Lineage, Meaning and Significance
Communitarian ideas offer a distinct approach to dealing with the perennial challenges that arise from human interactions . Rather than characterising them as some third or fourth option alongside prevailing modes of thinking, we may understand their meaning and significance better by recognising them as the on-going adaptation and application of what is arguably the âfirst wayâ in ethicsâthe way of reciprocal cooperation.
The Golden Rule of treating others as one would have others treat one was not only implicit in the mutually supportive behavioural traits of early human communities (Bowles and Gintis 2011), it was also explicitly accepted as the core moral injunction in every ancient civilisation from Egypt and Persia to India and China (Kainz 1988, pp. 46â48; Neusner and Chilton 2008). A corollary of this ethos is that people are expected, not to refer exclusively to oneâs own inclinations or defer routinely to othersâ demands, but to explore with others on a mutually respectful basis how they should behave towards one another. However, as relatively simple community structures gave way to more complex forms of social organisation, the gap between the recommended norm and actual practices began to widen.
The divergence was accelerated when tribes and clans were increasingly merged into larger political entities. Some individuals were able to secure much more power than the rest in the name of organising for better production or protection. Amongst them would be those who, driven by selfish impulse or delusion of infallibility, declared that they were so âsuperiorâ that it was unobjectionable for them to treat others in ways they would never expect or allow others to treat them in return. And because of the greater power they had acquired or inherited (to deceive, bribe, intimidate, harm), they could impose asymmetric treatment on those around them. In time, supporters and critics of the powerful would argue about what rulers should or should not do, by invoking notions such as the proper character of leaders, hallowed traditions , universal duties , the will of God , the glory of oneâs nation , the size of the economy , the rights of individuals, or the sum of human happiness . These notions, whatever their merits might be under different interpretations, shifted the ensuing debates away from what was once the primary focus on cooperative human relations. Instead of looking to work out with others what would be appropriate under varied circumstances, people were directed to look at themselvesâtheir own power, rights , desires, religious faith , economic interests, inherited loyaltyâto establish what should be done.
But the ethos of reciprocity was not entirely forgotten. In this book, we will examine how thinkers with communitarian ideas continued through the ages to contribute to theories and practices relating to the development of cooperative community life. Together, they have reminded us of the value of interdependence , and provided us with evolving guidance on how we should live as mutually supportive members of overlapping communities.
Before we proceed with our detailed exposition, we should dispel a number of misconceptions of the term âcommunitarianâ, which has only entered our political lexicon relatively recently. A key distinction should be drawn at the outset between casual usage and serious attribution based on historical understanding. The former comprises generic, rhetorical, and pre-conceived deployment of the term. Some people use âcommunitarianâ in a generic way to describe just about anything connected with the notion of community. For example, a book about communities is cited as a communitarian publication, a talk about the activities going on in a local community is described as a communitarian speech. Such usage is broad and may be considered unobjectionable so long as no one takes it as a pointer to what constitutes communitarian ideas.
The rhetorical use is mostly found amongst commentators who associate the term âcommunitarianâ with their own personal vision of a good society, and are inclined to ascribe it to any public figure they wish to claim as backing that vision. Despite their contrasting approaches and policies, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barrack Obama have all been described in the US as âcommunitariansâ (Milbank 2001; Marshall 2012; Ferenstein 2013). In the UK, commentators in the media have applied the âcommunitarianâ label to politicians with vastly different agendas such as Labour leader, Tony Blair1; Conservative leader, Theresa May; and Green leader, Caroline Lucas (Gove 2017; Williams 2017).
As for preconceived usage, this happens when writers associate any invocation of âcommunityâ with certain socio-political features they have strong reservations about. Consequently, they express their opposition to âcommunitarianâ ideas because they assume such thinking must be, for example, naĂŻvely idealising a form of community life that never actually existed and never will (Phillips 1993); inherently incapable of challenging communal prejudices and oppression (Frazer 1999); or crudely seeking to bring all aspects of community under the control of some big government (Frohnen 1995).
By contrast, any serious attribution of âcommunitarianâ would fully take into account its affinity with what can be called the conceptual DNA to be found in the core formulations of âcommunitarian/communitarianismâ. There are broadly five sets of such formulations that are found in the history of the concept, which are distinct from any generic, rhetorical, or pre-conceived usage.
The first set of formulations appeared around the middle of the nineteenth century. They related to the ideas and practices of Robert Owen and people who wanted to apply these to the development of cooperative arrangements to facilitate better social and economic relations (Owen 1991). âCommunitarianâ emerged as a common term for describing Owenite efforts to set up new forms of enterprise, work communities, and associations of workers, and it became widely used by subsequent historians to refer to their development (Bestor 1950; Harrison 1969; Claeys 1989).
While a common aspiration was to realise the age-old potential for collaboration and solidarity , the strategies that were tried out pointed, not to a return to some idealised past, but to new rules and structures to deal with the prevailing reality. Not all the experimental models worked, but one notable success was the cooperative group that came to be known as the Rochdale Pioneers (Holyoake 2017). Formed in 1844, this group of worker-owners pooled their resources to buy goods needed by local people and sell them at a reasonable price with any profit to be shared amongst members of the group. Customers and workers alike could become members and everyone had an equal vote in determining how the group was run. This approach proved highly effective in terms of its social impact and economic sustainability, and most importantly, was generally replicable not just in the grocery business in England, but in all sectors across the world. The communitarian ethos of the Rochdale Pioneers became a key influence over the development of the cooperative movement, and led to the founding of the International Co-operative Alliance in 1895. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, around 1 billion people in 96 countries belonged to a cooperative .2
The second set of formulations of âcommunitarianâ came via the commentary on the writings of Alasdair MacIntyre (1981, 1988), Michael Sandel (1982), Michael Walzer (1983, 1987), and Charles Taylor (1985, 1989), all of whom had penned critiques with a common targetâthe ideas of John Rawls . Despite significant differences in their epistemological and political views, these four philosophers came to be considered as sharing a âcommunitarianâ stance in opposing a form of liberalism that is premised on what they deemed a deeply flawed conception of the self (Avineri and de-Shalit 1992; Mulhall and Swift 1992; Frazer and Lacey 1993; Bell 1993). The culprit in question is the notion of an atomised individual, with no ties to anyone else, no preferences based on practical concerns or prior obligations, supposedly capable of calculating in the abstract what should or should not be done from oneâs point of view. Furthermore, it is not the deliberative interactions between these individuals which are expected to play a role in determining the rules and principles that will govern their behaviour, but the assumption that these will be defined by the identical conclusions each individual will in isolation arrive at.
It could be argued that Rawls was only making a hypothetical case to indicate how people, unencumbered by âincidentalâ factors, would converge on a very similar set of moral guidelines. But the communitarian objections dismiss this as misconceived on two levels. First of all, a person conceptually stripped of all relational connections with others is not the ârealâ person with the utmost clarity of thought, but an isolated entity with no sense of belonging, obligations, or concerns, without which there can be no meaningful moral reflections. Secondly, even the narrowest ârational â calculation of what one would rather have in a hypothetical world could not be assumed to lead to the same conclusion for everyone, unless a universal disposition towards the same degree of risk-taking and desire-satisfaction is built into the assumption. Otherwise, while some people might routinely stick with l...