1 Introduction: Culture, Strategy and Resilience
The 2016 Global Strategy (GS) produced by the new High Representative Federica Mogherini represented a very much needed platform to rethink the role of an increasingly weakened Europe in volatile international context. In that, despite their consistency and continuity, the 2003 European Security Strategy and the 2016 Global Strategy represent two different trajectories for the European Union (EU): one ascending and one descending. In 2003, the EU was still in an expansive stage. Ten years later, both the EU and the entire continent were turned upside-down by a series of crises, e.g. the Libyan and Syrian civil wars, the Ukrainian crisis, the refugee crisis, BREXIT and the rise of populism and anti-EU parties (Caporaso 2018). The difficulty to deal with external crises was further accompanied by a record low support for European integration even in traditionally pro-European countries. Beyond Europe, a less amicable U.S. administration and a less predictable international context made European strategic thinking even more compelling and needed (Biscop 2016; Higgott and Van Langenhove 2016).
This context underscored a loss of international reputation for the EU, and a sense of âEuropean fatigueâ (Barroso 2012) has ever since underpinned the EU public rhetoric (Cross 2016). For one thing, institutional discourses have progressively moved from a ânormative powerâ to a âprincipled pragmatismâ rhetoric, which seeks to ground the EUâs âidealistic aspirationsâ into âthe realistic assessment of the strategic environmentâ (GS 2016: 16). For another, this rhetoric reaffirmed the EUâs intention to play âa very strong regional and global roleâ (Mogherini 2016).
Not surprisingly, EU institutional discourses have thus progressively conceded the existence of a âfar from academicâ existential crisis (Duke 2014). The Global Strategy referred to threatening âtimes of existential crisis, within and beyondâ the EU (2016: 5). Van Rompuy acknowledged the existence of an âexistential testâ while receiving the Nobel Prize in 2012. Junker alluded to it in his âState of the Unionâ address in 2016. Verhofstadt reiterated the theme of a âcrossroad in 2017â that encompasses the âinsideâ and an âoutsideâ populated by Trump, Putin and radical Islam.
More and more, the EU strategic thinkers acknowledged that the EU needs to focus realistically on its objectives and doing so by reflecting about what kind of actor it wishes and can be, both abroad and at home. By analogy with Richard Haassâ book Foreign Policy begins at home (2013), the Global Strategy states that âglobal strategy begins at homeâ (2016: 18) and underscored the importance of unifying the domestic and international parts of the external action equation (EEAS 2017). Indeed, the relationship between political cohesion and foreign policy cuts both ways. Just as âdomesticâ political cohesion is indispensable to have an effective foreign policy, greater cooperation in foreign policy matters can act as a âdomesticâ confidence building measure. In this context, the concept of resilienceâthat is, âthe ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to prepare for, to withstand, to adapt, and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks without compromising long-term development prospectsâ (Council 2013: 1)âacquired increasing popularity among practitioners and policy pundits in Europe (Council 2013; Pawlak 2016; Cross and La Porte 2017) as a key component of the EU domestic/international strategy.
Current EU references to culture are hence to be situated in the broader discourse on how to overcome the EUâs âexistential crisisâ (Barroso 2012) and further located in the attempt to foster domestic and international societal resilience. Culture is thus imbricated in a bundle of domestic/international priorities. With its ductile, omnipresent nature, âcultureâ relates to the economic activities of the European cultural and creative sector (Commission 2016); development (Council 2017); and ânon-material development and economyâ (European Parliament 2011). Culture in International Relations (CiIR) is seen as a key vector for âaddressing major global challengesâ (GS 2016: 2) and as a reservoir of âimmaterialâ antibodies that allow the EU âto live up to its values internally and externallyâ (GS 2016: 1).
Hence, the relevance of âcultureâ as a vector of international political strategy draws on three interrelated considerations. First, as with its crucial role in the process of meaning-making (McNamara 2015: 27), âcultureâ encompasses both domestic and international arenas and goals. Second, if compared to public diplomacy , CiIR offers a platform for âlong-termâ political projection and programming (Nye 2009), and allows broader relationships which go beyond the realm of so-called âhigh politicsâ, typically associated with narrow conceptions of security. CiIR thus offers the EU the possibility of going beyond the âspeaking with one voiceâ mantra and to âengage with its own diversityâ (Macaj and NicolaĂŻdis 2014). Finally, linking foreign policy objectives to culture offers the possibility to capitalise on a far less controversialâe.g. seemingly depoliticisedâsymbolical repertoire. Hence, with the ânormative pedigreeâ of the EU is under strain, âcultureâ offers a defused way to rebuild its soft power repertoire.
However, strategising CiIR comes with challenges. The EU is a multilayered political system that presents significant coherence-related challenges. The way in which its member states (MSs) organise their cultural policies, both domestically and internationally, has a bearing upon the making of a common EU strategy. Different ânational ways to CDâ highlight the existence of different practices of âdoings and sayings thingsâ (Schatzki 2012: 20; Pouliot 2016; Adler-Nissen 2016), stemming from various material and immaterial cultural heritages, resources, institutional philosophies, structures and strategic conceptions (Lamo de Espinosa and Badillo Matos 2017).
The European Commissionâs 2007 Agenda for culture in a globalising world and the Joint Communication â Towards an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relationsâ bear witness of these reflections. Critically, the documents connected culture and international cultural relations to the concept of strategy, a role further reiterated in both the 2016 European Global Strategy and the 2017 Conclusions on a EU strategic approach to international cultural relations . But what does it mean to approach international cultural relations strategically? And how strategic effectively is the EU in developing its own strategic approach International Cultural Relations?
The EUâs increasing resort to culture for both internal (i.e. fostering European cohesion and advancing integration) and external (i.e. mitigating the demise of other soft power components) purposes calls for an analysis of the strategic role of culture for the EU, especially as it relates to the realm of external action. This book constitutes a step in this regard. It provides a conceptual discussion on CiIR and examines how this concept relates to that of Cultural Diplomacy (CD), International Cultural Relations (ICR) and Cultural Strategy (CS). It then discusses its role and relationship with both the GS and the current EUâs attempts to foster the EUâs political and societal resilience. This book proposes a way of conceptualising âcultureâ as an object of strategy based on a four-edged act of programming which includes: (a) the definition of the field (encompassing both culture and cultural diplomacy ); (b) the setting up of a network connecting different societal and institutional actors (which proceeds from an act of mapping of both institutional and cultural actors and resources); (c) the prioritisation of global actions (along geographical and/or thematic lines); and (d) th...