Democratic governmentâor any form of governmentâis not required unless humans congregate in such a way that task differentiation becomes necessary to sustain the community. An allocation of powers to service a community can be democratic or undemocratic, but the strong and rich have tended to dominate throughout most of human history. The idea of democracy, as presently understood, only arose relatively recently and its development is fascinating.
Some scholars utopianize âtribal democracyâ (Paley 2002), which has been claimed to have existed in pre-Babylonian Mesopotamia around 2100 bce (Jacobsen 1943: 159â72) and in certain parts of India from 1500 to 400 bce (Robinson 1997: 22â23; Keane 2009: xi). However, the best evidence indicates that democracy first existed, albeit for fleetingly, in city-states of Greece, where the idea arose that the people, not the elites, should determine the actions of governments. The idea of democratic rule has now become an aspiration for humanity.
But democracies are difficult to form. Some democracies are overthrown in coups by authoritarian, elite-run cliques. Others suffer civil wars. Many flounder, struggling like fish placed on dry land or elephants dancing on the edge of a precipice, nearly collapsing because the people are unable to communicate with those who run the government supposedly on their behalf.
There are many examples of democracies floundering, as itemized in Appendix A. Among the most prominent cases are the difficulties faced in forming coalition governments after World War II in Belgium, Fourth Republic France, Italy, Spain, and Thailand. More recently, efforts to create democracies in Afghanistan, Egypt, and Iraq have been unable to pass the test of political inclusiveness. As for Nepal, nine months of disagreement between political parties delayed the delivery of vital humanitarian relief pledged by sources worldwide after the massive earthquake of 2015 (Hammer 2016). But the more surprising example is the United States, where moderates in the two main political parties have had a majority of votes in Congress (Haas 2012b: ch. 7), yet compromise legislation has rarely been passed.
Something is very wrong when countries that value the idea of democracy cannot put their ideals into practice and thus allow the will of the people to prevail. As the present volume will demonstrate, one reason for such problems is the mistaken belief that the forms of democracy necessarily produce the substance of democracy. A politics of mass society exists when ordinary persons cannot make their voices heard because intervening institutions of civil society (interest groups, media, political parties) are either nonexistent or serve their own interests in pressuring government rather than representing the will of the people. âPseudo-democracyâ exists when a country has procedures of democratic government but lacks substanceâthat is, when government fails to carry out the will of the people. The most important question within democratic theory is to determine the conditions for achieving substantive democracy, but that question is rarely asked (cf. Miller and Stokes 1963; Clausen 1973; Jacobson and Carson 2016; Sinclair 1997: 231; Dengwerth 2014). Instead, there is a tendency to tolerate mass society politics, which is dangerous because pseudo-democracies can easily fail, and human suffering is exacerbated when the needs of the people are ignored.
Accordingly, the present volume addresses democratic theory from a long-neglected perspective. First, the term âdemocracyâ needs to be defined in terms of its major components, as in the present chapter (cf. Terchek and Conte 2000). Second, alternative types must be identified in order to discover why the term âdemocracyâ means different things in different cultures. ...
