Majoritarian versus Consensus Democracies
The debate about the ideal type of a democratic regime is a long and heated one and pervades the history of political science. Fine-tuning a balance between the ârule of the manyâ and the ârights of the fewâ has been a constant preoccupation of democratic political thinkers and practitioners. From the absolute, unconditional rule (or tyranny) of majority to the exhaustive deliberations until even the smallest citizen groups are convinced about the wisdom of a political decision, different solutions have been suggested. One of the key ways of crystallizing this debate has been through the juxtaposition of majoritarian and consensus democracy. 1 Between these two Weberian ideal types, all democratic regimes can be placed. Lijphart , arguably the scholar that has contributed the most to this important debate, has identified nine criteria for the definition of a consensus vs. a majoritarian democratic regime, as follows:
(1) broad coalition cabinets instead of one-party bare-majority cabinets; (2) a balanced power relationship between the cabinet and the legislature instead of cabinet predominance; (3) a bicameral legislature, particularly one in which the two chambers have roughly equal powers and are differently constituted, instead of unicameralism; (4) a federal and decentralized structure instead of unitary and centralized government; (5) a ârigidâ constitution that can only be amended by extraordinary majorities, instead of a âflexibleâ written or unwritten constitution; (6) judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation; (7) a multiparty instead of a two-party system; (8) a multidimensional party system, in which the parties differ from each other on one or more issue dimensions in addition to socioeconomic issues, for instance, along religious, cultural-ethnic, urban-rural, or foreign policy dimensions; and (9) elections by proportional representation instead of by plurality. 2
As consecutive waves of democratization in the twentieth century led to an ever-growing number of states that could be qualified as democratic, the debate between proponents of majoritarian and consensus democracies flourished. 3 The virtues and vices of majoritarianism have been explored in different regional and temporal contexts, 4 by means of comparing presidential , semi-presidential and parliamentary regimes. 5 Several scholars have identified the prevalence of majoritarian elements as an indication of institutional underperformance, particularly in the context of states that had only recently gone through a democratic transition . 6 Linz pointed the dangers of polarization in a fashion that points not only to presidential but also to all majoritarian regimes, as follows:
Winners and losers are sharply defined for the entire period of the presidential mandate. There is no hope for shifts in alliances, expansion of the governmentâs base of support through national-unity or emergency grand coalitions, new elections in response to major new events, and so on. Instead, the losers must wait at least four or five years without any access to executive power and patronage. The zero-sum game in presidential regimes raises the stakes of presidential elections and inevitably exacerbates their attendant tension and polarization . 7
In this light, the performance of democratic regimes in Latin America and Southern Europe has been evaluated and contrasted with the majoritarian features of the US 8 and French democratic regimes, as well as the consensus features of Germany and Nordic states. Southern Europe 9 and Latin America 10 have attracted considerable attention, given their recent transition to democracy and the challenges their democratic regimes faced in establishing sound and resilient institutions. 11 Merkelâs concept of embedded democracy acquired high relevance in this context, pointing not only at the diversity of democratic institutions, but also at the challenges faced by democracy in different institutional and cultural contexts. 12
Defining Populism
A discussion about majoritarianism in the Greek and Turkish context would not be complete without addressing the question of populism , a topic that has recently acquired increased interest. 13 A subject of conceptual confusion, populism has been praised by some as âa path to true democracyâ and despised by others as âproto-fascismâ. While one could not object to some key populist demands such as the involvement of the people into the political process or the âgovernment of the people, by the people, for the peopleâ in the way Abraham Lincoln famously put in his 1863 Gettysburg Address, it is important to remember that adherence to populism usually coincides with illiberal leanings, intolerance towards dissidence and diversity. In fact, opposition to liberal democracy has proven to be one of the most enduring features of populists across the globe. This study follows the definition of Mudde and Kaltwasser according to which, populism is
a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, âthe pure peopleâ versus âthe corrupt eliteâ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volontĂ© gĂ©nĂ©rale (general will) of the people. 14
One needs to clarify that inviting the people into the political debate is in itself anything but negative. The rise of populism often emerges as a healthy reminder about the need to engage the public in the political process, which often becomes too arcane and seemingly irrelevant to peoplesâ lives. On the other hand, the appeal to the people often moves further to identify as key political demand the emancipation of a âpureâ and âinfallibleâ people which suffers under a âcorruptâ and âillegitimateâ elite. In that context, appealing to the volontĂ© gĂ©nĂ©rale of the people in a Rousseauian sense as the sole yardstick of what is politically expedient and useful paves the way for the adoption of majoritarian views and growing intolerance, marginalization or even silencing of minority voices within the political arena.
When populists come to power, then a paradox is due to emerge, since the fiercest critics of the elites become elites themselves. Nevertheless, populist leaders have repeatedly claimedâand often with remarkable persuasivenessâthat âcorruptâ elites maintained their influence even after their rise to government and thus continued to limit the exercise of democratic popular sovereignty. Making use of that pretext, populist governance is characterized according to MĂŒller by three features:
attempts to hijack the state apparatus, corruption and âmass clientelism â (trading material benefits or bureaucratic favours for political support by citizens who become the populistsâ âclientsâ) and efforts systematically to suppress civil society. 15
Given the thin conceptual content of populism , it can borrow symbolic resources or be fully integrated with other mainstream ideologies, left- or right-wing: Nationalism , socialism and conservatism, religious or not, can imbue populism with features that produce a more resilient and context-specific political ideology. As it will become clear later, on account of their divergent historical experiences, it is no surprise that left-wing nationalist populism would thrive in Greece and right-wing nationalist populism in Turkey . Both of them engaged in constitutional reform projects aiming to promote a majoritarian vision of democracy, mirroring their claim of being the sole representative and defender of the people against its enemies, as well as their disrespect for social pluralism and minority views. The concomitant attempts to control the state apparatus through the establishment of clientelistic networks could not put the integrity of state institutions and government performance under severe pressure.
Case Selection-Thesis
Why choose Greece and Turkey to study the effects of populist majoritarianism through the study of their constitutions? The selection of Greece and Turkey as cases for this compar...