russia’s revisionism is not full-fledged, but partial (Clunan 2018). This means that Moscow does not seek to re-establish a brand new international order on the ruins of the existing order and rather aims to preserve some of the traditional principles (e.g. balance of power and sphere of influences) of the existing order that serve the Russian interests.
4. (d)
   Multilateralism: Russian discourse about the international order strongly advocates multi-purposed and multi-regional cooperation within the framework of international insti...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• 1. Russia and the Changing International System: An Introduction
• 2. Stasis and Change: Russia and the Emergence of an Anti-hegemonic World Order
• 3. Russia’s European Policies in a Post-liberal World
• 4. Russia as a Regional Actor: Goals and Motivations
• 5. (Mis)interpreting the Eurasian Economic Union? Images of the EAEU in Russia and the West
• 6. Russia and China in Global Governance
• 7. Geopolitical Economy of Russia’s Foreign Policy Duality in the Eurasian Landmass
• 8. Russia’s Strategies Towards BRICS: Theory and Practice
• 9. Ukraine Between Russia and the West: Russian Challenge to Euro-Atlantic Security
• 10. Russia’s Power Politics Towards Ukraine: Social Status Concerns and the Role of Emotions
• 11. Russia’s New Policy Towards Aspiring Political Movements and Unrecognized States
• 12. Russia’s “Modern” Foreign Policy Tools in Crimea and Syria
• 13. Assessing Russia’s Middle East Policy After the Arab Uprisings: Prospects and Limitations