Multicultural citizenship refers to a civic theory that emerged as a product of debates about rights to culture, particularly among minority groups. In broad terms, multicultural citizenship is a critique of traditional theories of citizenship that are not sensitive to the differentiated needs of citizens. Citizenship, when constructed merely as a framework that accords identical rights to citizens as individual members of a community, is not enough to ensure the inclusion of members within a political community, because while ā[c]itizenship is about status and rights, belonging is about being accepted and feeling welcome. Some individuals and groups might enjoy the same rights as the rest but feel they do not quite belong to the community, nor it to themā (Parekh 2006: 342). In a defence of multiculturalism, Dobbernack and Modood (2015: 170) argue that multicultural citizenship is based on āan understanding of citizenship as conversation and renegotiation: not just about who is to be recognised but about what recognition is and about the terms of citizenship itselfā. They aim to invoke a shift from negative to positive difference through a framework of multicultural citizenship, where groups are able to speak for themselves about their experiences of inferiorisation and oppression, and in so doing take control of their self-definition (Modood 2013: 36ā38).
As political theory, multiculturalism represents a move towards cultural sensitivity within the liberal canon. This ethos collapses when multicultural citizenship becomes taken for granted as a theoretical and policy response to cultural injustices. While racialised discrimination against non-citizens is not new, it is becoming increasingly visible, complex and problematic. In this book, I ask how multiculturalism as a theory can challenge the limitations of citizenship by expanding its compass to include non-citizens as multicultural subjects.
There are three objectives to this book. First, I argue there needs to be a refocus on āwho is to be recognisedā by including the misrecognition of non-citizens within the multiculturalist agenda. I discuss how multicultural citizenship in its various forms is problematic. While I agree that differentiated rights are needed, I question the apparent reliance on citizenship as a default condition of multicultural inclusion. Second, I disconnect the key tenets of multiculturalism from the condition of formal citizenship. I revisit normative arguments for respecting cultural diversity and difference, and the human need for recognition. Coupling these principles with that of non-domination, I propose how multiculturalism may be reworked through āmulticultural denizenshipā as a variant of multiculturalism that may be extended to non-citizens.
Lexicon
Before moving forward, the terms with which I discuss multiculturalism should be established. Multiculturalism refers to a substantive theory that I discuss in the following chapters. Theories of multiculturalism vary in their emphases on autonomy, culture, and if and how they justify group-specific rights.1 I use multiculturalist as an adjective, referring to scholars who fall into the relevant categories. I also use multiculturalist as a noun, to describe societies and policies that multiculturalists advocate. The only exception is when I use multicultural citizenship where I refer to frameworks of citizenship advocated by multiculturalists. For the purpose of clarity in writing, I refer to policies explicitly as a āmulticultural policyā, for instance, or by name, such as the Commission for Multi-Ethnic Britain (CMEB). I refer to ātheoretical argumentsā and āsituational argumentsā of multiculturalism with the same objective.
While making clear semantic differences in the terminology of multiculturalism, I take the epistemological position that theories inform and are informed by empirical cases, operating within a feedback loop. As theories, multiculturalism and multicultural citizenship are founded on principles, derived from interpretations of liberal tenets (Kymlicka 1995), recognition (Taylor 1995) and in some part, democracy (Parekh 2000). Complementing these normative positions, empirical cases provide the grounds for stimulating a rethinking of what they mean or entail in different contexts. The ways in which āpeople can be hurt and curedā vary, and āthese ways are not known a priori but are contextually discovered, sometimes through conflictā (Modood 2009: 75). The evaluation and redress of inequality cannot be identically applied across groups but only in a difference-sensitive way. It is for this reason that multiculturalism does not claim to be a āfull theoryā but instead āemerges out of the practice, imperfectly, [which] is clarified by some reflection and analysis and [the theory] is subsequently used to guide practice, including modifying some initial stepsā (Modood 2009: 75). This ethos is congruent with the objectives of this book, which seeks to build upon, modify and broaden the theoretical framework of multiculturalism by reflecting on the specific inequalities that are becoming more apparent in todayās world.
Having said this, there is a gap between theory as what should be, and the reality that exists at present. There is no society that is truly multiculturalist as prescribed by theory. In a (generally) theorised world of multiculturalism, culturally defined groups are constituted by and of individuals who self-identify with a specific cultural identity. Cultures and cultural practices are equally respected based on what they bring to their members in terms of beliefs, a sense of belonging and identity-formation (Parekh 2006: 167). As part of this respect, there is a dialogical relationship between groups and group members, where potential differences are thrashed out and challenged in a manner that does not inferiorise the other. The notion of intercultural dialogue is closely tied to an idealised vision of a democratic society, where voices are given equal opportunities to be heard within avenues that respect a plurality of interests (Benhabib 2002: 122). While providing an aspirational scenario, this multiculturalist society constructed by scholarship remains a theorised state of being.
To summarise, I use specific terms when referring to multiculturalism and multicultural citizenship as theories or policies. From an epistemological standpoint, I understand theory as informing and informed by empirical examples. While understood as intertwined in this sense, it should be clear that case studies are contextually differentiated, imperfect and bear only a resemblance to theorised ideals.
Performing Political Theory
My critique of multiculturalism as a theory draws from the understanding that how we learn from, employ and add to theories reproduces particular ways of seeing the world and ways of being. Already, āmulticulturalismā is a value-laden word when used within political rhetoric, usually with reference to immigration policy. It is partially for this reason that the term is often conflated with other notions as a reference to theory, public policy or rhetoric. Beyond semantic implications, the performance of multicultural citizenship as a political theory reproduces power relations through terms and categories that are often used uncritically. As a result of its reliance on citizenship, the canon of multiculturalism excludes the needs of non-citizens, privileges rights as a conduit of recognition and maintains claims-making as the default language for recognition.
Judith Butler (1997: 49) describes how the act of pronouncing a babyās sex at the point of birth is a performance of gender as fixed, imposed and historically embedded. Similarly, political theory is a performance, where it is concurrently an inscription of power and a conduit for re-inscription. Isin (2015: 3) explains that āpolitical theory is a speech act proper: it does not merely describe the world, it is also in it... saying something about that world brings it into beingā. Acknowledging political theory as constructed within a particular historical, political and social context highlights how canons of political theory are not givens. With this lens, I unpack how and why particular political theories and premises are seen as dominant, and at what cost, when it is understood that dominance is achieved at the suppression of possible alternatives.
Critical scholars illuminate how political theory performs the āWestā as centred and determines who can legitimately perform political theory. They uncover orientalist and orientalising performances of political theory, ch...