Europe has been faced with an unpredictable relationship with Russia since at least 2014. 2008 was the source of the current problem that happened when Russia reacted to the European and US plans of including Ukraine and Georgia in NATO and used military force to stop this, invading the provinces South-Ossietia and Abkhazia in Georgia and later recognising them as republics. The Western reaction then was one of discomfort, disbelief, and of mostly turning a blind eye. 1
In 2014 Russia responded to the political unrest and subsequent change of government in Ukraine in similar manner. This time, Russia occupied and annexed the Crimean Peninsula and assisted rebel groups with weapons support in Eastern Ukraine. As of today, Russia seems to have created a “frozen” conflict which is likely to persist for a long time. The backdrop to the Ukrainian crisis was similar to the Georgian case: a promise of closer ties between a liberal Europe and a former Soviet successor state that strove to find its own identity—in the “contested zone” between Russia in the East and EU and NATO in the West. 2 The Western reaction this time was one of strong rhetorical outrage, rather mild economic sanctions, and belated military deterrence in NATO member states close to Russia’s territorial borders.
The present situation is one of stale-mate: European states seem to prefer to avoid taking charge of the situation while the US de facto leads in the deterrent aspects. The EU sanctions continue but are contested, and as of February 2016 Europeans leaders spoke about lifting the sanctions: The French president ‘expected them to be lifted soon, the leader of Bavaria and the CSU party, Horst Seehofer, made a controversial trip to visit president Putin in early February, telling the press that he wanted the sanctions lifted and then closing trade deals between Russia and Bavaria. Finally, the Italian, Finnish and most East-European state leaders were all along very reluctant to impose sanctions.
There is a tense and adversarial relationship between Russia and the West, marked by enmity and unpredictability. NATO and USA are named as explicit “threats” in the 2016 Russian security strategy, and there is little political contact between the West and Russia. A verbal escalation took place early in 2016 when the US announced further military deployment in Eastern Europe. Defence Secretary Ashton Carter made it clear that much more spending on deterrence in Europe is necessary, a commentator wrote that “one now worries more about Russian actions than at any time since the collapse of the Soviet Union”. 3 Russia replied that it would take commensurate action, i.e. by reinforcing their military defence with four new Army Divisions along the Central and Western military districts. 4
The timing of this book is therefore—unfortunately—a very good one. There is a dire need for more knowledge of Russian thinking about politics and the use of force. But as importantly, there is also a need to understand how the West pursues its own political objectives, particularly within the institutional frameworks of the EU and NATO. This book explores and analyses the differences in political culture between Russia and the West. We concentrate on the Russian-European relationship in particular: how does Europe’s post-modern politics fare in confrontation with Russia? How do Russian political norms of using force, international legal interpretations, ethical, and even religious ideas, contrast with those in the EU and NATO? As the security dilemma seems to increase on both sides of the East-West divide, there is obviously plenty of room for misunderstanding. But is there also more room for mutual understanding?
In the EU and NATO we are mostly familiar with our liberal view of the world, based on economic and social integration, the postmodern politics of liberal democracy, and a “perpetual peace”. Although Realpolitik can be said to be “born and raised” in Europe, the vision of a “Europe whole and free” with the EU at its core today represents the very antithesis of Realpolitik. Russia seems to move according to classical Realpolitik, like most great powers in international politics. How can EU and NATO interact strategically with such states? Do post-modern Europeans understand the parameters of Realpolitik? The paradox is that whereas NATO and the EU enlarged in order to make “Europe whole and free”, in accordance with the logic that those who embraced Western values could join, Russia interpreted this differently. Even if the Europeans may be empirically right—that there was and is no “grand strategy” behind EU and NATO enlargements, it is nevertheless unwise and even dangerous if they do not properly understand Russia’s objections and security concerns. This book seeks to unearth how central norms of international politics are understood and interpreted in Europe and Russia respectively.
The book’s purpose is not to develop policy recommendations for how Europe should respond to a more assertive Russia, however. Instead it aims to provide more knowledge on how European responses vis-à-vis Russia can be explained, how they are generated, what they communicate in a political and strategic sense, and whether Russia and Europe are able to interact or merely “bypass” each other. Alexander L. George reminds us that successful crisis management is never a zero-sum game. Crises are best resolved through a careful balance between “carrots” and “sticks”—self-imposed restraints are neatly balanced with credibly imposed deterrence. 5 It is a context where the opposition’s preferences must be clearly understood in order to avoid miscalculation, unnecessary escalation, or in the worst case, war. Comprehending the security environment from both a Russian and a Western perspective respectively is therefore vital, especially at times where one-dimensional Western perspectives seem to prevail in the mass media. To this end it is important to comprehend how Russia and Europe interpret the rules of international politics and practise them, especially with regard to the most important norm—the use of force.
