The global cigarette industry is dominated by a small number of transnational tobacco companies (TTCs). Outside of China, in which over 90% of the market is overseen by the state-controlled Chinese National Tobacco Corporation (CNTC ), these corporations operate as oligopolies, dominating national cigarette markets, and enjoying significant ability to segment markets and control price points (CFTFKs 2018). In addition, TTCs pursue sophisticated marketing strategies, which have been shown to drive sales, consumption and harms when they enter new markets (Hafez and Ling 2005; Hawkins et al. 2016, 2018). Given the high level of fungibility between manufactured cigarettesāwhich in the words of tobacco industry whistle-blower Jeffrey Wigand are simply ānicotine deliveryā devicesādifferentiation between products depends almost exclusively on branding activity (Wigand 1996). The importance of branding and marketing to the cigarette industry is evident not only in the extensive history of industry advertising and celebrity endorsements over decades, but also in the vehemence with which they have opposed attempts to curtail their ability to advertise or promote their wares by national governments, at the European Union (EU) level and within the context of the World Health Organizationās (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC ) (Savell et al. 2014). Moreover, restrictions on marketing are correlated with reductions in smoking prevalence across the globe (WHO 2008), underlining the crucial role that marketing plays in recruiting and retaining smokers, with deleterious effects on public health. In many settings, including much of Europe, bans on television , cinema , magazine and billboard advertising meant the cigarette pack itself became one of the last available conduits available to tobacco producers to market their products. Consequently, the removal of colour branding and the introduction of standardised packaging (SP) for cigarettes, first in Australia and subsequently in several EU member states , posed a key strategic threat to industry actors, which they vehemently opposed. This book builds on previous studies of the battle for SP in Australia and elsewhere (Chapman and Freeman 2014; Jarman 2015) to examine how SP came onto the policy agenda in Europe, how its adoption was prevented by the industry at the EU level, and how individual member states subsequently succeeded in introducing it in the face of fierce industry opposition.
Transnational Tobacco Companies and Political Strategy
TTCs are formidable political actors. A now extensive literatureāwhich has drawn on internal company documents released into the public domain from the mid-1990sāhas documented the extent of their efforts to resist regulation and shape the policy environments in which they operate (Gilmore 2012; Hurt et al. 2009; Holden and Lee 2009; Smith et al. 2013; Savell et al. 2014). Strategies employed by the industry include extensive political lobbying and financial contributions to political candidates and parties; the funding of āscientificā research, and the formation of front groups to cast doubt on scientific evidence that identifies the harms associated with smoking and the effectiveness of policy interventions designed to reduce consumption (Bero 2005; Hurt et al. 2009; Savell et al. 2014; Smith et al. 2013; Brandt 2012). As information about the tactics of the industry entered the public consciousness and concerns about the conflicts of interest involved in TTCsā engagement with health policy-makers began to solidify, TTCs began to be marginalised from the policy process in many contexts. This culminated with the inclusion of Article 5.3 in the FCTC, which commits signatories to take pro-active measures to guard against the influence of the tobacco industry over policy (WHO 2003). The normative force derived from such an explicit recognition of the issues surrounding the tobacco industry within a global treaty has meant direct and overt engagement with tobacco industry actors is politically controversial in many settings, although implementation of Article 5.3 remains piecemeal, and political access away from the public spotlight is still possible (Fooks et al. 2017; Hawkins and Holden 2018). Industry influence remains extensive, particularly in strategically important low and middle-income country (LMIC) settings, and TTC strategies have evolved to take account of these changed political realities.
As their ability to engage decision-makers has been curtailed in many settings, TTCs have developed both more covert and more confrontational strategies to achieve their political objectives. This has involved, for example, the use of cross-industry trade bodies to represent their interests within the context of broader policy negotiations such as international trade agreements (Hawkins et al. 2018). Where specific tobacco industry interests are at stake, such as during the revision to the EU Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) examined below, or with the introduction of SP in Australia, industry actors have begun to use legal challenges in an attempt to prevent, or at least amend and/or delay, measures designed to reduce smoking and thus the consumption of their products (Hawkins and Holden 2016; Holden and Hawkins 2017). These challenges may be brought under international trade law via the World Trade Organization (WTO ), EU single-market law or, more recently, under the auspices of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). The latter often include investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms, which offer private companies the ability to take direct legal action against state governments which they claim have infringed their rights as investors (Hawkins and Holden 2016).
In parallel with the partial political marginalisation of the tobacco industry , the ability of TTCs to market their products has also been increasingly restricted (see Henriksen 2012), in line with best-practice guidelines set out in the FCTC (WHO 2013). Marketing restrictions have led TTCs to become increasingly reliant on pricing differentiation and market segmentation to attract and retain smokers (Gilmore et al. 2010). As with Article 5.3 compliance, the degree to which tobacco marketing is restricted varies greatly from region to region and country to country. Even in Europe, a region with one of the most advanced bodies of tobacco-cont...