Semi-Presidential Policy-Making in Europe

Executive Coordination and Political Leadership

Tapio Raunio, Thomas Sedelius

• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN:
  9783030164300
• eBook ISBN:
  9783030164317
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book explores how power-sharing between the president and the prime minister works in semi-presidential regimes. In contrast to much of the existing comparative work on semi-presidentialism, the book emphasizes the role of institutional coordination at the most concrete level of executive policy-making, and asks how institutional coordination between the president and prime minister influences presidential activism and the balance of power within the executive. The authors develop a tentative framework embedded in institutionalism and based on four strands of research – semi-presidentialism, public administration, political leadership, and foreign policy analysis – which is subsequently applied to the cases of Lithuania, Romania and Finland. Given the political challenges facing many semi-presidential countries, the study ultimately seeks to identify institutional solutions that facilitate power-sharing and successful policy-making.

© The Author(s) 2020

Tapio Raunio and Thomas SedeliusSemi-Presidential Policy-Making in EuropePalgrave Studies in Presidential Politicshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16431-7_1

Begin Abstract

1. Introduction

Tapio Raunio¹ and Thomas Sedelius²

(1)

Faculty of Management and Business, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland

(2)

School of Education, Health and Social Sciences, Dalarna University, Falun, Sweden

Tapio Raunio (Corresponding author)

Email: [email protected]

Thomas Sedelius

Email: [email protected]

Keywords

Semi-presidentialismSemi-presidential regimesSemi-presidential policy-makingExecutiveInstitutional coordinationFinlandLithuaniaRomania

End Abstract

Research on semi-presidentialism has emerged into a burgeoning subfield, with comparisons between regime types followed by comparisons between various types of semi-presidential countries (Elgie 2016; Åberg and Sedelius 2018). However, much of this research is theoretically and conceptually quite narrow. Studies have focused on regime stability, with authors interested in how variables such as presidential power or divided government affect the level of conflict between the two executives (Beuman 2016; Elgie 2018a). Some semi-presidential countries are more heavily affected by conflict than others, and certain periods within the same countries are more conflictive than others. Yet in most cases a dual executive seems to work without stalemate or instability (Elgie and McMenamin 2011). Another important line of inquiry has compared regime types, examining how semi-presidentialism is linked to various macro-political outcomes such as democratic performance and survival (e.g. Cheibub et al. 2014; Elgie 2011; Hicken and Stoll 2013; Sedelius and Linde 2018).

However, despite more than two decades of research on semi-presidential dynamics, we still know very little about the actual functioning of day-to-day routines and coordination between the president and the prime minister and about the various channels through which presidents wield influence. Executive policy coordination in semi-presidential regimes remains something of a blind spot in the current literature. To be sure, country studies have detailed relational dynamics between the president and the prime minister (e.g. Gherghina and Miscoiu 2013; Lazardeux 2015; Raunio 2012; Shen 2011; Shoesmith 2003), but without developing a systematic and comparative understanding of executive coordination in semi-presidential regimes. These studies do suggest that there is considerable variation between semi-presidential countries in how actual policy coordination and power-sharing mechanisms operate and to what extent such mechanisms are codified into constitutional rules. To our knowledge, there are no studies identifying operative mechanisms inside the semi-presidential system, such as bilateral meetings between the president and the cabinet, the organization and operation of committees and councils, or the administrative and expert resources available to the president and the cabinet, and how these are related to presidential activism. This book wants to contribute both theoretically and empirically on such key institutional aspects of semi-presidentialism.

1.1 Aim and Research Questions

The aim of this study is to dig deeper—beyond constitutional rules—into the mechanisms of executive coordination and policy-making in semi-presidential regimes. Based on a focused comparative design including unique expert interview data from two Central European countries, Lithuania and Romania, and one long-lasting case of European semi-presidentialism, Finland, we ask how coordination between the president and the prime minister actually works and how it influences the balance of power within the executive. We raise three main research questions guiding our endeavor:

1. 1.
   Across our three selected cases of semi-presidentialism, to what extent is coordination between the president and the prime minister established by formal institutional mechanisms such as codified rules and/or organizational bodies?
2. 2.
   In what ways do variations on the level of institutional coordination between the president and the prime minister matter to presidential activism and executive power-sharing?
3. 3.
   In addition to what previous research teaches us about intra-executive conflict and power-sharing in semi-presidential regimes, how may scholarly work on executive coordination help to further advance the study of semi-presidentialism?

As for our theoretical contribution, we build on different strands of literature (semi-presidentialism, public administration, political leadership, and foreign policy analysis) to develop an analytical framework subsequently applied on the three selected country cases. Given the political challenges facing many semi-presidential countries, the study also seeks to identify institutional solutions that facilitate power-sharing and successful policy-making.

1.2 What Is Semi-Presidentialism and What Do We Know About It?

Defining semi-presidentialism has proved to be far more complicated than defining parliamentarism and presidentialism. Parliamentarism has an authority structure based on mutual dependence between the parliament and the government, whereas presidentialism is defined by separation of powers where a popularly elected president names and directs the composition of government, and is not contingent on mutual confidence. Semi-presidential regimes, on the other hand, have dual elections (presidential and legislative), but the survival of the prime minister and the government is dependent on the maintenance of parliamentary support.

Since Duverger’s founding definition¹ of semi-presidentialism, there has been an enduring discussion on how to define and categorize regimes with a dual executive, including both a popularly elected president and a prime minister. Duverger’s (1980: 4) non-institutional criterion that “the president possesses quite considerable powers” has caused debate and confusion. Scholars have approached it differently and the classification of semi-presidential countries has varied extensively.

In the 2000s, comparative scholars began to increasingly accept the use of strictly constitutional definitions. Robert Elgie partly resolved the matter when proposing a minimalist definition, stating that “semi-presidentialism is where a constitution includes a popularly elected fixed-term president and a prime minister and cabinet who are collectively responsible to the legislature” (Elgie 1999: 13). Elgie’s definition has attracted considerable critique for encompassing too many and disparate countries, however. Elgie has acknowledged that his definition is mainly taxonomic and recommended that it should not be used as a discrete variable for explanatory purposes (Elgie and Moestrup 2016: 9–11). For both theoretical and empirical reasons, we need to separate between different forms of semi-presidentialism. Among alternatives in the literature, Shugart and Carey’s subcategorization of premier-presidential and president-parliamentary regimes has received broad acceptance. Premier-presidentialism is where (1) the president is elected by a popular vote for a fixed term in office; (2) the president selects the prime minister, who heads the cabinet; but (3) the authority to dismiss the cabinet rests exclusively with the parliament. President-parliamentarism is where (1) the president is elected by a popular vote for a fixed term in office, (2) the president appoints and dismisses the prime minister and other cabinet ministers, and (3) the prime minister and cabinet ministers are subjected to parliamentary as well as to presidential confidence (Shugart and Carey 1992: 23–24; Shugart 2005: 333). The key difference is that under president-parliamentarism the government is accountable to both the president and the parliament, whereas under premier-presidentialism the government is accountable only to the parliament. In addition, president-parliamentary constitutions do usually provide overall stronger presidential prerogatives.

The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the emergence of many new semi-preside...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Institutions, Coordination, and Leadership
• 3. The Semi-Presidential Cases in Comparative Context
• 4. Formal Coordination Mechanisms
• 5. Informal Avenues of Influence
• 6. Decision-Making in Foreign and Security Policies and EU Affairs
• 7. Conclusions
• Back Matter