Assertive East, Reactive West?
The conclusions in many chapters relate to the fact that Russia, despite its many structural deficiencies, stands forth as a more effective and unitary actor than EU and NATO. The Western security community, despite its economic preponderance compared to Russia, dithers along in less coherent manner. Being reactive rather than strategic, Europe’s response to Russia seems to be carried out by a security architecture that is fragmented, and now also strained by economic decline and uncontrollable waves of migration unprecedented in Europe’s modern history. On the civilian side, the EU seems to wither from within due to a gradual re-nationalisation of member states’ politics as a response to the Euro-crisis and mass-migration. 6 Britain’s Brexit adds another complication. On the military side, NATO member states strive to sustain their military credibility within a chain of command that lacks the necessary “unity of purpose” and “unity of command”. 7
In this anthology, four conclusions in particular stand out:
First, with regard to Europe’s ability to shape its own security environment: post-modern Europe is not up to the Russian challenge in the post-Ukraine era. Pursuing visions of “safety” rather than “security” has improved the quality of life for millions of citizens throughout the continent, particularly in Eastern Europe. But it has also made it easier for Russia to bend international rules, most notably in its “near abroad”. As pointed out by Christopher Coker, the EU in particular is not institutionally ready to run its own foreign policy, much less to act strategically towards Russia when state borders are changed. Europe’s “soft power instruments”, i.e. the value of liberal democracy, human rights, and rule by law, have been instrumental in increasing social welfare on the continent during the 1990s. The return of geo-politics and “spheres of influence” is as such inconsistent with the optimistic post-Cold War’s visions of “a new world order” and a “Europe whole and free”, where a UN-based rule by law was a hub in Europe’s strategic thinking. As argued by Janne Haaland Matlary, military force has returned as a natural instrument in a states’ tool box. This is not only true in Europe, but in the entire international system. NATO’s old worries from the 1950s—the fear of limited wars and a possible US abandonment—are again relevant. Yet, she underlines that few politicians in Europe are able to act strategically.
Second, with regard to strategic interaction between Europe’s military great powers, Russia’s lack of ideological appeal in Western Europe leads to serious shortcomings. This is particularly evident in the way Russia is marginalised on the international arena. Russia therefore choses to emphasise its conventional and nuclear forces to compensate for the influence that e.g. Britain and France can take for granted. Russia’s emphasis on military force exploits Russia’s comparative advantage vis-à-vis a EU that regards such force as an ‘uncivilised’ and old fashioned instrument of international politics. This has, however left European powers more exposed to pressure, both from a nuclear and conventional perspective. As pointed out by Julian Lindley-French, it is hard to believe that a British political leader would speak about the use of nuclear weapons if faced with an essentially limited war on NATO’s eastern flank. In France, the point is not to deter Russia, but to retain France’s position in Europe, sustain close ties with Germany, and be a major player in the EU. European powers may be economically resilient, but in military terms many of them have become “pygmies” that strive to sustain credibility as power politics has returned. The consequence may be a severe shortage in strategic action when vital interests are put at stake.
Third, with regard to the practical use of force, the dark side of globalisation (i.e. the hostile use of modern information and communication technology) has challenged the interface between war and peace. As a consequence, the uncertainty and unpredictability stemming from so-called “hybrid warfare” have become more pronounced on European theatres. This is particularly so among the NATO member states situated along Russia’s territorial rim; nations with growing nationalistic sentiment and often with a Russian diaspora inside their borders. These states still suffer from what may be a severe lack of credible reinforcement arrangements from NATO. To most NATO-members in Eastern-Europe, George Kennan’s message from “The Long Telegram” in 1946 is therefore more relevant than ever:
We have been handicapped … by a popular attachment to the concept of a basic difference between peace and war, by a tendency to view war as a sort of sporting context outside of all political context, by a national tendency to seek a political cure-all, and by a reluctance to recognize the realities of international relations–the perpetual rhythm of struggle, in and out of war. 8
The art of avoiding ambiguous interfaces between war and peace or between combatants and non-combatants is consequently a high priority for any state that fears Russia’s re-armament. Kennan’s “perpetu...