Over the last 25 years, traditional perceptions of organised crime and the types of criminality associated with it have evolved. Drug and firearms trafficking, fraud, cybercrime, organised money laundering, modern slavery, and child sexual exploitation are examples of existing and new threats which have been made easier to commit by the use and exploitation of technologies , transport and communications infrastructure, geopolitical contexts, and existing legitimate business structures—‘the drivers of crime’—by organised criminals (Europol 2017a). As a result, this has changed the nature of and the way we view, understand, and respond to organised crime in the UK and across the globe. This book presents findings from a three-year study on organised crime groups (OCGs) involved in fraud in the UK. Whilst fraud is not a new crime, the scale and sophistication with which it is committed by organised criminals makes it ‘the characteristic crime of the twenty-first century’ (Albanese 2005) and therefore ripe for further examination.
Organised Crime and Fraud in the UK1
In this book, we define organised crime as serious crime planned, coordinated, and conducted by people working together on a continuing basis (definitional issues are considered in more detail in Chap. 2). It is estimated that organised crime costs the UK £20–£40 billion annually (Home Office 2009, 2011). Mills et al. (2013) have reported that the total social and economic cost of organised crime in the UK is around £24 billion a year, of which £8.9 billion is attributed to organised fraud. The 2008 financial crisis and ensuing domestic ‘economic downturn’ along with the proliferation of new technologies and widespread use of the internet provided OCGs with the fertile ground, ease, methods, and tools to flourish (Home Office 2009, 2013). As a result there has been a surge in economic criminality in the UK (ONS 2016), in particular criminality facilitated by the internet. Cyber-enabled fraud2 often involves criminal networks operating from overseas and across jurisdictions (National Crime Agency 2015, 2016a). Described as a ‘conduit for criminal activity’ (Wall 2015), the internet and advances in technology have created new, faster, and easier methods for offenders to commit fraud on an industrial scale (ONS 2016; Cifas 2016). Further, with the re-emergence of what has been termed ‘super cases’ where the alleged value of the fraud case is £50 million or more,3 it is unlikely that frauds of this scale and complexity are committed by individuals acting alone. Attracting the attention of OCGs , fraud has become ‘one of the most lucrative criminal activities for criminal organisations in Europe’ (Savona and Riccardi 2015: 37). In 2013, around 1400 OCGs were involved in economic crime in the UK, many of which were also engaged in other serious and organised crimes (Home Office 2013).
High rewards and the low risk of detection and prosecution make fraud particularly attractive to OCGs .4 The lowered risks stem from the complexity of fraud investigations, which are further compounded if fraud is committed via the internet and/or require international, cross-border police cooperation.5 Fraud is typically viewed ‘either as the primary activity of an OCG or as an enabler/funding stream for other serious crimes’ (National Fraud Authority 2013a, b: 10). The link between organised crime and fraud on a local scale shows a similar picture. One study examining the impact of fraud on local communities in two police force areas in England found that around 31–45% of frauds committed locally were linked to OCGs (Garner et al. 2016).
Successive governments have consequently faced increasing pressure to tackle the threat of organised economic criminality by expanding the capabilities of law enforcement agencies (LEAs) alongside introducing new and strengthening existing legislation . Modelled on the counterterrorism framework, the launch of the Serious and Organised Crime Strategy in 2013 under the Coalition (Conservative-Liberal Democrat) government of 2010–15 outlined that UK police forces, directed by Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs), should work with cross-governmental partners and the public and private sectors to deliver the four strategic objectives of Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare—all of which are aimed at reducing the threat posed by serious and organised crime (Home Office 2013).
Historically, fraud has not been viewed as a policing or government priority (Doig et al. 2001; HM Government 2006). Over the last decade, however, there has been a range of legislative and policy reforms in the UK. Understanding and combating fraud is now firmly on government policy agendas, as is evident from the Fraud Act 2006,6 the recent inclusion of ‘fraud’ in the Crime Survey for England and Wales in October 2015 (ONS 2016), amendments to The Proceeds of Crime Act (2002) in 2015 which seek to undermine the financial incentives of crime,7 and more recently the Criminal Finances Act 2017,8 in addition to the establishment of the Joint Fraud Taskforce.9 However, OCGs have proved themselves to be relatively resilient to enforcement efforts. The most recent estimates suggest that there are approximately 5500 OCGs active in the UK, made up of 37,000 individuals (Mills et al. 2013).
Why Focus on Organised Crime and Fraud?
Whilst there is a wealth of knowledge about organised crime and its traditional links with, for example, drugs and firearms , comparatively less is known about organised crime and its links with fraud. Despite fraud being characterised as ‘the crime of the century’, little is known about OCGs who graduate or shift into fraud, their experiences of committing fraud, and the policing response. In addressing this gap, this book provides a timely contribution to research in this field.
Aims of the Research
As discussed above, there is limited res...
