Introduction: Dual Accountability, Constitutional Reform And Democracy
More than anything else, the dualistic legal-political construct of the Chief Executive of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region embodies the tension between state authority and local autonomy. As stipulated in the Basic Law, the Chief Executive is vested with the power to govern through a dual selection process. He or she is selected locally and appointed by the Central Peopleās Government. As such, he/she is constitutionally accountable to the people of Hong Kong on the one hand and the Central Peopleās Government on the other.1 The task of the Chief Executive to serve two masters, as entailed by the dual accountability, is daunting when perceptions and interests of the two diverge (Poon 2008). However, the stress of the office arising from the dual accountability has been somewhat alleviated by a carefully designed Election Committee. Functioning as a local electorate that selects the Chief Executive, the Election Committee has been comprised of limited numbers of political and business elites as well as professionals. The Election Committee as a whole represents the socioeconomic establishment that the central government also sought to preserve in the 1980s (Lau 2014: 110).
However, the Election Committee as an institution preserving a delicate balance was meant to exist for a limited time. As a result of negotiation between the central government and various social forces in Hong Kong, the Basic Law also provides that the Chief Executive will eventually be elected by universal suffrage via democratic procedures in Hong Kong.2 This provision imparts an evolving nature to the Office within a 50-year time frame.3 Nevertheless, terms of āuniversal suffrageā and ādemocratic procedureā were left unspecified. Such vagueness might be constructive for facilitating an agreement among Basic Law drafters from different political cultures, beliefs and interests at that historical time, but certainly opened rooms for competing interpretations thereafter (Poon 2008).
Consequently, constitutional reforms concerning the Office of Chief Executive unfolded periodically in the post-handover years, which in essence provided opportunities to reconstruct the office of the Chief Executive. Not surprisingly, these reforms became locus of competition among stakeholders. On the one hand, the oppositions in Hong Kong sought to expand the local electorate so that the Chief Executive could be more responsive to popular demands. On the other hand, the central government guarded against hasty reforms so as to preserve its power over the selection of its agent, ultimately the local establishment and its authority over the territory. As such, democratization in Hong Kong underscores the contestation and renegotiation of the boundary between the state and the Hong Kong SAR. It has been marked by interplays of competing perceptions and interests.
In the period between 1997 and 2015, three rounds of constitutional reform took place and each resulted in different outcomes. The first round of reform, dealing with the selection method for the Chief Executive in 2007, took place in 2005. Short of an agreement, this round of reform resulted in a political stalemate as the reform package was vetoed in the Legislative Council. The second round of reform, held in 2010, dealt with the selection method for the Chief Executive in 2012. This round of reform resulted in noticeable progress after intense negotiation and compromise by the parties involved. Consequently, the number of Election Committee members was increased from 800 to 1200, while more elected District Councilors were absorbed into the Election Committee. The third round of reform, which officially began in December 2013, sought to materialize universal suffrage for the Chief Executive in 2017 as permitted by the Standing Committee of the National Peopleās Congress (NPCSC). In its decision issued in December 2007, the NPCSC set out two tasks that served as the framework for the third round of reform. First, a ābroadly representativeā nominating committee with reference to the formulation of existing Election Committee was to be established. Second, ādemocratic proceduresā that allowed the nominating committee to nominate a certain number of candidates for the office of the Chief Executive for popular vote were to be formulated.4 In other words, this round of reform primarily focused on the composition of the nominating committee and the ways in which it would nominate candidates for the Chief Executive. This framework underlined the intention of the central government that the universal suffrage would proceed in a controlled fashion. However, this round of reform concluded with a political impasse. Universal suffrage for the Chief Executive was put off to an undetermined future.
At each round of constitutional reform, three clusters of actors came to the fore because of their constitutional powers over reform proposals as specified in the Basic Law, including the NPCSC, the opposition parties in the Legislative Council, and the Chief Executive and his administration.5 The NPCSC has been directly involved in interpreting the Basic Law and issuing decisions concerning electoral reforms in Hong Kong. The NPCSC together with relevant state departments, such as the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office under the State Council and the Liaison Office of the Central Peopleās Government in Hong Kong, collectively articulate and defend the interest of the central government. The opposition parties within the Legislative Council constitute the second important cluster of actors as they can veto reform proposals in the Legislative Council if they form a voting block. This cluster of actors promotes a quickened pace of electoral reform, ultimately, strengthening themselves through extended political channels and elected seats. Due to their differences in interest and tactics, the composition of the opposition alliance has been fluid. Constituent parties join hands or go their separate ways as political circumstances shift. More, these parties often sought to maximize their bargaining power by allying with activist groups outside of the Legislative Chamber. Last but not the least, the Chief Executive and his administration at any given time form the third actor. Since 2004, the Chief Executive has given the responsibility to initiate reforms, draft reform packages and give consent to reform packages passed in the Legislative Council before these packages could be submitted to the NPCSC for approval.6 Although the outcome of reform will only affect the selection of his or her successors, the incumbent Chief Executive is not without a stake in it, especially when he or she is looking for second term in the office. The way that the incumbent Chief Executive handles the reform tests his or her allegiance. The political skills exhibited in the management of reform could also affect his or her popularity and the credibility of his administration as a whole.
Characteristics: Confrontation in the Absence of Intermediaries
Like the previous two rounds of constitu...