Introduction
State-building in the Middle East has been a popular topic in political science literature since 9/11. The interest of Western powers in the region has increased in parallel with security concerns under the name of “spreading democracy.” Thus, the concept of state-building has acquired political, economic, and social dimensions, all of which are required to explain the state-building patterns in the Middle East . This chapter will examine some of the key theories of state-building and how certain theories have been applied to the Middle East and Iraq . I will then consider how these thematic areas relate to the core focus of the analysis: the state-building efforts in Iraqi Kurdistan .
I will concentrate on sociopolitical factors and, in particular, the role of the Turkoman people in this process. The northern part of Iraq , which is known as Iraqi Kurdistan , is a region rich in ethno-religious diversity. However, the role of the Kurds in state-building , for example, has been well researched. The Turkomans are the third-largest ethnic group in Iraq , yet we know relatively little about their role in constructing a successful Iraqi Kurdistan . This chapter aims to take a closer look at this group as their participation is vital in a number of different areas. As the Turkomans are politically very active, we are interested in their attitudes and role in Kurdish state-building . This chapter will examine demographic and related political questions, religious, cultural and ethnic matters, the role of language, and the vital connection to Turkey . The central argument presented here is that, while there are a number of complex problems for Turkoman integration (in addition to current issues related to ISIS, economic recession, and the refugee crisis), in many of these areas, there are also several reasons for optimism within a KRG that has often shown both tolerance and respect for the Turkoman population.
State-Building in the Context of Middle East
In general, the process of building a state has three dimensions: political, economic, and social. Although the first condition of building a state is easy to analyze, measuring emotions is not reliable and not possible. Charles Tilly (1975), who is a well-known scholar of state-building theory, defines the concept of “state” as consisting of relatively centralized, differentiated organizations with officials that successfully claim control over the means of violence within a population in a large territory. This definition constitutes the political dimension of state-building . Chandler (2006) also argues that state-building refers to the process of constructing institutions of governance that can provide citizens with physical and economic security .
Carment et al. (2007) argue that, nowadays, state-building typically occurs as a response of the international community to a state failure due to the consequences of underdevelopment and violent conflict. Thus, state-building is perceived as a post-conflict, failed state approach. Hayami (2003) claims that the biggest challenges involved in the restoration of a failed state relate to economic development . The global community’s effort to contribute to state-building from an economic perspective is a neoliberal state-building approach. The neoliberal approach emphasizes the importance of free markets and private sector growth in a state for successful state-building . Blowfield (2005) argues that post-conflict economies are built around core neoliberal principles, such as the right to make profit, the universal good of free trade , freedom of capital, supremacy of private property, the superiority of markets in determining price and value, and privileging of companies as citizens and moral entities. Furthermore, he claims that this approach explains the nature of post-occupation state-building in Iraq . In his view, by taking just the example of Iraq into consideration, we can judge the applicability of the neoliberal state-building approach to the cases in the Middle East .
In fact, Francois and Sud (2006) claim that focusing solely on a neoliberal approach to economic growth has failed to produce a cogent explanation in post-conflict states. Clapham (2002) also argues that it is expensive to maintain a state economically and socially as it requires solid material sources in order to build and maintain legitimacy . Thus, fragile, newly built states, in particular, need substantial material resources in order to build political support as well. The political legitimacy and independence of a rebuilt state require a form of “social contract” responding to national political priorities (Doner et al. 2005).
Indeed, Wesley (2008) focuses on the era of decolonization and claims that building a state is not only done via the infrastructure and economy but also through the development of emotional attachment among different ethnic and racial groups, which is related to our argument for Kurdistan . Without the process of emotional attachment, Wesley (2008) contends that “positive sovereignty” cannot be reached. Thus state-building is a combination of economy , polity, and society. Tilly (1993) specifies four core activities of state-building in modern Europe : state-making by neutralizing domestic competitors in the territory claimed by the state; war-making by deterring the rivals in the territory of the state; protection of the ally of the ruler against the external and internal rivals in the territory; and extraction of resources from the population in support of the other three activities.
In relation to Wesley’s (2008) arguments, Safran’s (1992) ideas on language and state-building can also be considered as an emotional attachment to the state. Safran (1992) links the concepts of ethnicity and language to the process of state-building in his analysis of France, Israel, and the Soviet Union. Similarly, in their analysis of China, Zhou and Ross (2004) argue that the Chinese language and its dialects have been used to regulate power of the state in history. Laitin (2006) points out that in the case of Africa “state rationalization” has not been successful as small tribes have their own linguistic practices, which weaken “nationalization” and, accordingly, the state-building process. Safran (1992) argues that the importance of languages comes from the fact that they can be manipulated, elevated, and transformed in the interest of the state. 1
Another form of attachment to the state suggested by Wesley (2008) is territorial belonging. According to Richards (2014), attachment to a given territory is another aspect of identity for people. Thus, state-building requires internal legitimacy , one of which is territorial attachment. 2 Wright (1998) proposes that emotional attachment to a territory used to be a behavior characteristic of medieval states. This attachment was the main motivation for wars as well. 3 According to Goemans (2006), this emotional attachment is actually used by political elites to socialize the public in order to encourage them to defend the state in return for even their sacrifices. Penrose (2002), who associates attachment to territory to a sense of nationalism, also claims this practice to be part of the eighteenth-century understanding of state-building .
State-building in the Middle East has well-pronounced economic and political dimensions and the social dimension is becoming more important. Furthermore, a fourth dimension can be added to state-building in the Middle East : international impact. Cousens (2005) maintains that state-building has become an important item on the international agenda in recent years due to the following three main factors: first, states learned that building peace after civil wars is necessary for peace implementation; second, by the 1990s, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the emergence of fragile or failed states became a serious problem; third, 9/11 provoked the concern that weak states create fertile grounds for terrorism. Accordingly, state-building , particularly in the Middle East , has been given serious attention by the international community. In fact, Katzenstein et al. (2000) argue that international security has become autonomous and predominantly regional since decolonization. Anderson (1987) believes that state-building in the Middle East has always been a reaction to international pressure and not genuine domestic political and ...